UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TROY REGIS,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24 - 2405 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan

KRISTI NOEM,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Troy Regis, a former fingerprint specialist at the United States Secret Service, brought this

lawsuit to recover damages under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act, alleging discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work

environment. He alleges that his supervisors at the Secret Service discriminated against him based

on his race and age by placing him on a performance feedback plan, revoking his telework

privileges, and subjecting his work to additional scrutiny. The Defendant has moved to dismiss

under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For the reasons below, the Court

denies the motion in part and grants it in part.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Complaint. Wright v.

Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found.,

(D.C. Cir. 2023).

Troy Regis is an “African American, born in Trinidad and Tobago,” who “was 59 years of

age” at the time of the following events. Compl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 1. He worked at the Secret Service

as a “Fingerprint Specialist” in the “Forensic Services Division for 14 years,” id. ¶ 7, before his supervisors “instituted a concerted effort to remove older and African American or Black

employees from the Forensic Services Division,” id. ¶ 8.

According to Mr. Regis, his supervisors “exclud[ed] [him] and other older African

American employees from training opportunities, . . . [and] assignments that would assist in their

development as specialists as well as their mastery of new technologies.” Id. ¶ 9. His supervisors

also “singled them out and over scrutinized their work to set them up for failure and removal.” Id.

Mr. “Regis complained [to his supervisor’s boss] . . . that he had been treated less favorably than

others outside his protected classes in that [his supervisors] were subjecting him to greater scrutiny

and accusing him of lapses in or poor performance when the objective evidence illustrated the false

nature of their claims.” Id. ¶ 19. Despite similar complaints from others in the organization, no

action was taken. See id.

Mr. Regis then “filed a formal EEO complaint concerning the discriminatory conduct” on

December 31, 2022. See id. ¶¶ 5, 19. His “supervisors were aware of his protected activity, namely

formal and informal complaints of discrimination and retaliation[.]” Id. ¶ 27. And “soon after,”

his supervisors “placed [Mr. Regis] on a [Performance Improvement Plan (PIP)],” id. ¶ 19,

“[d]espite objective evidence which demonstrated that [he] was on track to meet the requisite

number of completed cases for acceptable performance,” id. ¶ 11. His supervisors also “falsely

contended that [Mr.] Regis was not on track to complete the requisite number of cases for

acceptable performance and that the cases he had processed contained too many errors,” id., in

spite of evidence that his “level of errors or case revisions were no greater than the level of errors

committed or case revisions of other Fingerprint Specialists who were not African American,

Trinidadian born, over the age of 40 and who had not engaged in protected activity,” id. ¶ 12.

2 Although the “PIP contained objectively unreasonable requirements,” Mr. Regis

nevertheless “completed the requisite number of cases for acceptable performance in the rating

year (which ended just days after the PIP ended) and made no more errors during the PIP than was

typical of case processing[.]” Id. ¶ 13. But his supervisors “determined that [Mr.] Regis failed to

successfully complete the PIP,” and “gave [him] an unacceptable performance rating for the rating

year.” Id. ¶ 14. While “[t]he pressure and pace of properly processing cases is great,” the “scrutiny

and false accusations [from his supervisors] concerning the pace in which [Mr. Regis] was

completing work and the manner in which he was processing cases . . . added unduly to th[is]

typical stress.” Id. ¶ 15. These “verbal reprimands” “reflected [his supervisors’] discriminatory

animus against African Americans and older employees.” Id. ¶ 17. Further, Mr. Regis was required

to “participate in weekly []check-ins[] with a non[-]supervisory employee” that “Fingerprint

Specialists outside of [his] protected classes were not similarly required to participate in” and

which “took away from [his] normal work day.” Id. ¶ 16. His supervisors also “canceled

[Mr. Regis’s] telework privileges,” even while they were not canceled for “Fingerprint Specialists

outside his protected classes[.]” Id. ¶ 18.

B. Procedural Background

Mr. Regis filed this lawsuit against the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland

Security, alleging discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 1 See Compl.

at 1. On February 12, 2025, the Defendant moved to dismiss this case pursuant to Federal Rules

1 The Plaintiff named former Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Alejandro N. Mayorkas, as the Defendant in the Complaint. The current Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Kristi Noem, is “automatically substituted as a party” in his place pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).

3 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 9. This motion is fully briefed.

See Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 10; Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 13.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction. See Lujan v. Defs.

of Wildlife,

, 559–61 (1992). In reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), courts “construe the complaint liberally,” granting

the plaintiff “the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Thomas v.

Principi,

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (cleaned up).

