UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ZAINAB YUSUFF, Pro Se Plaintiff, v. Civ. Action No. 25-00309(EGS)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Zainab Yusuff (“Ms. Yusuff”) sued Defendant

District of Columbia (“the District”) for unlawful employment

practices in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia

(“D.C. Superior Court”), case number 2024-CAB-005229. On

February 3, 2025, the District removed Ms. Yusuff’s case to this

Court. See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.1 Now pending before the

Court are: (1) Ms. Yusuff’s Motion to Remand to State Court

(“Motion to Remand”), see Pl.’s Mot. to Remand to State Court

(“Mot. to Remand”), ECF No. 12; and (2) the District’s Motion to

Dismiss Ms. Yusuff’s Amended Complaint (“Motion to Dismiss”),

see Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot. to Dismiss”), ECF No. 15. Upon

careful consideration of the motions, the oppositions thereto,

the replies, and the entire record, Ms. Yusuff’s Motion to

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the page number of the filed document. 1 Remand is DENIED and the District’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED

IN PART, and Ms. Yusuff’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

I. Background

A. D.C. Superior Court Litigation

As set forth in her Amended Complaint, Ms. Yusuff

previously worked for various District agencies. See Def.’s Ex.

1 to Notice of Removal (“Def.’s Ex. 1”), ECF No. 1-2 at 661.2 She

claims that “her employment was marred by retaliatory actions,

discriminatory practices, and psychological abuse.” Id. On

August 16, 2024, Ms. Yusuff filed a complaint, pro se, in the

Civil Division of the D.C. Superior Court against the District

and District agencies, specifically the Alcoholic Beverage and

Cannabis Administration (“ABCA”); Board of Ethics and Government

Accountability (“BEGA”); Department of Insurance, Securities,

and Banking (“DISB”); Office of Employee Appeals (“OEA”);

Department of Human Resources (“DCHR”); and Office of Human

Rights (“OHR”). See id. at 2, 637.3

On November 12, 2024, the District filed a Motion to

Dismiss in D.C. Superior Court. See id. at 570-80. It argued

2 The District filed the documents from Ms. Yusuff’s D.C. Superior Court case as Exhibit 1 to its Notice of Removal. See Def.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-2. 3 Ms. Yusuff dated her complaint on August 9, 2024, but the Clerk

of the D.C. Superior Court stamped it as filed on August 16, 2024. See Def.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-2 at 2–3. 2 that: (1) Ms. Yusuff’s complaint did not allege facts sufficient

to show a plausible claim for relief; (2) the District agencies

were non sui juris and therefore could not be sued; and (3) Ms.

Yusuff’s wrongful termination claim, to the extent she alleges

it, is barred by the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (“CMPA”),

et seq. See

.

On December 31, 2024, D.C. Superior Court granted the

District’s motion in part and denied it in part. See

at 637–

714. The Court held that “the complaint must be dismissed as to

defendants ABCA, BEGA, DISB, DCHR, and OHR because they are non

sui juris and cannot be sued in their own right, and that [Ms.

Yusuff’s] claim of wrongful termination is barred by the CMPA.”

. But it “den[ied] the motion without prejudice,

however, to the extent [Ms. Yusuff] has attempted to allege

discrimination claims based on District or federal law and

direct[ed] [Ms. Yusuff] to file an amended complaint clearly

alleging any such causes of action and the essential facts

supporting them.”

On January 18, 2025, Ms. Yusuff filed her Amended Complaint

in D.C. Superior Court. See

. She brought claims “for

violations of anti-discrimination, anti-retaliation, and

whistleblower protection laws under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA), Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA),

D.C. Human Rights Act (DCHRA), and applicable whistleblower

3 statutes.”

She “allege[d] that Defendant systematically

failed to fulfill its mandated duties, engaged in negligence,

and allowed systemic abuse, retaliation, and harassment to

persist, resulting in professional, emotional, and financial

harm.”

She alleges that she suffered these unlawful

employment actions during “her employment with ABRA/ABCA from

February 18, 2020, to February 24, 2023, and subsequently with

DISB from February 27, 2024, until her wrongful termination on

March 27, 2024.” Id.4 These include, according to Ms. Yusuff,

“ABRA engag[ing] in retaliatory discussions with DISB prior to

her onboarding, directly influencing the adverse actions she

faced at DISB.”

