UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

OLIVE GROUP FZ-LLC,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24 - 2170 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan AFGHANISTAN CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case arises from a contract to provide aviation-related security services in

Afghanistan. The Plaintiff, the Olive Group FZ-LLC (Olive Group), is a Dubai-based company

that contracted with the Afghanistan Civil Aviation Authority (ACAA) to provide security services

at four airports in Afghanistan. The Olive Group commenced arbitration proceedings in 2021

alleging breach of contract, and an arbitrator issued an award in its favor in 2023. The Olive Group

then brought this action to enforce the arbitration award against the ACAA. When the ACCA failed

to answer, the Clerk of Court entered default. Before the Court is the Olive Group’s Motion for

Default Judgment. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants the motion.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s “pleadings, motion for

default judgment, and various attachments.” Omni Bridgeway Ltd. v. Ministry of Infrastructure &

Energy of the Republic of Albania, No. 23-cv-1938,

, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 14,

2025). The Olive Group is a “Dubai free-zone limited liability company” with “extensive

experience and expertise in different security fields, particularly in airport and aviation security.”

Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award (Pet.) ¶ 2, ECF No. 1. It “has supported and provided

aviation security related services to clients in various countries in the emerging and frontier

markets, including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen.”

And it “is an indirect wholly owned

subsidiary of Constellis Holdings, LLC, a limited liability company organized under the laws of

the State of Delaware.”

In 2018, the Olive Group entered into a contract with the ACAA, an

agency of the Government of Afghanistan, to “procure security services for four international

airports in Afghanistan.” Id. ¶¶ 3, 8; see also Arbitration Award ¶ 5, ECF No. 1-2. The ACAA

“was in charge of management and regulation of air transportation, management of airspace and

management and operation of airports in Afghanistan.” Pet. ¶ 3.

According to the Olive Group, the ACAA breached the contract on several occasions,

which prompted the Olive Group to commence arbitration proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 8–10. Arbitration

proceedings occurred in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and after extensive proceedings involving

the ACAA, see id. ¶¶ 22–43, a final award was issued on November 28, 2023, in favor of the Olive

Group, see id. ¶¶ 44, 46; see also Arbitration Award. The arbitrator ordered the ACAA to pay the

Olive Group a total of $15,286,002.30, at a post-award interest rate of 3%, accruing from

December 28, 2023, until full payment is made. See id. ¶¶ 46–48. As of the time of the filing of

the instant motion, the ACAA had not paid the award. See id. ¶ 50.

B. Procedural Background

The Olive Group filed this Petition on July 24, 2024, to recognize and enforce the

arbitration award under the New York Convention, an international treaty that provides for

recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitration awards, as codified in the Federal Arbitration

2 Act,

et seq. See Pet. ¶¶ 54–59. The ACAA was served on November 6, 2024, see

Return of Service Aff., ECF No. 9, and it has failed to answer or otherwise respond to the Petition.

On February 24, 2025, the Plaintiff requested that the Clerk of Court enter default. See Aff. for

Default, ECF No. 13. The Clerk entered default two days later. See Clerk’s Entry of Default, ECF

No. 14. The Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Default Judgment on March 28, 2025, requesting that

the Court order payment of $15,286,002.30, at an interest rate of 3% per year accruing on

December 28, 2023, up until the date of payment. See Mot. Default Judgment at 2–3, ECF No. 15.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 provides for “default judgments, which safeguard

plaintiffs when the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive

party.” Mwani v. bin Laden,

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). But an entry of default

judgment is not automatic, and it is not a decision that courts make lightly. See Jackson v. Beech,

(D.C. Cir. 1980) (observing that “[d]efault judgments are not favored by modern

courts, perhaps because it seems inherently unfair to use the court’s power to enter and enforce

judgments as a penalty for delays in filing”).

Where a plaintiff seeks default judgment in a case implicating the Foreign Sovereign

Immunities Act, the plaintiff must “establish[ ] . . . [its] right to relief by evidence satisfactory to

the court.”

(e). This “imposes a duty on [the] court[ ] to not simply accept a

complaint’s unsupported allegations as true, and obligates courts to inquire further before entering

judgment[.]” Firebird Glob. Master Fund II Ltd. v. Republic of Nauru,

(D.D.C. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A court retains its affirmative obligation” to

ensure it has subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the defaulting sovereign

nation. Compagnie Sahélienne d’Entreprise v. Republic of Guinea, No. 20-cv-1536,

, at *2 (D.D.C. June 14, 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

3 DISCUSSION

The Court is satisfied that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims, that it has

personal jurisdiction over the parties, and that the Olive Group has demonstrated an entitlement to

relief. The Court therefore finds that default judgment is proper and confirms the arbitration award.

