UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MARSELLES JEFFERSON,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24-1692 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORP., et al,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Marselles Jefferson was employed as a cyber security professional at the Science

Applications International Corporation (SAIC) in Germany. SAIC has a federal contract through

the General Services Administration (GSA) to perform services for the United States Air Force.

SAIC fired Mr. Jefferson after he raised concerns about fraud and lapses in protocol that he

observed at SAIC. He sued to challenge his termination under three federal statutes that protect

whistleblowers: the National Defense Authorization Act, the False Claims Act, and the Sarbanes-

Oxley Act. The Defendants have moved to dismiss the False Claims Act and Sarbanes-Oxley Act

claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons below, the Court denies

the motion in part and grants it in part.

BACKGROUND

The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Complaint. Wright v.

Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found.,

(D.C. Cir. 2023).

Marselles Jefferson is an American citizen with fifteen years of experience working as a

cyber security professional for United States defense contractors. See Compl. ¶¶ 3, 23, ECF. No. 1. He holds several certifications. Id. ¶ 25. In September 2019, Mr. Jefferson “began working at the

Headquarters USAFE-AFAFRICA Warfare Center (UAWC), at Einsiedlerhof Air Station,

Germany as a Cyber Security Systems Administrator for the U.S. Air Force contractor Huntington

Ingalls Industries.” Id. ¶ 27. In October 2020, SAIC, a publicly traded U.S. company headquartered

in Virginia, won a U.S. Air Force contract valued at $737 million from GSA “to implement,

integrate, and develop modeling and simulation[,] training, and analysis standards for the Air

Force, Department of Defense, and other organizations.” Id. ¶¶ 4, 29. Two months later, Mr.

Jefferson “transitioned to SAIC,” id. ¶ 30, where his primary duties included “scan[ning] UAWC’s

Information Technology systems and networks that were assigned to him for vulnerabilities and

address[ing] any required remediation, validat[ing] security control implementations, and

perform[ing] compliance suits before presenting those results to the Authorizing Official for

certification to connect to the Department of Defense network,” id. ¶ 31.

Around January 2021, Mr. Jefferson “disclosed” to Matthew Jamison, SAIC’s Program

Manager, that he spotted “deficiencies” in SAIC’s internal security control reporting. Id. ¶ 32. He

reported that the company was “using incorrect metrics” to report “material information” about

“cybersecurity risk management, strategy, and governance” to the U.S. Securities and Exchange

Commission and stockholders. Id. Around November 2021, Mr. Jefferson “sent multiple emails

detailing critical . . . issues and vulnerabilities in the IT system” to a senior engineer, copying

Mr. Jamison and other SAIC management. Id. ¶ 33. Around December 2021, “[s]till concerned

about persistent security issues,” Mr. Jefferson informed SAIC management personnel that its

“employees [were] not following government regulations” regarding the company’s IT security

controls. Id. ¶¶ 37–38. At the same time, he also notified SAIC management that its “employees

were reporting to the United States Government that SAIC . . . maintained appropriate internal

2 security controls when the company did not.” Id. In February 2022, Mr. Jefferson emailed SAIC

Program Manager Johnson to report that “SAIC was out of compliance” with the configuration of

an internal vulnerability management monitoring system on its networks. Id. ¶ 39.

In April 2022, while participating in a management meeting with U.S. Air Force personnel,

Mr. Jamison, and other SAIC management personnel, Mr. Jefferson explained that SAIC was

“making improper changes to policies . . . and committing fraud, waste, and abuse.” Id. ¶ 43. His

concerns related to “unnecessary equipment purchases” and “modifications that were made to the

Request for Services,” as well as Mr. Jefferson’s “unwillingness to take part” in “fraudulent action

and infractions against Air Force/DOD policy.” Id. ¶ 44. Mr. Jefferson “was informed that his

objections [and] concerns were detrimental to the program,” and Mr. Jamison questioned whether

Mr. Jefferson would “play ball” and be a “team player” about the issues he brought forward. Id.

