UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCY FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Petitioner, Misc. Action No. 24-142 (TJK) v.

KENNETH SANDERS,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The United States is prosecuting Kenneth Sanders for robbery in the Superior Court of the

District of Columbia. Last fall, the judge overseeing that case authorized a subpoena directed to

the Pretrial Services Agency for the District of Columbia, a federal agency that supervises defend-

ants before their trials. Sanders sought medical and toxicology reports about the alleged victim,

who is apparently the only eyewitness of the purported robbery. But the agency did not turn over

those records. Instead, it removed the subpoena to federal court and moves to quash on sovereign-

immunity grounds. For his part, Sanders moves to remand or, alternatively, to enforce the sub-

poena.

Because the United States has not consented to the enforcement of a state-court subpoena

against it, Sanders cannot obtain the remedy he seeks—at least not in this posture. To be sure, the

federal government sometimes provides limited consent to suit when it seeks civil remedies as a

plaintiff. But nothing about those cases suggests that this rule extends to criminal prosecutions.

And the more traditional way of showing consent—congressional waiver—does not help Sanders

either. The Administrative Procedure Act waives sovereign immunity for certain cases in courts

of the United States, not in the District of Columbia’s local courts. And without a waiver of sovereign immunity, the Court must quash the subpoena and leave it to the trial court to determine

what Pretrial Services’ non-disclosure means for the prosecution moving forward. So the Court

will grant the agency’s motion, deny Sanders’s, and quash the subpoena.

I. Background

Almost four years ago, the United States charged Sanders with robbery in D.C. Superior

Court. See United States v. Sanders, No. 2021 CF3 003737 (D.C. Super. July 5, 2021). The case

was delayed partly because of the COVID-19 pandemic. In October 2024, the judge presiding

over the case authorized a subpoena against the Pretrial Services Agency. See ECF No. 1 at 5.

According to that subpoena, the agency must bring to court “[a]ny and all medical, mental health,

or substance abuse and/or toxicology reports and testing,” id., for the “complaining witness,” ECF

No. 9 at 3. Pretrial Services removed the subpoena to federal court a few weeks after Sanders

served it. See ECF No. 1 at 2.

In late 2024, Sanders moved to remand or, alternatively, to enforce the subpoena. See ECF

No. 7. Removal was improper, Sanders argues, because Pretrial Services lacks a “colorable federal

defense.” ECF No. 7-1 at 4 (citation omitted). That argument mostly merges with his contention

that the Court should enforce the subpoena. See id. at 5. In other words, Sanders reasons that the

agency’s defense against enforcement relies on sovereign immunity barring suit, so it has no col-

orable federal defense justifying removal if that theory does not pan out. See id. at 4.

Pretrial Services opposed Sanders’s motion and cross-moved to quash the subpoena. The

arguments about removal and enforcement (or non-enforcement) again converge. Federal agen-

cies possess sovereign immunity against state-court subpoenas, Pretrial Services contends, and

nothing has waived that immunity here. See ECF No. 9 at 4–8. Plus, Sanders disregarded the

agency’s regulations governing the disclosure of official information, and he should not be able to

short-circuit that process by enforcing the subpoena. See id. at 8–9. The parties responded to each

2 other’s motions, see ECF Nos. 11, 12, and the Court held a hearing on them earlier this month.

II. Legal Standards

Federal agencies and officers can sometimes remove to federal court “civil action[s] or

criminal prosecution[s] that [are] commenced in a State court.”

(a)(1). The state-

court case must target actions taken “under color of such office.” In re Subpoena In Collins,

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting § 1442(a)(1)). That requirement, in turn, mandates that

removal “be predicated on the allegation of a colorable federal defense.” Id. (citation omitted).

But if the agency has one of those, it may remove “state subpoena proceedings” because they count

as a “civil action.” Id. (citation omitted). Still, “[t]he party opposing [the] motion to remand bears

the burden of establishing that subject matter jurisdiction exists in federal court.” Int’l Union of

Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers v. Ins. Co. of the W.,

(D.D.C. 2005).

