UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DOE CORPORATION 1, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 25-1404

INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs are corporate entities who have filed this lawsuit against the Inter-American

Development Bank, claiming that the IDB has improperly initiated sanctions proceedings against

them. See ECF No. 1 (Compl.), ¶¶ 1–4. Doe Corporations allege that those proceedings violate

both Defendant’s governing charter and its contracts with Plaintiffs. Id., ¶ 2. Concerned that

revealing that they are the subjects of the IDB’s sanctions proceedings would result in

“reputational harm,” “crater new business,” and “jeopardize existing projects,” Doe Corporations

now move to proceed under pseudonyms. See ECF No. 2-1 (Mot.) at 2. As Plaintiffs have not

made the detailed showing required to overcome the presumption in favor of disclosure, the

Court will deny the Motion. See LCvR 40.7(f) (providing that Chief Judge shall “hear and

determine . . . motion[s] to file a pseudonymous complaint”).

I. Legal Standard

Generally, a complaint must identify the plaintiff. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a); LCvR

5.1(c)(1). This identification requirement reflects the “presumption in favor of disclosure [of

litigants’ identities], which stems from the ‘general public interest in the openness of

1 governmental processes,’ and, more specifically, from the tradition of open judicial

proceedings.” In re Sealed Case,

(D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Wash. Legal Found.

v. U.S. Sent’g Comm’n,

(D.C. Cir. 1996)). A party moving to proceed

pseudonymously thus “bears the weighty burden of both demonstrating a concrete need for such

secrecy[] and identifying the consequences that would likely befall it if forced to proceed in its

own name.” In re Sealed Case,

(D.C. Cir. 2020). As a result, the court must

“‘balance the litigant’s legitimate interest in anonymity against countervailing interests in full

disclosure’” by applying a “flexible and fact driven” balancing test.

(quoting In re Sealed

Case,

). That test assesses “five non-exhaustive factors”:

[1] whether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve privacy in a matter of [a] sensitive and highly personal nature;

[2] whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the requesting party or[,] even more critically, to innocent non-parties;

[3] the ages of the persons whose privacy interests are sought to be protected;

[4] whether the action is against a governmental or private party; and, relatedly,

[5] the risk of unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action against it to proceed anonymously.

at 326–27 (quoting In re Sealed Case,

) (first alteration in original).

II. Analysis

Although their Motion raises close questions, Plaintiffs have, for now, not met their

burden to show that their privacy interests outweigh the public’s presumptive and substantial

interest in learning their identities. The Court will address each of the five factors in turn.

2 First, disclosure of Plaintiffs’ identities will not reveal any information of a “sensitive

[or] highly personal nature.”

at 326 (quoting In re Sealed Case,

). The

Complaint reveals no “intimate or sensitive personal information” of the kind “traditionally

recognized under this factor, such as sexual activities, reproductive rights, [and] bodily

autonomy.” Doe v. Rogers,

, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2023) (quoting Doe v.

Bogan,

, 23 (D.D.C. 2021)). Although the harms Plaintiffs allege do not fall

into that category, they nonetheless maintain that disclosure would “cause severe reputational

and financial harm.” Mot. at 9. These concerns are certainly relevant to the first factor. See

Doe v. Lieberman,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2020) (weighing whether

disclosure of allegations of professional misconduct against plaintiff would limit her ability to

practice medicine). They cannot, however, be mere “speculative and unsubstantiated claims of

harm.” John Doe Co. No. 1 v. CFPB,

(D.D.C. 2016) (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiffs have provided adequate evidence to support “their contention that public

disclosure that they are subject to an ongoing [IDB] investigation would likely cause them

debilitating reputational and financial hardship.”

