UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DAVID H. CRUM,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 24-2564 (TJK) COURT SERVICES AND OFFENDER SUPERVISION AGENCY, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Following his conviction for attempted second-degree sexual abuse and release from

prison, David Crum was placed on supervised release and had to register as a sex offender for ten

years. He sues the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the District of Columbia,

the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, and MedStar Georgetown University Hos-

pital for alleged violations of his civil and constitutional rights stemming from his conditions of

release. Defendants move to dismiss. The Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency and

the U.S. Attorney argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Crum’s claims, and MedStar asserts

that Crum fails to state a claim against it. The Court agrees with both, so it will grant their motions

and dismiss the case.

I. Background

Though Crum’s handwritten filings are not a model of clarity, he appears to challenge the

terms of his court-ordered supervision. In 2019, he pleaded guilty to second-degree sexual abuse

in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia and was sentenced to thirty-six months’ impris-

onment followed by ten years of supervised release. See United States v. Crum, 2018-CF1-000667

(D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2019). After he served his sentence, Crum was subject to the supervision of the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the District of Columbia (“CSOSA”)

and had to register as a sex offender as part of his conditions of supervision. Id. At some point

after he was released, Crum says that he visited MedStar Georgetown University Hospital (“Med-

Star”)—a “not-for-profit, acute-care, teaching and research hospital”—to refill a prescription. See

ECF No. 1-1 at 5; ECF No. 9 at 2.1 Hospital staff allegedly checked his name against a sex offender

registry and, after discovering Crum’s criminal record, had security escort him during the hospital

visit. ECF No. 1-1 at 5; ECF No. 9 at 1. Crum felt “insulted,” as he “did nothing to them” and

was just “minding his own business.” ECF No. 9 at 1; see also ECF No. 13 at 2. Although he

acknowledges that the “records [are] public,” Crum says they “are specifically for the Metropolitan

Police” and not for entities “like Med-Star.” ECF No. 13 at 2.

Crum also alleges that CSOSA and the United States Attorney are “penaliz[ing]” him “un-

fairly and unprovoked for the same D.C. Superior Court Conviction (although the Plaintiff have

been [sic] Clean for Three years).” ECF No. 1-1 at 5 (emphasis in original). CSOSA, Crum says,

“refused to respect” Crum’s “privacy” and to “acknowledge” that “the past three years . . . caused

significant inconvenience and harassment.” Id. at 10. Crum also states that “[t]he United States’

Attorneys are Trained Lawyers who knew before-hand the systematic federal and local violations

they helped cause” when the D.C. Superior Court imposed “the unlawful supervision in question.”

Id. at 11. The ten-year “supervision,” Crum claims, was supposedly “added . . . at the last minute”

such that Plaintiff had no “time to . . . contest the information that they used to enhance” his sen-

tence.” ECF No. 12 at 2–3.

1 About Our Hospital, MedStar Geo. U. Hosp., https://www.medstarhealth.org/loca- tions/medstar-georgetown-university-hospital/about-our-hospital (last visited April 16, 2025).

2 Proceeding pro se, Crum sued CSOSA, the U.S. Attorney, and MedStar in the Superior

Court of the District of Columbia. ECF No. 1-1. CSOSA and the U.S. Attorney removed the case.

ECF No. 1. As best the Court can tell, Crum asserts that “all of these Defendants” are liable for

“federal Civil Rights Violations” and “Under Bivens” for the imposition (or terms) of his super-

vised release condition. ECF No. 1-1 at 10; see id. at 2 (alleging “Systematic Violations of federal

Statute [sic]” that “are Both Counter-Productive and a total waste of tax-paying funds and re-

sources”); id. at 3 (describing his “unlawful[] sentence of supervision” as a “clear, premeditated

Bivens violation that’s ongoing”). CSOSA and the U.S. Attorney, he alleges, “repeatedly do what

they want without concern for the Due Process and U.S. Civil Rights of People of Color.” Id. at

