UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

HENRY SEARCY, JR.,

Plaintiff, Case No. 23-cv-140 (JMC)

v.

THOMAS J. VILSACK, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Henry Searcy, proceeding pro se, sues U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) officials

for alleged mistreatment he endured while employed at the agency. ECF 1.1 Defendants move to

dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ECF 4. Searcy has filed

several motions challenging Defendants’ Westfall Act certification, ECF Nos. 9–12, as well as a

motion for leave to file an amended complaint, ECF 22.

While briefing in this case was underway, Searcy filed another, virtually identical case,

which was assigned to another judge in this District. See Searcy v. Vilsack, No. 23-cv-3166, ECF 1

(D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2023). The district court dismissed that case for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed. Searcy v. United States, No. 23-cv-3166,

(D.D.C. May 14, 2024), aff’d, No. 24-5160,

(D.C. Cir. Jan. 15, 2025).

The doctrine of collateral estoppel, otherwise known as issue preclusion, provides that once

a court has decided an issue of law or fact, its decision generally prevents those same parties from

1 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the top of each page.

1 relitigating that issue in the future. Allen v. McCurry,

(1980). This rule “relieve[s]

parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve[s] judicial resources,

and . . . prevent[s] inconsistent decisions.”

The issues at the heart of Searcy’s case were already

conclusively resolved in 23-cv-3166, and those decisions have preclusive effect here. Furthermore,

the Court concludes that Defendants’ Westfall Act certification was proper. As such, the Court

will GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF 4; DENY Searcy’s motions challenging

Defendants’ Westfall certification, ECF Nos. 9–12; and DENY Searcy’s motion for leave to file

an amended complaint, ECF 22, as futile.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Searcy worked for the USDA as an Economic and Community Development Policy and

Outreach Coordinator. See ECF 1-1 at 173. In November 2017, the USDA announced that it

planned to realign staff in Searcy’s office, the Office of Outreach (OAO), to either the Office of

External Affairs (OEA) or the Rural Development Innovation Center. ECF 1 ¶¶ 1–2. Soon after,

Searcy learned that his duties would be realigned to the OEA as part of this departmental

reorganization. Id. ¶¶ 2, 4. Searcy contends that this realignment or reassignment was unlawful

because his role was required by statute to be located within the Rural Development (RD) Mission

Area, not the OEA. See id. ¶¶ 12–13.

In October 2018, OEA Director Marie Wheat told Searcy “that a budget related to his OAO

duties was not available,” but that she needed help with various OEA duties. Id. ¶ 5.

Searcy alleges that Wheat and Julie Henderson (the Rural Development Space

Coordinator) “conspired” to relocate his office. Id. ¶ 8. In January 2019, Searcy discovered that

his belongings had been moved from his single office to a group office on a different floor. Id. ¶ 6.

This set off a months-long dispute over where he should work. At one point, Wheat “kicked in the

2 door” of the office where Searcy was working and yelled at him “in an abusive aggressive manner”

to “GET OUT . . . AND SIT IN ROOM 4807 – NOW!” Id. ¶ 12. In total, Searcy alleges that he

was required to move offices five times in eight months “in order to force [him] to perform only

OEA duties.” Id.

In March 2019, Wheat again told Searcy that there was no budget available for his OAO

duties. Id. ¶ 9.

During a July 2019 performance review, Wheat told Searcy that she knew he earned a

higher salary than her and other OEA employees, and that she “needed to get more out of him.”

Id. ¶ 10. The meeting “took a turn” when Searcy asked Wheat to allocate OEA funds to his OAO

duties. Id. Wheat responded, “you do not get to spend OEA funds!” and told him that OEA does

not perform OAO functions. Id. Searcy “expressed his lack of interest in performing OEA

functions.” Id. Wheat said that she would “MANDATE [Searcy] to perform OEA functions and

require him to move to room 4168.” Id.

In October 2019, Wheat accused Searcy of being AWOL and said that she would conduct

a “[m]anagement inquiry” into his time and attendance issues. Id. ¶ 11. Later that month, Wheat

removed Searcy from his position on the Interagency Council for the Homeless and replaced him

with a political appointee. Id. ¶ 12.