¶ 45. Refusing to back down, on April 8, 2022, Mr. Jefferson sent an email to SAIC management

personnel stating that “he disagreed with their decision not to take action regarding his concerns.”

Id. ¶ 46. Mr. Jamison demanded Mr. Jefferson “recall the email,” and he “threatened” Mr. Jefferson

by asking, “Do you still want to work here?” Id. ¶ 47.

Around mid-April 2022, Mr. Johnson, a SAIC Deputy Program Manager, “suspended

[Mr.] Jefferson’s telework privileges.” Id. ¶ 48. Mr. Jefferson was also forced to take family and

medical leave rather than telework. Id. ¶ 50. In late April, Mr. Jamison and Mr. Johnson demoted

Mr. Jefferson, removing him as “Cyber Security Lead.” Id. ¶ 49. According to Mr. Jefferson, he

was removed because of “his disclosures about cyber security lapses and non-compliance with

security standards.” Id.

In mid-June, after Mr. Jefferson returned from forced leave, his “work environment became

more hostile.” Id. ¶¶ 51–53. Mr. Jefferson’s work was “discredited among other members of the

3 cyber security team,” and members would “only engage in verbal discussions about the issues he

raised and . . . not address them in writing.” Id. ¶ 53. Soon after, Mr. Jefferson’s access to the

internal vulnerability management security program was removed and his “passwords were

changed, preventing him from accessing the system.” Id. ¶ 54.

In early July 2022, Mr. Jefferson complained to “SAIC Program Director Jeffrey Burdett,

Human Resources Director Stacey Wyland, and other management personnel” that “he was being

retaliated against for raising concerns about cybersecurity deficiencies and related issues.” Id. ¶ 56.

In mid-July, Mr. Jefferson was placed on leave without pay for four weeks. Id. ¶ 57. On August 5,

2022, Mr. Jefferson “notified SAIC Executive, Human Resources, and management Personnel,

including then-CEO Nazzic Keene, that they were committing fraud against the U.S. Government

by making false claims, submitting improper security controls, and providing false information

that created risks to national security.” Id. ¶ 58. Mr. Jefferson stated that SAIC officials “knowingly

submitt[ed] insufficient security controls to the government and [committed fraud] that cost

taxpayers billions of dollars annually and . . . put[] our national security at risk.” Id. ¶ 58 (cleaned

up). “He also stated that SAIC officials ‘had consistently lied to the government.’” Id. ¶ 58. A little

over three weeks later, on August 29, 2022, SAIC terminated Mr. Jefferson. Id. ¶ 59.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Jefferson filed a Complaint on June 11, 2024, alleging violations of the National

Defense Authorization Act, the False Claims Act, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See Compl.

¶¶ 64–88. He seeks both declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. ¶ 90. The Defendants filed a Motion

for Partial Dismissal, seeking dismissal of the False Claims Act and Sarbanes-Oxley Act claims.

See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 8. The motion is fully briefed. ECF Nos. 1, 8, 11, 13.

4 LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must dismiss a complaint that does not “contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)).

Courts “must construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of

all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But courts need not accept

as true “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Papasan v. Allain,

(1986), nor an inference “unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint,” Trudeau v. Fed.

Trade Comm’n,

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp.,

(D.C. Cir. 1994)).

DISCUSSION

The Defendants move to dismiss Mr. Jefferson’s False Claims Act and Sarbanes-Oxley

Act claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court denies the

motion to dismiss the False Claims Act claim but dismisses the Sarbanes-Oxley Act claim.

1. False Claims Act

The False Claims Act imposes a civil penalty and treble damages on any individual who,

among other things, “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented a false or fraudulent claim for

payment or approval.”

(a)(1)(A). The Act authorizes private citizens to bring civil

actions in the government’s name to recover damages from those who engage in prohibited

conduct,

§ 3730(b)(1), and the government has the option of taking over the lawsuit or leaving

it to the private party to prosecute, id. §§ 3730(b)(4)(A)–(B).