. They submit a declaration from John

Doe, the “Group Chief Legal Officer and General Counsel of Doe Corporation 1, the parent

company of Doe Corporation 2, Doe Corporation 3, and Doe Corporation 4.” ECF No. 2-2 (John

Doe Decl.), ¶ 2. Doe explains that “Doe Corporations will suffer severe and permanent harm if

their identities are disclosed.” Id., ¶ 4. Like the declarant in John Doe Co. No. 1, Doe has

“substantial experience” in the relevant industry. Id., ¶ 3. And like the John Doe Co. No. 1

declarant, Doe notes the “highly competitive nature of Doe Corporations’ industry” and the

likelihood that Plaintiffs will lose business from current and potential customers. Id., ¶ 10; see

John Doe Co. No. 1,

. He explains that “Doe Corporations rely to a

3 significant degree on their hard-earned reputation for ethical dealings and regulatory compliance

when soliciting new customers, maintaining current customers, and obtaining approvals from

governments and regulatory authorities typically needed to conduct their business activities”;

indeed, “[e]ntities accused of or adjudicated to have engaged in corrupt conduct are often barred

from or otherwise disadvantaged in participating in commercial tenders.” Doe Decl., ¶ 7. Doe

buttresses those assertions with specific examples of harm Doe Corporations have already

suffered. He recounts an instance in which a government agency “reversed course and barred [a

subsidiary of Doe Corporation 1] from participating in [an] event on account of supposed

‘integrity concerns’ that the IDB had raised about Doe Corporations.” Id., ¶ 9. He also avers

that the government of the country in which the relevant commercial project is sited is likely to

terminate its agreement with Doe Corporations based on Defendant’s allegations. Id., ¶ 11.

This, then, is not a case in which Plaintiffs have “merely asserted that disclosure of the ongoing

investigation could fracture the plaintiffs’ business relationships” or only “loosely identified the

mechanism for potential damage but did not more specifically explain why harm was likely to

result.” John Doe Corp. v. PCAOB,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 2025). Doe

Corporations have instead provided sufficient explanations and support to succeed under the first

factor.

The second and third factors, however, support disclosure. Plaintiffs do not express any

fear that the IDB will retaliate against them, nor do they contend that any minors are involved.

Whether these factors are thereby framed as “inapplicable,” Doe v. Merrill Lynch,

, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 2016), or weighing “in favor of disclosure,”

their

disposition makes Plaintiffs’ Motion less compelling insofar as they fail to support the use of a

pseudonym.

4 The fourth factor also supports disclosure. The IDB is “an international organization that

was created by a multinational agreement.” Compl., ¶ 35. While it is not a governmental actor,

it nevertheless has a quasi-governmental structure and purpose and therefore may “not share the

concerns about reputation that private individuals have when they are publicly charged with

wrongdoing.” J.W. v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Doe v.

Cabrera,

(D.D.C. 2014)). Regardless of the governmental status of Defendant,

moreover, this Court favors pseudonymity in lawsuits against a government defendant only when

plaintiffs request individualized relief. Plaintiffs’ challenge is not grounded in their specific

circumstances or limited to individualized relief; as they explain, they seek “to resolve questions

of law — including those concerning the IDB’s immunity and compliance with contractual

duties — on an undisputed factual record.” Mot. at 15. Because their “arguments would clearly

apply beyond [their] case,” this factor weighs against pseudonymity. John Doe Corp. v.

PCAOB,

, at *3.

The fifth factor, on the other hand, supports pseudonymity. Defendant would suffer no

“risk of unfairness” if the Motion were granted, as it is already aware of Plaintiffs’ identities.

See Mot. at 15; In re Sealed Case,

n.1 (explaining that this factor is “not

implicated” where defendant knows plaintiff’s identity).

In sum, the first and fifth factors weigh in favor of granting pseudonymity. Because the

second, third, and fourth factors support disclosure, however, the Court concludes that Doe

Corporations have not met “the weighty burden” of “demonstrating a concrete need” for

pseudonymity in this lawsuit. In re Sealed Case,

.

5 III. Conclusion

The Court accordingly ORDERS that:

1. Plaintiffs’ [2] Motion for Leave to File Under Pseudonym is DENIED;

2. Within fourteen days of the Court’s Order, Plaintiffs shall file a Notice advising the

Clerk of the Court whether they wish to proceed with filing the Complaint on the

public docket using their real names, and, if so, shall also file their [2] Motion on the

public docket as an appendix to the Notice; and

3. If Plaintiffs do not file such Notice within fourteen days, the Clerk is directed to

terminate the case.

/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG Chief Judge Date: May 15, 2025

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