In October 2020, Searcy contacted HR because he believed that his position description

(PD) had been “falsified.” Id. ¶ 13. According to Searcy, the PD had been altered to state that he

reported to the Director of OEA rather than the Deputy Undersecretary, and worked for the OEA

rather than the RD Mission Area. Id. When Searcy contacted an HR representative to ask about

the changes, the representative told him that “Angilla Denton reassigned [him] to the OEA.” Id.

¶ 14. Searcy filed a “whistleblower complaint” about the changes to his PD. Id.

3 Disputes over Searcy’s job duties persisted. Searcy continued to inquire into why there was

no budget for his OAO functions, and Wheat continued to insist that he perform only OEA

functions. See id. ¶¶ 15–18. During a meeting, employee relations representative Stephanie

Mitchell told Searcy that he was “more than welcome to file whatever grievance action that is

appropriate.” Id. ¶ 17. Searcy told Mitchell and Wheat, “NO ONE SHOULD BE FORCED TO

DO WORK THAT IS NOT A PART OF THEIR JOB DESCRIPTION!” and Mitchell and Wheat

hung up. Id. In April 2020, Wheat and Misty Giles “removed [Searcy’s] OAO duties . . . and

forced [him] to perform OEA functions only.” Id. ¶ 18.

Searcy filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint in April 2020. Id. ¶ 19.

In September 2020, Searcy learned that he was being relocated to the RD Innovation Center. Id.

¶ 22. In October 2020, Searcy reviewed his employment paperwork and learned that he had been

“reassigned” rather than “realigned” to the RD Innovation Center. Id. ¶ 23. He believed that was

incorrect and filed a reprisal complaint with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Id. He

filed another reprisal complaint with the MSPB in January 2021, id. ¶ 27, and another EEO

complaint for reprisal in April 2022, id. ¶ 33.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Searcy filed this lawsuit in January 2023, suing Secretary of Agriculture Thomas Vilsack,

Deputy Undersecretary of Rural Development Justin Maxson, and USDA employees Misty Giles,

Angilla Denton, Jacki Ponti-Lazaruk, and Marie Wheat. ECF 1. Searcy brings four claims. First,

he alleges tortious interference with employment, arguing that Giles, Denton, Ponti-Lazaruk, and

Wheat “interfered with the employment relationship between the Plaintiff and the OAO by

removing [his] OAO functions and forcing [him] to perform RD OEA functions only.” Id. ¶ 43.

Second, he alleges negligent infliction of emotional distress, arguing that management’s actions

4 caused him to be depressed. Id. ¶¶ 46–50. Third, Searcy brings a negligence claim, contending that

his supervisors failed to “review the Plaintiff’s PD and realign the Plaintiff according to duties

identified within his PD,” consistent with (Searcy’s understanding of) the relevant statutory

provisions. Id. ¶¶ 51–57. Finally, Searcy seeks punitive damages. Id. ¶¶ 58–62.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. ECF 4. Because Searcy explicitly sought relief in

tort, Defendants construed the complaint as one for relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act

(FTCA),

et seq., and therefore substituted the United States as the proper

defendant pursuant to the Westfall Act,

. ECF 4-1. Defendants argue, among

other things, that Searcy’s complaint should be dismissed because his claims for a personal injury

incurred at work are barred by the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA). ECF 4 at 8. In

the alternative, even if FECA did not preempt Searcy’s FTCA claim, Defendants explain that he

would still be unable to prevail. Id. at 9. Searcy has not exhausted administrative remedies as

required by the FTCA; a plaintiff cannot sue under the FTCA for tortious interference with contract

rights; and a plaintiff cannot maintain a suit for punitive damages against the United States. Id.

at 9–10.

The Court entered a Fox order advising Searcy of his obligations in responding to

Defendants’ motion, ECF 5, and Searcy filed an opposition, ECF 15. He also filed four motions

styled as motions “for Attorney General’s Review” of Ponti, Wheat, Denton, and Giles’ actions.

See ECF 9; ECF 10; ECF 11; ECF 12. Defendants construed these motions as challenges to its

Westfall certification and filed an opposition. ECF 13. (Searcy also filed two motions for summary

judgment, which the Court denied as premature. See Dec. 7, 2023 Min. Order.)

