UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SHAUNTA M. RICHARDSON,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24 - 2517 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Shaunta Richardson filed this lawsuit against her former employer, the National Railroad

Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

, and the District of Columbia Human Rights

Act. Amtrak has moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies the

motion in part and grants it in part. Ms. Richardson’s discrimination claims and her retaliation

claim under

survive the Defendant’s motion.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Complaint. Wright v.

Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found.,

(D.C. Cir. 2023). The Court also takes

judicial notice of Ms. Richardson’s complaint filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC), which Amtrak attached to its motion. See Mot. Dismiss, Ex. A, ECF No. 9-

2; Ndondji v. InterPark Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2011) (“A court may consider an

EEOC complaint and Notice of Charge without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment because such records are public documents of which a court may take judicial

notice.” (cleaned up)).

Ms. Richardson joined Amtrak as a police officer in January 2012. Compl. ¶ 29, ECF No. 1.

She excelled in the role, earning “Officer of the Year” in 2018, an award given to “only one police

officer in all of Amtrak’s operations nationwide each year.” Id. ¶ 30. The same year, she was

promoted to Patrol Sargeant. Id. ¶ 31. But in January 2023, things took a turn when Ms. Richardson

reported mistreatment by Captain Dawn Cook, “one of her immediate commanders,” to two

members of the Amtrak Police union and her immediate supervisor. Id. ¶ 32. She reported

“intimidation and differential treatment” from Captain Cook “in comparison to a comparable white

male Amtrak police officer named David Brooks[.]” Id. After filing that report, Ms. Richardson

was “subjected to a stream of negative actions by Captain Dawn Cook,” including “denial of

employment opportunities, forced work when injured, unwarranted criticisms, coerced transfer of

work assignments, letters of instruction, . . . and, ultimately, termination[.]” Id. ¶ 33.

In February 2023, Ms. Richardson injured her left hand while at work, which required

surgery. Id. ¶ 42. While she was out on approved “injury on duty” leave, Captain Cook “approved

docking [her] pay for 72 hours of missed time.” Id. ¶¶ 43–44. The same month, Captain Cook

refused to allow her to postpone a firearms training, which required utilizing her injured left hand.

Id. ¶ 45. A police sergeant informed Ms. Richardson that Captain Cook “was the supervisor who

did not allow” her to postpone the training. Id. ¶ 46. Captain Cook then “refused to allow

[Ms. Richardson] to take on light administrative duty in the form of a week-long detail in

California that was scheduled for April 2023[.]” Id. ¶ 47.

In March 2023, an Amtrak inspector named Victor Green informed Ms. Richardson that

Captain Cook had filed a complaint regarding her “holding external employment” and “booking

2 clients for a hair styling business while on duty at Amtrak.” Id. ¶¶ 34, 38. Captain Cook had “stated

or implied that certain pictures on Instagram of Plaintiff braiding her own hair and her children’s

hair, were pictures of Plaintiff’s hair clients and that such activities occurred while Plaintiff was

on duty at Amtrak, which was not true.” Id. ¶¶ 36, 38. The same month, Ms. Richardson learned

that she passed the “promotional [Sargeant’s exam] with the second highest score out of 54 test

takers and had scored the highest of any of the Washington, D.C. test takers.” Id. ¶ 91.

Three incidents then led to disciplinary action against Ms. Richardson. First, in August

2023, a group of intoxicated females entered the station and Ms. Richardson “raised her voice a

little bit” to warn them about blood on the floor. Id. ¶¶ 57–58. One of the individuals complained

that Ms. Richardson was “rude to her regarding a medical call.” Id. ¶ 57. Second, in November

2023, Ms. Richardson and other officers restrained an individual in a wheelchair who “made

incomprehensible and belligerent demands to Amtrak employees” and “grabbed

[Ms. Richardson’s] hand aggressively[.]” Id. ¶¶ 62–65. “[T]he man fell out of the wheelchair,

grabbing [Ms. Richardson] and pulling her down and, in the process, grabbing her vest, body

camera, and radio microphone, and swinging his hands aggressively at her face.” Id. ¶ 66.

