UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KAREEMAH BELL,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 25 - 128 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan

CVS PHARMACY,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Kareemah Bell, proceeding pro se, sued CVS Pharmacy in the Superior Court of the

District of Columbia alleging racial profiling and harassment. CVS removed the case to this Court

under

(a) and moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the reasons below, the Court

grants the motion and dismisses the case.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual and Procedural Background

The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Complaint. Estelle v.

Gamble,

(1976).

On December 13, 2024, Ms. Bell filed a Complaint against CVS in the Superior Court of

the District of Columbia seeking $50 million dollars for “racial profiling, false accusations based

on physical appearance, [and] discrimination” that she experienced while trying to fill her

prescriptions. Not. Removal, Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1-3. On December 3, 2024, Ms. Bell had an

appointment at Fuch Family of Dermatology, and a dermatologist wrote her four prescriptions to

treat acne, eczema, a reaction to mold inside her apartment, and rosacea.

When she brought the prescriptions to a CVS store, the pharmacist “refused to fill the medications,” explaining that the

doctor had not signed the prescriptions. Id. at 2. The pharmacist called the store manager,

Mrs. Jackson, who told Ms. Bell she was “loitering” inside the store and called the Second District

Police Department. Id. at 3. Two police officers then arrived on the scene. Id.

Ms. Bell’s Complaint contains sweeping assertions. She states that “[h]e couldn’t accept

that I had four prescriptions” and “wasn’t willing to communicate with the African American

woman, 50 years of age, disability (movement disorder), unemployed . . . due to sexual harassment

in the workplace[.]” Id. at 3. She adds that she was “racially discriminated against, and harassed

by the neighborhood pharmacist and white metropolitan police officer” for trying to fill her four

prescriptions from the dermatologist. Id.

Ms. Bell’s Complaint references various statutes but offers no corresponding factual

allegations. On the Complaint form, she asks for “any other information of which the Court should

be aware,” then writes “[b]ased on the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Id. at 2. Later, she adds that,

“[b]ased on the Americans with Disability Act of 1990,” she is “requesting reasonable

accommodations due to a physical disability (movement disorder).” Id. at 2. And with no further

details, she notes that “[a]ll incidents occurred in 2024” and that she is “seeking help for being

abused, mistreated, and harassed by [the] CVS neighborhood pharmacist.” Id.

On January 16, 2025, CVS removed the case to this Court pursuant to

(a).

See Not. Removal at 1, ECF No. 1. CVS notified Ms. Bell of the removal via first-class mail and

email.

. On January 23, 2025, CVS moved to dismiss Ms. Bell’s claims under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Mot. Dismiss at 1, ECF No. 4. On February 19, 2025, the Court

ordered Ms. Bell to respond to the motion by March 20, 2025, and warned that if she failed to

respond, the Court might “(1) treat the Motion as conceded[]; (2) rule on the Motion based on the

2 Defendant’s arguments alone and without considering [her] arguments; or (3) dismiss [her] claims

for failure to prosecute[.]” Fox/Neal Order at 1, ECF No. 5; see also Fox v. Strickland,

(D.C. Cir. 1988). That deadline has passed, and Ms. Bell has not responded or asked for

more time to do so.

LEGAL STANDARD

“Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and ‘possess only that power

conferred by [the] Constitution and [by] statute.’” Logal v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,

(D.D.C. 2004) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

(1994)). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff’s complaint “must ‘contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,’ to plausibly establish [] [the] elements.” Howard R.L.

Cook & Tommy Shaw Found. v. Billington,

(D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Ashcroft

v. Iqbal,

(2009)). The “plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Delk v. PNC Bank, N.A.,

, 85 (D.D.C. 2024) (quoting Iqbal,

). Courts must hold pro se pleadings to a “less stringent standard than formal pleadings” drafted

by lawyers, but “need not assume the role of [their] advocate.” Mehrbach v. Citibank, N.A.,

(D.D.C. 2018). In other words, no matter how “inartfully pleaded” a pro se

plaintiff’s complaint, a court must grant her the benefit of all inferences that can flow from the

facts she alleges. Haines v. Kerner,

(1972).

DISCUSSION

CVS removed this case from Superior Court under

(a), arguing that this

Court has both diversity jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction. See Not. Removal ¶¶ 6–8,

9–16. It urges dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on the basis that Ms. Bell’s claims are without merit.

Mot. Dismiss at 4. The Court agrees that it has diversity jurisdiction and dismisses the federal

3 claims under 12(b)(6). Even “liberally” construing Ms. Bell’s Complaint given her pro se status,

Richardson v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 1999), it falls far short of the minimum

requirements for establishing a claim under either the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Americans

with Disabilities Act (ADA). The Court also dismisses the non-federal claims as deficient.

A. Jurisdiction

Defendants “‘in a civil action brought in state court may remove the action to a federal

district court if the action is one over which the federal district courts have original jurisdiction’—

including diversity jurisdiction.” Walker v. 2100 2nd St SW, LLC, No. 24-cv-677,

, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2024) (quoting Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Wilson, No. 18-cv-

2381,

, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 2019)). Diversity jurisdiction arises when the two

parties are “citizens of different states” and the “matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of

$75,000[.]”