If “the state court” that issued the subpoena “lacks the jurisdiction to enforce” it, then the

“federal court” does not “acquire[]” jurisdiction to do that upon removal under § 1442. Edwards

v. DOJ,

(7th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); Merkulov v. U.S. Park Police,

, 129–30 (D.D.C. 2014). That is because the “jurisdiction of the federal court on

removal is, in a limited sense, a derivative jurisdiction.” Minnesota v. United States,

(1939). So when the “sovereign immunity doctrine bars enforcement of the subpoena,”

“courts have quashed state court subpoenas . . . that were removed on the ground that [the] court

. . . lacks jurisdiction to enforce a subpoena against an unwilling sovereign.” Louisiana v. Sparks,

(5th Cir. 1992). Put another way, a federal court will quash a state-court sub-

poena directed to a federal agency if “[s]overeign immunity bars the state court”—and thus the

federal court “on removal jurisdiction”—from enforcing the subpoena. Maryland v. Smith,

No. 24-cv-3699 (BAH),

, at *7 (D. Md. Feb. 3, 2025); see also California v.

MacKenzie (In re Subpoena Issued to Merrick Garland), No. 24-mc-119 (RC),

,

3 at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 2025).

III. Analysis

A. Removal Is Proper Under Section 1442(a)(1)

Sanders challenges removal on only one ground: Pretrial Services lacks a colorable federal

defense. See ECF No. 7-1 at 4–5. But as explained below, the agency has more than just a color-

able federal defense; it has a winning one. See In re Subpoena In Collins,

n.2

(removal proper because “the federal defense was indeed colorable” where agency’s “design sug-

gest[ed]” that it has “sovereign immunity” (citation omitted)). And the other requirements for

removal under § 1442(a)(1), though uncontested, pose no problem. Pretrial Services is part of the

Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the District of Columbia, which is “a federal

government entity.” Way v. Johnson,

(D.D.C. 2012); see also, e.g., Wil-

liams v. Pretrial Servs. Agency for D.C., No. 23-cv-1859 (RDM),

, at *1 n.1

(D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2024) (“PSA is a federal agency.”) As mentioned, “state subpoena proceedings”

fall within the scope of the removal statute. See In re Subpoena in Collins,

. And

§ 1442(d)(6) defines “State court” to “include[] the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.”

So Pretrial Services properly removed the subpoena at issue to this Court.

B. Sovereign Immunity Requires the Court to Quash the Subpoena

“The Federal Government cannot be sued without its consent.” United States v. Navajo

Nation,

(2009). That much “has been settled since at least the mid-nineteenth

century.” Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3654 (Apr. 2025 update). This doc-

trine of sovereign immunity, moreover, carries jurisdictional importance. The government’s “con-

sent” to suit “is a prerequisite for jurisdiction,” United States v. Mitchell,

(1983),

and “the power to consent to such suits is reserved to Congress,” United States v. Dalm,

(1990). More than that, the consent must be “unequivocally expressed” in the form of “a

4 clear statement . . . waiving sovereign immunity.” United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe,

(2003) (citation omitted). That said, some cases recognize limited circum-

stances in which the United States waives immunity—to some degree—when it “comes into court

and institutes a suit for redress . . . and submits a claim wholly in the nature of a private litigant.”

United States v. Moscow-Idaho Seed Co.,

(9th Cir. 1937).

As a federal agency, Pretrial Services “is shielded by sovereign immunity” in “state court,”

which “prevents the state court from enforcing the subpoena.” Hous. Bus. J., Inc. v. Office of

Comptroller of Currency, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury,

(D.C. Cir. 1996). Sanders,

arguing that the Superior Court’s subpoena is enforceable despite sovereign immunity, pursues

both waiver paths described above. He begins with the exception to the rule that Congress must

waive sovereign immunity. In Sanders’s view, the United States has waived any immunity related

to the subpoena because it “affirmatively invoke[d] the power of a court to resolve a legal claim”—

here, by bringing a criminal prosecution. ECF No. 7-1 at 5. And even if not, Sanders says that

the APA waives sovereign immunity under the more typical method of consenting to suit. See

at 8–10. But neither theory does what Sanders needs it to: show that the federal government con-

sented to a state-court subpoena against one of its agencies.

To begin, the consent-by-lawsuit exception is not nearly as broad as Sanders contends. He

“cites no case[]—and this Court knows of none—in which” a court held that “the United States

. . . waived its sovereign immunity merely by bringing a criminal prosecution.” United States v.