Ms. Richardson put the man, whose face was bloody, in handcuffs and asked another individual

to call an ambulance. Id. ¶¶ 67–69. A use of force investigation later found that Ms. Richardson’s

“actions were justified, and that there was no violation of any Amtrak Police rule or procedure for

restraining a person in such circumstances.” Id. ¶ 72. But later, another use of force panel that

included Captain Cook convinced the investigator to “renege his position,” and the investigator

“changed his vote to ‘unjustified and not within policy’ with no explanation whatsoever.” Id. ¶ 74.

Finally, in January 2024, a “black female patron made several threats to cause Amtrak Police

Officers bodily harm and resisted being handcuffed.” Id. ¶ 75. Ms. Richardson, also an African-

3 American woman, id. ¶ 10, “used two mild phrases that, in the black community, are known to

refer to being loud and obnoxious and unruly in a public place” and “to a certain type of shoes[.]”

Id. ¶ 76. Amtrak interviewed Ms. Richardson about the incident, and she was “taken out of

service.” Id. ¶¶ 77–78. Amtrak listed the charge as “rudeness and use of force.” Id. ¶ 78.

On March 13, 2024, Amtrak conducted a disciplinary hearing to review all three incidents.

Id. ¶ 79. Ms. Richardson’s union argued that Amtrak “did not engage in proper procedures and

investigation in regard to these incidents” and “did not follow proper grievance procedures,

including failing to meet filing deadlines.” Id. ¶¶ 80–81. For example, prior to the March 2024

hearing, neither Ms. Richardson nor her union were told that two of the earlier incidents were “the

subject of further investigations,” which represents a “violation of the collective bargaining

agreement’s Rule 34B.” Id. ¶¶ 83–84. Furthermore, Amtrak “refused to produce” and “did not

preserve” body camera footage from “those present at the incidents[.]” Id. ¶ 85. After the Amtrak

Police Department Use of Force Panel reviewed the August 2023, November 2023, and January

2024 incidents, id. ¶¶ 86, 88–89, it suspended Ms. Richardson for five days, id. ¶ 86, and then

“discharged [her] from her Amtrak employment, ‘effective immediately,’” id. ¶¶ 88–89.

According to Ms. Richardson, this was in stark contrast to Amtrak’s treatment of a white male

Amtrak police officer, Sergeant Kevin Dauphin, who “made racial slurs in the presence of an

African-American Amtrak Police Officer.” Id. ¶ 87. Despite the fact that this was “reported to

Amtrak Police Commanders,” absolutely “no discipline was imposed on Sargeant Dauphin.” Id.

Ms. Richardson appealed the disciplinary actions to the Public Law Board. Id. ¶ 90.

Ms. Richardson also “formally complained to Amtrak” about Captain Cook’s conduct at least three

times between January 5, 2023[,] and May 18, 2023.” Id. ¶ 93. And she “timely filed a charge of

race and gender discrimination” with the EEOC “on or about May 22, 2024, which was cross-filed

4 to the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights.” Id. ¶ 9. She ultimately filed this lawsuit

“with[in] 90 days of receipt of a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC,” dated June 2, 2024. Id.

Amtrak’s actions have caused Ms. Richardson “great mental, emotional, and physical

harm, including but not limited to embarrassment, emotional distress, humiliation, indignity,

anxiety, and resulting injury and loss[.]” Id. ¶ 95. And Ms. Richardson lost a promotion

opportunity because of “disciplinary papers in her file for the incidents and matters described

above[.]” Id. ¶ 92. She has “fully mitigated her damages” by “taking reasonable measures to seek

employment to replace her lost wages as a result of her unlawful termination.” Id. ¶ 96.

B. Procedural Background

On August 31, 2024, Ms. Richardson filed the instant lawsuit, alleging six counts of racial

discrimination and retaliation. See Compl. ¶¶ 97–177. In Count 1, Ms. Richardson alleges that

Amtrak violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by subjecting her to racial discrimination.

Id. ¶¶ 97–107. In Count 2, she alleges that Amtrak intentionally retaliated against her based on

protected activity in violation of Title VII. Id. ¶¶ 108–18. In Count 3, she alleges racial

discrimination under

.

¶¶ 119–30. In Count 4, she alleges intentional

retaliation in violation of

.

¶¶ 131–40. In Count 5, she alleges race

discrimination under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), §§ 2-1401.01–2-

1401.04. Id. ¶¶ 141–63. And in Count 6, she alleges retaliation under the DCHRA, § 2-1402.61.

Id. ¶¶ 164–77. The Defendant moved to dismiss on December 16, 2024, urging dismissal under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss (Mot. Dismiss), ECF No. 9.

