UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SASHA PIPPENGER, et al.,

Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 25-cv-1090 (BAH) v. Judge Beryl A. Howell U.S. DOGE SERVICE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING TEMPORARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Seven plaintiffs, who include former employees, program partners, a current personal

services contractor, and a donor of the U.S. Institute of Peace (“USIP”), sued the U.S. DOGE

Service (“DOGE”), several DOGE (or DOGE-affiliated) officials (including the current

President of USIP, Nate Cavanaugh), the existing ex officio members of USIP’s Board of

Directors, President Trump, White House staffer Trent Morse, the Office of Personnel

Management, the General Services Administration (“GSA”), the Department of State, as well as

USIP itself (collectively, “defendants”). Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6-30, ECF No. 9. Their claims arise out

of the same set of alleged facts at issue in U.S. Institute of Peace v. Jackson, No. 25-cv-804,

namely, President Trump’s termination of USIP’s appointed Board members, the replacement of

USIP’s president by three remaining ex officio members, the subsequent transfer of USIP’s

headquarters and other assets to GSA, the termination of the majority of USIP’s employees, and

broad termination of its contracts and programming. See generally Am. Compl.; Am. Compl.,

USIP v. Jackson, 25-cv-804, ECF No. 12. As in the prior related case, plaintiffs here allege that

USIP “is an independent non-profit organization” not subject to executive branch control. Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 1, 32, 136 (describing USIP as an “independent nonprofit corporation”); Am. Compl.

1 ¶¶ 1, 6, 30, 75, 77, USIP v. Jackson, 25-cv-804. Plaintiffs assert, in five claims, that defendants

acted ultra vires and in violation of the USIP Act’s statutory removal protections when removing

USIP’s former Board members, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 135-44, 156-72 (Counts 1, 3), that they violated

the APA by acting arbitrarily and capriciously when seizing control of USIP assets, id. ¶¶ 145-

55, (Count 2), that they violated the APA by attempting to cease USIP’s activities and effectively

shut it down, id. ¶¶ 156-72 (Count 3), that they acted ultra vires and violated the USIP Act and

other statutory mandates in doing the same, id. ¶¶ 173-76 (Count 4), and that they violated

separation of powers by engaging in all of these acts, id. ¶¶ 177-183 (Count 5).

Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) on April 14, 2025, seeking an

injunction directing a host of actions by defendants, including: (1) prohibiting (a) USIP, its

Endowment, its Board, and its officers from transferring any assets out of USIP or the

Endowment; (b) USIP, its Board, and its officers from terminating any further employees,

personal service contractors, or contracts; (c) defendants from publishing or disclosing the

identity of any current or former employees, grantees, program partners, or personal service

contractors; (2) restoring all terminated USIP employees and personal service contractors to their

roles in a paid leave status so they can retain their benefits during litigation; and (3) transferring

ownership of USIP’s headquarters—which were previously transferred by defendant Cavanaugh,

as president of USIP, to GSA—back to USIP. Pls.’ Mot. for TRO (“Pls.’ Mot.”) at 14, ECF No.

11; Pls.’ Proposed Order, ECF No. 11-18. Plaintiffs also requested that the TRO include

declarations that the former Board members were terminated unlawfully and that all subsequent

actions after removal of those Board members were ultra vires, violated the APA, and violated

separation of powers. See Pls.’ Proposed Order. Defendants opposed. See Defs.’ Opp’n, ECF

No. 18.

2 After providing an opportunity for defendants to submit briefing explaining their

opposition to plaintiffs’ claims, see Minute Order (Apr. 14, 2025), this Court held a hearing on

the motion for a TRO on April 16, 2025. In response to the Court’s queries about the scope of

the requested relief, plaintiffs requested an opportunity to supplement their papers in support of a

more limited TRO, and after the hearing, plaintiffs timely filed a new proposed order, narrowing

their request for relief. See Pls.’ Notice Following Hr’g, Amended Proposed Order, Ex. A, ECF

No. 21-1. Specifically, plaintiffs no longer request the inclusion in the TRO of any declarations,

nor an injunction barring the publication or disclosure of identities of people affiliated with USIP

and termination of any USIP employees or contracts (apart from personal service contractors,

whose termination plaintiffs still wish to be enjoined), nor an injunction requiring the transfer of

USIP headquarters back to USIP. They narrowed their request regarding future property

transfers to an order prohibiting transfers of USIP assets to GSA or the Department of the

Treasury. Defendants timely filed their response to plaintiffs’ supplemental submission earlier

today. See Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Notice Following the Hearing on the TRO, ECF No. 22.