Fears,

(D.D.C. 2011), vacated, United States v. Fears, No. 11-mc-174

(RLW),

, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2011) (vacating opinion after the prosecution

produced all requested documents except redactions that the trial court found “need not be pro-

duced to [the defendant]”). Instead, the caselaw shows that this limited exception is just that—a

5 narrow carveout from the rule that Congress must waive sovereign immunity. Some of these cases,

for example, are “only admiralty cases allowing a limited cross-libel claim against the United

States when the United States sues another vessel for collision damages.” United States v.

$4,480,466.16 in Funds Seized from Bank of Am. Account Ending in 2653,

(5th

Cir. 2019) (collecting cases and rejecting the argument that “the United States waives sovereign

immunity simply by ‘initiat[ing] an in rem proceeding’”). And further review of the caselaw re-

veals why this exception, whatever its contours, does not extend to criminal prosecutions.

For the most part, these cases are lawsuits “brought by the United States[] to recover

money.” United States v. Ringgold,

(1834). In that context, the defendant may

assert a “counterclaim . . . against [the] sovereign” to “defeat or diminish the sovereign’s recovery”

of money—that is, “recoupment.” United States v. Intrados/Int’l Mgmt. Grp.,

(D.D.C. 2003) (citation omitted). But “the United States does not,” by suing a party, waive

“sovereign immunity” beyond that.

(citation omitted). To the contrary, “courts have firmly

rejected” the “theory of a general waiver by implication,” so the United States does not “submit[]

itself to the court’s full jurisdiction as to any counterclaim” just by “commenc[ing] an action.”

Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1427 (Apr. 2025 update). A “suit in the name

of the United States,” then, does not “subject[] the United States to an affirmative adverse judgment

on a counterclaim.” United States v. Forma,

(2d Cir. 1994) (emphasis added)

(citation omitted).

What this means in practice is that when the United States sues a party for money, it opens

itself up to claims arising out of the relevant transaction that seek to diminish the government’s

recovery. Or in slightly different terms: a defendant may “recoup on a counterclaim an amount

equal to the principal claim” by the United States. Forma,

. For example, a

6 defendant in a False Claims Act lawsuit may dodge the sovereign-immunity bar by asserting “a

counterclaim for recoupment[] alleging that” the United States breached the contract. Intra-

dos/Int’l Mgmt. Grp.,

. But that recoupment counterclaim must be limited;

it is just the “right of a defendant to have the plaintiff’s claim reduced or eliminated because of the

plaintiff’s breach of contract or duty in the same transaction.”

at 57 n.1 (emphasis added)

(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999)). Recoupment, after all, is “the setting off against

asserted liability of a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction.” Reiter v. Cooper,

(1993). So these claims “must seek relief of the same kind or nature” of “plaintiff’s suit,”

and the relief sought cannot be “an amount . . . in excess of the plaintiff’s claim.” FDIC v. Hulsey,

(10th Cir. 1994).

The limited consent-by-suit carveout, then, is typically about claims for money damages

and ordinarily does not “appl[y] to non-monetary relief.” United States v. Washington,

, 969 (9th Cir. 2017) (request for injunctive relief barred by sovereign immunity). More pre-

cisely, it is “purely defensive” and applies “only to the abatement, reduction, or mitigation of the

damages claimed by plaintiff.” Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Okla. Tax

Comm’n,

, 1305 (10th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted), aff’d in relevant part and rev’d

in part,

(1991). Perhaps this concept includes some play in the joints; it might, for

instance, cover counter-claims for “occupancy rights” when the United States sues for “ejectment

and trespass.” United States v. Tsosie,

(10th Cir. 1996). But the bottom line

is that sovereign immunity still bars claims against the United States seeking “affirmative relief

. . . beyond the demand” made by the government or the “property in controversy.” The Siren,

(1868).

Against that backdrop, Sanders faces a steep climb to show that the Court should extend to

7 criminal cases this exception to the usual rule requiring congressional waiver. The United States

has not “sue[d]” Sanders for “damages” or about property rights. United States v. Bankers Ins.

Co.,

(4th Cir. 2001). Nor is this criminal case “a suit for redress” in which the

United States has “submit[ted] a claim wholly in the nature of a private litigant” rather than for

the “infringement of its sovereignty.” Moscow-Idaho Seed Co.,

(emphasis added).

