UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

EUROFINSA, S.A., : : Petitioner, : Civil Action No.: 23-3013 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 33 : THE GABONESE REPUBLIC, : : Respondent. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO

(C)

I. INTRODUCTION

This action arises out of international arbitration proceedings between Eurofinsa, S.A.

(“Eurofinsa”), a Spanish construction company, and its former client, the Gabonese Republic

(“Gabon”). On January 17, 2025, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and separate Order

entering judgment in favor of Petitioner Eurofinsa. Eurofinsa now moves for an order of

attachment and execution pursuant to

(c). It argues that Respondent Gabon

received proper notice under

(e) and that a reasonable time has elapsed such

that it may seek to attach Gabon’s assets to aid in the execution of the judgment. The Court

agrees with Eurofinsa, and for the reasons below, grants its motion for relief under § 1610(c).

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 15, 2020, Eurofinsa obtained an arbitral award (the “Award”) resulting from

Gabon’s failure to fulfill its contractual obligations. 1 Award 22899/DDA, Ex. A to Pet. to

1 Because Gabon has not appeared in this action, the Court relies on Eurofinsa’s account of the facts. Recognize & Enforce Arbitral Award (“Ex. A”), ECF No. 1-4; Pet’r’s Mem. Supp. Mot. to

Authorize Attach. & Execution (“Pet’r’s 1610 Mot.”) at 1, ECF No. 34. The Award ordered

Gabon to pay Eurofinsa over 12 million euro plus interest. Pet’r’s 1610 Mot. at 1; Ex. A. To

date, Gabon has not paid any portion of the Award. Pet’r’s 1610 Mot. at 2.

Eurofinsa initiated this enforcement action on October 11, 2023. Id. at 1. After Gabon

failed to respond, Eurofinsa requested that the Clerk of Court enter default against Gabon

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). Mot. Entry Default, ECF No. 16. The Clerk

entered default on February 16, 2024. Clerk’s Entry Default, ECF No. 17. Eurofinsa then

moved for default judgment, which this Court granted on January 17, 2025. Eurofinsa, S.A. v.

Gabonese Republic (“Eurofinsa I”), No. 23-3013,

, at *1 (Jan. 17, 2025).

Eurofinsa now moves to authorize attachment and execution under

(c). Pl.’s

Mot. Order Authorizing Attach. & Execution, ECF No. 33. Gabon has yet to enter an

appearance or otherwise participate in this action.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Under

(c), where a litigant seeks to attach the property of a foreign state

located in the United States, such attachment is not permitted “until the court has . . . determined

that a reasonable period of time has elapsed following the entry of judgment and the giving of

any notice required under section 1608(e) of this chapter.” A description of the specific property

against which attachment or execution is sought “‘is not required.’” Warmbier v. Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea, No. 18-977,

at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 9, 2019)

(quoting Baker v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahirya,

(D.D.C.

2011)). A § 1610(c) order serves only to determine that (a) “any notice required under § 1608(e)

2 has been given” and that (b) “a reasonable period of time has elapsed following entry of

judgment.” Id. (quoting Baker, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 101–02).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Notice Pursuant to 1608(e)

First, Eurofinsa provided proper notice to Gabon pursuant to § 1608(e). That provision

provides that “[a] copy of any . . . default judgment shall be sent to the foreign state or political

subdivision in the manner prescribed for service in this section.”

(e). These

service procedures are found in § 1608(a), which “prescribes four methods of service, in

descending order of preference.” Ben-Rafael v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C. 2008). The four methods of service are (1) “special arrangement for service between the

plaintiff and the foreign state or political subdivision;” (2) service “in accordance with an

applicable international convention on service of judicial documents;” (3) service “by sending a

copy of the summons and complaint and a notice of suit” including translations “into the official

language of the foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and

dispatched by the clerk of the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign

state concerned;” or (4) service

by sending two copies of the summons and complaint and a notice of suit, together with a translation of each into the official language of the foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the Secretary of State in Washington, District of Columbia, to the attention of the Director of Special Consular Services—and the Secretary shall transmit one copy of the papers through diplomatic channels to the foreign state and shall send to the clerk of the court a certified copy of the diplomatic note indicating when the papers were transmitted.

(a). The plaintiff must “attempt service by the first method (or determine that it

is unavailable) before proceeding to the second method, and so on.” Ben-Rafael,

.