Upon consideration of the current record, the parties’ initial and supplemental

submissions and arguments presented at the TRO motion hearing, plaintiffs’ motion is denied for

the reasons explained below.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

For a TRO to be granted, a plaintiff must demonstrate the following: (1) the plaintiff is

likely to succeed on the merits of its claims; (2) the plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm

without the TRO; (3) the balance of the equities favors issuance of the TRO; and (4) the issuance

of a TRO is in the public interest. Ramirez v. Collier,

(2022) (quoting Winter

v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,

(2008)). When the government is the opposing party,

3 the final two factors, the balance of the equities and the public interest, merge into one. Karem v.

Trump,

(D.C. Cir. 2020).

The likelihood of success on the merits factor is the most important, and absent such a

showing, relief should be denied. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. U.S

Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (“When a plaintiff has not

shown a likelihood of success on the merits, there is no need to consider the remaining factors.”);

Hanson v. District of Columbia,

, 242-43 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (“[W]e hold [appellant]

is not sufficiently likely to succeed on the merits of his claim to warrant the entry of

a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the [law].”).

To show a likelihood of success on the merits, and for the Court to have jurisdiction over

plaintiffs’ motion, plaintiff must also demonstrate that plaintiff has standing. “In the context of”

temporary injunctive relief, the plaintiff must “show a substantial likelihood of standing under

the heightened standard for evaluating a motion for summary judgment,” thus requiring more

than mere allegations. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Presidential Advisory Comm’n on Election

Integrity,

(D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack,

(D.C. Cir. 2015)) (describing the standard for a preliminary injunction).

Standing requires “(1) . . . a ‘concrete and particularized’ injury (2) that is ‘fairly traceable to the

challenged action of the defendant’ and (3) that is ‘likely’ to be ‘redressed by a favorable

decision.’”

at 376-77 (quoting West v. Lynch,

(D.C. Cir. 2017)).

II. DISCUSSION

At the outset, the purpose of a TRO is not to decide which party will prevail or lose the

case. That assessment comes later when the factual record and legal arguments of the parties are

fully developed and the Court has time for thorough consideration. The purpose of a TRO is to

4 preserve the status quo while the merits of the case are considered. See Nat’l Council of

Nonprofits v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, --F. Supp. 3d --, No. 25-cv-239 (LLA),

,

at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 2025) (citing MGU v. Nielsen,

(D.D.C. 2018))

(involving a TRO); Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England,

(D.C.

Cir. 2006) (involving a preliminary injunction). Still, restraining parties in ongoing litigation,

even temporarily, from going about their business requires that the party seeking the TRO meet

the significant thresholds for obtaining such “extraordinary” relief. Winter,

.

The events at USIP over the past two months—involving sudden change of leadership,

mass terminations of employees conducted in alphabetical order with no forewarning, the

transfer of USIP’s headquarters and other property, and termination of contracts and

programming—undoubtedly wreaked havoc on the lives of people affiliated with USIP in

numerous capacities. For plaintiffs’ TRO to be granted, however, plaintiffs must demonstrate

they are likely to succeed on a specific legal claim, and that claim must involve conduct by the

defendant that caused or will cause a cognizable injury experienced by plaintiffs that can be

redressed by this Court through the relief requested. The mismatch here between the harms

experienced by plaintiffs, the allegedly unlawful acts challenged, and the requested forms of

relief—even in the more limited amended order proposed by plaintiffs—forecloses such a

favorable conclusion in this preliminary posture.