The matter is now fully briefed. See Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 16; Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 18.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

5 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Gilliard v.

Gruenberg,

(D.D.C. 2018); see also Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham,

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (“A claim crosses from conceivable to plausible when it

contains factual allegations that, if proved, would ‘allow[] the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678)). This requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully[.]”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

DISCUSSION

Amtrak argues that all six claims should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court

agrees that the Title VII and DCHRA retaliation claims fail. But Ms. Richardson has adequately

pleaded discrimination under Title VII, the DCHRA, and Section 1981, and retaliation under

Section 1981. Amtrak describes the underlying allegations as “implausible, speculative, and

unsupported[.]” Reply at 1. But accepting Mr. Richardson’s allegations as true, as it must, the

Court finds that these claims survive dismissal at this early stage.1

1 Although Amtrak construes the Complaint as including a hostile work environment claim, see Mot. Dismiss at 8–11, Ms. Richardson clarified that her Complaint “does not set forth explicitly a cause of action using the term ‘hostile work environment’” and that she “intends to move to file an Amended Complaint to include” such a claim. Pl.’s Opp’n at 17 n.2. But Ms. Richardson never filed that motion, so the Court will not proceed down that path. See de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary,

(D.C. Cir. 2013) (noting that “plaintiffs are ‘masters of the complaint’ with the power to bring those claims they see fit” (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams,

(1987))); see also Sabra ex rel. Baby M v. Pompeo,

, 314 n.9 (D.D.C. 2020) (declining to “construe the operative complaint as asserting [an APA claim]” when “[the plaintiff], as the master of the complaint, did not assert [that claim]”).

6 A. Discrimination (Counts 1, 3, and 5)

Ms. Richardson first alleges race discrimination in violation of Title VII, see Compl. ¶¶ 97–

107, Section 1981,

¶¶ 119–130, and the DCHRA,

¶¶ 141–163. Title VII makes it unlawful

to “discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national

origin[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making

and enforcement of contracts, guaranteeing all persons the same contractual rights as white

citizens. See

(a). And Section 2-1402.11(a) of the DCHRA prohibits D.C.

employers from discriminating against individuals on the basis of race in hiring, firing,

compensation, or other terms and conditions of employment. See

(a).

1. Timeliness

At the threshold, the Defendant urges the Court to dismiss claims relating to events that

occurred prior to May 28, 2023, because both Title VII and DCHRA “impose statutory filing

obligations on employees” that Ms. Richardson has not met. Mot. Dismiss at 4. Title VII requires

an employee to file a charge within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory acts. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(e)(1) (a charge must be filed “three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment

practice occurred”). And the DCHRA requires an employee to file a complaint within one year of

the alleged discriminatory acts. See

(a) (a complaint must be filed “within

one year of the unlawful discriminatory act, or the discovery thereof,” and the “timely filing of a

complaint . . . shall toll the running of the statute of limitations while the complaint is pending”).

Ms. Richardson filed an EEOC charge on May 22, 2024. So the Court agrees that she may only

pursue Title VII claims for conduct that occurred on or after August 2, 2023, and DCHRA claims

7 for conduct that occurred on or after May 28, 2023. Any other conduct cannot form the basis for

her Title VII and DCHRA claims before this Court.

Ms. Richardson invokes the doctrine of “equitable tolling” to argue otherwise. Pl.’s Opp’n

at 16–17. But equitable tolling does not help her. Equitable tolling applies when a party “has been

pursuing his rights diligently” and “some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Robinson

v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Off. of Inspector Gen.,

(D.C. Cir. 2023) (cleaned up).

An “extraordinary circumstance” must be one that is “beyond [the litigant’s] control,” Menominee

Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 2014), aff’d,

(2016), and is not “a product of that litigant’s own misunderstanding of the law or tactical mistakes

in litigation,” Young v. SEC,

(D.C. Cir. 2020). Ms. Richardson presents no facts

to suggest extraordinary circumstance caused the delay, much less that it resulted from

circumstances beyond her control.2

Amtrak does not assert any timeliness defense to Ms. Richardson’s Section 1981 claims.