B. Removal and Motion to Dismiss

On February 3, 2025, the District removed Ms. Yusuff’s case

to this Court. See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. Ms. Yusuff

filed her Motion to Remand on February 12, 2025. See Mot. to

Remand, ECF No. 12. The District filed its Opposition to Ms.

Yusuff’s Motion to Remand on February 24, 2025. See Def.’s Opp’n

to Mot. to Remand (“Opp’n to Mot. to Remand”), ECF No. 13. On

February 25, 2025, Ms. Yusuff filed her Reply. See Pl.’s Reply

to Mot. to Remand (“Reply to Mot. to Remand”), ECF No. 14.

4 The District notes that “the Amended Complaint erroneously states that Plaintiff began her employment at DISB on February 27, 2024. Her employment there began in February 2023.” Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 15 at 7 n.1 (citations omitted). 4 On March 12, 2025, the District filed a Motion to Dismiss

Ms. Yusuff’s Amended Complaint. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 15.

Ms. Yusuff filed her opposition to the District’s Motion to

Dismiss on March 13, 2025. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss

(“Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss”), ECF No. 16. On March 20, 2025, the

District filed its Reply. See Def.’s Reply to Mot. to Dismiss

(Reply to Mot. to Dismiss”), ECF No. 18. Both motions are now

ripe for this Court to resolve.

II. Standard of Review

A. Remand

The right to remove cases from state to federal court is

derived from

. Int'l Union of Bricklayers &

Allied Craftworkers v. Ins. Co. of the W.,

(D.D.C. 2005). “The party opposing a motion to remand bears

the burden of establishing that subject matter jurisdiction

exists in federal court.”

Further, “‘the removal statute is

to be strictly construed.’”

(quoting Kopff v. World Research

Grp., LLC,

(D.D.C. 2003)). Consequently,

“the court must resolve any ambiguities concerning the propriety

of removal in favor of remand.” Johnson–Brown v. 2200 M St. LLC,

(D.D.C. 2003). Defendants may only

remove state-court actions that originally could have been filed

in federal court.

(a); Caterpillar Inc. v.

Williams,

(1987). Absent diversity of

5 citizenship, federal-question jurisdiction is required to

establish that the case could have originally been filed in

federal court. Caterpillar,

.

B. Jurisdiction

“The basic statutory grants of federal-court subject-matter

jurisdiction are contained in

and 1332.”

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,

(2006). “Section 1331

provides for ‘[f]ederal-question’ jurisdiction, § 1332 for

‘[diversity of citizenship’ jurisdiction.” Id. (alterations in

original). “A plaintiff properly invokes § 1331 jurisdiction

when she pleads a colorable claim ‘arising under’ the

Constitution or laws of the United States.” Id. (quoting Bell v.

Hood,

, 681–85 (1946)). A court has supplemental

jurisdiction over claims that would otherwise not be under its

subject-matter jurisdiction if the other claims ‘“are so

related”’ to the federal claims ‘“that they form part of the

same case or controversy.”’ Searcy v. DeMaurice Fitzgerald

Smith,

(D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting

(a)); see also

(a) (“Except as provided in

[

(b) and (c)], or as expressly provided

otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the

district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts

shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that are so

related to the claims in the action within such original

6 jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy

under Article III of the United States Constitution.”).

C. Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning

v. Clinton,

(D.C. Cir. 2002). To survive a

12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal (“Iqbal”),

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly (“Twombly”),

(2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw [a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.”

The standard does not amount to a

“probability requirement,” but it does require more than a

“sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

(internal quotation marks omitted).

When evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “may consider

only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either

attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of

which [courts] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis

Xavier Parochial Sch.,

(D.C. Cir. 1997).

Furthermore, the court “must accept as true all of the factual

allegations contained in the complaint.” Atherton v. D.C. Off.

7 of the Mayor,

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal

quotations omitted). The court must also give the plaintiff the

“benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts

alleged.”

(internal quotations omitted). However, the

court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched

as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain,

(1986). And “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are not

sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal,

.