Rather, the United States brought “a criminal prosecution” against Sanders, so it is acting “in its

sovereign capacity to punish domestic criminal conduct.” Pasquantino v. United States,

(2005) (emphasis added). And precisely because “a criminal prosecution” is “not a suit

or action for damages,” United States v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.,

(N.D.

Cal. 2016), Sanders’s efforts to enforce a subpoena against Pretrial Services go far beyond the

limited waiver recognized in the caselaw for when the United States brings civil lawsuits.

The cases that Sanders marshals about the waiver of federal sovereign immunity reinforce

this conclusion. In United States v. The Thekla, the government sought damages in “the position

of a private suitor”—specifically, as the owner of a steamship that collided with the defendant’s

ship.

, 338–40 (1924). Because the case “was like a bill for an account,” the United

States effectively “offer[ed] to pay the balance if it should turn out against the party bringing” the

lawsuit.

. At bottom, though, The Thekla is just an “admiralty case[]” that “allow[ed] a

limited cross-libel claim against the United States when the United States sue[d] another vessel for

collision damages.” Bank of Am. Account Ending in 2653,

. So it hardly supports

a broader waiver for non-monetary relief in a criminal prosecution where the United States acts as

a sovereign enforcing its laws rather than as a private litigant seeking money.

Nor do Sanders’s other cases. One involved whether a foreign sovereign seeking “to re-

cover [a] deposit” was subject to the “limitation statutes of the forum.” Guaranty Tr. Co. of N.Y.

8 v. United States,

(1938). Another addressed a “counterclaim” for a declar-

atory judgment about “occupancy rights” in a civil “action for ejectment and trespass.” Tsosie,

. A third was yet again a “civil action” seeking “chiefly . . . monetary damages.”

El Badrawi v. DHS,

(D. Conn. 2008). True, the El Badrawi court ob-

served that in “criminal action[s],” some courts have—“in certain very limited circumstances”—

“expunge[d] criminal records in cases that had proceeded before th[ose] court[s]” despite “immun-

ity concerns” that might otherwise arise.

(emphasis omitted). But that court held that

the government retained sovereign immunity, and it found other cases unpersuasive “because they

did not fully discuss whether sovereign immunity barred the expungement action.”

Finally,

Exxon Shipping Co. v. United States Department of Interior stands for the unremarkable proposi-

tion that, because the APA waives sovereign immunity in federal court, the “limitations on a state

court’s subpoena” power “do not apply when a federal court exercises its subpoena power.”

, 778 (9th Cir. 1994). In sum, these cases cannot do the heavy lifting Sanders asks them

to. 1

1 In reply, Sanders cites three cases involving subpoenas “where the APA”—and its waiver of sovereign immunity—“was inapplicable,” which he says shows that “the federal government lacks immunity when it initiates criminal proceedings.” ECF No. 11 at 9–10. But none of these cases “fully discuss[ed]”—or even discussed at all—“whether sovereign immunity barred the” subpoena, so “the [C]ourt does not find them persuasive” on that issue. El Badrawi,

. Instead, more recent decisions engaging with the sovereign-immunity question are the better guide. See United States v. Young (In re Subpoena Issued to FBI), No. 24-mc-143 (RC),

(D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2025); Smith,

. Even on their own terms, moreover, Sanders’s cases are far afield from this one. In United States v. Poindexter, the govern- ment “object[ed] to only a few paragraphs in the proposed subpoenas” directed to several congres- sional committees and Senators.

(D.D.C. 1990). And the Poindexter court quashed those objected-to paragraphs while permitting the recipients to raise “any claims of priv- ilege” to the authorized parts.

The defendant in United States v. Layton also moved for a federal-court subpoena for documents from a congressional committee.

(N.D. Cal. 1981). Without mentioning sovereign immunity, the Court limited the subpoena—issued under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17—to one section of a staff report. See

.

9 The conclusion that the United States did not waive sovereign immunity regarding the sub-

poena at issue by bringing a criminal prosecution against Sanders is not novel, as several courts in

this District have already found in similar circumstances. See Young,

, at *3;

Fears, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 169–70. And from that conclusion, it follows that the Court may not

permit the subpoena’s enforcement.