See Mot. Dismiss at 13–15. For good reason. Section 1981 “does not contain its own statute of

limitations period.” Harris v. Perini Corp.,

(D.D.C. 1996). Instead “federal courts

apply ‘the most appropriate or analogous state statute of limitations to claims based on asserted

violations of § 1981,’” Newman v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 21-cv-531,

, at *5

(D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2022) (quoting Jones v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co.,

(2004),

and “[i]n the District of Columbia, the applicable statute of limitations is three years,” Kargbo v.

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,

(D.D.C. 2017) (citing

(8)).

2 Ms. Richardson also raises the “continuing violation” doctrine in response to the Defendant’s timeliness arguments. Pl.’s Opp’n at 17–18. But she makes this argument about “a hostile work environment claim,”

, which she says she did not bring, see supra, at 6 n.1.

8 2. Merits

Turning to the merits, courts evaluate all three discrimination claims under the Title VII

standard. See Burt v. Nat’l Republican Club of Capitol Hill,

(D.D.C.

2011) (noting that “in addressing employment discrimination claims under [

and

the DCHRA], courts look to the jurisprudence surrounding Title VII”); see also Johnson v. Dong

Moon Joo, No. 01-cv-0004,

, at *19 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2006) (using the Title VII

framework as a “a short-hand reference” when analyzing claims brought under the DCHRA and

). A Title VII plaintiff must show (1) that she belongs to a protected class, (2) that

she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that a causal connection exists between her

protected characteristic and the adverse employment action. See Caison v. Tulino, No. 23-cv-2414,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2025) (citing Baloch v. Kempthorne,

(D.C. Cir. 2008)). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff is “not required

to plead every fact necessary to establish a prima facie case” but must instead “plead sufficient

facts to show a plausible entitlement to relief.” Bartlette v. Hyatt Regency,

(D.D.C. 2016) (cleaned up). Ms. Richardson has plausibly alleged all three elements of her

discrimination claims under Title VII, the DCHRA, and Section 1981.

a. Protected Class

Amtrak does not contest that Ms. Richardson, who is African American, Compl. ¶ 10, is

part of a protected class.

b. Adverse Employment Action

Ms. Richardson points to adverse employment actions in the form of “discriminatory

discipline, denial of promotional opportunities, and discriminatory termination.” Compl. ¶¶ 99,

143. She also alleges “discriminatory termination of employment and inability to maintain and

9 enforce a contract to the same degree as is enjoyed by white citizens, including to perform her job

duties as an Amtrak employee under a contract.” Id. ¶ 121.3 Unsurprisingly, Amtrak does not

contest that Ms. Richardson’s termination is an adverse employment action. Mot. Dismiss at 6–7;

see also Douglas v. Donovan,

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (describing “termination” as an

“obvious” adverse employment action). It argues only that the alleged discriminatory discipline

and denial of promotional opportunities do not represent a “significant change” in

Ms. Richardson’s employment. Mot. Dismiss at 6.

But Amtrak relies on precedent that no longer holds. The Supreme Court recently rejected

the rule that the harm an employee suffers must be “significant,” “[o]r serious, or substantial, or

any similar adjective suggesting that the disadvantage . . . must exceed a heightened bar” for there

to be an adverse employment action. Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Mo.,

, 355 (2024).

Instead, an employee need only show “some harm” with respect to “an identifiable term or

condition of employment.” Id. at 354–55. Muldrow aligned with the D.C. Circuit’s holding in

Chambers v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2022), decided two years earlier. See

Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 353 n.1 (describing Chambers as “overruling precedent that demanded an

‘objectively tangible harm’ and rejecting a ‘material adversity’ requirement” (quoting Chambers,

35 F.4th at 876–77)). Applying Muldrow and Chambers, Ms. Richardson has plausibly alleged

adverse employment actions.