III. Analysis

A. Remand

Ms. Yusuff raises several arguments in support of her

Motion to Remand. See Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 12 at 2.5 Some of

these arguments are based on her mistaken understanding of

whether a plaintiff must consent to removal or choose to

litigate her case in federal court, which is not required under

the law. See Reply to Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 14 at 3. Ms.

Yusuff argues that the District’s “removal was procedurally and

substantively defective, and prejudicial to [her] ability to

fairly litigate her claims.” Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 12 at 2.

5 Ms. Yusuff reiterates her arguments for remand in her Opposition to the District’s Motion to Dismiss. See Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 16 at 2. The Court focuses its analysis here on those arguments properly raised in her Motion to Remand. 8 She further claims that “[the District’s] removal is an improper

attempt to delay and obstruct [her] access to justice, as this

case is primarily based on violations of D.C. laws, including

the D.C. Human Rights Act (DCHRA) and the D.C. Whistleblower

Protection Act (DCWPA).”

She argues that “[t]hese claims do

not require federal jurisdiction, making the [D.C.] Superior

Court . . . the proper forum for adjudication.”

None of

these arguments is persuasive.

1. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

Before the Court reviews the merits of Ms. Yusuff’s

arguments, it first addresses its jurisdiction. This Court has

jurisdiction over Ms. Yusuff’s claims that arise under federal

law, specifically the ADA and the FMLA, which are Counts I, II,

and III of the Amended Complaint. See

. It also

has supplemental jurisdiction over her D.C. law claims brought

under the DCHRA and the DCWPA, which are Counts IV and V of the

Amended Complaint.6 There is no dispute regarding federal

jurisdiction over Ms. Yusuff’s claims that arise under federal

law, and it appears that Ms. Yusuff also does not dispute

supplemental jurisdiction over her D.C.-law claims. See Mot. to

Remand, ECF No. 12 at 2–3; Reply to Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 14

at 4 (“Even assuming that this Court might assert supplemental

6 The word “State” in the relevant jurisdictional statutes “includes the District of Columbia . . . .”

(e). 9 jurisdiction over Ms. Yusuff’s state law claims under

, such jurisdiction does not negate her right to litigate

in the forum where the case was originally filed.”).7 Her

argument instead focuses on why her case should be remanded

notwithstanding federal jurisdiction. Primarily, she argues that

the state-law aspects of her claims predominate over federal

aspects. See Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 12 at 2–3. Before

addressing whether state law predominates, the Court will

briefly explain why it has supplemental jurisdiction over Ms.

Yusuff’s D.C.-law claims.

Supplemental jurisdiction is proper here because the claims

that Ms. Yusuff raises under the DCHRA and DCWPA arise under the

same “common nucleus of operative fact” as her federal claims

under the ADA and FMLA. See Daimler-Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno,

(2006) (citing United Mine Workers of America v.

Gibbs,

(1966)). This standard is met when

7 Elsewhere in her Reply, Ms. Yusuff asserts that “[t]his case was originally and properly filed in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia—a court that has long been recognized as having exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Reply to Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 14 at 2. But she cites to no authority supporting this proposition and ignores the many cases in which federal courts have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over employment-related cases originally brought in D.C. Superior Court. See, e.g., Lott v. Not-for-Profit Hospital Corp.,

(D.D.C. 2018) (exercising jurisdiction over sufficiently pled DCHRA and DCWPA claims, as well as FMLA and D.C. FMLA claims); Martin v. District of Columbia, 78 F. Supp. 3d. 279 (D.D.C. 2015). 10 ‘“without regard to their federal or state character, a

plaintiff’s claims are such that [s]he would ordinarily be

expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding . . . .”’

Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,

(1978) (quoting Gibbs,

).

Here, Ms. Yusuff’s claims all arise from the same operative

facts, the District and its agencies’ allegedly unlawful

employment actions against her. See Def. Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-2 at

661-64. Ms. Yusuff relies on the same factual support for both

her federal and state law claims. See

In support of each of

her federal and state law claims, Ms. Yusuff incorporates all of

the facts from her Amended Complaint. See

All Counts allege

that the District discriminated and/or retaliated against her.

See

Therefore, these are the types of claims that would

ordinarily be expected to be tried in one judicial proceeding.

See Kroger,

.