. The removing defendant “bears the burden of proving that

jurisdiction exists in federal court.” Perez v. Anchor Constr. Corp., No. 22-cv-0023,

, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 14, 2022) (quoting Downey v. Ambassador Dev., LLC,

(D.D.C. 2008)). Here, CVS argues that this Court has diversity jurisdiction because

“there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties, and the amount in controversy

exceeds the sum or value of $75,000.” Not. Removal ¶ 10. The Court agrees.

To establish the first prong of diversity jurisdiction, a plaintiff “must allege that the parties

are domiciled in different states.” Thomas v. Lescht, 23-cv-3528,

, at *2 (D.D.C.

Feb. 3, 2025). An individual’s domicile “is established by physical presence in a place in

connection with a certain state of mind concerning one’s intent to remain there.” Mississippi Band

of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,

(1989) (citing Texas v. Florida,

(1939)); see also Lalabekyan v. Vaziri, No. 23-cv-1994,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb.

4 20, 2025) (citing Mitchell v. United States,

(1874) (“By the term domicile, in its

ordinary acceptation, is meant the place where a person lives and has his home.”)).

Ms. Bell is domiciled in Washington D.C., where she resides. See Compl. (listing her

address in Northwest D.C.). And CVS is a citizen of Rhode Island, where it has its principal place

of business and corporate headquarters. See Not. Removal ¶ 12 (listing principal place of business

and corporate headquarters as Woonsocket, Rhode Island); see also Farar v. Coffield, No. 17-cv-

2072,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2019) (citing Novak v. Cap. Mgmt. & Dev. Corp.,

, 906–07 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“To determine the citizenship of a corporate entity, courts

look to the corporation’s state of incorporation and principal place of business.”)). Thus, there is

complete diversity between Ms. Bell and CVS.

The amount in controversy requirement is met when “the matter in controversy exceeds

the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.”

(a)(1). “[W]hen

assessing whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, ‘the sum claimed by the plaintiff

controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith.’” Goldman v. Fiat Chrysler Automobiles

US, LLC,

(D.D.C. 2016) (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red

Cab Co.,

(1938)). The question is whether it is possible to say with a “legal

certainty” that the plaintiff’s claims fall below the $75,000 minimum.

(internal citation

omitted). Courts reject an amount in controversy when it involves an “indecipherable complaint”

that “makes no other attempt to quantify damages.” Shells v. NRA, No. 23-cv-2335,

, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2023) (finding the plaintiff’s claim for “620 million trillion”

dollars “frivolous” where the plaintiff “d[oes] not allege any claims arising under federal law”).

Ms. Bell “demands monetary relief in the amount of $50 million” for her claims. Not.

Removal ¶ 15 (citing Compl. at 1). And nothing suggests she pled that amount in bad faith.

5 Although $50 million appears excessive considering Ms. Bell’s allegations, the question is not

whether the amount sought is reasonable, but whether the Court can say with “legal certainty” that

the amount in controversy is less than $75,000. See Goldman,

(“[T]he

Supreme Court’s yardstick demands that courts be very confident that a party cannot recover the

jurisdictional amount before dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction.”) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted); see also Shells,

, at *2 (where the plaintiff’s

“indecipherable complaint demands [a] frivolous amount and makes no other attempt to quantify

damages, it appears to a legal certainty, . . . that his claims are for less than the jurisdictional

amount—if they are even for any amount at all.” (cleaned up)). It cannot and so the amount in

controversy requirement is satisfied.

B. Federal Claims

Turning to the merits of Ms. Bell’s federal claims, even holding those pro se claims to a

less stringent standard, they cannot survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

1. The Civil Rights Act of 1964

CVS argues that Ms. Bell fails to state a claim under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, as a pharmacy is not a “place of public accommodation.” Mot. Dismiss at 4. The Court

agrees.

Although Ms. Bell does not specifically mention Title II of the Civil Rights Act, the Court

will construe her claim as arising under that statute. Title II prevents the “denial[] of equal access

to public establishments,” see Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,

(1964), on “the ground[s] of race, color, religion, or national origin,” Katzenbach v. McClung,

(1964). “The statute ‘sets forth a comprehensive list of establishments that qualify

as a place of public accommodation and in so doing excludes from its coverage those categories

6 of establishments not listed.’” Delk, 749 F. Supp. 3d at 89 (quoting Foster v. Howard Univ. Hosp.,

No. 06-cv-244,

, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2006)). It includes hotels and other

establishments that “provide[] lodging to transient guests,” places that “sell food for consumption

on the premises,” gas stations, and places of “exhibition or entertainment” like theatres and sports

arenas. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b). Retail pharmacies are not included in the definition. See, e.g.,

Jackson v. Walgreens Co., No. 16-cv-0398,

, at *2 & n.1 (D. Minn. Aug. 10,

2016) (dismissing Title II claim against Walgreens and noting that 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)’s

definition of public accommodation does not include “pharmacy”). Here, Ms. Bell complains of

events that took place at a retail CVS pharmacy, Compl. at 1 (complaining of events at “CVS

Pharmacy” on “1199 Vermont, Avenue, NW, Washington D.C., 200360), which is not covered

under Title II.