A. Rule 55 Requirements

A plaintiff seeking default judgment must: (1) request that the Clerk of the Court enter

default based on the defendant’s failure to respond and (2) file a motion for default judgment. See

Omni Bridgeway Ltd.,

, at *3; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. The Olive Group has

completed both steps, see Aff. for Default; Clerk’s Entry of Default, ECF No. 14; Mot. Default

Judgment, ECF No. 15, so this threshold requirement is satisfied.

B. Jurisdiction

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) is the “sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction

over a foreign state in federal court,” Samantar v. Yousuf,

, 313–14

(2010) (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,

(1989)),

and it provides that “a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the

United States” unless one of its exceptions applies,

. The Defendant in this case,

the ACAA, is an agency of the Afghanistan Government responsible for the “management and

regulation of air transportation.” Pet. ¶ 3. It is therefore a foreign state, see

(a)

(defining a “foreign state” to include a “political subdivision of a foreign state, or an agency or

instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in [

](b)”); see also

(b) (defining an “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” to include corporations that

are majority owned by the foreign state), that is “presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of

United States courts,” Saudi Arabia v. Nelson,

(1993).

4 But under the FSIA’s arbitration exception, a foreign state is not entitled to immunity from

a suit to “confirm an award made pursuant to . . . an agreement to arbitrate” if the agreement or

award is “governed by a treaty or other international agreement in force for the United States

calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards[.]”

(a)(6). A

“district court must find three ‘jurisdictional facts’” to proceed under the arbitration exception in

the FSIA: “(1) an arbitration agreement, (2) an arbitration award, and (3) a treaty potentially

governing award enforcement.” NextEra Energy Glob. Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain,

(D.C. Cir. 2024). All three exist here.

The first two requirements are easily met. First, the Olive Group entered into a contract

with the ACAA providing that “[d]isputes shall be settled by arbitration[.]” Contract Agreement

at 7, ECF No. 1-3; see also NextEra Energy Glob. Holdings B.V.,

(“FSIA

requires ‘an agreement made by the foreign state’—either ‘with’ or ‘for the benefit’ of a private

party—to submit certain disputes to arbitration.” (quoting

(a)(6)). Second, after

arbitration proceedings in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, a final arbitration award totaling

$15,286,002.30 was issued in favor of the Olive Group. See Pet. ¶¶ 44, 46; Arbitration Award; see

also VAMED Mgmt. und Serv. GMBH v. Gabonese Republic, No. 22-cv-3737,

,

at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2024) (noting that the plaintiff’s submission of the arbitral award generally

“demonstrate[s] the [second] jurisdictional fact[ ],” especially when the defaulting party “has not

appeared in th[e] case” and therefore “does not dispute [the submission’s] authenticity”).

Turning to the third requirement, the Olive Group asserts that the New York Convention

is the treaty that governs the arbitration award. See Pet. ¶ 1. The Court agrees. “[T]he New York

Convention is exactly the sort of treaty Congress intended to include in the arbitration exception.”

Creighton Ltd. v. Gov’t of State of Qatar,

, 124–25 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (cleaned up). It

5 is a multilateral treaty providing for “the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards” across

international borders. New York Convention Art. I(1). Congress codified the Convention in the

Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which provides that “[a]n action or proceeding falling under the

Convention shall be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the United States.”

. And that provision of the FAA vests district courts with “original jurisdiction over such an

action or proceeding.”

Thus, arbitration awards governed by the New York Convention satisfy

the FSIA’s arbitration exception.

The arbitration award entered in the Plaintiff’s favor is governed by the Convention. The

Convention controls an action to enforce an arbitration award when “(1) there is a written

agreement; (2) the writing provides for arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the convention;

(3) the subject matter is commercial; and (4) the subject matter is not entirely domestic in scope.”

Compagnie Sahélienne d’Entreprise,

, at *2 (cleaned up); Creighton Ltd., 181

F.3d at 123–24. All four requirements are met.

The contract for security services is in writing, and it provides that the parties may resolve

disputes through arbitration in the United Arab Emirates, a signatory to the New York Convention.