In October 2023—while briefing in this case was underway—Searcy filed another case,

23-cv-3166, which was assigned to Judge Trevor McFadden. Searcy sued Secretary Vilsack and

5 Deputy Undersecretary Maxson, but did not name the other four USDA employees as defendants.

See Searcy v. Vilsack, No. 23-cv-3166, ECF 1 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2023). Otherwise, the complaint

in 23-cv-3166 is virtually identical to the complaint in the instant case. Compare id., with ECF 1.

As in the instant case, Defendants in 23-cv-3166 construed Searcy’s complaint as one for

relief in tort under the FTCA, substituted the United States as the proper defendant, and moved to

dismiss. Searcy, No. 23-cv-3166, ECF 10 (D.D.C. Feb. 15, 2024). And again, as in the instant case,

Defendants argued that Searcy’s claims were barred by FECA and, regardless, would fail under

the FTCA. Id. at 12–17.

In May 2024, Judge McFadden granted Defendants’ motion and dismissed the case without

prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Searcy v. United States, No. 23-cv-3166,

, at *1 (D.D.C. May 14, 2024). Judge McFadden found that substitution under the

Westfall Act was proper because “the named Defendants were acting within the scope of their

authority as federal officials at the time of the events alleged.”

at *1 n.1. Judge McFadden

agreed with Defendants that FECA was the exclusive remedy for Searcy’s claims and the district

court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Id. at *3. He also explained that

even if Searcy’s claims were not barred by FECA, the court would still lack jurisdiction because

Searcy failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the FTCA. Id. Although Searcy

had “made some attempts to exhaust related claims against USDA officials” by filing MSPB and

EEO complaints, those complaints did not fulfill the FTCA’s particular exhaustion requirements.

Id. at *3–4. Finally, Judge McFadden determined that Searcy’s claims for tortious interference

were barred by the FTCA’s intentional tort exception, and that he could not maintain a punitive

damages claim against the United States. Id. at *3 n.2.

6 Searcy appealed Judge McFadden’s decision, and this Court stayed the instant case pending

resolution of that appeal. See Sept. 5, 2024 Min. Order. The D.C. Circuit summarily affirmed.

Searcy v. United States, No. 24-5160,

(D.C. Cir. Jan. 15, 2025) (per curiam).

The Circuit held that Searcy “ha[d] shown no error in the district court’s conclusion that the United

States is the proper defendant under the Westfall Act,” and that even assuming his FTCA claims

were not barred by FECA, Searcy did not show that he had exhausted his administrative remedies

as required by the FTCA. Id. at *1. As the court explained, “[a]dministrative exhaustion of related

statutory claims, such as a Title VII discrimination claim, does not on its own suffice to exhaust

administrative remedies for specific tort claims for purposes of the FTCA.” Id.

After the D.C. Circuit issued its decision, Searcy moved this Court for leave to file an

amended complaint. ECF 22. The proposed amended complaint is identical to the original

complaint, except that Searcy seeks to remove Secretary Vilsack and Deputy Undersecretary

Maxson as Defendants, leaving only Giles, Denton, Ponti-Lazaruk, and Wheat. Id. at 1–2.

Defendants oppose, arguing that amendment would be futile because the proposed amended

complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss. ECF 26. Defendants explain that Searcy’s claims

are barred by collateral estoppel because they involve the same issues that were already resolved—

first by Judge McFadden and then by the D.C. Circuit—in 23-cv-3166. Id. at 8–10. Defendants

also argue that Searcy cannot successfully rebut the government’s Westfall certification. Id. at 10–

13.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

When assessing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(1), “[i]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside [the federal courts’] limited

jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

(1994). The court

7 accepts the complaint’s allegations as true, Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham,

(D.C. Cir. 2015), and “where necessary . . . may consider the complaint supplemented by

undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus

the court’s resolution of disputed facts,” Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis.,

(D.C.

Cir. 1992).

Because Searcy is proceeding pro se, the Court considers his complaint “in light of all

filings, including filings responsive to a motion to dismiss.” Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp.,

Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2015). Complaints filed by pro se litigants are “held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Atherton v. D.C. Off. of Mayor,

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007)), but still

“must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of

misconduct,’”

at 681–82 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009)).