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must dismiss a complaint that does not “contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)).

Courts “must construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of

all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). But courts need not accept as true “a legal conclusion couched

as a factual allegation,” nor an inference “unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.”

Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm’n,

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (cleaned up).

DISCUSSION

The Defendant urges dismissal of all of the claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Def.’s Mot. at 5–12. The Defendant also argues that

Mr. Regis cannot seek compensatory damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(ADEA), and seeks dismissal of that request under Rule 12(b)(1). See

at 12–13. The Court

dismisses the hostile work environment claims but denies the motion to dismiss the discrimination

and retaliation claims. And the Plaintiff does not appear to be seeking compensatory damages

under the ADEA.

4 A. Discrimination

1. Title VII

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing]

against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]” 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To establish a claim under Section 2000e-2(a)(1), a plaintiff must

demonstrate (1) that he belongs to a protected class, (2) that he suffered an adverse employment

action, and (3) that a causal connection exists between his protected characteristic and the adverse

employment action. See Baloch v. Kempthorne,

(D.C. Cir. 2008). Mr. Regis

has plausibly alleged all three elements of his Title VII discrimination claim.

a. Protected Class

There is no dispute that Mr. Regis is African American, Compl. ¶ 6, and thus belongs to a

protected class.

b. Adverse Employment Action

Mr. Regis has also suffered adverse employment action. He alleges that his supervisors

“excluded [him] . . . from training opportunities, . . . assignments that would assist in [his]

development as [a] specialist[] as well as [his] mastery of new technologies[,] and singled [him]

out and over scrutinized [his] work to set [him] up for failure and removal.” Compl. ¶ 9. He also

alleges that his supervisors “gave [him] an unacceptable performance rating,” id. ¶ 14, “despite

[his] objectively superior performance when compared” to “non-African American Fingerprint

Specialists,” id. ¶ 21. And they removed his telework privileges. See id. ¶ 18. These allegations

clear the bar at the motion to dismiss stage. See Muldrow v. City of St. Louis,

, 354–55

(2024) (requiring “some harm” in the term or condition of employment to constitute an adverse

5 employment action under Title VII); see also, e.g., Mitchell v. Garland, No. 23-cv-2412,

, at *4 (D.D.C. July 1, 2024) (finding adverse employment action where supervisors

“refus[ed] to respond to [the plaintiff’s] messages in a timely manner, requir[ed] [the plaintiff] to

work on holidays, requir[ed] [the plaintiff] to complete a training that others did not have to

complete, [gave the plaintiff] an unfavorable performance rating, and chang[ed] [the plaintiff’s]

schedule without notice”); Dixon v. Blinken, No. 22-cv-2357,

, at *3 (D.D.C.

Sept. 11, 2024) (finding that the “denial or revocation of a telework schedule constitutes an adverse

change to the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” (cleaned up) (collecting cases)).

c. Causal Connection

Finally, Mr. Regis also adequately pleads a causal connection. A plaintiff may demonstrate

causation by showing that he was “treated differently from similarly situated employees who are

not part of the protected class.” George v. Leavitt,

(D.C. Cir. 2005). And

Mr. Regis alleges that despite his “level of errors or case revisions [being] no greater than the level

of errors committed or case revisions of other Fingerprint Specialists who were not African

American,” he was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 11–19.

At this stage, this is sufficient to link the adverse action to his protected status. See, e.g., Ross v.

U. S. Capitol Police,

, 204–05 (D.D.C. 2016) (finding discriminatory motive

where the defendant “den[ied] [the plaintiff] the opportunity to perform notwithstanding his

protective order (in contrast to other non-African American employees) and . . . by recommending

[the plaintiff] for termination as a result of the performance limitation (when no such

recommendation was made for a similarly situated white employee)”); Winston v. Clough,

(D.D.C. 2010) (finding an adequate claim under Title VII where the plaintiff alleges

that “that other co-workers outside of [his] protected class used their cell phones more than he did,

6 yet none was suspended or disciplined for it”); Ghawanmeh v. Islamic Saudi Acad.,

(D.D.C. 2009) (finding sufficient that the “plaintiff [wa]s asserting that she was treated

differently from Saudis and men who applied for the leave she was refused, and who were not

fired as a result of seeking that leave, as she was”).