See Contract Agreement at 7 (“Disputes shall be settled by arbitration[.]”); id. at 8 (providing that

“proceedings shall . . . be held in Dubai, UAE”); see also Contracting States, New York

Arbitration Convention, https://perma.cc/S6WD-BJWS (showing the United Arab Emirates is a

signatory to the New York Convention). Contracting to provide aviation-related security services

is commercial in nature. See Pet. ¶ 2; Belize Soc. Dev. Ltd. v. Gov’t of Belize,

, 103–04

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (defining commercial as “matters or relationships, whether contractual or not,

that arise out of or in connection with commerce”). And the arbitration award is not entirely

domestic in scope, as it was issued in the United Arab Emirates to resolve a dispute between a

6 “Dubai free-zone limited liability company established under the laws of the United Arab

Emirates,” Pet. ¶ 2, and “an agency of the Government of Afghanistan,” id. ¶ 8, over a contract for

services in Afghanistan, see id. ¶ 3; Arbitration Award; see also, e.g., Compagnie Sahélienne

d’Entreprise,

, at *2 (finding that the subject matter is not entirely domestic in

scope where “the award was issued in France and the dispute is between two foreign parties over

a contract performed in Guinea”).

Because there is an arbitration agreement and an arbitration award governed by the New

York Convention, the arbitration exception to the FSIA applies and the Court has subject-matter

jurisdiction to resolve this dispute. See

(a) (“The district courts shall have original

jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign

state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect

to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title

or under any applicable international agreement.”).

2. Personal Jurisdiction

A court also needs to “satisfy itself that it has personal jurisdiction before entering

judgment against an absent defendant.” Mwani,

. In the case of default judgment, the

plaintiff need only raise a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. See

(reversing a district

court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction under the preponderance of evidence standard).

The FSIA provides that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every

claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction . . . where service has been made

under section 1608 of this title.”

(b). Section 1608(b) sets forth three ways a

plaintiff may serve an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state: (1) “by delivery of a copy of

the summons and complaint in accordance with any special arrangement for service between the

7 plaintiff and the agency or instrumentality,” (2) “by delivery of a copy of the summons and

complaint either to an officer, a managing or general agent,” or another agent authorized to receive

service in the United State or under “an applicable international convention on service of judicial

documents,” or (3) (a) “by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint” and “a translation

of each into the official language of the foreign state” either “in response to a letter rogatory or

request” from “an authority of the foreign state or political subdivision,” (b) by mail sent “by the

clerk of the court to the agency or instrumentality to be served” that requires a signed receipt, or

(c) “as directed by order of the court consistent with the law of the place where service is to be

made.”

(b). “[A] plaintiff must attempt service by the first method (or determine

that it is unavailable) before proceeding to the second method, and so on.” Angellino v. Royal

Family Al-Saud,

(D.C. Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted).

The Olive Group has satisfied its burden. The first two service methods were unavailable

because no “special agreement” for service exists, see Mot. Alt. Service of Process at 2–3, ECF

No. 4;

(b)(1), and Afghanistan is not a party to any relevant international

convention for the service of documents, see Mot. Alt. Service of Process at 4;

(b)(2). So the Olive Group instead attempted the third method of service. And the first two

options failed because “Afghanistan has no certified mail services or recognized government that

could aid in the execution of letters rogatory,” Mot. Alt. Service of Process at 4;

(b)(3)(1), and “[a]ccording to the U.S. Postal Service’s website, recorded delivery, which

is the international service equivalent of domestic certified mail, is not available for Afghanistan,”

Mot. Alt. Service of Process at 4–5;

(b)(3)(2).

The Olive Group ultimately accomplished service through the final option as directed by

the Court “through a combination of email to several of [the Defendant’s] representatives, email

8 to a general-purpose email address listed on the website of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Transport &

Aviation, and express mail delivery (DHL) to [the] Respondent’s office located in Kabul,

Afghanistan.” Mot. Alt. Service of Process at 7. The Court initially ordered the Olive Group to

serve the ACAA by emailing a copy of the relevant documents to three named representatives of

the Defendant and “a general purpose email address listed on the website of Afghanistan’s

Ministry of Transport & Aviation,” and mailing the documents to Ministry of Transport &

Aviation in Afghanistan. Order at 1–2 (granting motion for alternative service), ECF No. 6. The