Starting with discriminatory discipline, Ms. Richardson alleges a host of disciplinary steps

that Amtrak took, including “a verbal warning” and “letter of counseling” related to tardiness,

Compl. ¶¶ 53–54, and a “notice of discipline” regarding her alleged “derogatory” statement to a

3 The Court does not consider Ms. Richardson’s alleged adverse actions that are time-barred. See supra at 7–8.

10 citizen, id. ¶ 59. “Even post-Chambers (and post-Muldrow), courts have found that to be

considered an adverse employment action, a letter of reprimand must lead to some deleterious

change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Wilson v. Noem, No. 20-cv-100,

, at *24 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2025) (collecting cases). But a “formal reprimand can

be an adverse action . . . if it serves as ‘a building block’ that justifies an adverse action down the

road,”

(cleaned up), and Ms. Richardson alleges that her disciplinary record led to her ultimate

termination, see Compl. ¶¶ 88, 92. In the end, the link between the disciplinary steps and her

termination “may ultimately be found too tenuous,” Robb v. Vilsack, No. 20-cv-0929,

, at *13 (D.D.C. July 19, 2021), but her allegations are sufficient at this stage.

Ms. Richardson next alleges that she was passed over for a promotion to Sergeant because

of disciplinary history. See Compl. ¶ 92 (“Plaintiff has . . . missed out on promotion opportunities

to Sergeant due to the existence of disciplinary papers in her file for the incidents and matters

described above, that precluded or suppressed consideration of her for promotions that would have

come after passing the Sergeant’s exam.”). Amtrak argues that Ms. Richardson’s “Complaint fails

to describe with any detail whatsoever any alleged ‘denial of promotional opportunities.’”

Mot. Dismiss at 6, n.5 (citing Compl. ¶ 99). But Ms. Richardson does provide details, noting that

she passed the promotional test with the “second highest score out of 54 test takers” and “scored

the highest of any of the Washington D.C. test takers,” yet still did not receive a promotion to

Sergeant. Compl. ¶¶ 91–92. These allegations are sufficiently detailed at the motion to dismiss

stage to sustain a claim for failure to promote, a workplace act that has long been recognized as

adverse under Title VII, see Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,

(1998)

(“A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as

hiring, firing, [or] failing to promote[.]”); see also Perry v. Donovan,

, 119

11 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Plaintiff correctly argues there is an adverse employment action if the employee

is denied an opportunity for promotion[.]”).

c. Causation

Turning to causation, Ms. Richardson alleges disparate treatment by pointing to a

comparator, Sergeant Kevin Dauphin, “a white male Amtrak police officer” who “made racial

slurs in the presence of an African-American Amtrak Police Officer” and faced “no discipline.”

Compl. ¶ 87. Amtrak argues that Sergeant Dauphin is not similarly situated. Mot. Dismiss at 8.

The Court disagrees.

A plaintiff alleging Title VII discrimination can prevail by showing that the protected

characteristic was either a “but-for cause” of the adverse employment action or a “motivating

factor” in the adverse action. See Ponce v. Billington,

(D.C. Cir. 2012)

(“In addition to the but-for standard, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) provides that ‘an unlawful

employment practice is established when . . . race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a

motivating factor for any employment practice.’” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m))). And at the

motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff is not required to plead a prima facie case. See Swierkiewicz v.

Sorema N.A.,

(2002) (referring to the prima facie framework as “an evidentiary

standard, not a pleading requirement”). Instead, the question is whether the facts plausibly suggest

that a prima facie case could later be established. See Gilliard,

(noting that

courts can “explore the plaintiff’s prima facie case at the dismissal stage to determine whether the

plaintiff can ever meet her initial burden” (cleaned up)); cf. Skinner v. Switzer,

, 529–

30 (2011) (noting that when “resolv[ing] a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,” the

question is not whether the plaintiff will “ultimately prevail,” but whether the allegations are

“sufficient to cross the federal court’s threshold” (cleaned up)).

12 Ms. Richardson’s allegations suffice at this stage. She raises an inference of discrimination

by alleging “that she was treated differently from similarly situated employees who are not part of

the protected class.” George v. Leavitt,

(D.C. Cir. 2005). Ms. Richardson’s

allegations about her white colleague, Sergeant Dauphin, who faced “no discipline” for making

“racial slurs,” Compl. ¶ 87, stands in stark contrast to her own experience being “taken out of

service” (i.e., fired) for two derogatory statements to a customer, see

¶¶ 76–78. To be sure, this

single comparator may not ultimately carry the day for Ms. Richardson, but it is sufficient to

survive a motion to dismiss. See Ryan-White v. Blank,

(D.D.C. 2013)

(“[S]ince discovery may reveal direct evidence of discrimination, it would be ‘incongruous to

require a plaintiff, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, to plead more facts than he may

ultimately need to prove to succeed on the merits.’” (quoting Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511–12));

see also Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510–511 (“Before discovery has unearthed relevant facts and

evidence, it may be difficult to define the precise formulation of the required prima facie case in a

particular case.”). As Ms. Richardson herself points out, “discovery may well show many more

valid comparators,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 21, and substantiate her claims.