5. And MedStar, he claims, is also “violat[ing] . . . U.S. Privacy Laws.” Id. Crum seeks “10

million Dollars from each Defendant.” Id. at 2.2

CSOSA and the U.S. Attorney move to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). ECF No. 5. Medstar separately moves to dismiss for

failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 7.3

2 Crum also moved for a temporary restraining order, asking that the Court order Defend- ants to “[c]ease all actions immediately and investigate the pure facts.” ECF No. 1-1 at 5. The Court denied the motion for failing to show that he would suffer irreparable harm and that the terms of his supervision were “likely unlawful.” Min. Order of Sept. 18, 2024. Crum renewed his arguments in a motion for injunction, which the Court denied as well. See Min. Order of Oct. 14, 2024. 3 The Court notes that Crum also appears to challenge the removal of this case. See ECF No. 9 at 2 (“This specific Case should have Remained in D.C. Superior Court . . . .”); ECF No. 13 at 1 (“[T]he Plaintiff didn’t ask for this Action to be Moved to the District Court.”). Although Crum does not present any traditional objections to removal, the Court explains why removal was proper. See Terrell v. Mr. Cooper Grp., Inc., No. 20-cv-496 (CKK),

, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2020) (considering a pro se plaintiff’s motion to remand as a “threshold ques- tion”). CSOSA is an “agency” of the United States, and the U.S. Attorney is a United States “officer,” so either party may “remove[]” a case “commenced in a State court . . . to the district court of the United States for the district . . . embracing the place wherein it is pending.”

(a). And although Crum does not argue that removal was defective under § 1446, the Court

3 II. Legal Standards

On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing

jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Bagherian v. Pompeo,

, 91–

92 (D.D.C. 2020) (citation omitted). The Court “assume[s] the truth of all material factual allega-

tions in the complaint and ‘construe[s] the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all

inferences’” that it can “derive[] from the facts alleged.” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Although pro se plaintiffs like Crum are generally

held to a “less stringent standard,” Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007), the “factual alle-

gations in the complaint . . . will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolv-

ing a 12(b)(6) notion for failure to state a claim.” Wright v. Foreign Serv. Grievance Bd.,

(D.D.C. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). A plaintiff

states a facially plausible claim when he pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009). The Court accepts as true “all well-pleaded factual allegations” and

“construes reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s favor.” Sissel v. HHS,

(D.C. Cir. 2014). But “mere conclusory statements” are not enough to establish a

plausible claim, and courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Iqbal,

(quoting Twombly,

). Moreover, because Crum

is pro se, the Court considers not only the facts in his complaint, but also those alleged in his

finds no defect. Defendants removed the case within thirty days of the U.S. Attorney’s receipt of the complaint on August 15, 2024. See

(b). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff requests remand, his request is denied.

4 opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Watson v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth.,

(D.D.C. 2017).

III. Analysis

A. The Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over Crum’s Claims Against CSOSA and the U.S. Attorney

Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity bars suits against the United States, its agencies, and

its employees sued in their official capacities. See FDIC v. Meyer,

(1994);

Governor of Ga. v. Madrazo,

, 123–24 (1828). Such a waiver “cannot be implied but

must be unequivocally expressed.” United States v. Mitchell,

(1980) (citation

omitted). Crum’s claims against CSOSA—a federal agency—and the U.S. Attorney—a federal

official—bring this doctrine into play. See Ali v. D.C. Ct. Servs.,

(D.D.C.

2008) (holding that sovereign immunity barred a suit against CSOSA and its employees in their

official capacities); Crockett v. Mayor of the D.C.,

(D.D.C. 2013), aff’d,

(D.C. Cir. 2014) (dismissing claims against U.S. Attorney for the District of Co-

lumbia on sovereign immunity grounds). So unless the United States has waived immunity for

Crum’s claims, the Court lacks jurisdiction. See Meyer,

. It hasn’t.

Crum purports to assert constitutional tort claims against CSOSA and the U.S. Attorney

under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,

(1971),

the federal analogue to suits brought against state officials under

. See ECF No.

1-1 at 10 (“All of these Defendants are guilty of federal Civil Rights Violations Under Bivens . . .

Regarding the D.C. Superior Court Conviction.”); see also id. at 5, 11. But Bivens is a private

damages action against federal employees for violating an individual’s constitutional rights. See

Bivens,

. Thus, no “Bivens-type cause of action” lies “directly against a federal

agency” like CSOSA. Mullen v. BOP,

(D.D.C. 2012) (citation omitted).