2. State Law Does Not Predominate

Even though Ms. Yusuff essentially concedes supplemental

jurisdiction, she argues that removal is improper because state

law predominates her claims. See Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 12 at

2–3. Specifically, she argues that the DCHRA and DCWPA “provide

broader protections than their federal counterparts” and that

other courts have held that “claims under these laws are best

11 adjudicated in D.C. Superior Court.” Id.8 Ms. Yusuff argues that

“The [DCHRA] provides broader protections than the ADA and

should be interpreted in D.C. courts where it was legislated and

where judges are familiar with its application.”

(citing

Estate of Wallace v. D.C.,

(D.C. 2011)).9 She also

contends that her “[DCWPA] claims require interpretation of

local statutes, best suited for the Superior Court.”

Ms. Yusuff is correct that “the mere presence of federal

claims does not mandate removal”, see Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 12

at 1 (citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams,

(1987)); “federal claims do not automatically grant federal

question jurisdiction when they are intertwined with state-based

rights and remedies”,

(citing Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v.

Thompson,

(1986)); and that “federal courts may

decline supplemental jurisdiction when state-law issues

predominate”,

(citing Gibbs,

). But she fails

to show how these cases and principles require remand here.

As the District points out, three of Ms. Yusuff’s five

claims arise under federal law. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 101-2 at

663–64. Count I and Count II of the Amended Complaint arise

8 Ms. Yusuff cite to a case Johnson v. D.C.,

(D.D.C. 2013), but no such case appears in the Westlaw database. 9 Nor does Estate of Wallace appear in the Westlaw database.

Indeed, the citation listed,

, is included in a Maryland state case: Carroll Indep. Fuel Co. v. Washington Real Est. Inv. Tr.,

,

(2011). 12 under the ADA; Count III arises under the FMLA; and Counts IV

and V arise under the DCHRA and “Whistleblower Protection Laws”,

respectively. See

As such, it is simply incorrect for Ms.

Yusuff to argue that her “[DCHRA] and [DCWPA] claims (state law

claims) form the core of this case” or that “[a]ny reliance on

federal statutes is supplemental . . . .” Mot. to Remand, ECF

No. 12 at 1. Ms. Yusuff is correct that she is the “master of

her complaint”, but here, she has chosen to allege three federal

causes of action out of the five total claims in her Amended

Complaint.

The cases on which Ms. Yusuff relies do not help her

argument; rather, they demonstrate why remand is not required.

In Caterpillar, the question before the Supreme Court was

“whether [the employees’] state-law complaint for breach of

individual employment contracts is completely pre-empted by §

301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA) . . .

, and therefore removable to Federal District

Court.”

. The plaintiffs/respondents had “filed

an action based solely on state law in California state court”

alleging Caterpillar breached their individual employment

agreements.

. Caterpillar removed to federal court,

arguing that the individual employment contracts were “as a

matter of federal substantive labor law, merged into and

superseded by the . . . collective bargaining agreements [that

13 existed for certain, unionized positions].”

The Supreme

Court rejected Caterpillar’s arguments that the state claims

were fully preempted by federal law, or that the individual

contracts were subsumed into the collective bargaining

agreement; holding that remand was appropriate because

plaintiffs/respondents could have brought their claims under

state law or federal law, and they chose to bring state law

claims only. See

at 394–96. Here, it is Ms. Yusuff who

raises federal claims in her Amended Complaint; this is not a

situation where the only federal questions that arise are as a

result of the District’s defenses.

In Merrell Dow, plaintiffs/respondents had filed complaints

against Merrell Dow in state court alleging “common-law theories

of negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability, fraud, and

gross negligence” related to Merrell Dow’s manufacturing and

distribution of the drug Bendectin. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at

805. They also included a count of misbranding under the Federal

Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”). Id. Merrell Dow sought to

remove to federal court by arguing that the FDCA claim arose

under federal law. See id. at 806. But the Supreme Court held

remand was appropriate because it determined that Congress did

not provide a “private, federal cause of action for” violating

the FDCA, and therefore, there was no federal-question

jurisdiction. Id. at 817. Here, in contrast, no party disputes

14 that individuals may bring claims under the ADA and the FMLA in

federal court.

