UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STANLEY A. CAVIENSS, JR., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-01157 (UNA) ) UNITED STATES, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff filed this matter on March 3, 2025, but he did not provide a residence address, in

contravention of D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1). Plaintiff has since complied with the court’s order,

ECF No. 3, directing him to provide an address of record, see Response, ECF No. 4. Now, upon

review of plaintiff’s pro se untitled amended submission (“Am. Compl.”), ECF No. 7, and his

application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2, the court grants the IFP

application, but for the reasons explained below, it dismisses this matter without prejudice.

Plaintiff presents an untitled operative submission that he refers to as a “silver bullet of a

smoking gun brief,” see Am. Compl. at 6 (cleaned up), contravening Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) and

D.C. LCvR 5.1(g), but the court generously construes the submission as an amended complaint,

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3; In re Sealed Case No. 98-3077,

, 1069 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(noting that a civil action “must be initiated by complaint[.]”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 3); see also

Adair v. England,

(D.D.C. 2002) (“A party commences a civil action by

filing a complaint. . . [and] [w]hen no complaint is filed, the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain

the plaintiff's petition for injunctive relief.”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 3).

The content of plaintiff’s “amended complaint” fares no better the original. Plaintiff

previously filed a now-closed employment discrimination matter in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, see Cavienss v. Norwak Transit, No. 21-cv-01694 (MPS) (filed D. Conn.

filed Dec. 20, 2021) (“Cavienss I”); 1see

at 2nd Cir. Mandate, ECF No. 149 (dismissing

interlocutory appeal, Jan. 13, 2025);

at Order & Judgment, ECF No. 160–61 (granting

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment). In the instant matter, plaintiff sues entities and

individuals associated with Cavienss I, namely, the presiding judge, opposing counsel, the Clerk

of Court for the District of Connecticut, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,

and two Second Circuit judges. See Am. Compl. at 4. Plaintiff also attempts to bring this case as

a whistleblower on behalf of the United States under the False Claims Act. See id. at 8, 10.

The amended complaint is difficult to follow and is, essentially, a reconfiguration of his

claims in Cavienss I, just now expanded to include those involved with its adjudication. See id. at

1–12. Plaintiff quite broadly alleges, with little to no supporting facts or context, that defendants

conspired to carry out judicial misconduct and plotted to violate his constitutional rights and

myriad other rules and statutes, primarily “Rule 60(b) and Bivens.” See id. At root, plaintiff takes

issue with unfavorable decisions in Cavienss I, and he asks this court for assorted equitable relief

“vacating and overturning” those determinations. See id. at 1, 3–7, 10.

First, pro se litigants must comply with the Federal and Local Rules of Civil Procedure.

See Jarrell v. Tisch,

, 239–40 (D.D.C. 1987). Here, the “complaint” fails to

comply with Federal Rule 8(a), which requires such pleadings to contain “(1) a short and plain

statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

, 678–79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA,

(D.C. Cir. 2004). When a

pleading “contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither plainly nor concisely stated, nor

1 A court may take judicial notice of the docket and facts on the public record in other court proceedings. See Covad Commc'ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp.,

, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2005). meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp harangues and personal comments [,]” it

does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 8. Jiggetts v. D.C.,

(D.D.C. 2017),

aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. D.C., No. 17-7021,

(D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). “A

confused and rambling narrative of charges and conclusions . . . does not comply with the

requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp.,

(D.D.C.

2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff’s amended complaint falls squarely

into this category, failing to advance beyond a tangled mass of broad assertions.

Second, this court is without jurisdiction to intervene in Cavienss I, because it may not

review the decisions of other federal courts. See In re Marin,

(D.C. Cir. 1992);

Panko v. Rodak,

, 171 n.6 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding it “axiomatic” that a federal court

may order judges or officers of another federal court “to take an action.”), cert. denied,

(1980); United States v. Choi,

(D.D.C. 2011) (stating that federal

district courts “generally lack[] appellate jurisdiction over other judicial bodies, and cannot

exercise appellate mandamus over other courts”) (citing Lewis v. Green,

(D.D.C. 1986). Indeed, as noted, plaintiff cites repeatedly to Federal Rule 60(b), see Am. Compl.

at 1–3, 5, but to the extent he seeks relief from judgment, he must file for that relief in Cavienss I,

not in a separate action, or in a different District.

Third, even if plaintiff could overcome these hurdles, he has failed to state a claim under

Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,

(1971). For Bivens claim, “it is

damages or nothing,” Davis v. Passman,

(1979) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted), and here, plaintiff has not sought damages. Even if he had, his claims would still

fail, because constitutional tort suits against the United States or its instrumentalities are not

recognized under Bivens. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp v. Meyer,

, 484–486 (1994). Fourth, plaintiff may not bring this action as a whistleblower. In federal courts, a plaintiff

“may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel.”

. Here, the

United States is “the real party in interest,” Cobb v. California, No. 15-cv-176,

,

at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2015); therefore, the “pro se plaintiff may not file a qui tam action[,]” Jones

v. Jindal, 409 Fed. App’x. 356 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also Gunn v. Credit Suisse Grp.

AG, 610 Fed. App’x 155, 157 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that “every circuit that has [addressed the

issue] is in agreement that a pro se litigant may not pursue a qui tam action on behalf of the

Government.”) (citing cases)); U.S. ex rel. Szymczak v. Covenant Healthcare Sys., Inc., 207 Fed.

App’x 731, 732 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[A] qui tam relator—even one with a personal bone to pick with

the defendant—sues on behalf of the government and not himself. He therefore must comply with

the general rule prohibiting nonlawyers from representing other litigants.”). It is well established

that “pro se parties may not pursue [qui tam] actions on behalf of the United States.” Walker v.

Nationstar Mortg. LLC,

(D.D.C. 2015) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Fisher v.

Network Software Assocs.,

, 196–97 (D.D.C. 2005)); see Canen v. Wells Fargo

Bank, N.A.,

(D.D.C. 2015) (noting that “courts in this jurisdiction

consistently have held that pro se plaintiffs . . . are not adequately able to represent the interests of

the United States”) (citing cases).

Finally, insofar as plaintiff attempts to report judicial misconduct, see Am. Compl. at 1–2,

3–4 (citing

), 5–7, 9–10, this court bears no jurisdiction to take action on a judicial

conduct or disability complaint, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–364. Congress has established a statutory

mechanism for JC&D complaints that begins with a complaint filed with the clerk of the court of

appeals for the relevant circuit, see

(a); see also Hueter v. Kruse, No. 20-cv-03686,

, at *2 (D.D.C. July 20, 2021) (no private right of action under

, et seq.), but this court is not a circuit court, and the proper court would be the Second Circuit, not

the D.C. Circuit, as this action bears no connection to this jurisdiction. Simply put, at no point

does a JC&D complaint involve the federal district court. See Smith v. Scalia,

,

44 n.11 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Smith v. Krieger,

(10th Cir. 2010) (other

citation omitted)).

For all of these reasons, this matter is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s pending

motion for protective order, ECF No. 6, seeking the same relief, is denied for the same reasons

explained above. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

__________/s/_____________ Date: June 18, 2025 AMIT P. MEHTA United States District Judge