UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RAVEL FERRERA PARRA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-01061 (UNA) ) ) JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ) OF THE UNITED STATES, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on its initial review of plaintiff’s pro se complaint

(“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The court

grants plaintiff’s IFP application and, for the reasons discussed below, it dismisses the complaint,

and this matter, without prejudice.

Plaintiff, a resident of New Jersey, sues the Judicial Conference of the United States, the

United States Marshals Service (“USMS”), and the Department of Justice’s Office of Information

Policy (“OIP”). See Compl. at 1. The prolix complaint totals 404 pages, and plaintiff has also

submitted an influx of other submissions and motions. At root, plaintiff is aggrieved regarding the

determinations and outcome of an employment and disability discrimination case that he filed, and

that was adjudicated by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Ferrera-Parra

v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 19-cv-01053 (S.D. Tex. removed on Mar. 21, 2019), at Final

Judgment, ECF No. 70 (Mar. 30, 2021, dismissing matter with prejudice); Order, Fifth Circuit,

ECF No. 86 (July 12, 2021, dismissing appeal), 1 and the complaint chronicles his countless

1 A court may take judicial notice of the docket and facts on the public record in other judicial proceedings. See Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp.,

, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2005). objections in a rambling fashion, see generally Compl.; Compl. Addendum (“Compl. Add.”), ECF

No. 1-1.

In response to the actions of the Southern District of Texas and the Fifth Circuit, plaintiff

has since attempted several actions, including filing judicial conduct & disability complaints, see

Compl. at 1–3; Compl. Add. at 7, 20, 34, 47, 60, 73, 86, 111, 128, 213, 216, 240, 252, 260, 266,

275, 278–80, 282–85, 305, 311, 322–23, 362, 371–723, 377, 381–83, 388, 392, 397, and

submitting FOIA requests to USMS (vis-à-vis OIP) for “policy documents” and CCTV footage

from the federal courthouse in Houston, Texas, see Compl. at 1–3; Compl. Add. at 134–61, 166–

77, 222, 252–53, 260–61, 267, 276, 295, 305–06, 312, 328, 332–353, 359, 368, 389, 396. Plaintiff

alleges that he has suffered “systemic procedural violations and retaliation in federal judicial

proceedings,” Compl. at 1, including “case manipulation, ex parte communications, and evidence

suppression,” id. at 2, and that the Judicial Conference has unfairly failed to act on his complaints,

see id. at 1–3; Compl. Add. at 2. He further alleges that defendants have denied him “reasonable

ADA accommodations to ensure meaningful access to court records and case proceedings,” and

that USMS and OIP have conspired with Southern District of Texas and the Fifth Circuit to

“suppress exculpatory evidence.” See Compl. at 2; Compl. Add. at 2–3, 177, 279. He demands

damages, and assorted equitable relief, including, inter alia, an order mandating that the Judicial

Conference “properly review Plaintiff’s judicial misconduct complaints,” enjoining USMS from

“obstructing justice” after purportedly “unlawfully destroying” the materials sought, commanding

“an investigation into the destruction of materials,” and directing USMS and OIP to release any

available materials. See Compl. at 2–3; Compl. Add. at 2, 276, 396.

Pro se litigants must comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. See Jarrell v. Tisch,

, 239–40 (D.D.C. 1987). Federal Rule 8(a) requires complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v.

Iqbal,

(2009); Ciralsky v. CIA,

(D.C. Cir. 2004). The

Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they

can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of

res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano,

(D.D.C. 1977). Additionally, “[e]ach

allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).

Plaintiff’s complaint is neither short nor plain, and the allegations cannot be described as

simple, concise, or direct. Nor are its paragraphs limited “to a single set of circumstances.” See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). To the contrary, the pleading is “far too unwieldy to proceed.” See Spence

v. U.S. Dep’t of Vet. Affairs, No. 19-1947,

, at *11 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2022),

aff’d,

(D.C. Cir. 2024), cert. denied,

(2024). “Courts have often

dismissed complaints that contain bloated and disorganized allegations such as this for violations

of Rule 8.”