IV. ANALYSIS

The Court begins with Searcy’s motions “for Attorney General’s Review,” which it

construes as challenges to Defendants’ Westfall Act certification. See ECF 9; ECF 10; ECF 11;

ECF 12. Because the certification is proper and the United States is the appropriate defendant, the

Court denies those motions. The Court then turns to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. ECF 4. The

key issues Defendants raise in their motion to dismiss—whether FECA is the exclusive remedy

for Searcy’s tort claims and, regardless, whether he failed to exhaust or otherwise could not pursue

his claims under the FTCA—were already resolved in 23-cv-3166. See

at 8–10; see Searcy,

No. 23-cv-3166,

, at *2–4. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Searcy may

not relitigate those issues here. The Court therefore concludes, as did Judge McFadden and the

D.C. Circuit, that Searcy’s complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

8 Finally, the Court denies Searcy’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint, ECF 22, because

the proposed amended complaint also would not survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

A. Westfall Certification

The Westfall Act “accords federal employees absolute immunity from common-law tort

claims arising out of acts they undertake in the course of their official duties.” Osborn v. Haley,

(2007). When a plaintiff sues a federal employee, the Attorney General can

“certify that the employee ‘was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of

the incident.’”

at 229–30 (quoting

(d)(1), (2)). That is what the United States

did here. See ECF 4-1. Upon that certification, the employee is dismissed from the lawsuit and the

United States is substituted as the defendant. Osborn,

.

Searcy has filed four motions calling for the Attorney General to review Ponti-Lazaruk,

Wheat, Denton, and Giles’s actions—which the Court understands to be challenging Defendants’

Westfall certification.2 ECF 9; ECF 10; ECF 11; ECF 12. When a plaintiff contests a Westfall

certification, the certification “constitute[s] prima facie evidence that the employee was acting

within the scope of his employment.” Wuterich v. Murtha,

(D.C. Cir. 2009)

(quoting Council on Am. Islamic Relations v. Ballenger,

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (per

curiam)). “To rebut the certification and obtain discovery, a plaintiff must ‘alleg[e] sufficient facts

that, taken as true, would establish that the defendant[’s] actions exceeded the scope of [his]

employment.’”

(quoting Stokes v. Cross,

(D.C. Cir. 2003)).

2 It is not clear whether Searcy also challenges Defendants’ Westfall certification as to Secretary Vilsack and Deputy Undersecretary Maxson. If so, that issue was already fully litigated in 23-cv-3166: Searcy sued Vilsack and Maxson, the United States substituted itself for those Defendants, and both Judge McFadden and the D.C. Circuit found that the substitution was proper. See Searcy, No. 23-cv-3166,

, at *1 n.1; Searcy, No. 24-5160,

, at *1. Searcy is therefore estopped from relitigating that issue as a matter of issue preclusion—a doctrine the Court discusses in greater detail below. See infra Part IV.B. Because Searcy did not name the four individual USDA employees (Ponti-Lazaruk, Wheat, Denton, and Giles) as defendants in 23-cv-3166, the district court in that case did not have occasion to determine whether those employees were acting outside the scope of their employment. The Court therefore addresses that question on its own terms rather than as a matter of issue preclusion.

9 “Scope of employment questions are governed by the law of the place where the

employment relationship exists”—here, the District of Columbia. Majano v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 2006). Under D.C. law, the “[c]onduct of a servant is within the scope of

employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially

within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve

the master; and (d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force is

not unexpectable by the master.” Schecter v. Merchants Home Delivery, Inc.,

(D.C. 2006) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958)). This test often amounts to

“whether the defendant merely was on duty or on the job when committing the alleged tort.”

Jacobs v. Vrobel,

(D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Harbury v. Hayden,

,

422 n. 4 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). Thus, for example, the D.C. Circuit has held “that a congressman acted

within the scope of his employment when he allegedly defamed the plaintiff during a telephone

call with the press because ‘[s]peaking to the press during regular work hours in response to a

reporter’s inquiry falls within the scope of a congressman’s authorized duties.’”

at 222 (quoting

Ballenger,

).

Searcy argues that Giles, Denton, Ponti-Lazaruk, and Wheat acted outside the scope of

their employment by reassigning or realigning his position (which was created by Section 14218

of the Farm Bill) without appropriate authority to do so, and subsequently requiring him to perform

different functions. See ECF 15 at 6; ECF 27 at 2–7. Per Searcy, “[t]he authority to reassign and

realign OAO/OPPE positions . . . rests within the USDA Departmental Management within the

Assistant to the Secretary for Administration (ASA) not Rural Development.”