5 In 1986, Congress amended the False Claims Act to add a whistleblower protection

provision “in response to concern that employees who exposed false claims were being punished

by their companies[.]” United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard University,

(D.C. Cir. 1998). That provision, Section 3730(h), empowers an employee to sue for retaliation:

Any employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment by his or her employer because of lawful acts done by the employee . . . in furtherance of an action under this section . . . shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole.

(h). To establish a retaliation claim under this provision, “an employee must

demonstrate that: (1) he engaged in protected activity, that is, ‘acts done . . . in furtherance of an

action under this section’; and (2) he was discriminated against ‘because of’ that activity.”

Yesudian,

.

As to the first element, “[m]ere dissatisfaction with one’s treatment on the job is

not . . . enough.”

. “Nor is an employee’s investigation of nothing more than his

employer’s non-compliance with federal or state regulations. . . . To be covered by the False

Claims Act, the plaintiff’s investigation must concern ‘false or fraudulent’ claims.”

(citations

omitted). And “while the employee must be investigating matters which are calculated, or

reasonably could lead, to a viable [False Claims Act] action, it is not necessary for a plaintiff to

know that the investigation could lead to a False Claims Act suit.” Shekoyan v. Sibley Int’l,

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (cleaned up).

On the second element, “the employee must demonstrate that the employer had knowledge

of the employee’s protected activity and that the retaliation was motivated by the protected

activity.” Hicks v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2018) (cleaned up).

This is because “[u]nless the employer is aware that the employee is investigating fraud, . . . the

6 employer could not possess the retaliatory intent necessary to establish a violation of § 3730(h).”

Brady v. Liquidity Servs., Inc., No. 18-cv-1040,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2018)

(quoting United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., Ltd.,

, 1260–61

(D.C. Cir. 2004)).

Mr. Jefferson clears the bar at this stage on both elements of his claim. The Defendants do

not appear to challenge the first element in their motion. Defs.’ Mot. 3–7. This comes as no surprise

given that Mr. Jefferson complained about fraud on several occasions. And his “actions matched

[his] words of protest.” Singletary v. Howard University,

(D.C. Cir. 2019)

(citation omitted). He reported to SAIC management and U.S. Air Force officials that “SAIC had

failed to disclose . . . substandard policies and procedures relating to the prevention of timely

detection of unauthorized acquisitions, use, or disposition of SAIC’s assets.” Compl. ¶ 60. He also

complained that “SAIC employees were reporting to the United States Government that SAIC was

compliant and maintained internal security controls when the company did not.” Id. ¶ 38. He

emailed SAIC’s Deputy Program Manager to notify him that “SAIC was out of compliance.” Id.

¶ 39. And he alerted SAIC management that its employees were “making improper changes to

policies . . . and committing fraud[.]” Id. ¶ 43; see also id. ¶ 32 (disclosing SAIC “was using

incorrect metrics for reporting material information about cybersecurity risk management,

strategy, and governance to stockholders and the [SEC]”); id. ¶ 44 (describing “the fraudulent

action and infractions” by SAIC employees); id. ¶ 46 (emailing SAIC management to state that he

“disagreed with [SAIC management’s] decision not to take action regarding his concerns” of

fraudulent activity); id. ¶ 56 (explaining that he was “being retaliated against for raising concerns

about cybersecurity deficiencies”); id. ¶ 58 (stating SAIC officials were “committing fraud” and

that they had “consistently lied to the government”).

7 The Defendants contest the second element, arguing that “SAIC was not on notice of

[Mr. Jefferson’s] engaging in protected activity under the [statute], because his reporting security

concerns and issues was a fundamental part of his ordinary job duties.” Defs.’ Mot. at 5. The Court

disagrees. The D.C. Circuit has explained that an employee whose normal job functions include

audit responsibilities need not “incant talismanic words to satisfy the notice element[.]” United

States ex rel. Williams,

. Accepting the allegations in the Complaint as true,

Mr. Jefferson’s reporting went well beyond his normal job duties. He informed SAIC executive

and management personnel that “they were committing fraud against the U.S. Government” that

“cost taxpayers billions of dollars annually” and that “they had consistently lied to the

government.” Compl. ¶ 58. And he sent emails to members of the U.S. Air Force about “problems

in [SAIC’s] vulnerability management process.” Id. ¶ 37. In a management meeting with the U.S.