The Defendant argues that Mr. Regis has not met his burden, relying on cases finding no

causation despite allegations of similarly situated comparators. See Def.’s Mot. at 5–7. But those

cases involved nothing “more than the bald assertion[s]” of “similarly situated comparator[s.]” See

Mitchell,

, at *4 (finding that the complaint failed to provide “facts about the

identity, race, or other characteristics of any alleged comparator”); SS & T, LLC v. Am. Univ.,

No. 19-cv-721,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2020) (concluding that the plaintiffs

“cannot merely allege that similarly situated leaseholders not owned by persons of Indian-descent

were treated differently and then offer ‘nothing more in the way of specific facts or allegations

associated with this claim’”). But Mr. Regis does more. He alleges that the Fingerprint Specialists

outside his protected class committed similar errors. See Compl. ¶ 12. Yet they were not subject

to a performance improvement plan, see id. ¶¶ 11, 12, or similarly scrutinized, see id. ¶ 15. And

they did not have their telework privileges revoked. See id. ¶ 18. These allegations are sufficient

at this stage of the proceedings. See, e.g., Ryan-White v. Blank,

(D.D.C.

2013) (“[S]ince discovery may reveal direct evidence of discrimination, it would be ‘incongruous

to require a plaintiff, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, to plead more facts than he may

ultimately need to prove to succeed on the merits.’” (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,

, 511–12 (2002)).

7 2. ADEA

The ADEA prohibits age discrimination in federal employment.

(a). An

ADEA plaintiff must demonstrate: “that ‘(1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he suffered

an adverse employment action, and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of

discrimination (that is, an inference that his employer took the action because of his membership

in the protected class).’” Bartlette v. Hyatt Regency,

, 321–22 (D.D.C. 2016)

(quoting Brown v. Sessoms,

(D.C. Cir. 2014)). Mr. Regis makes this showing.

a. Protected Class

Mr. Regis alleges that he was 59 years old when the events giving rise to this suit occurred,

see Compl. ¶ 6, and so he falls within the ADEA’s protected class,

(a).

b. Adverse Employment Action

Mr. Regis also satisfies the second element. To show an adverse employment action, a

plaintiff must demonstrate that he has been discriminated against with respect to his “terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). This requires “some harm

respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment,” but he need not show that “the harm

incurred was significant[, or] . . . serious, or substantial, or any similar adjective suggesting that

the disadvantage to the employee must exceed a heightened bar.” Muldrow,

.

Mr. Regis alleges that his supervisors excluded him from training opportunities, see id. ¶ 9, placed

him on a performance improvement plan that required weekly check-ins, see id. ¶¶ 11, 16, and

cancelled his telework privileges, see id. ¶ 18. These allegations survive dismissal at this early

stage of the litigation. See supra, at 5–6; see also Wilson v. Cox,

(D.C. Cir.

2014) (noting courts “generally apply the same approach in ADEA cases” as “in Title VII cases”).

8 c. Inference of Discrimination

Finally, Mr. Regis’s allegations raise an inference of discrimination. A plaintiff may

establish an inference of discrimination through either “direct evidence of . . . animus” or a

comparison to a similarly situated employee. Yuvienco v. Vilsack, No. 23-cv-186,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2024). Where a plaintiff relies on a comparison to a similarly

situated employee, the plaintiff “must also demonstrate that all of the relevant aspects of his

employment situation were nearly identical to those of the other employee.” Burley v. Nat’l

Passenger Rail Corp.,

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). Here, Mr. Regis alleges

his “level of errors or case revisions were no greater than the level of errors committed or case

revisions” of similarly situated Fingerprint Specialists outside of his age group. Compl. ¶ 12. And

Mr. Regis experienced less favorable treatment, including exclusion from training opportunities,

see id. ¶ 9, weekly check-ins that took time away from his normal schedule, see id. ¶ 16, and

cancellation of his telework privileges, see id. ¶ 18. These allegations are sufficient at this stage.

See Swierkiewicz,

(finding that a complaint with allegations about the events

leading up to an adverse action and the ages of at least some of the relevant persons involved with

the adverse action satisfied the pleading standard for an age discrimination claim under the

ADEA); see also, e.g., Golden v. Management & Training Corporation,

(D.D.C. 2018) (finding a plaintiff’s allegation that he “was treated less favorably than similarly

situated younger managers employed by Job Corps who did not satisfactorily perform their duties

during [the plaintiff’s] tenure” to be sufficient to make out a claim under the ADEA (cleaned up));

Washington v. District of Columbia Housing Authority,

, 241–42 (D.D.C.

2016) (the plaintiff pleading “that other . . . employees outside of the ADEA’s protected class were

9 treated more favorably than he was” was sufficient to “give [the] plaintiff’s ADEA claim facial

plausibility”).