But even

assuming that is true, an employee’s conduct may fall within the scope of their employment even

if that conduct is not expressly authorized. “[T]he test is whether the employee’s ‘actions [were]

10 of the same general nature as that authorized or incidental to the conduct authorized.’” Conyers v.

Westphal,

(D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Haddon v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 1995), abrogated in part by Osborn,

). Assigning employees job

duties and requiring them to perform those duties clearly meets that test. See, e.g.,

(approving

Westfall certification even though plaintiff argued that defendant’s actions were beyond the scope

of employment because he was not her supervisor and therefore was not authorized to discipline

her). With that in mind, Defendants’ actions meet the four-part part test laid out above. See

Schecter,

. Assigning Searcy to perform certain job duties within a particular office

are the kinds of actions Defendants are “employed to perform.”

Those actions were performed

“within the authorized time and space limits”—i.e., in the course of the workday. Defendants took

these actions to serve the employer’s interest by effectuating an agency-wide reorganization. See

id.; ECF 1 ¶ 1. Finally, Searcy does not allege any intentional use of physical force against him.

The closest he comes is an allegation that Wheat “kicked in the door” of Searcy’s office and yelled

at him “in an abusive aggressive manner” to leave that office and sit in a different office instead.

ECF 1 ¶ 12. But even assuming that qualifies as intentional use of force against another, it does

not change the Court’s analysis. Barging into a subordinate’s workspace and yelling at them to

move to a different office is certainly inappropriate, but it is not entirely “unexpectable” by an

employer. Schecter,

. In sum, Searcy’s alleged facts demonstrate that Giles,

Denton, Ponti-Lazaruk, and Wheat were “on the job,” and were not acting outside the scope of

their employment. Jacobs,

; see Wuterich,

.

Searcy also seems to argue that the FTCA (and by extension, the Westfall Act) is inapposite

because

(b)(2)(B) applies. See, e.g., ECF 9 at 1. That provision states that the

FTCA is not the exclusive remedy for torts committed by federal employees acting within the

11 scope of their employment if the action “is brought for a violation of a statute of the United States

under which such action against an individual is otherwise authorized.”

(b)(2)(B).

Searcy seems to contend that Section 14218 of the Farm Bill (now codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6941a)

provides such a cause of action. That provision reads: “The Secretary of Agriculture shall establish

a Coordinator for Chronically Underserved Rural Areas . . . to be located in the Rural

Development Mission Area.” 7 U.S.C. § 6941a. The Court can discern neither an express nor

implied right of action here. See El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. United States,

(D.C.

Cir. 2014) (describing four-factor test to determine whether an implied right of action exists). The

provision does not “focus on any particular class of beneficiaries whose welfare Congress intended

to further.” California v. Sierra Club,

(1981). Instead, it is “phrased as a

directive to [the] federal agenc[y]” and regulates the agency’s obligations. Alexander v. Sandoval,

(2001) (quoting Univs. Rsch. Assn., Inc. v. Coutu,

(1981)).

Courts regularly find that such provisions do not confer any private right of action. See, e.g., Coutu,

450 U.S. at 771–72 (no private right of action where statute provided that certain federal contracts

“shall contain” minimum wage provisions); Godwin v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urb. Dev.,

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (explaining that it is unlikely that Congress would create an implicit private

right of action when “enacting a statute that creates federal obligations,” given that “agency action

can normally be reviewed by a district court pursuant to its federal question jurisdiction”).

Because Searcy has not plausibly alleged that Giles, Wheat, Denton, and Ponti-Lazaruk

acted outside the scope of their employment by realigning or reassigning him, and because

(a) does not independently authorize suit against federal employees, Defendants’

Westfall substitution is proper and the United States is the appropriate defendant in this case. The

12 Court therefore denies Searcy’s motions challenging Defendants’ Westfall certification. ECF 9;

ECF 10; ECF 11; ECF 12.

B. Collateral Estoppel

Now that the Court has confirmed that the United States is the appropriate Defendant, the

rest of the case can be resolved as a matter of collateral estoppel. The doctrine of collateral

estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, provides that once a court has decided an issue of law or

fact, its decision generally prevents those same parties from relitigating the issue in the future.