B. Retaliation (Counts 2, 4, and 6)

Ms. Richardson also argues that Amtrak retaliated against her for protected activity under

Title VII, see Compl. ¶¶ 108–18, Section 1981,

¶¶ 131–40, and the DCHRA,

¶¶ 164–177.

Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision prohibits retaliation where an employee “‘opposed any

practice’ made unlawful by Title VII or ‘made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in’ a

Title VII proceeding or investigation.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 56 (citing

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)); see also Rochon v. Gonzales,

(D.C. Cir. 2006)

(noting that § 2000e-3(a) applies to the federal government through § 2000e–16). Similarly, the

13 DCHRA makes it unlawful “to coerce, threaten, retaliate against, or interfere with any person in

the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of having exercised or enjoyed . . . any right granted

or protected under” the Act.

(a). And Section 1981 prohibits retaliation for

opposing racial discrimination, providing that all persons shall have the same right “to make and

enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”

; see Harris v. D.C. Water

& Sewer Auth.,

, 69–70 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The Court will again evaluate all three

claims under the Title VII standard. See Harris, 791 F.3d at 68–69 (applying the same standard to

retaliation claims under Title VII and

); Gibson v. Kirkland & Ellis, LLP, No. 23-

cv-3371,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2025) (noting that “the analysis for DCHRA

retaliation is the same for Title VII”).

To state a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a Plaintiff must show that (1) she

engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) the employer took an adverse employment action

against her, and (3) a causal connection existed between the two. Gibson,

, at *4

(collecting cases). At the motion to dismiss stage, “the issue is not whether the plaintiff will

ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.”

Swierkiewicz,

; see also Rochon,

(“[I]n order to survive a motion

to dismiss, all [the] complaint has to say is [that] ‘the [defendant] retaliated against me because I

engaged in protected activity.’” (cleaned up)). The Court finds that Ms. Richardson’s retaliation

claim under Section 1981 survives this liberal pleading standard, but it dismisses her claims under

Title VII and the DCHRA.

1. Protected Activity

Ms. Richardson alleges that she “formally complained about Captain Dawn Cook’s

conduct at least three times between January 5, 2023, and May 18, 2023.” Compl. ¶ 93. “[A]n

14 activity is protected for the purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim if it involves opposing alleged

discriminatory treatment by the employer or participating in legal efforts against the alleged

treatment.” Belov v. World Wildlife Fund, Inc., No. 21-cv-1529,

, at *5 (D.D.C.

Oct. 13, 2021) (cleaned up). “While no magic words are required, the complaint must in some way

allege unlawful discrimination—that is, discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic.”

Middlebrooks v. Godwin Corp.,

(D.D.C. 2010) (cleaned up). Here,

Ms. Richardson engaged in protected activity when she reported alleged racial discrimination by

Captain Cook. See Compl. ¶ 32. But she made those reports between January and mid-May 2023,

see id. ¶ 93, and events that occurred prior to May 28, 2023, may not form the basis for

Ms. Richardson’s Title VII or DCHRA claims, see supra, at 7–8. So while Ms. Richardson has

adequately alleged that she engaged in statutorily protected activity for her Section 1981 retaliation

claim, she has not done so for her Title VII and DCHRA claims.

2. Adverse Action

An employee pleading retaliation must show that “she engaged in protected activity, as a

consequence of which her employer took a materially adverse action against her.” Taylor v. Solis,

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). “A materially adverse action is one that ‘could

well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’”

(quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 57). This inquiry is “fact-specific” and

“highly contextual.” Lawrence v. Lew,

(D.D.C. 2016) (cleaned up).