B. Retaliation

A retaliation claim under either Title VII or the ADEA requires that a plaintiff show (1) that

he engaged in protected activity, (2) that he suffered a materially adverse action by his employer,

and (3) a causal link between the two events. See Howard R.L. Cook & Tommy Shaw Found. Ex

rel. Black Emps. Of Libr. of Cong., Inc. v. Billington,

(D.C. Cir. 2013)

(retaliation claim under Title VII); Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc’y,

(D.C. Cir. 1991)

(retaliation claim under the ADEA); see also Tomasello v. Rubin,

(D.C. Cir.

1999) (“[T]he test for determining retaliation under the ADEA and Title VII is identical.”). To

establish causation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his protected activity was the but-for cause

of the employer’s adverse action, Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,

(2013),

through direct evidence of retaliatory intent or circumstantial evidence showing that (1) “the

employer had knowledge of the employee’s protected activity” and (2) “the adverse action took

place shortly after that activity,” Mitchell v. Baldrige,

(D.C. Cir. 1985). While

temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse action is sufficient to establish

causation, the two events must be “very close” in time. See Bergbauer v. Mabus,

(D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Hamilton v. Geithner,

, 1357–58 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

It is undisputed that Mr. Regis engaged in protected activity when he “filed a formal EEO

Complaint concerning [his supervisors’] discriminatory conduct.” Compl. ¶ 19; see Holbrook v.

Reno,

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (filing an EEO complaint is protected activity under

Title VII). Mr. Regis has also sufficiently alleged that he suffered adverse actions by his employer

because of his protected activity. Mr. Regis’s supervisors “soon after [he filed his EEO complaint]

10 placed [him] on a PIP,” Compl. ¶ 19, and following his completion of the PIP, they “gave [him]

an unacceptable performance rating for the rating year,” id. ¶ 14. “[C]ourts in this jurisdiction

consistently have held that the imposition of a PIP—even one that does not result in a negative

impact on salary, grade or performance appraisal—can constitute an adverse action” for a

retaliation claim. Crowley v. Vilsack,

(D.D.C. 2017) (collecting cases).

The same goes for “lowered performance review[s].” Turner v. Buttigieg, No. 23-cv-1665,

, at *9 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2024).

All that remains to be determined is whether Mr. Regis has established a causal link

between his protected activity and the materially adverse employment actions. Mr. Regis relies on

the temporal proximity between his protected activity and the subsequent adverse employment

actions. See Compl. ¶ 19 (“Regis then sought EEO counseling and filed a formal EEO complaint

concerning the discriminatory conduct. Regis’s supervisors soon after placed on a PIP.”).

Mr. Regis specifies when he filed his formal EEO complaint, see Compl. ¶ 5 (“Plaintiff timely

filed a formal complaint on December 31, 2022.”), pleads that his “supervisors were aware of his

protective activity,” id. ¶ 27, and alleges that the adverse employment actions took place “soon

after,” id. ¶ 19. This is enough at the motion to dismiss stage. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511–

14 (holding that the plaintiff need not plead all elements of his prima facie case in the complaint).

The Defendant argues that specific dates are necessary to establish a causal nexus. See

Def.’s Mot. at 9. But drawing all inferences in the Plaintiff’s favor, temporal proximity is met

where the Complaint alleges that retaliatory action took place “soon after” the protected activity.

See, e.g., Dave v. Lanier,

(D.D.C. 2009) (“drawing all reasonable inferences

in the plaintiff’s favor, the complaint suggests that these adverse acts began soon after he returned

from sick leave” even though “the plaintiff does not specify the exact interval between the

11 protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory acts”); Brown v. Snow,

(D.D.C. 2005) (“To demonstrate causation in the absence of direct evidence, . . . the plaintiff must

show that the employer knew of the protected activity and that the adverse action occurred soon

thereafter.”).

C. Hostile Work Environment

Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect

to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s

race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). This language makes it

unlawful for an employer to “requir[e] people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive

environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,

(1993). Because in this Circuit,

“[c]ourts apply the same Title VII standard to ADEA hostile work environment claims,” this Court

will analyze Mr. Regis’s hostile work environment claims under Title VII and the ADEA as one.

McArdle v. District of Columbia, No. 19-cv-3637,

, at *8 (D.D.C. April 22,

2025) (collecting cases).