Ms. Bell’s claim also fails because it includes almost no details regarding the alleged

discrimination. See, e.g., Delk, 749 F. Supp. 3d at 89 (noting that “[e]ven if the bank does qualify

as a ‘public accommodation’ for purposes of Title II as it does under other statutory regimes, the

complaint is woefully deficient”). Beyond noting that she is an “African American woman, 50

years of age,” Compl. at 3, Ms. Bell provides no facts that would support a plausible inference that

CVS took actions because of her race during the encounter she describes, Parkes v. Belga Cafe

Betsy, No. 24-cv-2374,

, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2024) (quoting Bray v. RHT,

Inc.,

(D.D.C. 1990) (noting that a plaintiff “cannot merely invoke h[er] race in

the course of a claim’s narrative and automatically be entitled to pursue relief”).

2. The Americans with Disabilities Act

CVS also urges dismissal of Ms. Bell’s claim under Title III of the Americans with

Disabilities Act. Mot. Dismiss at 5. Dismissal is warranted.

7 The Court construes Ms. Bell’s claim as arising under Title III of the Americans with

Disabilities Act. To plead a discrimination claim under Title III, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that

she is disabled under the ADA, (2) that the defendant is a place of public accommodation, and

(3) that the defendant discriminated against her to deny a full and equal opportunity to enjoy their

goods and services. See, e.g., Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc.,

(D.C. Cir.

2015). Although Title III defines a place of public accommodation to include a pharmacy,

(7)(f), Ms. Bell has not pleaded facts to support the remaining two elements.

The ADA “defines a ‘disability’ as ‘a physical or mental impairment that substantially

limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual.’” Duncan v. Washington Metro.

Area Transit Auth.,

(D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing

(2)(A)). The

Complaint alleges only: “I’m requesting reasonable accommodations due to a physical disability

[] movement disorder.” Compl. at 2. This allegation is too vague to survive Rule 12(b)(6). See,

e.g., Sindram v. Merriwether,

, 12 n.8 (D.D.C. 2007) (the plaintiff did not allege

“any facts” about the disability and instead “ma[de] vague assertions of the need for

accommodations without specifying what accommodations he needs, were requested, and were

denied”). Even if it qualifies as an impairment, Ms. Bell has not alleged that it limits her major life

activities, much less that it substantially limits them. See, e.g., Gordon v. D.C.,

(D.D.C. 2007) (the plaintiff’s arthritis failed to “meet[] the ‘substantially limiting’

standard,” when she required a walker, could only walk a few blocks at a time, and experienced

“extreme pain” while climbing the stairs); Massaquoi v. D.C.,

(D.D.C. 2015)

(the plaintiff failed to “plausibly assert that he is disabled under the ADA because there is no

allegation that his alleged ‘anxiety disorder’ substantially limits a major life activity”); Sheller-

Paire v. Gray,

(D.D.C. 2012) (rejecting an ADA claim where the plaintiff

8 “concede[d] that he was not restricted from a ‘substantial class of jobs’” but was instead “capable

of performing as a firefighter with limited duties”).

And Ms. Bell presents no facts that suggest that discrimination occurred during her

encounter at CVS. In fact, according to the Complaint, the pharmacist refused to fill the

prescription because it was not signed. See Compl. at 3; Mot. Dismiss at 7 (noting that under

pharmacy regulations, a written prescription must include “the original legal signature of the

practitioner, in ink”). There are no facts that would support a plausible inference of discrimination.

C. Other Claims

CVS also urges dismissal of a long list of common law and D.C. statutory claims. On the

“Information Sheet” attached to Ms. Bell’s Complaint in Superior Court, she checked several

boxes asserting more claims, including breach of contract, drug related nuisance abatement,

medical malpractice, abuse of process, libel, slander, defamation, fraudulent misrepresentation,

invasion of privacy, and the D.C. Consumer Protection Act. Receipt of Original File, ECF No. 3;

see also Mot. Dismiss at 9–13. But Ms. Bell’s Complaint does not mention these causes of action

or provide any facts whatsoever to support them. These claims are dismissed. Checking boxes on

a civil cover sheet, without more, is insufficient to survive Rule 12(b)(6). Favors v. Coughlin,

(2d Cir. 1989) (“The civil cover sheet, of course, is merely an administrative aid to

the court clerk, and is therefore not typically considered part of a litigant’s pleading papers.”); see

also, e.g., Shells,

, at *1 (dismissing complaint where the plaintiff “checked

twenty-six boxes under the heading ‘Nature of Suit’ on the Information Sheet attached to his

complaint, but his claims appear to relate to a contractual dispute”); Andreakos v. Dep’t of Interior,

No. 14-cv-1125,

, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2014) (dismissing complaint under

9 Rule 12(b)(6) where the plaintiff “checked multiple boxes” on the civil cover sheet but provided

no facts or circumstances giving rise to those claims).

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court grants the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 4. A

separate order will issue.

SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge

Date: May 15, 2025

10