(citing Unfoldment, Inc. v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 07-1717,

, at

*1–2 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 2007) (dismissing 61-page complaint); Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 668–671

(affirming dismissal without prejudice of 61-page complaint and striking of 119-page complaint);

Nichols v. Holder,

, 253–54 (D.D.C. 2011) (dismissing 140-page complaint

because it was “prolix, redundant, [and] bloated with unnecessary detail,” falling far short of Rule

8(d)’s requirement that each allegation be “simple, concise, and direct”); Brown,

(collecting cases)). To be clear, it “is not merely the length . . . that warrants dismissal for violating

Rule 8; the disorganized and convoluted nature of the allegations counsel that result as well.”

at *12 (citing Nichols,

) (“[U]necessary prolixity in a pleading places an

unjustified burden on the court and the party who must respond to it because they are forced to select the relevant material from a mass of verbiage.”)) (other citations and internal quotation

marks omitted).

Here, plaintiff’s complaint “contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither plainly

nor concisely stated,” Jiggetts v. D.C.,

(D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper

v. D.C., No. 17-7021,

(D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017), rife with “myriad seemingly

irrelevant descriptions,” id. at 415, thus failing to meet the requirements of Rule 8. Put differently,

a “rambling narrative of charges and conclusions . . . does not comply with the requirements of

Rule 8,” Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp.,

(D.D.C. 2014) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted), and therefore, plaintiff’s complaint cannot survive.

Indeed, although plaintiff approaches stating a FOIA claim, due to the state of the

complaint, it is unmanageable to discern the necessary supporting facts and details relating thereto,

particularly because they are deeply conflated with plaintiff’s myriad other grievances. “While

such a pro se litigant must of course be given fair and equal treatment, he cannot generally be

permitted to shift the burden of litigating his case to the courts[.]” Dozier v. Ford Motor Co.,

(D.C. Cir. 1983); see Sun v. D.C. Gov’t,

, 168 n.6 (D.D.C.

2015) (“[I]t is not the Court’s job to canvass the record for documents supporting a pro se party’s

position.”). Moreover, the court finds that plaintiff’s foundational proposition that the “Smoking-

Gun FOIA integrity issues,” see Compl. Add. at 267, 312, 328, 389, 396, evidences an alleged

government conspiracy to “destroy” and “conceal evidence of judicial misconduct or procedural

errors,” see id. at 6, 135–36, 215, 260, 262, 279, 305, 328; Compl. at 2–3, is patently frivolous,

see Webb v. Dep’t of Army, No. 22-cv-02236,

, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 7, 2022)

(dismissing the plaintiff’s claims for alleged FOIA violations predicated on a government conspiracy against him), aff’d, No. 22-5292,

, (D.C. Cir. Mar. 20, 2023) (per

curiam).

Finally, this court bears no jurisdiction to direct the Judicial Conference to take action on

plaintiff’s judicial conduct & disability complaints. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–364. Congress has

established a statutory mechanism for JC&D complaints that begins with a complaint filed with

the clerk of the court of appeals for the relevant circuit, see

(a); see also Hueter v.

Kruse, No. 20-cv-03686,

, at *2 (D.D.C. July 20, 2021) (no private right of

action under

, et seq.), and potentially ultimately culminating in Congressional

impeachment proceedings, but at no point does a JC&D complaint involve the federal district

court, see Smith v. Scalia,

, 44 n.11 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Smith v. Krieger,

(10th Cir. 2010) (other citation omitted)). While a level of the JC&D

process involves potential review by the Judicial Conference, its determination whether or not to

take action on a complaint is “final and conclusive and shall not be judicially reviewable on appeal

or otherwise.” See

(c).

For all of these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s other pending

motions, ECF No. 3, ECF No. 8, ECF No. 5, ECF No. 6, ECF No. 7, are all DENIED as moot. A

separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

Date: April 29, 2025

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge