UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ARSHAK REZVANI, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-03381 (CJN)

MARCO RUBIO, Secretary of State, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Plaintiffs are eight Iranian nationals whose applications for nonimmigrant visas were

refused pursuant to INA Section 221(g) and then placed into “administrative processing.” 1 ECF

No. 1 (Compl.) ¶¶ 2, 4. That status reflects that, although the visa application has been “officially

refused,” “th[e] refusal may (or may not) be overcome with new information at a later date.”

Karimova v. Abate,

, at *2 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (per curiam) (citing 9 Foreign

Affairs Manual (“FAM”) § 306.2-2(A)(a)). “[K]eeping the door open in administrative processing

can only benefit, never hurt, [an] applicant’s entry prospects.” Id. But plaintiffs here allege that

the indefinite nature of administrative processing means that the government has unreasonably

delayed in conclusively adjudicating their visa applications, and so seek an order compelling such

an adjudication. Compl. ¶¶ 4–7.

It is true that, when a visa applicant “execute[s]” his application “by bringing the required

paperwork to an in-person interview with a consular officer,” “the consular officer—by

1 Plaintiffs initially filed suit as a group of fourteen, see Compl. ¶ 1, but six plaintiffs later voluntarily dismissed their claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). See ECF Nos. 8, 10, 13. 1 regulation—must issue or refuse the visa.”2 Karimova,

, at *1 (citing 9 FAM

§ 504.1-3(a), (g);

(a)) (quotation marks omitted). But as the Court of Appeals

recently explained, a visa applicant whose application is refused and then placed into

administrative processing has still “received the ‘refused’ decision that the law expressly

authorizes as one of the allowed actions on a visa application.”

at *4 (citing

;

(g)). Plaintiffs thus cannot show that defendants “failed to take a discrete agency

action that [they were] required to take,” as required for injunctive relief under either the APA or

the Mandamus Act. Id. at *1.

Plaintiffs argue that the Court of Appeals’ (unpublished) decision in Karimova is not on

point because, whereas the plaintiff there relied on “only Section 555(b)” of the APA “as the source

of the consular officer’s alleged duty to act,” id. at *3, plaintiffs here have “invoked more specific

legal authorities . . . , including

and

, 1153.”3 ECF No. 12

(Opp.) at 11. But plaintiffs miss the broader thrust of Karimova, which is that an INA § 221(g)

refusal followed by administrative processing is a refusal. See Karimova,

, at

*4 (citing

;

(g)). It is thus not clear how, under the persuasive

logic of Karimova, any provision of law requiring that visas be either issued or refused, see

(g),

(a), 42.81(a), or otherwise mandating “agency action,” see

2 Upon order of the Secretary of State, consular officers may also “‘discontinue granting immigrant visas’ from specified countries during certain diplomatic disputes.” Karimova,

, at *1 n.2 (quoting

(d)); see also

(a). No such order is at issue in this case. 3 The Court need not decide whether Karimova is technically binding on it. At minimum, it offers persuasive authority that the Court opts to follow in this case. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Blinken,

, at *3 (D.D.C. 2024) (denying preliminary injunction partially in light of Karimova) (“Plaintiffs have not explained why they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim given that a unanimous decision of the D.C. Circuit, unpublished or not, would suggest otherwise.”). 2

(1), could remain unsatisfied by the § 221(g) refusals that plaintiffs received. 4 See,

e.g., Ibrahim v. Spera,

, at *3 (D.D.C. 2024) (rejecting argument that Karimova

is “confined to the issue of whether the APA alone created a duty for the Department of State to

complete administrative processing” because “one cannot read Karimova as saying anything other

than a 221(g) refusal and placement in administrative processing was a conclusion”). “Similarly,

to the extent that the State Department’s collection of fees under

creates a duty

to complete the corresponding service, the consular officer did so by issuing the refusal decision.”

Hemmat v. Blinken,

, at *4 (D.D.C. 2024). And insofar as plaintiffs seek to rely

on various other immigration-related regulations or statutes, such as those requiring consular

officers to process certain application forms “in accordance with applicable regulations” or to

allocate visas to certain demographic groups in certain amounts, see

,

, plaintiffs do not explain how those discrete provisions impose a clear duty on any consular

officer to “not put an officially refused visa application in administrative processing.” Karimova,

, at *3.

The government further argues that, because plaintiffs have received the visa refusals to

which the law entitles them, their claims also fail under the consular non-reviewability doctrine.

ECF No. 9 (Mot.) at 14. That “longstanding principle” provides that, when a consular officer

decides “to admit or [] exclude” a noncitizen, his decision is “immune from judicial inquiry or

4 Plaintiffs also purport to assert a claim under

(2)(A) and (D) to “set aside agency action” that is arbitrary and capricious or taken “without observance of procedure required by law.” See id.; Compl. ¶¶ 228–33; Opp. at 16. But “[w]hen . . . review is sought . . . under the general review provisions of the APA, the ‘agency action’ in question must be ‘final agency action.’” Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n,

(1990) (citing

). Here, by contrast, plaintiffs’ theory of the case is that they improperly received “non-final refusals” of their visa applications. Compl. ¶ 2. As such, plaintiffs fail to allege a crucial element of a § 706(2) claim. See, e.g., Dalmar v. Blinken,

, at *6 (D.D.C. 2024) (dismissing claim on same basis). 3 interference” unless Congress specifically provides otherwise. Dep’t of State v. Munoz,

, 907–08, 915 (2024). The Court agrees that, under Karimova’s logic that a refusal followed

by administrative processing is itself a decision of exclusion, the consular non-reviewability

doctrine would likely apply. See Karimova,

, at *6 (describing the plaintiff as

seeking “yet another ‘final decision’ on her already-refused visa application”); see also Motevali

v. Blinken, 2024 WL3580937, at *4 (D.D.C. 2024) (observing that Karimova “casts doubt on”

“prior decisions [by courts in this district] rejecting the government’s reliance on the consular non-

reviewability doctrine in cases [involving visa applications subject to administrative processing

after Section 221(g) refusals]”). But because Karimova expressly declined to decide whether the

“principle of nonreviewability” would apply in a case that “purports to challenge the timing rather

than the content of a consular visa decision,”

at *6, the Court sees no need to

do so here either. It will instead dismiss this suit because, as discussed above, plaintiffs have not

demonstrated that defendants have a duty to take any further action with respect to their visa

applications. 5

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the government’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9, is GRANTED; and it

is further

ORDERED that the claims of plaintiff Mehdi Jahanbakhshi are DISMISSED AS MOOT;

and it is further

5 In addition, the application of one plaintiff, Mehdi Jahanbakhshi, has now been re- adjudicated and denied pursuant to

(b). ECF No. 9-1 (Peterson Decl.) ¶ 15. Since Jahanbakhshi has received the conclusive adjudication of his visa application that he sought, there is no meaningful relief the Court could grant him—even if it had not determined that a refusal followed by administrative processing is itself a legally permissible outcome. The Court will thus dismiss Jahanbakhshi’s claims as moot. See Sayad v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

, at *2 (D.D.C. 2022). 4 ORDERED that the claims of the remaining plaintiffs are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate this case.

DATE: May 5, 2025 ________________________ CARL J. NICHOLS United States District Judge

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