First, plaintiffs argue that President Trump illegally removed USIP’s appointed Board

members. Pls.’ Mot. at 14; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 135-44 (Count One). That claim has been twice

brought before this Court in an emergency posture and the relief denied, given the complexity

and novelty of that claim. See USIP v. Jackson, No. 25-cv-804, Min. Orders (Mar. 19, 2025, and

Apr. 1, 2025). Both sides present strong arguments supporting their divergent views of the

5 nature of USIP. This is no trivial legal dispute, given the number of other entities with similar or

analogous structures and claims of independence from executive branch control, at least for

certain purposes. See, e.g., Pls.’ Mot. at 18 (referencing Dong v. Smithsonian Institute,

(D.C. Cir. 1997), which held that the Smithsonian Institute is not an establishment of the

executive branch for one purpose); Defs.’ Opp’n at 13 (citing Lebron v. National Railroad

Passenger Corp.,

(1995), which held that Amtrak is part of the federal government

for purposes of a First Amendment claim).

For its part, defendants argue that USIP “is plainly an Executive Branch agency.” Defs.’

Opp’n at 9. To support this argument, defendants point out that USIP was “established” in a

federal statute by Congress, with its authority vested in a Board of Directors appointed by the

President (including three ex officio members, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense,

and the president of the National Defense University). Defs.’ Opp’n at 3, 10-11 (citing

(a), 4605(a)-(b)). USIP is funded largely by Congress,

(a),

4604(h), and like other federal agencies, USIP is required to publish certain notices in the

Federal Register,

§ 4605(h)(3), is subject to Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), id.

§ 4607(i), and its employees subject to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), id. § 4606(f)(1),

and statutory provisions for federal government benefits, including, e.g., workers compensation,

civil service retirement, federal life insurance, and federal health insurance, id. Defs.’ Opp’n at

3-4, 10-11. Further, defendants emphasize that the Office of Management and Budget has long

designated USIP as a federal entity, pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, Defs.’ Opp’n

at 11-12 (citing

(h)), and that other federally created entities with

nongovernmental features, like Amtrak, have been found to be part of the government for

constitutional purposes,

at 13 (citing Lebron,

). USIP also conducts,

6 defendants insist, core executive branch foreign policy activities—exercising “soft power to

enhance its diplomacy and foreign relations and attempt to obviate the need for military

action.” Id. at 15. By defendants’ reasoning, USIP’s Board, which is presidentially appointed, is

therefore subject to the President’s Article II removal authority, and because USIP exercises such

core executive power, as opposed to quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial authority, the narrow

exception to the President’s constitutional authority to remove his subordinates presented by

Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,

(1935) and Wiener v. United States,

(1958), does not apply. Defs.’ Opp’n at 19-21. Thus, defendants conclude, the USIP

Act’s limitations on the President’s unilateral power to remove USIP’s Board members are

invalid and void, and that the removal of USIP Board members was lawful.

In contrast, plaintiffs argue that USIP is an entirely independent nonprofit corporation

not subject to Article II. See Pls.’ Mot. at 15-22. Congress established USIP as an “independent

nonprofit corporation,” characterized it as a charitable organization under the tax code, and

provided that its officers and employees are not federal officers or employees except for limited

purposes, so USIP is not a government entity, according to plaintiffs. Pls.’ Mot. at 17 (citing

(b), 4604(a), 4606(f)(1)). Plaintiffs acknowledged the complexity of this issue at

the hearing, briefly offering a theory of entities on a “continuum” from “wholly independent

entities” to “something like the Red Cross or Girl Scouts” to the “Department of State,” and put

USIP in the middle category, but plaintiffs did not offer that argument in their papers or expound

on that theory at the hearing, by, for example, explaining the statutory difference “between a

charter versus an establishment of an entity,” instead proposing to wait until summary judgment

briefing. Rough Draft Hr’g Tr. at 93:1-94:5. Plaintiffs also reason that USIP is not part of the

executive branch, in particular, and discount the fact that USIP is explicitly made subject to

7 FOIA and the FTCA by contending this is necessary only because the entity is not automatically

subject to these laws as an executive agency.