5 Nor can one “be maintained against” a federal official like the U.S. Attorney “in his or her official

capacity.” Scinto v. BOP,

, 8–9 (D.D.C. 2009) (citation omitted).4 In other

words, because “the United States has not consented to be sued for damages based . . . on consti-

tutional violations,” Cofield v. United States,

(D.D.C. 2014), the Court

lacks jurisdiction over any constitutional tort claims against CSOSA and the U.S. Attorney in his

official capacity.5

Crum also vaguely refers to “systematic violation” of an unspecified “federal statute.” ECF

No. 1-1 at 2; see id. at 10 (alleging that the “Unlawful[] Supervision” “Violat[es] . . . federal Stat-

ute”); id. (referencing “federal Civil Rights Violations”). To the extent he intends to invoke the

Civil Rights Act, no “provision” of that Act “may provide [a] basis for an action against the United

4 Nothing in Crum’s complaint or pleadings suggests that he sues the U.S. Attorney in his individual capacity. Cf. Gebretsadike v. D.C., No. 23-cv-3198 (RCL),

, at *4 (D.D.C. July 3, 2024) (“When the plaintiff does not formally name a defendant in their individual capacity, that indicates that the plaintiff has pleaded an official capacity rather than an individual capacity claim.”). But even liberally construing Crum’s complaint as attempting to do so under Bivens, he fails to allege any facts to support it. He alleges that “[t]he United States Attorneys are Trained Lawyers who knew before-hand the Systematic federal and local violations they helped Cause before The D.C. Superior Court judge did what she did concerning the Quality of The Un- lawful Supervision in question in Direct Violation of Bivens!” ECF No. 1-1 at 11. Missing from these allegations, however, is any suggestion that the U.S. Attorney personally participated in the events giving rise to Crum’s claims—i.e., that he himself “acted unconstitutionally.” Dial v. Kane,

(D.D.C. 2018). And on top of that, the U.S. Attorney when suit was filed, Matthew Graves, did not assume office until 2021, several years after Crum’s conviction, so there is no obvious individual-capacity claim Crum could assert against him. Finally, to the extent Crum seeks to hold the U.S. Attorney responsible for constitutional violations committed by the prosecutors in his underlying conviction, he cannot do so under Bivens. See

(“[U]nder Bivens, a federal official may not be held liable simply because he is in a position of authority over the alleged individual offender.”). Because Crum does not connect the dots between the U.S. Attorney and any possible constitutional violation, he has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the U.S. Attorney in his personal capacity. See Burke v. Lappin,

, 247–48 (D.D.C. 2011). 5 It is also far from clear what constitutional right, if any, Crum could assert because “[t]here is no constitutional liberty interest in supervised release under general supervision as op- posed to under the supervision of a mental health unit.” Ali,

n.2.

6 States or a [f]ederal agency.” Jarvis v. DeJoy, 23-cv-1970 (UNA),

, at *1

(D.D.C. July 27, 2023), aff’d,

(D.C. Cir. Nov. 27, 2023) (citation omitted).

And Crum’s reference to violations of “local” laws gets him no further: “the laws of the District

of Columbia are not federal laws, so they cannot waive federal sovereign immunity.” Ferguson v.

McDonough, No. 22-cv-1302 (TJK),

, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2022); see ECF

No. 1-1 at 11.

No other liberal construction of Crum’s claims saves them. Indeed, “the only possible

basis for court jurisdiction” in suits seeking “monetary damages against a federal agency for cer-

tain torts committed by federal employees” is the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). Epps v.

U.S. Atty. Gen.,

(D.D.C. 2008) (citing

(b)). But even

assuming Crum had invoked the FTCA’s limited waiver of federal sovereign immunity, the Court

would still lack jurisdiction. The FTCA does not permit lawsuits against federal agencies, see

(a), and “does not waive sovereign immunity for constitutional torts,” Epps,

. And any conceivable common-law tort that Crum could assert would have to be

brought against the United States, and only after exhausting administrative remedies. See

.

Finally, even had Crum stated (and exhausted) claims cognizable under the FTCA, another

jurisdictional bar—the derivative jurisdiction doctrine—would compel dismissal. Under that doc-

trine, the Court “deriv[es]” its jurisdiction on removal under

from that of the

state court—here, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Houston Bus. J., Inc. v. Off. of

Comptroller of Currency, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury,

, 1211–12 (D.C. Cir. 1996). So if

the Superior Court “lack[ed] jurisdiction,” then this Court cannot “acquire” it upon removal, even

if Crum could have filed his complaint in federal court in the first instance. Robinson v. U.S. Dep’t

7 of Health & Hum. Res., No. 21-cv-1644 (CKK),

, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2021)

(quoting Arizona v. Manypenny,

, 242 n.17 (1981)). That doctrine would bar any

claims for monetary damages under the FTCA because the statute confers “exclusive” jurisdiction

on the federal courts.