3 Eurofinsa followed § 1608(a)’s procedures. The first two methods of service under

§ 1608(a) do not apply because no special arrangement for service exists between Eurofinsa and

Gabon, see Mot. Default J. ¶ 11, ECF No. 18-1, and the United States has no treaty relations with

Gabon that provide for service in civil matters, see id.; VAMED Mgmt. und Serv. Gmbh v.

Gabonese Republic, No. 22-cv-3737,

, at *3 (D.D.C. March 13, 2024)

(finding the same). Eurofinsa was therefore entitled to serve Gabon using the third method,

which directs sending the relevant documents “together with a translation of each into the official

language of the foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and

dispatched by the clerk of the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign

state concerned.”

(3). Here, the Clerk of the Court mailed the necessary

documents, via DHL, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Gabon on February 14, 2025.

Certificate of Clerk, ECF No. 31. Service of the judgment was effective when Gabon received

and signed for the documents on February 24, 2025. Aff. of Serv., ECF No. 32; Thuneibat v.

Syrian Arab Republic,

(D.D.C. 2016) (finding that service via DHL

complied with § 1608(a)(3)). Because Eurofinsa provided notice to Gabon in accordance with

§ 1608(a)(3), Eurofinsa satisfied the notice requirement under § 1610(c).

B. Reasonable Period of Time Elapsed

Second, a reasonable period of time has elapsed since the judgment, which satisfies the

requirements of

(c). The statute does not specify what constitutes a “reasonable

time,” leaving the decision to the Court’s discretion. Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian

Republic of Venezuela, No. 16-cv-0661,

, at *1 (D.D.C. June 9, 2017) (citing

Owens v. Republic of Sudan,

(D.D.C. 2015)). As Eurofinsa notes, the

reasonable time requirement exists because “foreign sovereigns act through their bureaucracies

4 and if the foreign government intends to pay the judgment, it should be given time to do so.”

Pet’r’s 1610 Mot. at 4; see Ned Chartering & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Pakistan,

(D.D.C. 2001).

When making this determination, a court should consider the procedures the foreign state

must take to pay the judgment, evidence that the foreign state is attempting to pay the judgment,

and evidence that the foreign state is attempting to evade its obligation. See Ned Chartering,

; H.R. REP No. 94-1487, at 30 (1976). Under this guidance, this Court and

others in this district (and elsewhere) have determined that a period of three months typically

satisfies the reasonable time requirement under § 1610(c); even periods as short as six weeks

have been considered reasonable. See, e.g., Crystallex Int'l. Corp.,

, at *1

(finding two months reasonable); Warmbier,

, at *2 (finding three and one-

half months reasonable); Owens,

(finding three months reasonable); Ned

Chartering, 130 F. Supp 2d at 67 (finding six weeks enough time for governments to take

necessary internal steps to pay judgment, thus reasonable under § 1610(c)); Karaha Bodas Co. v.

Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, No. 01-cv-0634,

, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2002) (finding seven weeks reasonable).

On January 17, 2025, this Court granted a default judgment and ordered Gabon’s

payment of the Award. Eurofinsa I,

, at *1. More than four months have

passed since entry of judgment against Gabon, see

and it has been over four years since the

arbitral award was originally issued, see Ex. A. Assuming, arguendo, the date Gabon was

provided notice of the judgment (February 24, 2025) governs, three months have passed, and this

Court finds that three months fits well within what courts have determined constitutes a

reasonable time under § 1610(c). Aff. of Serv.

5 Additional factors support this conclusion. As described above, courts are more likely to

find a reasonable time has elapsed where no evidence of an attempt to pay judgment is offered.

See, e.g., Warmbier,

, at *2 (finding three and one-half months sufficient

“particularly . . . where North Korea has made no efforts to satisfy the judgment”); Owens,

(finding three months a reasonable time “[i]n the absence of any evidence that

defendants are making efforts to pay the[ ] judgment[ ] voluntarily”); Ned Chartering,

(finding six weeks appropriate absent evidence of action from defendant). Gabon

has failed to proffer any evidence of its efforts to pay the judgment and has not participated in

this litigation, see Notice Gabonese Rep. Failure Oppose Mot. Default J., ECF No. 24; Eurofinsa

I,

at *1, thus bolstering the conclusion that a reasonable time has passed. As

such, a reasonable period of time has elapsed since entry of judgment to satisfy the requirement

under § 1610(c).

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that notice was properly given to Respondent

under § 1608(e) and that Gabon has had a reasonable time since it received that notice.

Accordingly, the Court will grant Petitioner’s motion to attach Respondent’s assets pursuant to

§ 1610(c). An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and

contemporaneously issued.

Dated: June 11, 2025 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

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