Plaintiffs also differentiate USIP’s function

from executive powers, noting that USIP does not enforce laws, issue rules, or implement any

statute, and does not represent the U.S. government when interacting with foreign groups. Id. at

17-18.

Even if USIP were an executive branch agency, however, plaintiffs urge that, under

Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener, for-cause removal protections on USIP’s multimember,

partisan-balanced Board are constitutionally permissible, especially in light of USIP’s de minimis

exercise of executive power. Id. at 19-22. The President therefore violated the law when

removing USIP’s Board members without cause, and, as a result, plaintiffs contend, all of the

subsequent actions conducted by USIP’s new leadership are ultra vires and void. See Pls.’ Mot.

at 16, 22, 36 (“Improper removal of the board members, and all harm to Plaintiffs that flowed

from those illegal actions, were ultra vires in violation of the USIP Act.”).

Given that briefing on the issue is ongoing in the USIP v. Jackson litigation, where Board

members themselves are plaintiffs, this Court will not opine further in an emergency posture

with incomplete briefing on that claim here. For the purposes of this emergency application, the

Court assumes that defendant Cavanaugh, who was appointed by two of the three ex officio

Board members remaining, Defs.’ Opp’n, Ex. 3, ECF No. 18-3, is lawfully USIP’s president.

Second, regarding plaintiffs’ claim that the transfer of USIP’s property to GSA violates

the APA, plaintiffs lack standing. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 145-55 (Count Two); Pls.’ Mot. at 25-26.

Plaintiffs have not shown any specific injury caused by transfer of property that can be redressed

by this Court. See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr.,

. Plaintiffs who are former

employees (or soon-to-be former employees abroad) or former program partners explain that

8 they suffer injuries involving the complexities of finding healthcare and other uncertainties

regarding financial and physical security due to sudden loss of their jobs or contracts. See Pls.’

Mot., Declarations, Exs. F-J, N-O. Those circumstances will not be alleviated if USIP recoups

its headquarters building, retains its remaining property—the only property-related relief the

Amended Proposed Order seeks—nor will they be worsened if USIP transfers away other

assets. 1

While the donor plaintiff likely suffered harm from USIP’s disposal of its headquarters

resulting in improper use of his dedicated donations, giving rise to a claim in contract or tort, that

financial harm is not irreparable so as to warrant preliminary injunctive relief on this claim. See

Decl. of Chester Crocker, Donor ¶¶ 4-5, Ex. L, ECF No. 11-13. 2 In any case, the only relief

requested—preventing further transfer of assets away from USIP—would not redress the donor’s

harm. Rather, for the donor’s interests to be effectuated—i.e., the specific purpose for his

donations carried out—other actors (USIP’s leadership) must make decisions, for instance about

the use and name of a particular conference room, that this Court cannot micromanage. See

Hectate Energy LLC v. FERC,

(D.C. Cir. 2025) (holding that redressability

cannot be established when it depends on future choices by third parties “whose exercise of

broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume to either control or to predict”).

Third, plaintiffs argue that defendants have taken specific actions that are arbitrary and

capricious, unlawful, and contrary to constitutional right in an effort to shutter the agency and

cease all of its activities, in violation of the APA. See Pls.’ Mot. at 26-34; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 156-

1 Plaintiffs’ counsel raised the concern about plaintiffs’ access to COBRA if USIP is shuttered entirely. See Rough Draft Hr’g Tr. at 20:14-21:12. Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate, however, that dissolution of the Institute would result from any further transfer of assets to GSA or the Treasury. That harm—related to ongoing access to health benefits—therefore would not be directly redressed by the relief sought. 2 The same is true for the harm suffered by a contractor who left professional video equipment in the USIP headquarters. See Pls.’ Mot., Decl. of Intermotion Media, LLC ¶ 13, Ex. N, ECF No. 11-15.

9 72 (Count Three). Reviewing each of plaintiffs’ challenged actions, none constitutes a violation

on this record. See Am. Compl. ¶ 163. Regarding the termination of staff and their benefits,

plaintiffs argue that around 300 of USIP’s 400 employees were terminated in a single day and

defendants announced termination of the rest in May, which amounts to an effective shutdown of

the Institute in violation of acts of Congress establishing USIP and requiring certain programs.

