UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

) MICHAEL BEASLEY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00565 (UNA) ) DEPARTMENT OF CHILD ) SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, ) ) Defendant. ) ___________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s pro se complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and

application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The court grants the IFP

application and, for the reasons discussed below, it dismisses this matter without prejudice

pursuant to

(e)(2)(B)(ii) (requiring immediate dismissal of a case upon a

determination that the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted) and Federal

Rule 12(h)(3) (mandating dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “at any time”).

Complaints filed by pro se litigants are held to less stringent standards than those applied

to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner,

(1972). But

“even a pro se plaintiff must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” Hedrick v. FBI,

(D.D.C. 2016), and must “plead factual matter that permits [the Court] to

infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp.,

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires

that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's

jurisdiction depends, a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). It “does

not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-

unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiff, a resident of Washington, D.C., sues the “Department of Child Support

Enforcement,” in Washington, D.C. See Compl. at 1–2. He states only that the Minnesota

Supreme Court “ruled in 1999 that Minnesota’s administrative child support process was

unconstitutional” because it “violated separation of powers.” See

at 4 (citing to Holmberg v.

Holmberg,

(Minn. 1999)). He demands $2.5 million dollars as reimbursement

for “all money [he] paid into the child support system plus interest,” and for his alleged pain and

suffering. See

Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions do not state a claim to relief. Even acknowledging that

“when weighing whether a pro se plaintiff has stated a claim, courts must treat technical

deficiencies in the complaint . . . leniently and scrutinize[ ] the entire pleading . . . to determine if

any legally cognizable claim can be found,” Spence v. United States Dep’t of Veterans Affs.,

(D.C. Cir. 2024) (internal quotation omitted), nothing in plaintiff’s complaint

resembles a legally cognizable claim.

Nor has plaintiff established this court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See generally

and 1332. The subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited

and is set forth generally at

and 1332. Under those statutes, federal jurisdiction

is available only when a “federal question” is presented,

§ 1331, or the parties are of diverse

citizenship and the amount in controversy “exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of

interest and costs,” id. § 1332(a). A party seeking relief in the district court must at least plead facts that bring the suit within the court’s jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Failure to plead

such facts warrants dismissal of the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

First, plaintiff has not stated a federal question. Apart from his reliance on Minnesota case

law, which is not binding on this court and bears no applicability to plaintiff’s ostensible child

support obligations to the District of Columbia’s Child Support Services Division (“CSSD”),

plaintiff cites to no other authority, federal or otherwise, to justify his plausible entitlement to the

relief sought, nor does the court independently discern any possible applicability. Moreover, the

domestic relations exception generally deprives a federal district court of the power to involve

itself with determinations of child support obligations. See Bennett v. Bennett,

(D.C. Cir. 1982). Such determinations must be contested in the local court where the

proceedings were held. See

at 1042–43.

Second, despite purporting to bring this matter through diversity jurisdiction, see Compl.

at 3, plaintiff has failed to establish same. CSSD is non sui juris, see Proctor v. Title 4-D,

, 344 n.5 (D.D.C. 2018), and “[t]he District of Columbia is not considered a ‘citizen’

of a state, and thus cannot be sued under the diversity statute in federal court,” Simms v. Dist. of

Columbia Gov’t,

(D.D.C. 2009) (citing Long v. Dist. of Columbia,

, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Even if it could be sued, plaintiff is a resident of the District, thus

defeating complete diversity. See Bush v. Butler,

(D.D.C. 2007) (citing

Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger,

, 373–74 (1978)) (“For jurisdiction to exist

under

, there must be complete diversity between the parties, which is to say that

the plaintiff may not be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.”). For all of the foregoing reasons, the complaint, ECF No. 1, and this case, are dismissed

without prejudice. 1 A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

Date: April 21, 2025

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

1 The court notes that plaintiff has recently filed, unsuccessfully, other substantially similar lawsuits in this District. See, e.g., Beasley v. Dep’t of Child Support Enforcement, No. 24-03050,

, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2024) (dismissing for failure to state a claim and pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)); Beasley v. Dep’t of Child Support Enforcement, No. 24-03049,

, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 2024) (dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Beasley v. Becker, No. 24-cv-02832,

, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 27, 2024) (dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and on the basis of immunity); Beasley v. Chandler, No. 24-02938,

, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2025) (dismissing for failure to state a claim and on the basis of immunity). Plaintiff is forewarned that “[d]uplicative lawsuits filed by a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis are . . . subject to dismissal as either frivolous or malicious under

(e).” Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, No. 09-0699,

, at *1 n.2 (D.D.C. April 16, 2009) (citing Risley v. Hawk,

(D.D.C. 1996), aff’d,

(D.C. Cir. Mar. 05, 1997); McWilliams v. State of Colo.,

(10th Cir. 1997); Cato v. United States,

, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995); Pittman v. Moore,

(5th Cir. 1993)).