Ms. Richardson relies on several alleged adverse actions to sustain her retaliation claims,

including “denial of employment opportunities, forced work when injured, unwarranted criticisms,

coerced transfer of work assignments, letters of instruction, which are a form of discipline, and,

ultimately, termination of [her] employment.” Compl. ¶ 33. Her complaint also details various

15 disciplinary actions that Amtrak took, including a “verbal warning” and “letter of counseling”

related to tardiness,

¶ 53–54, a “notice of discipline” regarding her alleged “derogatory”

statement to a customer, id. ¶ 59, and being “taken out of service” for “rudeness and use of force,”

id. ¶ 78. Amtrak argues that actions that occurred between January 5, 2023, and May 28, 2023,

may not support Ms. Richardson’s retaliation claim because she failed to comply with the statutory

filing requirements. Mot. Dismiss at 12 n.10. But the statutory time bars apply only to the Title

VII and DCHRA claims; all of Ms. Richardson’s allegations are fair game for the Section 1981

claim. See supra, at 7–8.

Ms. Richardson’s allegations that she was terminated and passed over for a promotion

easily satisfy the materially adverse action standard. See Bridgeforth v. Jewell,

(D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Typically, a materially adverse action in the workplace involves ‘a significant

change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with

significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in benefits.”

(quoting Taylor v. Small,

(D.C. Cir. 2003))); see also Blackmon-Malloy v.

U.S. Capitol Police Bd., No. 01-cv-2221,

, at *15 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2024)

(referring to a failure to promote as “a classic indication of material adversity”); Rogers v. Voltron

Data, Inc., No. 24-cv-84,

, at *8 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2024) (holding that the

plaintiff’s termination “plainly represents materially adverse employment action”).

Her remaining allegations are a closer call. Typically, “formal criticisms or reprimands,

without additional disciplinary action such as a change in grade, salary, or other benefits, do not

constitute adverse employment actions.” Stewart, 275 F.3d at 1136 (citation omitted). But formal

discipline can be an adverse action “if it serves as ‘a building block’ that justifies an adverse action

down the road.” Holmes v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.,

, 17 (D.D.C. 2024);

16 see, e.g., Robb,

, at *13 (finding the plaintiff sufficiently pled that a letter of

reprimand was a “building block” when it “l[ed] to an objectively tangible harm—her ultimate

termination”). Here, Ms. Richardson alleges that some of the disciplinary actions Amtrak took—

including a verbal warning and letter of counseling, Compl. ¶ 53–54, notice of discipline,

,

and removal from service,

¶ 78—factored into her lack of promotion and termination,

(noting that the “existence of disciplinary papers in her file for the incidents and matters described

above . . . precluded or suppressed consideration of her for promotions”), 79 (noting that “a

disciplinary hearing was conducted that reviewed [three prior disciplinary incidents]”). Thus, even

if those actions would not have been adverse actions on their own, they served as “building blocks”

for her lack of promotion and ultimate termination.

But the same is not true of the remaining alleged actions: unwarranted criticisms, letters of

instruction, transfer of work assignments, and being forced to work when injured. Compl. ¶ 33.

Ms. Richardson does not allege that any of these actions led to her lack of promotion or

termination. In fact, she provides no details about the “letters of instruction.”

And a general

allegation of “unwarranted criticisms,”

, is a “purely subjective” injury that does not meet

the adverse action requirement, Holcomb v. Powell,

(D.C. Cir. 2006); see also

Blackmon-Malloy,

, at *15 (noting that “petty slights [and] minor

annoyances . . . do not rise to the level of material adversity necessary for a retaliation claim”

(cleaned up)).

3. Causation

Finally, turning to causation, “traditional principles of but-for causation” apply to Title VII

retaliation claims, Segal v. Harris Teeter Supermarkets, Inc., No. 15-cv-1496,

,

at *8 (D.D.C. Dec. 13, 2016), meaning that the plaintiff must show “that the unlawful retaliation

17 would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer,”

(quoting Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,

(2013)). To meet this

requirement, “a plaintiff may submit direct evidence of retaliation” or “may allege facts supporting

an inference of retaliation[.]” Blackmon-Malloy,

, at *11 (cleaned up). A causal

relationship between the protected activity and the adverse action “may be inferred through either

temporal proximity or the existence of a pattern of antagonism.” Román v. Castro,

(D.D.C. 2016) (citing Taylor, 571 F.3d at 1322–23). And at the motion to dismiss

stage, “the hurdle of alleging a causal link is not a high one[.]” Doe 1 v. George Wash. Univ.,

(D.D.C. 2019) (citation omitted).