(b)(1), 2679(a). Thus, the Superior Court would have

lacked jurisdiction in the first place, and the Court could not assert jurisdiction on removal.

Because CSOSA and the U.S. Attorney in his official capacity possess sovereign immun-

ity, Crum’s claims must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. And to the extent he

asserts a Bivens claim against the U.S. Attorney in his individual capacity, the Court will dismiss

it for failure to state a claim.

B. Crum Has Failed to State a Claim Against MedStar

As for MedStar, Crum fails to state any claim against it arising from his visit to the hospital,

where staff “escorted” him after “check[ing]” the sex offender registry and discovering his “sen-

sitive charge conviction that happened more than five years ago.” ECF No. 1-1 at 5. Crum claims

these actions violated the “Constitution[]” and his “federal Civil Rights” under Bivens and flouted

“United States Privacy Laws.” Id. at 10, 11; ECF No. 9 at 2. The Court agrees with MedStar that

Crum fails to “identify any claim or cause of action” against it. ECF No. 7 at 3.

To begin, the Constitution constrains governmental actors and protects private actors. See

Richards v. Duke Univ.,

, 238–39 (D.D.C. 2007). So “private” entities, “acting

in their private capacities, cannot be guilty of” constitutional violations. Avila v. CitiMortgage,

Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Canadian Transp. Co. v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 1980)). MedStar is a private entity, and Crum has not alleged that the

hospital was “not acting in [its] private capacit[y].”

Thus, even putting aside Crum’s failure

to “clarify what constitutional right has been violated,” Voinche v. Obama,

(D.D.C. 2010) (citation omitted), he has no “right of action, under Bivens or any other line of

8 cases, to obtain damages from” MedStar “for constitutional violations,” Richards,

.

Crum’s claim for violations of his “federal Civil Rights” fails too. It is unclear how Med-

Star’s actions—running his name through a publicly available database and, upon discovering his

criminal conviction, taking precautionary measures to escort him while he was present in its hos-

pital—could violate any federal civil rights statute (or any other statute for that matter). In any

event, Crum points to no provision of the Civil Rights Act, let alone one providing for liability

against private parties like MedStar. See Lindke v. Freed,

, 194 (2024) (“[Section

1983 of the Civil Rights Act] protects against acts attributable to a State, not those of a private

person.”). So his “bare assertion” falls far short of “stat[ing] a civil rights claim of any kind.”

Amiri v. Gelman Mgmt. Co.,

(D.D.C. 2010), aff’d,

(D.C. Cir.

2011); see also Jones v. Nat’l Council on Disability,

(D.D.C. 2014), aff’d,

(D.C. Cir. Feb. 5, 2015) (dismissing “vague” “Civil Rights Act claim” where

plaintiff did “not allege a violation of any particular Title of the Act”).

And for that same reason, Crum’s claim for violations of “United States Privacy Laws”

must be dismissed. He identifies no provision of any federal law that MedStar purportedly vio-

lated, nor does he plead any facts showing how MedStar could have violated any privacy law.

Indeed, Crum concedes that the sex offender registry is a publicly available database, ECF No. 9

at 2, so it is unclear how MedStar could “use[] [it] in an unauthorized manner.” Id.6 And because

the registry is government-run, it is implausible that MedStar itself “place[d]” Crum on that

“Watch List.” ECF No. 1-1 at 5; see Christian v. Giant Food Stores, No. 20-cv-2880 (JMC), 2022

6 See National Sex Offender Public Website, www.nsopw.gov (last accessed April 16, 2025).

, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2022) (dismissing pro se complaint where plaintiff’s allega-

tions were “implausible on their face”).

Because Crum fails to state a viable claim for any constitutional or other violations against

MedStar, the Court will grant its motion to dismiss.

IV. Conclusion

For all these reasons, the Court will grant the U.S. Attorney’s and CSOSA’s motion to

dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and grant MedStar’s motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim. A separate order shall issue.

/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: April 18, 2025

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