Air Force Director of Communications and SAIC management, he “explained that SAIC . . . [was]

making improper changes to policies, the . . . contract, and committing fraud, waste, and abuse.”

Id. ¶ 43. Mr. Jefferson, throughout his employment, persistently alerted SAIC management and

personnel that he “noticed deficiencies in [SAIC’s] internal security control reporting . . . [,] that

the company was using incorrect metrics for reporting material information,” id. ¶ 32, that it had

“issues and vulnerabilities in [its] IT system,” id. ¶ 33, and that it “was out of compliance,” id.

¶ 39. He further explained that SAIC was “making improper changes to policies,” id. ¶ 43,

committing “fraudulent action and infractions,” id. ¶ 44, and “not . . .tak[ing] action regarding”

these fraudulent activities, id. ¶ 46. He also explained to SAIC’s HR that he was being retaliated

against for “raising [these] concerns about cybersecurity deficiencies[.]” Id. ¶ 56.

Indeed, the Defendants’ own reactions to Mr. Jefferson’s reporting establish that they were

on notice. In a “management meeting” where Mr. Jefferson explained that SAIC was “committing

8 fraud, waste, and abuse,” id. ¶ 43, SAIC’s Program Director asked Mr. Jefferson to “play ball” and

be a “team player,” id. ¶ 45. After that meeting, Mr. Jefferson “sent a follow-up email” to

management “disagree[ing] with their decision not to take action regarding his concerns,” and

SAIC’s Program Director demanded Mr. Jefferson “recall the email” and “threatened [him] asking,

‘Do you still want to work here?’” Id. ¶¶ 46–47. These allegations are sufficient to establish notice

of protected activity at this stage. See United States ex rel.

(“Notice can be

accomplished by . . . any action which a factfinder reasonably could conclude would put the

employer on notice that litigation is a reasonable possibility.” (cleaned up)); see also United States

ex rel. Schweizer v. Oce N.V.,

, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that the plaintiff

engaged in protected activity under FCA because she “repeatedly disobeyed the orders of . . . her

supervisor[] to stop investigating,” and “did so despite [her supervisor’s] warnings that the

company would ‘destroy’ her if she did not comply”).

Critically, Mr. Jefferson also reported his concerns to individuals outside his traditional

chain of command, like SAIC’s CEO and U.S. Air Force personnel. “[W]hen an employee acts

outside his normal job responsibilities or alerts a party outside the usual chain of command, such

action may suffice to notify the employer that the employee is engaging in protected activity.”

United States ex rel. Williams,

; see, e.g., Moses v. Neighborhood Reinvestment

Corporation, No. 23-cv-2246,

, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2024) (plaintiff ignored

“the chain of command” and reported the alleged fraud to his higher-ups); Omwenga v. United

Nations Foundation,

(D.D.C. 2017) (plaintiff spoke to a corporate

attorney outside the plaintiff’s reporting channels); Sharma v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2011) (plaintiff went outside the institution to report fraud).

9 At bottom, taking all reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. Jefferson, he has satisfactorily

alleged both elements of his False Claims Act claim. The Court denies the motion as to this claim.

2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act protects employees of publicly traded companies who report

illegal activities. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. To encourage the disclosure of corporate fraud, Section

806 of the Act authorizes employees to file complaints with the Secretary of Labor or lawsuits in

federal district courts if they are retaliated against for engaging in protected whistleblower activity.

See Garvey v. Admin. Rev. Bd., United States Dep’t of Lab.,

(D.C. Cir. 2022).

In Garvey v. Administrative Review Board, the D.C. Circuit addressed whether Section 806

applies extraterritorially.

. The Court carefully analyzed the competing interests and held

that the provision does not apply extraterritorially to employees working overseas.