As discussed, Ms. Yusuff chose to include three federal

claims out of her five total causes of action in her Amended

Complaint, all based on the same factual allegations. The

federal causes of action that Ms. Yusuff pled are routinely

litigated in federal court, and Ms. Yusuff has failed to show

that the state law claims she also raised predominate over the

federal claims so as to warrant remand. See Busby v. Capital

One, N.A.,

(D.D.C. 2011).

3. The District Has Not Evidenced Bad Faith

Ms. Yusuff also argues that the District acted out of bad

faith when it removed her case “only after [she] amended her

complaint to clarify federal claims, despite having had full

knowledge of the claims from the outset.” Id. at 3. She argues

that “[t]his deliberate maneuvering serves no legitimate purpose

other than to delay litigation and impose additional burdens on

a pro se litigant.” Id. (invoking cases in which courts have

“condemned such tactics”) (citing Williams v. Int’l Paper Co.,

(8th Cir. 2009); Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp.,

(2005)). She urges that because she has “already

suffered delays due to the [District’s] misconduct, this Court

must not allow further prejudicial delays by permitting removal

to stand.”

15 This argument is unpersuasive for a number of reasons.

First, the District timely filed a notice of removal after Ms.

Yusuff filed her Amended Complaint—there is no indication that

the District unnecessarily delayed removal. See Def. Ex. 1, ECF

No. 1-2 at 661 (dating the Amended Complaint as filed on January

18, 2025); Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1 (filed on February 3,

2025). Second, the procedural background of this case in D.C.

Superior Court makes clear that the legal bases for Ms. Yusuff’s

claims were not made clear until after she filed her Amended

Complaint. Indeed, when the D.C. Superior Court judge granted in

part and denied in part the District’s Motion to Dismiss in that

case, it ordered Ms. Yusuff to specify the bases of her claims

in her Amended Complaint. See Def.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-2 at 638.

Therefore, Ms. Yusuff’s assertion that the District acted in bad

faith because it “had full knowledge of the [federal] claims

from the outset” is incorrect. Moreover, it cannot be that any

time a defendant timely removes to federal court after a

plaintiff files an amended complaint that includes federal

claims not clearly stated in their original complaint, the

timeline for doing so shows bad faith. For all these reasons,

Ms. Yusuff has not shown that the District acted in bad faith

here.

16 4. Remand is Not Required in the Interests of Justice

Ms. Yusuff argues that remand is “necessary to ensure 1.

[p]roper adjudication of [her] claims under D.C. laws; 2.

[e]limination of unnecessary delays caused by [the District’s]

bad-faith removal; and 3. [f]air access to justice for a pro se

litigant facing obstructionist litigation tactics.” Mot. to

Remand, ECF No. 12 at 3. In support, she argues that “[f]ederal

courts routinely remand cases where state or local interests

predominate to avoid unnecessary federal intervention.”

at 4

(citing Gonzalez v. Thaler,

(2012)).

Again, Ms. Yusuff’s arguments are unpersuasive. As

discussed above, there is no indication of the District’s bad-

faith in the timing or procedural posture of this case. For

similar reasons, it does not appear that Ms. Yusuff is facing

“obstructionist litigation tactics.” The Court is sensitive to

Ms. Yusuff’s interests in “fair access to justice” and having

her local claims litigated in D.C. Superior Court, especially

given her pro se status, but Ms. Yusuff is the party who decided

to include federal claims in her Amended Complaint, thus opening

the door to federal jurisdiction. Therefore, the interests of

justice do not require remand to D.C. Superior Court.

17 5. Ms. Yusuff’s Procedural and Other Claims are Meritless

Finally, Ms. Yusuff argues that the District’s removal is

procedurally defective, and should be rejected for several other

reasons.

On the procedural arguments, Ms. Yusuff claims that the

District’s removal was improper under

(b)

because “Plaintiff was never properly served, and [the District]

is attempting to manipulate procedural timing in its favor.”

Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 12 at 4 (citing Murphy Bros., Inc. v.

Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.,

(1999)) (claiming

that “Courts have ruled that failure to effectuate proper

service can render removal improper”). She also contends that

that District failed to obtain consent from all defendants. See

She acknowledges that “[t]he notice states that the District

is the only remaining defendant” but asserts that “it is unclear

whether all prior defendants have properly exited the case.”

