UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KOKO ACHACHAK,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 24-cv-2005 (TSC)

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff brought this suit pro se on July 10, 2024. Compl., ECF No. 1. On October 24,

2024, he filed an Amended Complaint, the operative complaint. Am. Compl., ECF No. 4. He sues

Defendants United States of America, the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Secretary of

Commerce Gina Raimondo, and the United States Census Bureau (collectively, “Defendants”),

under the Alien Tort Statute,

, to “resolve issues related to [his] status and rights

as a citizen of the Maipuri Arauan Nation (MAN).”

at 1–3. Plaintiff alleges that he is a citizen

of the Maipuri Arauan nation and therefore “a foreigner and alien to the United States.”

at 1–

2. He brings claims “for crimes against humanity and denying and interfering with [his] rights to

access plenipotentiary protections, as provided by [his] nations representatives and the laws of the

United States of America.”

.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that “on February 6, 2015, the United States Commerce

Department Inspector General agreed that fraud had been committed against” him and ordered the

Census Bureau to change and adjust their records related to Plaintiff’s identity.

. But

according to Plaintiff, the Commerce Department and the Census Bureau have not adjusted their

1 records, and therefore he claims that Defendants have “committed or aided and abetted in various

actions of Constructive Fraud, Identity Theft, [and] Forced Identity as a means to suppress and

oppress, Unlawful Conversion, Economic Deception, and Ethnic Cleansing” in violation of the

First, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution of the

United States and other protections “accorded by (sic) Plaintiff by Law of nations, treaty, and

Customary international Law.”

. He further claims that Defendants are “participants

involved in what appears to be systemic crimes against humanity and systemic racism against

Plaintiff,” given, in part, the “forced nationality and fraudulent identification practices and

policies” used by the Commerce Department and the Census Bureau.

.

Among other relief, Plaintiff demands compensation in the amount of ten million dollars

($10,000,000) “per year for each year of identify fraud committed by [the Commerce Department]

and [the Census Bureau]” and an order that the Census Bureau and Commerce Department adjust

their records related to Plaintiffs’ identity.

.

Defendants moved to dismiss. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 5. Because sovereign

immunity bars Plaintiffs’ claims, the court will GRANT Defendants’ motion.

Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “possessing only that power

authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton,

(2013) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff must establish that the court has subject-matter

jurisdiction over the claims in the complaint. Shuler v. United States,

(D.C.

Cir. 2008); White v. United States,

(D.D.C. 2011). If the plaintiff is

unable to do so, the court must dismiss the action. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,

(1998) (citation omitted).

2 “A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’” and “a pro se complaint, however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,

(1976)). But this standard “does not constitute a license for a plaintiff filing pro se to ignore

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or expect the Court to decide what claims a plaintiff may or

may not want to assert.” Jarrell v. Tisch,

(D.D.C 1987) (citations omitted).

And a pro se plaintiff must nevertheless establish a basis for jurisdiction. Bickford v. United States,

(D.D.C. 2011) (“Although a pro se complaint is held to a less stringent

standard than other complaints, even a pro se plaintiff . . . bears the burden of establishing that the

Court has subject matter jurisdiction.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The court will dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) because sovereign immunity bars Plaintiffs’ claims. “Absent a waiver,

sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” FDIC v. Meyer,

(1994). In order to overcome this bar, a plaintiff must prove that the United

States has waived its sovereign immunity. See Tavoulareas v. Comnas,

(D.C.

Cir. 1983) (“Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing jurisdiction . . . and it must appear on the

face of the complaint[.]”).

The Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), which vests in federal district courts “original jurisdiction

[over] any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a

treaty of the United States,”

, does not confer any waiver of foreign sovereign

immunity. Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.C. Cir. 2015). The ATS “is

a purely jurisdictional statute, [] does not itself create a private cause of action,” Ofisi v. BNP

Paribas, S.A.,

, 676 (D.C. Cir. 2023), and is not a valid basis for suing the United

3 States, see El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 2010) (en

banc) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“The Alien Tort Statute has never been held to cover suits

against the United States or United States Government officials.”); see also Angeni v. U.S. Dep’t

of Com., No. 24-cv-2006 (CRC),

, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 25, 2024) (dismissing

claim against Census Bureau for misclassifying plaintiff as “Black” rather than “American

Aborigine” because ATS “cannot be used to sue the United States for damages.”); Kongari v.

United States Dep’t of Com., No. CV 24-1919 (UNA),

, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 11,

2025) (dismissing case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after finding sovereign immunity

barred similar claims against the Commerce Department and its Secretary).

To the extent Plaintiff intends to assert common law torts claims against any federal

defendant, see Am. Compl. at 4, those claims must proceed under the Federal Tort Claims Act

(FTCA), which does not “confer a cause of action,” but “merely provides a method for enforcing

state tort law against the federal government.” Buie v. United States,

, at *5

(D.D.C. 2024), aff’d,

(D.C. Cir. 2025). But the only proper defendant in an

FTCA case is the United States, not “individuals or [ ] particular government agencies.” Cox v.

Sec’y of Lab.,

(D.D.C. 1990) (“Since the plaintiff elected to sue the Secretary

of Labor in her official capacity rather than the government itself, the complaint must fail for that

reason alone for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”).

Further, the United States may be sued under the FTCA only after the plaintiff has “first

presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency.”

(a); see also McNeil v.

United States,

(1993) (“The FTCA bars claimants from bringing suit in federal

court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies.”). The exhaustion requirement is a

mandatory jurisdictional prerequisite. GAF Corp. v. United States,

(D.C. Cir.

4 1987). Because Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts showing that he complied with this exhaustion

requirement as to any tort claims he makes against the United States, those claims must be

dismissed.

For the reasons set forth above, the court will GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,

ECF No. 5, and DISMISS this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. An Order will

accompany this opinion.

Date: May 27, 2025

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

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