UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DR. GANIYU AYINLA JAIYEOLA, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 24-2354 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 8 : DEPUTY CLERK JEFF HOKANSON, : : Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

Proceeding pro se, Dr. Ganiyu Ayinla Jaiyeola (“Dr. Jaiyeola” or “Plaintiff”) files this

action against Deputy Clerk Jeff Hokanson of the District of Kansas (“Deputy Clerk Hokanson”

or “Defendant”). Plaintiff initially brought this action against three defendants—Deputy Clerk

Hokanson, Chief Judge Eric F. Melgren of the District of Kansas (“Judge Melgren”), and Clerk

Skyler B. O’Hara of the District of Kansas (“Clerk O’Hara”) (collectively, “Defendants”). After

Defendants moved to dismiss the initial Complaint, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint where

he drops the latter two defendants, leaving Deputy Clerk Hokanson as the sole defendant.

Plaintiff is alleging deprivation of due process and denial of his “constitutional right to due

process and equal protection and first amendment rights” as a result of Deputy Clerk Hokanson’s

thirty-day delay in filing Plaintiff’s Complaint against District Judge Holly L. Teeter (“Judge

Teeter”). Deputy Clerk Hokanson files a motion to dismiss, arguing lack of personal

jurisdiction, improper venue, judicial immunity, and failure to state a claim. For the foregoing

reasons, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case originally arose out of a failure-to-hire employment discrimination lawsuit in

the District of Kansas, where Plaintiff sued Garmin International, Inc. (“Garmin Lawsuit”) for

alleged violation of his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Amended

Complaint (“Am. Compl.”) at 2, ECF No. 7. The causes of action raised in that suit were racial

discrimination, age discrimination, disability association discrimination, and denial of due

process. See id. On June 24, 2021, the presiding judge in the Garmin Lawsuit, Judge Teeter,

dismissed Dr. Jaiyeola’s case with prejudice as a sanction for “vexatious” conduct. See Def.’s

Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot. Dismiss”) at 1, ECF No. 8; Jaiyeola v. Garmin Int’l, Inc., No. 20-

cv-2068,

, at *6 (D. Kan. June 24, 2021). The Tenth Circuit affirmed Judge

Teeter’s decision. See Def’s Mot. Dismiss at 1; Jaiyeola v. Garmin Int’l, Inc., No. 21-3114,

, at *6 (10th Cir. Apr. 26, 2022). In another action resolved by this Court,

Plaintiff sued Judge Teeter, alleging she received a “gift” of Garmin stock while presiding over

the case and thus should have recused herself. See Am. Compl., Ex. C; Jaiyeola v. Teeter, No.

24-1798 (RC) (D.D.C.). This Court ultimately granted Judge Teeter’s motion to dismiss based

on lack of personal jurisdiction. See generally Mem. Op., Jaiyeola v. Teeter, No. 24-1798 (RC)

(D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2025), ECF No. 23.

Plaintiff filed the instant pro se lawsuit in this Court on July 31, 2024 against three

defendants—i.e., Deputy Clerk Hokanson, Judge Melgren of the District of Kansas, and Clerk

O’Hara of the District of Kansas. See Complaint (“Compl.”) at 2, ECF No. 1. Defendants

subsequently filed a motion to dismiss on October 25, 2024, arguing lack of personal

jurisdiction, improper venue, judicial immunity, and failure to state a claim. See Defs.’ Mot.

Dismiss at 5–13, ECF No. 5. However, as “the Motion to Dismiss [was] targeted at the Original

2 Complaint . . . [it is] rendered moot by the filing of the Amended Complaint.” Am. Compl. at 1.

The Amended Complaint, filed on November 04, 2024, drops Judge Melgren and Clerk O’Hara

as defendants, leaving Deputy Clerk Hokanson as the sole defendant in this action. Am. Compl.

¶ 6. The complaint raises two causes of action: (1) “deprivation of due process” and (2) “denial

of ‘constitutional right to due process and equal protection’ and ‘first amendment’ rights.” Am.

Compl. ¶ 15–29. The basis for these claims is that by not filing Plaintiff’s proposed Complaint

for the Jaiyeola v. Teeter lawsuit on the day Plaintiff emailed it (June 10, 2024), and instead

approving it for opening on July 10, 2024, Deputy Clerk Hokanson violated Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights.