As discussed above, the D.C. Superior Court granted the

District’s motion to dismiss as to the other defendants so the

only defendant left in this case is the District. Therefore, no

other consent to remove is possible.

In addition to these procedural arguments, Ms. Yusuff

argues that the District’s inconsistent document handling

undermines its positions; its request for her “broad medical

18 records violates HIPPA and ADA protections”; and that the

District has engaged in pretextual justifications and

retaliatory patterns.

at 4–5. Ms. Yusuff includes a final

line in her request for relief that she seeks sanctions against

the District under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 for

“abusing the removal process in an attempt to delay litigation

and intimidate plaintiff.” Id. at 6.

None of these arguments is persuasive. First, Defendant has

certified that Ms. Yusuff was properly served its notice of

removal and accompanying exhibit. See Opp’n to Mot. for Remand,

ECF No. 113 at 7 (citing Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1 at 4

(certifying that Plaintiff was mailed and emailed the Notice of

Removal and accompanying attachments on February 3, 2025); Ex.

A, Def.’s Not. of Removal (Sup. Ct., Feb. 3, 2025) (certifying

that Plaintiff was mailed and emailed the Superior Court Notice

of Removal and accompanying exhibit on February 3, 2025)). The

District also points out that Ms. Yusuff filed her Motion to

Remand only a few days after the government removed this case,

further showing that she had been served. See id.

Second, the District also points out that there were no

other defendants remaining to consent to removal because the

D.C. Superior Court judge had dismissed the other District

agencies from the suit. See id. at 7-8; Def.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-

2 at 638 (dismissing other district agencies with prejudice).

19 Third, the District argues that Ms. Yusuff’s arguments that

it engaged in bad faith and sought invasive information from her

are unfounded. See Opp’n to Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 13 at 8. The

Court already rejected Ms. Yusuff’s argument about bad faith,

and the District represents that it “has not engaged in or made

any requests for discovery from [Ms. Yusuff] in this case—

indeed, this case has not moved beyond the pleadings stage.” Id.

at 8. Ms. Yusuff does not dispute this representation in her

Reply. See Reply to Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 14.

Fourth, Ms. Yusuff has not shown that sanctions are

appropriate at this point, let alone warranted. Putting aside

for the sake of argument how Ms. Yusuff has not followed the

proper process to seek Rule 11 sanctions, see Opp’n, ECF No. 13

at 8; there is no indication that the District has acted in bad

faith throughout this removal process and therefore her request

would fail even if properly made.

The District has shown that this Court has Subject-Matter

Jurisdiction over Ms. Yusuff’s claims; and this is not a case

where state law questions predominate over the federal

questions. Additionally, there were no procedural defects in the

District’s removal to this Court, nor evidence of bad faith. For

all the reasons explained above, Ms. Yusuff’s Motion to Remand

is DENIED.

20 B. Motion to Dismiss

The District argues that Ms. Yusuff’s Amended Complaint

should be dismissed for: (1) failure to administratively exhaust

her ADA claim; and (2) failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. See generally Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No.

15; Reply to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 18. Ms. Yusuff disagrees

and asserts that she sufficiently exhausted her claims and

stated plausible claims, though she only provides specific

support for her exhaustion argument. See generally Opp’n to Mot.

to Dismiss, ECF No. 16. Additionally, Ms. Yusuff reiterates some

of her arguments for removal to state court in her Opposition to

the District’s Motion to Dismiss. See id.

The Court is mindful of the latitude afforded to pro se

plaintiffs when evaluating motions to dismiss. Indeed, the

issues that Ms. Yusuff raises in her Amended Complaint, if

supported, would be serious concerns. But even so, Ms. Yusuff

must still demonstrate in response to the District’s Motion to

Dismiss how she survives this stage of litigation, which means

in this case, she must explain how she states claims upon which

relief can be granted. Because Ms. Yusuff fails to do so, the

Court must GRANT the District’s Motion to Dismiss, but it

dismisses her case WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

21 A. Failure to State a Claim

The Court addresses Ms. Yusuff’s response to the District’s

failure to state a claim argument first because that alone is

dispositive of her case. The entirety of Ms. Yusuff’s response

on this point is:

Plaintiff’s Claims Are Well-Pleaded and Plausible – Defendant’s motion misapplies the pleading standard under Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly.

Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 16 at 1 (emphasis in

original).

The Court disagrees with the District’s assertion that Ms.

Yusuff necessarily conceded that she failed to state a claim for

any of the counts in her Amended Complaint because this was the

extent of her counterargument. See Reply to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF

No. 18 at 2 (citing Lockhart v. Coastal Int’l Sec.,

(D.D.C. 2012); Hopkins v. Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. of

Global Ministries,

(D.D.C. 2002)). It

is clear that Ms. Yusuff does not concede this point. But, she

fails to make any effort to support her broad assertion. Indeed,

nowhere does Ms. Yusuff explain how Defendant “misapplie[d] the

pleading standard under [Iqbal] and [Twombley]”, nor how she

satisfies this standard for any of her five claims.

In its Motion to Dismiss, the District went through each of

Ms. Yusuff’s five counts and explained the legal requirements to

22 state a claim under those laws; what facts Ms. Yusuff alleges in

her Amended Complaint that could relate to that specific count;

and its argument for why Ms. Yusuff fails to satisfy the legal

requirements for that count based on what she alleges in her

Amended Complaint. See generally Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 15 at

12-22. Ms. Yusuff does not address any of these points.

For Count I, Retaliation under the ADA, the District

explained the legal elements that a plaintiff must show to state

a prima facie case, and it argued why Ms. Yusuff “has not

plausibly alleged that she engaged in protected activity”; “has

not shown a causal link between her OHR and ODR complaints and

any materially adverse action”; and “has not shown any temporal

proximity between protected activity (even if she had engaged in

any) and any materially adverse action.” Id. at 12-13. As such,

the District argued that Ms. Yusuff’s “allegations do not show

causation” nor “materially adverse actions”, meaning her Amended

Complaint fails to state a claim under Count I. Ms. Yusuff

refutes none of these assertions in her Opposition, and her

Amended Complaint lacks non-conclusory statements to support

this cause of action.

For Count II, Discrimination under the ADA, the District

similarly laid out the legal requirements for the claim and why

it alleges Ms. Yusuff fell short of these requirements. See id.

23 at 13-16.10 Specifically, it cites to inconsistencies between Ms.

Yusuff’s Amended Complaint and her EEOC Charge as to whether she

was indeed granted accommodations, the denial of which is an

element of an ADA discrimination claim. See id. at 14.

Additionally, the District argues that Ms. Yusuff has not

alleged that she meets the definition of a person with a

disability under the ADA; nor that she was “subjected to a

hostile work environment based on disability.” Id. at 14-16.

Again, Ms. Yusuff disputes none of these arguments, and her

Amended Complaint fails to allege how she qualifies for an ADA

claim.

For Count III, Violations of the FMLA, the District states

the purpose of FMLA leave and protections, then defines what the

law requires to show an FMLA violation and why it asserts that

Ms. Yusuff has failed to do so. See id. at 16-17. Specifically,

it argues that Ms. Yusuff “does not plead facts necessary to

establish either an FMLA interference claim [n]or a[n] FMLA

retaliation claim.” Id. at 17. It faults Ms. Yusuff for failing

to state with any specificity how she faced harassment or

10The District also notes that the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (“D.C. Circuit”) has not yet determined whether a hostile work environment claim is actionable under the ADA. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 16 at 15 n. 4 (citations omitted); see also Hill v. Assocs. for Renewal in Educ., Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2018) (acknowledging and not reaching the question). 24 retaliation, “when she sought FMLA leave, what her serious

health condition was, or whether she gave her employer adequate

notice of her intention to take leave.”

Again, Ms. Yusuff

offers no response to any of these arguments, and the facts

alleged in her Amended Complaint, see Def.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-2

at 662–63, are not enough to make this claim facially plausible.

For Count IV, Violations of the DCHRA, the District again

explains what legal elements are required for such a claim and

argues that Ms. Yusuff’s claims here fail for the same reason as

her ADA claims. See id. at 17-20. Specifically, it argues that

Ms. Yusuff “has not alleged that she is a member of a protected

class, that she suffered harassment as a result of her

membership in that class, or that the alleged harassment was

severe or pervasive enough to create an abusive working

environment.” Id. at 19. Additionally, it contends that Ms.