Olive Group could not comply with the mailing requirement because “no express mail [wa]s being

delivered to Kabul, Afghanistan” at the time. Second Mot. Alt. Service at 3, ECF No. 7. So it

requested permission “to serve[the Defendant] . . . by sending the Petition Papers via express mail

to the Consulate General of Afghanistan in Dubai, United Arab Emirates,” “which is the only

official diplomatic presence that the current Government of Afghanistan and its agencies have

outside of Afghanistan.” Id. at 3. The Court granted this request. See Order at 1–2, ECF No. 8

(granting second motion for alternative service). The Olive Group complied with the Court’s

orders, and the ACAA was served on November 4, 2024. See Return of Service/Affidavit, ECF

No. 9. The ACAA thus had until January 3, 2025, to respond, which it failed to do. See

(d) (“a foreign state . . . shall serve an answer or other responsive pleading to the complaint

within sixty days after service has been made under this section.”). Finding that service was proper

under § 1608(b)(3)(C), the Court has personal jurisdiction over the ACAA.1

1 The Court is also satisfied that venue is proper in this District. See

(f)(4) (“A civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title may be brought . . . in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia if the action is brought against a foreign state or political subdivision thereof.”).

9 C. Right to Relief

Under the FSIA, “[n]o judgment by default shall be entered by a court of the United

States . . . unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the

court.”

(e). The Olive Group must therefore show that it is entitled to confirmation

of the arbitral award against the ACAA under the New York Convention. It may meet this burden

through affidavits and declarations. See Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C. 2009). The Olive Group has demonstrated its entitlement to relief.

The New York Convention requires a district court to “confirm” an arbitration award if

“any party to the arbitration” applies for such an order within “three years after [the] award”

“unless [the court] finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement

of the award specified in the . . . Convention.”

. The party applying for recognition

and enforcement must provide the “duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy” and

“[t]he original agreement” or “a duly certified copy[.]” N.Y. Convention art. IV. If those

requirements are met, courts have “little discretion in refusing or deferring enforcement of foreign

arbitral awards: the Convention is ‘clear’ that a court ‘may refuse to enforce the award only on the

grounds explicitly set forth in Article V of the Convention.’” Belize Soc. Dev. Ltd. v. Gov’t of

Belize,

(D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P.,

(D.C. Cir. 2007)).

Article V of the Convention lays out seven grounds for refusal. For the first five, the party

resisting confirmation must provide proof that:

(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or

10 (b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or

(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or

(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or

(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. V(1)(a)–(e),

June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3. The remaining two grounds permit a court to

“refuse” confirming if it finds that “[t]he subject matter of the difference is not capable of

settlement by arbitration under the law of that country” or “[t]he recognition or enforcement of the

award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.” New York Convention, art. V(2).

The party resisting confirmation “bears the heavy burden of establishing that one of the grounds

for denying confirmation in Article V applies.” Sterling Merch. Fin. Ltd. V. Rep. of Cabo Verde,

(D.D.C. 2017) (cleaned up).

With these requirements in mind, the Olive Group has met its burden. It brought this

lawsuit seeking confirmation of the arbitration award within three years of the award. See

; Arbitration Award at 1 (final award rendered on November 28, 2023); Pet. at 1 (lawsuit

filed on July 24, 2024). And it has provided the Court with a “duly certified copy” of both the

award and the agreement under which the parties agreed to submit to arbitration. See N.Y.

Convention art. II, IV; Arbitration Award; Contract Agreement.

11 The ACAA has defaulted and thus not raised any of the available Article V defenses, much

less provided “proof” for why the arbitration award should not be enforced. See Art. V(1)(a)–(e);

supra at 11; see, e.g., Compagnie Sahélienne d’Entreprise,

, at *4 (finding that

the opposing party did not meet its burden under the New York Convention by failing to appear

or raise any defenses). And the remaining two grounds for refusal are inapplicable. Nothing in the

record suggests that the underlying contract dispute could not be settled by arbitration. To the

contrary, a breach of contract dispute is “surely capable of settlement by arbitration[.]” See Omni

Bridgeway Ltd.,

, at *8. And the Supreme Court has recognized an “emphatic

federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution” that “appl[ies] with special force in the field

of international commerce[.]” See Belize,

(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.

Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,

(1985)). On this record, the Olive Group has

demonstrated its entitlement to relief under the New York Convention.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment,

ECF No. 15, and confirms the arbitration award. The Court orders the Afghanistan Civil Aviation

Authority to pay the Olive Group FZ-LLC the arbitration award of $15,286,002.30, at a post-award

interest rate of 3%, accruing from December 28, 2023, until full payment is made.

A separate order will issue.

SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge

Date: June 12, 2025

12