.

There, the plaintiff was a U.S. citizen working abroad for a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company.

. After the plaintiff raised concerns with his superiors in New York “regarding

potential U.S. securities law violations” that “affect[ed] U.S. markets,” he faced retaliation that

caused him to resign.

.

Having found that Section 806 does not apply extraterritorially, the Court went on to assess

whether these facts involved a domestic application of the statute.

at 126–28. Given that the

“focus” of Section 806 is “prohibiting covered employers from retaliating against employees for

engaging in the protected activities enumerated in the statute,” the Court set out a two-part test for

determining whether there is a domestic application of the statute.

. In “assessing” claims

under Section 806, courts must consider the (1) “the locus of an employee’s work” and (2) “the

terms of his . . . employment contract.”

10 Applying this test, the D.C. Circuit found no domestic application of Section 806 where

the locus of the plaintiff’s employment was Asia—where he worked exclusively—and the relevant

employment agreement was governed by Hong Kong law.

. The Court was unpersuaded

that other facts—including the plaintiff’s U.S. citizenship, his employment with a subsidiary of a

U.S. company, or the fraud affecting U.S. markets—“change[d] the overseas locus of [the

plaintiff’s] employment [or] ma[d]e the conduct domestic.”

Applying Garvey to this case, the Defendants argue that Mr. Jefferson’s claim is an

extraterritorial application of Section 806. Defs.’ Mot. at 8. The Court agrees.

First, the locus of Mr. Jefferson’s employment was Germany, not the United States. His

Complaint alleges that he worked exclusively in Germany. See Compl. ¶ 2. Mr. Jefferson’s only

response on this point is that he worked on a U.S. military base in Germany. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 7.

Without explaining further, he appears to argue that a U.S. military base is necessarily the United

States when analyzing the domestic application of the statute. Not so. Generally, where “the United

States has not demonstrated intent to exercise sovereignty over” a U.S. military base, it does not

constitute de facto U.S. territory. Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.,

(5th

Cir. 2017) (quoting Marshall v. Exelis Sys. Corp., No. 13-cv-545,

, at *6 (D.

Colo. Mar. 24, 2014)); see also Al Maqaleh v. Gates,

(D.C. Cir. 2010).

Mr. Jefferson has not alleged that the United States exercises sovereignty over USAFE-

AFAFRICA Warfare Center at Einsiedlerhof Air Station, Germany, where he was stationed, and

he has offered no support for his apparent assertion that the military base is the United States.1

1 At least one court has said that “Germany retains exclusive jurisdiction” within its borders. See United States v. Morton,

(D. Md. 2004); see also Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, art. VII, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846 (entered into force on Aug. 23, 1953) (providing that “the sending State [United States] shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over a member 11 Second, turning to the terms and conditions of Mr. Jefferson’s employment, he has not

pleaded sufficient domestic facts. “Unless a statute provides otherwise, a U.S. law regulating an

employee’s terms and conditions of employment does not automatically confer protections to

individuals . . . who have opted to work outside the United States.” Garvey,

(finding no domestic application where the plaintiff’s employer was a foreign subsidiary of a U.S.

company and his “employment agreement [was] governed by the laws of a [foreign nation]”);

Daramola v. Oracle America, Inc.,

(9th Cir. 2024) (same); Carnero v. Boston

Scientific Corp.,

, 18 n.2 (2d Cir. 2006) (same). While Mr. Jefferson has alleged that he

worked for SAIC, a U.S. company, see Compl. ¶¶ 2, 30, his Complaint is devoid of any allegations

about his employment contract or the law that governs it, see Compl. ¶ 30. Without more, the Court

cannot presume that his contract is governed by U.S. law when he works in Germany.