Yusuff “does not allege an actionable hostile work environment .

. . .” and that “even if the Court were to find that [Ms.

Yusuff’s allegations of workplace hostility] are the result of

discriminatory conduct,” they “are not enough to show pervasive,

workplace abuse as required to successfully state a hostile work

environment claim.” Id. at 19-20 (citation omitted). Once more,

Ms. Yusuff fails to dispute any of these arguments, and her

Amended Complaint lacks sufficient factual support for these

claims.

25 Finally, for Count V, Violations of the DCWPA, the District

again shows the legal requirements for a DCWPA claim and

provides its argument for why Ms. Yusuff fails to plausibly

allege these elements. See id. at 20-22. It asserts that Ms.

Yusuff “includes virtually no facts in support of her purported

DCWPA claim.” Id. at 21. The District argues that Ms. Yusuff

gives no details that would show she “made a protected

disclosure under the DCWPA” and fails to show a causal link

“between the alleged retaliatory actions and her OHR and ODR

complaints.” Id. Again, Ms. Yusuff declines to refute any of

these specific arguments in her Opposition, and her Amended

Complaint lacks any relevant details.

Ms. Yusuff’s failure to dispute any of the District’s

arguments, or attempt to justify her claims, with any degree of

specificity in her Opposition is especially notable when

considering the procedural background of her case. When Ms.

Yusuff first brought her Complaint in D.C. Superior Court and

the District filed its Motion to Dismiss there, it argued in

part in its Reply brief that Ms. Yusuff had conceded certain

arguments by failing to dispute them. See Def. Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-

2 at 633. The D.C. Superior Court ultimately agreed with the

District’s arguments, but did not say whether it agreed that Ms.

Yusuff conceded these arguments. See id. at 638. The D.C.

Superior Court also agreed with the District that Ms. Yusuff

26 could not attempt to amend her complaint and add causes of

action through her Opposition to the District’s Motion to

Dismiss in D.C. Superior Court, but it dismissed without

prejudice and allowed Ms. Yusuff to file an amended complaint

“clearly alleging any such causes of action [, Discrimination

claims based on District or federal law,] and the essential

facts supporting them.” Id. at 638.

Ms. Yusuff therefore would have reasonably known that she

had to demonstrate the legal bases and facts of her claims in

her Amended Complaint. But instead of explaining how she did so

in her Opposition to the District’s Motion to Dismiss in this

Court, Ms. Yusuff chose to make a broad statement of

disagreement, then focus much of her response on why her case

should be remanded to D.C. Superior Court. Even though the Court

is mindful of the need to give Ms. Yusuff latitude as a pro se

plaintiff, it is clear on this record that she had notice of her

requirements to allege sufficiently-supported and specific

counts in her Amended Complaint, and how to survive a motion to

dismiss, but failed to do so.

Aided in its review of Ms. Yusuff’s Amended Complaint only

by the District’s arguments and lacking any specific response

from Ms. Yusuff, the Court agrees that she fails to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted for any of these counts.

27 Therefore, Ms. Yusuff’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED in its

entirety.

The District asks that the Court dismiss Ms. Yusuff’s

complaint with prejudice. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 15 at 22.

Ms. Yusuff does not make any request nor argument that if the

Court dismisses her Amended Complaint, it should do so without

prejudice; nor has she sought leave to amend her Amended

Complaint. But the D.C. Circuit has held that dismissal with

prejudice is “warranted only when a trial court determines that

the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged

pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Rollins v.

Wackenhut Servs., Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2012).

Because it is possible that additional factual allegations could

cure some of the deficiencies in Ms. Yusuff’s Amended Complaint,

the Court will dismiss it WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

B. Exhaustion

The Court need not reach the question of exhaustion of Ms.

Yusuff’s ADA claim because it dismisses the entirety of her

Amended Complaint on the grounds stated above.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, the Court DENIES Ms.

Yusuff’s Motion to Remand, ECF No. 12; and GRANTS IN PART the

District’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 15, and DISMISSES Ms.

Yusuff’s Amended Complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

28 An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge April 29, 2025

29