See Pls.’ Mot. at 29-30; Rough Draft Hr’g Tr. at 60:18-21;

(a) (establishing the

Institute); Gandhi-King Scholarly Exchange Act Initiative,

Stat. 3114

(2020). Defendants, to the contrary, insist that USIP “while reduced, continues to perform

functions required by statute.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 31. A factual dispute exists as to whether USIP

can do so in its current situation. While plaintiffs raise legitimate doubts that USIP’s current

leadership, at USIP’s current gutted staffing levels, has the expertise, resources, and partnerships

necessary to effectuate USIP’s statutory mission, no clear violation of its congressional

mandates, is so far apparent. Defendants could be hiring new staff or taking other efforts to meet

their obligations. 3 Nor have plaintiffs demonstrated that the mass terminations were arbitrary

and capricious, given current leadership’s stated goals of reducing USIP to its core functions and

promoting efficiency. See Pls.’ Mot., Letter from Cavanaugh, Ex. C, ECF No. 11-5; Executive

Order 14217 (“EO 14217”) § 1,

, 10577 (Feb. 19, 2025).

With respect to defendants’ abrupt cancellation of USIP contracts, see Pls.’ Mot. at 28-

29, a recent per curiam opinion by the Supreme Court may deprive this Court of the authority to

consider claims sounding in contract or to enjoin further termination of contracts, even if they are

styled as APA claims. In Department of Education v. California,

(2025), the

3 At summary judgment, defendants will have to demonstrate they are in fact successfully doing so and not reducing USIP to a shell in name-only.

10 Supreme Court construed as an appealable preliminary injunction a district court order that

enjoined the government from terminating various education-related grants after a finding of

plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on their APA claims. See id. at 968. Despite acknowledging

that “a district court’s jurisdiction ‘is not barred by the possibility’ that an order setting aside an

agency’s action may result in the disbursement of funds,” id. at 968 (quoting Bowen v.

Massachusetts,

(1988)), the Supreme Court nonetheless concluded that the

district court “lacked jurisdiction to order the payment of money under the APA” because “the

Tucker Act grants the Court of federal Claims jurisdiction over suits based on ‘any express or

implied contract with the United States,’”

(quoting

(a)(1)). This holding

appears in tension with the D.C. Circuit’s approach in Crowley Government Services, Inc. v.

GSA,

(D.C. Cir. 2022), but in this preliminary posture with incomplete

briefing presented in short form after the TRO hearing when raised by the Court, plaintiffs have

not sufficiently distinguished the Supreme Court’s new holding to warrant a finding of likelihood

on the merits. See Pls.’ Notice Following Hr’g at 2. 4

In any case, the only relief related to contracts that plaintiffs seek is an order ceasing

further termination of personal services contractors—individuals who are effectively employed

by the Institute on a contractual basis. See Amended Proposed Order. Plaintiffs have not, at this

juncture, provided specific detail about the nature of these contracts and how such an order

would not effectively “enforce a contractual obligation to pay money.” Dep’t of Educ., 145

S.Ct. at 968.

4 Plaintiffs suggest that Department of Education v. California might be inapposite, given that USIP is an independent nonprofit without sovereign immunity,

(k), and thus the Tucker Act might not apply. See Pls.’ Notice Following Hr’g at 2 n.1. Defendants respond that “a waiver of sovereign immunity” is not the same as “the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction,” and “[f]or claims sounding in contract, jurisdiction generally lies exclusively in the United States Court of Federal Claims.” Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Notice at 2 n.1. Regardless, in this preliminary posture, this Court will not decide the nature of USIP, and plaintiffs have not provided sufficient explanation of the inapplicability of the Tucker Act to demonstrate likelihood of success on the merits.