Sanders’s fallback argument relies on the APA but fares no better. That statute “waives

the Government’s immunity from actions seeking relief other than money damages.” Trudeau v.

FTC,

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dep’t of the

Army v. Blue Fox, Inc.,

, 260–61 (1999)). The waiver is agnostic as to the cause of

action; “whether under the APA or not,” a claim meeting the APA waiver’s requirements can go

forward against the United States.

In this way, it does not matter that Sanders failed to bring

an APA claim—at least for immunity purposes. What does matter, though, is that the D.C. Supe-

rior Court issued the subpoena. That is because the APA waives sovereign immunity only for

“action[s] in a court of the United States,” 5 U.S.C. § 702—language that “courts have interpreted”

to mean that the United States “retain[s]” its “immunity from suit in state courts,” Wright & Miller,

Federal Practice & Procedure § 3659 (Apr. 2025 update) (emphasis added); see also Fed. Nat’l

Mortg. Ass’n v. LeCrone,

(6th Cir. 1989) (Congress “refus[ed] to waive sover-

eign immunity for APA actions in the state courts”); Aminoil USA, Inc. v. Cal. State Water Res.

Control Bd.,

, 1233 (9th Cir. 1982) (APA does not waive sovereign immunity for

suit against the “United States or its officers in state courts”).

Finally, in United States v. Maloney, the court quashed the requests for documents while permitting the requests for witnesses to “remain in effect.”

(W.D. Pa. 1965). But the key point is that Maloney, like the other cases, never mentioned sovereign immunity. So the Court can infer little meaning from this trio of cases—and nothing outweighing the persuasive authority of the other cases that explained why sovereign immunity is not waived in a situation like this one.

10 Sanders does not dispute that general rule. Instead, he says that the D.C. Superior Court is

a court of the United States, so the action for non-monetary relief—i.e., the subpoena—fits within

the waiver of sovereign immunity. See ECF No. 7-1 at 9–10; ECF No. 11 at 14. Not so. “The

D.C. Superior Court is . . . no[t] a United States court.” Berry v. Buttigieg, No. 23-cv-3587 (TSC),

, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2025) (collecting cases). So a subpoena originating in

D.C. “Superior Court” is a subpoena “issued by a State court,” meaning that it “cannot be en-

forced” absent a waiver of sovereign immunity. Stauffer v. Miller, No. 14-mc-454 (ABJ) (AK),

, at *2–3 (D.D.C. July 16, 2014). And the APA, which does not waive sover-

eign immunity for state-court actions, does not solve that problem.

Treating D.C. Superior Court as a state court rather than one of the United States makes

good sense. Congress, after all, “created a wholly separate court system” in D.C. to “function[]

essentially” like “the local courts found in the 50 States.” Palmore v. United States,

,

408–09 (1973). As part of that reform, Congress “intended” “Article I [D.C.] Superior Court

judges . . . to be analogous to state court judges.” United States v. Stewart,

(D.C. Cir. 1997). And it “intend[ed]” that “federal courts” should “treat the District of Columbia

judicial system as if it were a state system.” JMM Corp. v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2004). This understanding of D.C. Superior Court explains why it is considered

a state court in many contexts. For example, “D.C. local courts are treated as ‘state’ courts for

purposes of federal habeas-corpus jurisdiction.” Gorbey v. United States,

(D.D.C. 2014). So too for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars lower federal courts from

reviewing state-court judgments. Holt v. District of Columbia, No. 16-cv-2300 (TNM),

, at *1 & n.1 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2018). Ditto for Title VII; the “United States’s waiver of

sovereign immunity” under that statute—which covers claims filed in “United States district

11 court[s] and each United States court”—does “not extend to Title VII claims filed in D.C. Superior

Court.” Robinson v. HHS, No. 21-cv-1644 (CKK),

, at *4 (D.D.C. Oct. 14,

2021). The upshot is that “the D.C. Superior Court” is a “state court” for APA purposes, so it

lacks “jurisdiction to enforce the subpoena because” of “sovereign immunity.” Est. of Pal v. Bar-

code Corp., No. 19-cv-109 (CKK),

, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2019).