To prevail on a retaliatory hostile-work-environment claim, “a plaintiff must show that his

employer subjected him to ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ that is ‘sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive

working environment.’” Baloch,

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Harris,

). “To determine whether a hostile work environment exists, the court looks to the totality of the

circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, its

offensiveness, and whether it interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Baloch,

(citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,

, 787–88 (1998)). “The Supreme

Court has made it clear that ‘conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and

12 conditions of employment.’” George v. Leavitt,

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting

Faragher,

). By adhering to these standards, a court “ensure[s] that Title VII does

not become a general civility code” that involves the courts in policing “the ordinary tribulations

of the workplace[.]” Faragher,

(cleaned up).

Mr. Regis argues that he was subject to a hostile work environment that was so severe and

pervasive that it altered the conditions of his employment. But plaintiffs face a high bar in hostile

work environment claims, see Baloch,

(D.C. Cir. 2008), and Mr. Regis cannot

meet his burden.

First, Mr. Regis contends that his supervisors “placed [him] on a Performance

Improvement Plan,” Compl. ¶ 11, “falsely contended that [he] was not on track to complete the

requisite number of cases for acceptable performance and that the cases Regis had processed

contained too many errors,”

and “gave [him] an unacceptable performance rating for the rating

year,” id. ¶ 14; see also id. ¶ 15 (supervisors subjected Mr. Regis to “false accusations concerning

the pace in which he was completing work and the manner in which he was processing cases added

unduly to the typical stress”); id. ¶ 17 (supervisors “subjected [Mr.] Regis to verbal reprimands

concerning his performance . . . includ[ing] his pace of work and the method in which he

completed case assignments”). But performance improvement plans and criticisms of work, while

unpleasant, are part of the daily churn of a workplace and thus do not establish a hostile work

environment. See, e.g., Sims v. Sunovion Pharms., Inc., No. 17-cv-2519,

, at

*22 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2020) (“Many of the challenged actions here—including [the] Plaintiff’s

performance review and placement on a [Performance Improvement Plan]—are the type of ‘work-

related actions by supervisors’ that provide insufficient grounds for a hostile work environment

claim.” (quoting Grosdidier v. Chairman, Broad. Bd. of Governors,

, 111

13 (D.D.C. 2011))); Yuvienco,

, at *5 (collecting cases); Nurriddin v. Bolden,

(D.D.C. 2009) (explaining that “disparaging remarks” and “‘lowered

performance evaluations’” cannot “be characterized as sufficiently intimidating or offensive in an

ordinary workplace context”).

Second, Mr. Regis claims that he was subject to “greater scrutiny” including “weekly

check-ins with a non-supervisory employee . . . that took away from [his] normal work day[.]”

Compl. ¶¶ 15, 16. But these are typical employment grievances that do not establish a hostile work

environment. See Nurriddin,

(“[T]he removal of important

assignments . . . and close scrutiny of assignments by management [cannot] be characterized as

sufficiently intimidating or offensive in an ordinary workplace context.”).

Third, the allegations that Mr. Regis’s supervisors “canceled [his] telework privileges,”

Compl. ¶ 18, are insufficiently severe or offensive to support a hostile work environment, see, e.g.,

Xie v. Chao, No. 21-cv-1289,

, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2022) (concluding that

“[d]enying requests for telework” was insufficient for a hostile work environment); Tyes-Williams

v. Whitaker,

(D.D.C. 2019) (concluding that “a plaintiff’s being denied . . . the

opportunity to telecommute,” among other things, “came ‘nowhere near satisfying

the . . . standard’ for a hostile work environment” (quoting Beckwith v. Ware,

,

5–6 (D.D.C. 2104))); Koch v. White,

, 167–68 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding that

denial of a request for “part-time telework arrangement” did not create hostile work environment

claim).

At bottom, Mr. Regis’s complaints of typical “work-related actions by supervisors” are not

sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile work environment claim. Munro v. LaHood,

(D.D.C. 2012); see, e.g., Crews v. Carson, No. 19-cv-3538,

12948520, at *5–7 (D.D.C. Oct. 16, 2020) (low performance reviews, unfair scrutiny, interference

with management of subordinates, and a letter of reprimand were insufficient to establish a hostile

work environment); Davila v. Mayorkas, No. 22-cv-357,

, at *9 (D.D.C. Feb.

17, 2023) (collecting other cases).

D. Compensatory Damages under the ADEA

The Defendant urges dismissal of the Plaintiff’s request for compensatory damages under

the ADEA, arguing that the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity for such damages.

See Def.’s Mot. at 12. But the Plaintiff has clarified that he is not seeking compensatory damages

under the ADEA. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 10 (“The Complaint Does Not Pray for Compensatory

Damages Under the ADEA.”). That settles that matter.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies in part and grants in part the Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9.

A separate order will issue.

SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge

Date: June 4, 2025

15