11 Plaintiffs also challenge the apparent dissolution of the Gandhi-King Academy, through

the firing of USIP’s staff tasked with work on the Academy, as arbitrary and capricious and in

violation of the statute requiring its formation. Pls.’ Mot. at 34. Yet, plaintiffs do not have

standing to challenge this apparent act because they lack harm directly traceable to it, as opposed

to their individual termination or termination of specific contracts. See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr.,

; Pls.’ Mot., Decl. of Sasha Pippenger ¶¶ 3, 10-17, Ex. F, ECF No. 11-8

(describing her former role on a team that was one of four components of the Gandhi King

Global Academy and describing harm resulting from her termination and loss of employment

benefits rather than directly from dissolution of that program). Even so, plaintiffs have not

demonstrated on this record that the Academy has been forever eliminated in contradiction to the

statutory mandate and that defendants do not have alternative plans for meeting those statutory

requirements.

Plaintiffs also refer to defendants’ shutdown of the USIP website, rendering its electronic

resources inaccessible. Pls.’ Mot. at 28-29; Am. Compl. ¶ 163. Again, however, plaintiffs have

not demonstrated concrete or particularized harm from this action or requested any specific relief

that would remedy such harm. Finally, plaintiffs refer to defendants’ threats to wind down all

programs and grants, Am. Compl. ¶ 163, but a threat of that sort is not a final agency action ripe

for this Court’s review, nor does it constitute an ultra vires act in violation of a statute. See

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n,

(1990). All of these challenges to agency

actions, therefore, are either improperly before this Court based on the particular plaintiffs suing

and the relief requested, or not unlawful on the present record.

Fourth, plaintiffs allege that efforts to cease all of USIP’s corporate activities are ultra

vires, beyond defendants’ authority, and violative of the USIP Act and the Gandhi-King

12 Initiative Act. See Pls.’ Mot. at 35; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 173-76 (Count Four). For the reasons

previously described, plaintiffs have not described concrete, particularized harm from all of these

actions—apart from their individualized terminations which do not themselves violate the

statutes—that this Court can remedy. Moreover, even putting all of defendants’ actions together,

plaintiffs have not demonstrated that defendants have actually gone so far as to decimate USIP to

make achievement of its statutory mandates impossible.

Fifth, plaintiffs allege a violation of separation of powers and ultra vires action because

defendants have violated the Take Care Clause in not carrying out the mandates of USIP’s

statute. See Pls.’ Mot. at 36; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 177-83, U.S. CONST. art II, § 3. While plaintiffs

also argue that President Trump violated separation of powers in flouting Congress’s removal

protections when terminating USIP’s Board members, that issue is only one part of this claim,

given that whoever is leading USIP must carry out the USIP Act and any other congressional

statute guiding USIP’s purpose and activities. See Pls.’ Mot. at 36. To be sure, the executive

branch cannot unilaterally shut down USIP—that would violate the executive branch’s Take

Care obligation to establish the entity and implement its statutory functions. See

(a) (giving USIP the powers of a D.C. nonprofit corporation, except for the power to

dissolve itself); see also In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union,

(D.C.

Cir. 1999) (‘Needless to say, the President is without authority to set aside congressional

legislation by executive order.”). The record does not support a finding, let alone demonstrate,

however, that defendants have done that—at least yet. Defendant Cavanaugh espouses a

relatively broad view of how USIP is required to operate, see Letter from Cavanaugh at 2, Ex. C

(citing

(b)(1)-(10)). If USIP can accomplish all of those statutory goals, see

the challenged actions would not violate the separation of powers in the respect of unlawfully

13 shuttering the Institute. Whether USIP actually can do so remains to be seen and will be

scrutinized at summary judgment.

Given plaintiffs’ failure to demonstrate likelihood of success on the merits of any of their

claims, no temporary injunctive relief is warranted and the other factors need not be considered.

See Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr.,

.

III. ORDER

Plaintiffs’ motion for TRO, ECF No. 11 is DENIED; it is further

ORDERED that the parties jointly submit, by 3:00 PM on April 18, 2025, a briefing

schedule for expedited dispositive motions that adheres as closely as practicable to the briefing

schedule in USIP v. Jackson, No. 25-cv-804.

Date: April 17, 2025

__________________________ BERYL A. HOWELL United States District Judge

14