Although there is no direct evidence of retaliatory intent, the Court finds sufficient

circumstantial evidence at the motion to dismiss stage. Starting with temporal proximity, it can

“support an inference of causation, . . . but only where the two events are ‘very close’ in time[.]”

Woodruff v. Peters,

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden,

, 273–74 (2001)). Ms. Richardson complained about Captain Cook’s behavior

between January 5, 2023, and May 18, 2023. See Compl. ¶ 93. Those complaints are too far

detached from her March 13, 2024, termination, id. ¶¶ 86, 88, to establish temporal proximity on

their own. See, e.g., Ho v. Garland,

(D.C. Cir. 2024) (explaining that although

“neither the Supreme Court nor this [Circuit] has established a bright-line rule” for temporal

proximity, “the Supreme Court has cited circuit decisions suggesting that in some instances a three-

month period between the protected activity and the adverse employment action may, standing

alone, be too lengthy to raise an inference of causation”); see also Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist.,

(concluding that a gap of “20 months . . . suggests, by itself, no causality at all”). And

Ms. Richardson has not provided enough information about her lack of promotion for the Court to

18 assess temporal proximity. See Compl. ¶¶ 91–92 (explaining that she was not promoted to

Seargeant even though she “passed the promotional test with the second highest score out of 54

test takers” and “the highest of any of the Washington, D.C. test takers,” but neglecting to including

any allegations about timing); see Johnson v. DeJoy, No. 23-cv-2342,

, at *8

(D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2024) (“When the chief evidence relied upon by the plaintiff to establish the

causal connection is the temporal proximity, courts have, at a minimum, required the plaintiff to

plead specific dates of the protected activity and the adverse action.”).

But the lack of temporal proximity does not doom Ms. Richardson’s retaliation claim.

Accepting her allegations as true, she has raised an inference of causation based on the “existence

of a pattern of antagonism.” Román,

(citation omitted); see also Ho,

(The plaintiff’s complaint did “not rely solely on the timing of his non-selection in

relation to his EEO complaints. He pled several other facts . . . that together support an inference

of causation.”). Ms. Richardson alleges that a “stream of negative actions” actions followed her

complaints about Captain Cook, Compl. ¶ 33, including disciplinary action, see

¶¶ 53–54

(“verbal warning” and “letter of counseling” in May 2023 related to tardiness), 59 (“notice of

discipline” regarding alleged “derogatory” statement to a customer in August 2023), 78 (being

“taken out of service” for “rudeness and use of force” in February 2024), and other actions,

including being forced to work when injured,

¶¶ 42–45 (alleging that she was forced to attend

a firearm training in February 2023 while still recovering from hand surgery), and being disallowed

from “tak[ing] on light administrative duty” in April 2023 after her injury, id. ¶ 47. And her

Complaint raises an inference that Captain Cook weaponized one of these incidents against her.

See id. ¶ 74 (alleging that Captain Cook “convinced” Amtrak’s police inspector to change his

position on Ms. Richardson’s use of force). Courts have found causation satisfied through the

19 pattern-of-antagonism theory in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Román,

(finding causation where adverse actions “occurred against a backdrop of a cycle of protected

activity and repeated adverse personnel actions”); Rogers,

, at *2, 9 (finding a

pattern of antagonistic activity when a supervisor “attacked [the plaintiff] on email chains,”

“removed [her] from projects,” and “disinvited her from key leadership meetings”).

Whether Ms. Richardson can ultimately carry her burden and prevail on her retaliation

claim will depend on the facts “unearthed” by discovery. Swierkiewicz,

. Amtrak

may well produce evidence of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its decisions. But at the

motion to dismiss stage, the likelihood of a plaintiff’s success is irrelevant. See Munro v. LaHood,

(D.D.C. 2012) (“Despite these doubts as to whether plaintiff will

ultimately be able to prove that he suffered an adverse employment action, the Court finds that

plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.”). The Court is satisfied that

Ms. Richardson has alleged facts sufficient to raise an inference of retaliation.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court denies the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9, as to

Count 1 (discrimination under Title VII), Count 3 (discrimination under Section 1981), Count 4

(retaliation under Section 1981), and Count 5 (discrimination under the DCHRA), and grants the

motion as to Count 2 (retaliation under Title VII) and Count 6 (retaliation under the DCHRA).

A separate order will issue.

SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge

Date: June 3, 2025

20