Mr. Jefferson relies on two out-of-circuit cases finding a domestic application of the

Sarbanes-Oxley Act where the plaintiffs were located overseas. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 8–9. But the

alleged retaliation in those cases occurred in the United States. See O’Mahony v. Accenture Ltd.,

, 514–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that the “retaliation against [the plaintiff]

for reporting the fraud occurred in the United States” even though the plaintiff was employed in

France); Prout v. Vladeck,

(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (giving weight to the fact

of a force or of a civilian component in relation to [...] [offenses] solely [...] against the person or property of another member of the force or civilian component of that State or of a dependent[,]” but “[i]n the case of any other [offense] the authorities of the receiving State [Germany] shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction”); USAREUR Reg. 550–56; USNAVEUR Instr. 5820– 13C; & USAFE Reg.1 10–6, Exercise of Jurisdiction by German Courts and Authorities Over U.S. Personnel (Dec. 17, 1992) (“For U.S. civilian and dependent personnel, German jurisdiction is exclusive.”).

12 that the retaliation occurred in the United States).2 Garvey made clear that “if the conduct relevant

to the focus occurred in a foreign country, then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial

application.” Garvey,

(quoting RJR Nabisco v. Eur. Cmty.,

, 337

(2016)). And the “clear focus” of Section 806 is “prohibiting covered employers from retaliating

against employees.” Garvey,

. Here, all of the alleged retaliatory conduct—

Mr. Jefferson’s demotion, removal from the GSA contract, placement on unpaid leave, and

termination—took place in Germany. See id. ¶¶ 49, 57, 59.

In urging this Court to find a domestic application of Section 806 here, Mr. Jefferson also

points to his U.S. citizenship and the fact that a U.S. company perpetrated the alleged wrongdoing.

See Pl.’s Opp’n at 7–9. But these allegations, standing alone, do not compel a domestic application

of Section 806. See, e.g., Garvey,

(finding no domestic application of Section 806

where the plaintiff was a U.S. citizen, and the alleged fraud was perpetrated by the U.S. parent

company’s employees). Indeed, most cases will have some domestic features. See, e.g., Morrison

v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd.,

(2010) (“[T]he presumption against extraterritorial

application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel

whenever some domestic activity is involved in the case.”); Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG,

(2d Cir. 2014) (“[S]imply alleging that some domestic conduct occurred cannot support

a claim of domestic application because it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application

that lacks all contact with the territory of the United States.” (cleaned up)).3

2 Mr. Jefferson also relies on Smith v. Coupang Inc., No. 23-cv-1887,

, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 11, 2024), but the court there was not considering a domestic application of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Instead, the court permitted the plaintiff to amend the complaint to correct an error in the defendant’s corporate name because that change, on its own, would not render the Act inapplicable.

3 In opposing the Defendants’ motion, Mr. Jefferson also argues that SAIC executives in the United States were likely involved in the alleged retaliatory conduct. Pl.’s Opp’n at 8. But this allegation 13 At bottom, while Mr. Jefferson thinks the Sarbanes-Oxley Act should reach the allegations

in this case, they fall short of the test the D.C. Circuit has set out. The D.C. Circuit painstakingly

reviewed the text, context, and legislative history of Section 806 and concluded that Congress did

not intend the provision to apply extraterritorially. And in analyzing the domestic application of

Section 806, the Court was clear that “the locus of any employee’s work and the terms of his or

her employment are critically important.” Garvey,

. The record in this case simply

does not support a domestic application of Section 806 under that framework.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court denies in part and grants in part the Defendants’ Partial Motion

to Dismiss, ECF No. 8.

A separate order will issue.

SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge

Date: May 6, 2025

is nowhere to be found in Mr. Jefferson’s Complaint, so the Court does not consider it in deciding this motion. See Singh v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2014) (“[I]t is ‘axiomatic’ that a party may not amend his complaint through an opposition brief.”). Even if properly before the Court, it would not change the result. See Garvey v. Admin. Rev. Bd., United States Dep’t of Lab.,

(D.C. Cir. 2022) (the fact that “corporate decisionmakers in the United States directed the retaliation campaign against [the plaintiff]” “neither change[s] the overseas locus of [the plaintiff]’s employment nor make[s] the conduct domestic” (citation omitted)). 14