Allen,

. Issue preclusion has three requirements: (1) “the same issue now being raised

must have been contested by the parties and submitted for judicial determination in the prior case”;

(2) “the issue must have been actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent

jurisdiction in that prior case”; and (3) “preclusion in the second case must not work a basic

unfairness to the party bound by the first determination.” Martin v. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Yamaha Corp. of Amer. v. United States,

(D.C.

Cir. 1992)). Even though Searcy filed the instant case before filing 23-cv-3166, “it is the first final

judgment rendered in one of the actions which becomes conclusive in the other action, regardless

of which action was brought first,” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982), and a final

judgment in 23-cv-3166 was entered before any judgment in this case. It is also immaterial that

23-cv-3166 was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, because “[i]ssue preclusion

applies to threshold jurisdictional issues.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA,

(D.C. Cir. 2015).

With the Westfall certification issue resolved, this case is essentially a carbon copy of

23-cv-3166. Searcy challenges the same employment action—his reassignment or realignment—

that he challenged before Judge McFadden. The key merits questions here are (1) whether Searcy’s

13 claims are barred by FECA, and in the alternative, (2) whether he exhausted his FTCA claims or

is otherwise unable to pursue his claims under that statute. See ECF 4 at 8–10. Those issues were

“contested by the parties and submitted for judicial determination in” 23-cv-3166. Martin,

; see Searcy, No. 23-cv-3166,

, at *2–4. Judge McFadden “actually

and necessarily determined” that FECA provides the exclusive remedy for Searcy’s tort claims.

Martin,

; Searcy, No. 23-cv-3166,

, at *3. He further

determined, and the D.C. Circuit agreed, that even assuming FECA did not bar Searcy’s FTCA

claims, Searcy had failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the FTCA. Searcy,

No. 23-cv-3166,

, at *3–4; see Searcy, No. 24-5160,

, at *1.

Judge McFadden also found that Searcy’s tortious interference claims were barred by the FTCA’s

intentional tort exception, and that Searcy’s punitive damages claim was barred because the United

States has not waived sovereign immunity as to punitive damages claims under the FTCA. Searcy,

No. 23-cv-3166,

, at *3 n.2. The D.C. Circuit therefore held that Judge

McFadden properly dismissed Searcy’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Searcy,

No. 24-5160,

, at *1. Finally, preclusion in this case does not “work a basic

unfairness to the party bound by the first determination.” Martin,

(quoting

Yamaha,

). The Court is particularly sensitive to this question given Searcy’s pro

se status, but—after a thorough review of both the district court and appellate record in

23-cv-3166—is more than persuaded that Searcy fully litigated these issues in his other case.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

Searcy’s claims and therefore grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss. ECF 4.

14 C. Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint

Finally, Searcy moves for leave to file an amended complaint. ECF 22. The proposed

amended complaint is identical to the original complaint, except that Searcy seeks to remove

Secretary Vilsack and Deputy Undersecretary Maxson as Defendants, leaving only Giles, Denton,

Ponti-Lazaruk, and Wheat.

at 1–2. “Courts may deny a motion to amend a complaint as

futile . . . if the proposed claim would not survive a motion to dismiss.” James Madison Ltd. by

Hecht v. Ludwig,

(D.C. Cir. 1996). That is the case here, because removing

Secretary Vilsack and Deputy Undersecretary Maxson does not change the Court’s foregoing

analysis. Defendants have substituted the United States as the sole defendant in place of Giles,

Denton, Ponti-Lazaruk, and Wheat, and the Court has already found that Westfall certification to

be proper. Nor, as Defendants point out in their opposition, would Searcy’s amendment change

the preclusive effect of the district court and D.C. Circuit’s rulings in 23-cv-3166. See ECF 26

at 8–10. Searcy’s proposed amended complaint is substantively identical to the operative

complaint and challenges the same employment action—his reassignment or realignment—that

was already conclusively adjudicated. The Court therefore denies Searcy’s motion for leave to file

an amended complaint, ECF 22, as futile.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, Searcy’s motions for Attorney General’s review, ECF Nos. 9–

12, and for leave to file an amended complaint, ECF 22, are DENIED. Defendant’s motion to

dismiss, ECF 4, is GRANTED, and as a result Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

15 SO ORDERED.

__________________________ JIA M. COBB United States District Judge

Date: June 6, 2025

16