Angling to overcome all these cases and reasons to treat the D.C. Superior as a state court

rather than a court of the United States, Sanders points to two statutory provisions defining “court

of the United States.” But neither does so for purposes of the APA. Instead,

defines that phrase—“[a]s used in this title”—to cover various federal courts, including “any court

created by Act of Congress” whose judges “are entitled to hold office during good behavior.” And

although

(4) says that the phrase includes D.C. Superior Court, it does so only

for “this chapter”—not for the chapter including the APA. The APA, of course, cross-references

neither § 451 nor § 6001(4). If anything, Congress’s decision to specify D.C. Superior Court in

§ 6001(4) might suggest that the phrase “court of the United States” typically excludes D.C. Su-

perior Court. And Congress separated “courts of the United States” from “the government of the

District of Columbia” when defining “agency” under the APA, see

(b)(1)(B), (D),

further implying that the APA tracks the many contexts in which D.C. Superior Court is a state

court rather than one of the United States. In any event, the non-APA statutes that Sanders cites

do not overcome the default rule that the District of Columbia courts are “a trial and appellate court

system . . . separate from the United States courts.” Madley v. U.S. Parole Comm’n,

(D.C. Cir. 2002).

In the end, Sanders has not shown that the APA waives sovereign immunity in a way that

permits enforcement of the subpoena. Nor does he point to any other possible congressional

12 waiver. And because his consent-by-suit theory falters for the reasons already discussed, sovereign

immunity requires the Court to quash the subpoena. That outcome should not be surprising. Other

courts “agree that” when “state-court third-party subpoena proceedings are removed to federal

court,” “federal sovereign immunity both applies to the third-party subpoenas in the first instance

and bars them in the second.” Russell v. Jones,

(5th Cir. 2022). So too here.

Two final points warrant brief discussion. First, although the parties spill significant ink

on the relevance of the agency’s regulations for disclosing official materials, the Court need not

follow suit. In brief, federal law permits Executive Branch departments to “prescribe regulations”

governing the “custody” and “use” of their “records.”

; see also United States ex

rel. Touhy v. Ragen,

(1951). Agencies may direct individuals seeking records to

“adhere to” these “Touhy regulations.” Young,

, at *4. Given the APA’s waiver

of sovereign immunity, these regulations may have less force in federal cases because § 301 does

not itself “authorize[] a federal agency to withhold documents from a federal court.” Alexander v.

FBI,

(D.D.C. 1998) (citation omitted). “[I]t is sovereign immunity,” in other

words, that “gives rises to the Government’s power to refuse compliance with a subpoena”—not

“housekeeping regulations” promulgated under § 301. Smith,

, at *8 (citation

omitted). But because the Court “quashes the subpoena based on sovereign immunity,” it need

not untangle how Touhy regulations factor in here. Young,

, at *4.

Second, the Court’s holding here is not necessarily the end of the matter. Sanders could

request the records he wants from Pretrial Services under its Touhy regulations and then, if the

agency denies his request, challenge that decision under the APA’s “familiar ‘arbitrary and capri-

cious’ standard of review.” Agility Pub. Warehousing Co. K.S.C.P. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def.,

(D.D.C. 2017); see also, e.g., Smith,

, at *8. Or he could argue

13 to the judge overseeing the prosecution that the criminal “case” should be “dismiss[ed]” because

this “non-disclosure denies [Sanders] due process of the law.” Young,

, at *4

(citing Jencks v. United States,

(1957)). That argument, though—or one for

any other ameliorative measure—is not “a matter for this court”; it is for “the Superior Court judge

overseeing the criminal matter.” Id.; see also Fears,

(“[I]t is for the Supe-

rior Court, rather than this Court, to decide whether the refusal . . . to produce the subpoenaed

records justifies dismissal . . . .”).

When the United States “prosecutes an accused,” it “has the duty to see that justice is done.”

United States v. Reynolds,

(1953). The Court’s decision today says nothing about

how the Superior Court judge might answer whether the United States is meeting that obligation

in its prosecution of Sanders. But because neither statute nor the initiation of that prosecution

waived sovereign immunity, the Court must quash the Superior Court subpoena.

IV. Conclusion

For all the above reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s Cross-Motion to Quash, ECF

No. 8, and will deny Respondent’s Motion to Remand or, in the Alternative, Enforce the Subpoena,

ECF No. 7. A separate order will issue.

/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: April 30, 2025

14