¶ 8–14; see also

Ex. A–C.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Pro Se Plaintiff

The Court is mindful that complaints filed by pro se litigants are held to less stringent

standards than those applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner,

(1972) (per curiam); Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007) (per curiam)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble,

(1976)). However, they must still “plead factual

matter that permits the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Abdelfattah

v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Jones v. Horne,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, a pro se

plaintiff is not exempt from the Rule 12(b)(6) requirements. See Atherton v. D.C. Office of the

Mayor,

, 681–82 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

B. Personal Jurisdiction

A plaintiff “bear[s] the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendants.”

Clay v. Blue Hackle N. Am. L.L.C.,

(D.D.C. 2012). To establish personal

3 jurisdiction, a plaintiff “must allege specific acts connecting the defendant with the forum and

cannot rely on conclusory allegations.”

(quotation omitted). Unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss, the Court need not treat all of a plaintiff’s allegations as true when making a personal

jurisdiction determination. The Court may instead receive and weigh affidavits and any other

relevant matter to assist it in determining the jurisdictional facts. See

However, the Court

must resolve any factual discrepancies with regard to establishing personal jurisdiction in favor

of the plaintiff. See Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y,

(D.C. Cir. 1990).

“Jurisdiction to resolve cases on the merits requires both authority over the category of

claim in suit (subject-matter jurisdiction) and authority over the parties (personal jurisdiction), so

that the court’s decision will bind them.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,

(1999). When “personal jurisdiction is in question, a court must first determine that it possesses

personal jurisdiction over the defendants before it can address the merits of a claim.” Kaplan v.

Cent. Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.C. Cir. 2018).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Personal Jurisdiction

One of Deputy Clerk Hokanson’s arguments for why dismissal of Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint is warranted is that Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of establishing personal

jurisdiction. See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 5–7. A two-part inquiry is required for the Court to

establish personal jurisdiction over Defendant. See Safex Found., Inc. v. SafeLaunch Ventures

Ltd.,

, 8 (D.D.C. 2023). The Court “must first examine whether jurisdiction is

applicable under the state’s long-arm statute,” and then it must determine whether constitutional

requirements of due process are satisfied. Id.; see also GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth

Corp.,

(D.C. Cir. 2000)).

4 Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to establish in personam jurisdiction under the

District of Columbia’s long-arm statute. See

(2001). The Court

agrees. Plaintiff has not brought forth any facts to demonstrate that Deputy Clerk Hokanson

transacted any business, contracted to supply services, or caused tortious injury in the District of

Columbia. See

§ 13-423(a)(1)–(4); see generally Am. Compl. Dr. Jaiyeola has also failed to

establish Defendant’s interest or possession in any property, or any marital or parental

relationships, in the District of Columbia. See id. § 13-423(a)(5)–(7). The allegations establish

that Defendant is a Deputy Clerk at the Kansas District Court. Am. Compl. ¶ 6. Dr. Jaiyeola’s

grievances regarding Deputy Clerk Hokanson’s alleged failure to file his Complaint against

Judge Teeter are actions that occurred in the District of Kansas, see generally Am. Compl., while

Dr. Jaiyeola is a resident of California. See Summons in a Civil Action at 1, ECF No. 2. “For

there to be personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute, plaintiff must allege some specific

facts evidencing purposeful activity by defendants in the District of Columbia by which they

invoked the benefits and protections of its laws and specific acts connecting the defendants with

the forum.” Robinson v. Ashcroft,

(D.D.C. 2004). Beyond the

enumerated contacts listed in the statute, Dr. Jaiyeola has not shown that Deputy Clerk Hokanson

lives in, works in, or has any general connection to the District of Columbia. See generally Am.

Compl. As Dr. Jaiyeola has failed to point to specific facts that connect Deputy Clerk Hokanson

to this District or bring forth any evidence that illustrates purposeful activity in this forum, the

long-arm statute does not extend to Defendant.

The Court also agrees with the due process concerns raised by Defendant. See Def.’s

Mot. Dismiss at 7. To satisfy the due process requirements, a plaintiff must show “minimum

contacts” between the defendant and the forum “such that the maintenance of the suit does not

5 offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,

(1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer,

(1940)). This means

that the “‘defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should

reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’” GTE New Media Servs.,

(citation omitted). The defendant’s contacts with the forum “must [also] be the defendant’s own

choice and not random, isolated, or fortuitous” and must “show that the defendant deliberately

reached out beyond its home” to “exploi[t] a market” in the forum or “enter[] a contractual

relationship centered there.” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.,

(2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed above, Dr. Jaiyeola has failed to

procure any facts that point to Defendant’s contacts with the District of Columbia.

Consequently, Deputy Clerk Hokanson has not exploited this forum in a way that would make

anticipation to be haled into this Court reasonable, thus offending traditional notions of fair play

and substantial justice.

Because the plaintiff has the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over the

defendant, see Ashcroft,

(D.D.C. 2004), and Dr. Jaiyeola has not pointed

to any facts to demonstrate Deputy Clerk Hokanson’s contacts with the District of Columbia, Dr.

Jaiyeola has failed to establish this Court’s personal jurisdiction over Deputy Clerk Hokanson.

Therefore, the Court concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant, and it does not

address the remaining arguments presented in support of the motion to dismiss.1

1 Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of Jaiyeola v. Teeter, 24-cv-01798 (D.D.C. 2024), the case that Defendant allegedly delayed filing in the District of Kansas. See Am. Compl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff further requests the Court to deem this venue as proper under the doctrine of pendent venue. See

at 3–5. But, because the Court has concluded that it does not have personal jurisdiction over Defendant, it need not determine whether this District is an appropriate venue. Accordingly, the request to take judicial notice is denied. 6 B. Transfer or Dismissal

Plaintiff argues that the Court should transfer rather than dismiss this case, asserting that

transfer is preferable if it is in the interest of justice. See Am. Compl. at 4–5. Plaintiff

acknowledges that it is within the Court’s discretion to grant the transfer. See

However,

given that Defendant’s judicial immunity bars this action even if the suit were to be transferred to

the appropriate forum, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request to transfer the action.

When jurisdiction over an action is found lacking, “the court shall, if it is in the interest

of justice, transfer such action . . . to any other such court . . . in which the action or appeal could

have been brought at the time it was filed.”

; see Gather Workspaces LLC v.

Gathering Spot, LLC,

, at *10 (D.D.C. Oct. 16, 2020). The decision whether

to transfer pursuant to

is within the discretion of the district court. See

“There are three required elements to a

transfer: ‘(1) there must be a lack of

jurisdiction in the district court; (2) the transfer must be in the interest of justice; and (3) the

transfer can be made only to a court in which the action could have been brought at the time it

was filed or noticed.’”

(quoting Fasolyak v. The Cradle Soc’y, Inc.,

, at

*11 (D.D.C. July 19, 2007)). The first element is met in this action, as neither Plaintiff nor

Defendant have any connection to the District of Columbia. See generally Am. Compl. The

third element would require a transfer to the District of Kansas, the jurisdiction where all the

contested events took place.

However, due to Defendant’s absolute judicial immunity, which

would bar this action against him even if it were transferred to the District of Kansas, the second

element cannot be met.

“[C]lerks, like judges, are immune from damage suits for performance of tasks that are an

integral part of the judicial process.” See Sindram v. Suda,

(D.C. Cir. 1993)

7 (per curiam). Whether an act is discretionary or “ministerial” does not determine the

applicability of immunity, but rather “immunity applies to all acts of auxiliary court personnel

that are basic and integral part[s] of the judicial function, unless those acts are done in the clear

absence of all jurisdiction.” See

(internal quotation omitted). It is crucial that “a

judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, [] be free to act upon his own

convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” Stump v. Sparkman,

(1978) (internal quotation omitted).

Judicial immunity is also not overcome by “allegations of bad faith or malice.” Mireles

v. Waco,

(1991) (per curiam). Only two sets of circumstances can overcome

judicial immunity: (1) “nonjudicial actions” and (2) “actions, though judicial in nature, taken in

the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”

at 11–12. These two circumstances are not present

in this action. Dr. Jaiyeola’s claims are based on Defendant’s delay in filing Plaintiff’s

Complaint against Judge Teeter in a Kansas court. See Am. Compl. ¶ 15–29. Given that “[t]he

clerk or deputy clerk's receipt and processing of a litigant's filings are part and parcel of the

process of adjudicating cases,” Deputy Clerk Hokanson acted within his official capacity as a

judicial officer and is thus entitled to absolute immunity. Sibley v. U.S. Supreme Court,

(D.D.C. 2011).2

Given that transferring this action would lead to the dispositive issue of judicial immunity

arising again, even in the appropriate forum, the Court finds that transfer would merely keep “the

case alive only until the next court looked it over and found it wanting.” Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at

2 Plaintiff raises a Bivens allegation, claiming that federal employees can be held liable for violations of a citizen's rights. Am. Compl. ¶ 14. However, as Plaintiff’s claim arises from an act conducted in Defendant’s official capacity as a judicial officer and is thus shielded by absolute immunity, the Court will not conduct an in-depth analysis of his Bivens allegation.

8 10; Simpkins v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 1997). The Court thus denies

Plaintiff’s request to transfer and, instead, dismisses this action for lack of personal jurisdiction.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. An order

consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.

Dated: April 17, 2025 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

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