UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RYAN V. MILLER,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 23 - 2455 (LLA)

MICHAEL & SON SERVICES, INC.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Ryan Miller brought this action against Defendant Michael & Son Services, Inc.

for failure to pay proper wages under federal and District of Columbia law. After many months

of litigation, the parties reached a settlement agreement to resolve their disputes and now jointly

move for approval of that agreement. ECF No. 12. For the reasons explained below, the court

will grant the motion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The court recounts the facts as alleged in the complaint. ECF No. 1. From March 2021 to

December 2021, Mr. Miller worked as a plumber for Michael & Son. Id. ¶ 7. He provided

plumbing services to Michael & Son’s customers in Maryland and the District of Columbia but

spent more than half of his working hours in the District. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. Even though Mr. Miller

worked more than forty hours most weeks, Michael & Son “never paid [him] at the overtime rate

of one and one-half times his regular rate for hours worked in excess of forty during each one-

week period.” Id. ¶¶ 10-11. In August 2023, Mr. Miller filed suit and alleged that Michael & Son had failed to pay him

overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”),

et seq.,

the District of Columbia Minimum Wage Act (“DCMWA”),

et seq., and the

District of Columbia Wage Payment and Collection Law (“DCWPCL”),

et

seq. ECF No. 1.

In October 2023, Michael & Son filed a motion to compel arbitration, ECF No. 6, which

Mr. Miller did not oppose. The case was then reassigned to the undersigned. See Dec. 18, 2023

Docket Entry. The parties subsequently informed the court that they had submitted their dispute

to arbitration and requested that the matter be stayed pending further developments. ECF No. 7.

The court stayed the case and ordered periodic status reports on the progress of arbitration. See

Feb. 26, 2024 Minute Order; Apr. 25, 2024 Minute Order; June 24, 2024 Minute Order; Aug. 21,

2024 Minute Order; Oct. 22, 2024 Minute Order.

In December 2024, the parties jointly filed a motion to dismiss the case and approve their

proposed settlement agreement. ECF No. 12.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

In most cases, parties can resolve their disputes privately and dismiss a lawsuit without

court involvement. When a plaintiff brings an FLSA claim, however, additional steps are required

to satisfy the Act’s “statutory policy” of protecting workers. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil,

(1945). Specifically, “FLSA rights cannot be abridged or otherwise waived by

contract because such private settlements would allow parties to circumvent the purposes of the

statute by agreeing on sub-minimum wages.” Beard v. D.C. Hous. Auth.,

(D.D.C. 2008). FLSA claims can thus be settled in one of two ways: (a) “through a settlement

supervised by the Secretary of Labor,” or (b) “through a settlement scrutinized and ratified by a

2 ‘court of competent jurisdiction.’” Rivas Ferrera v. Foulger-Pratt Constr. Inc.,

, 208 (D.D.C. 2024); see

(b), (c).

With respect to the second option, the FLSA “does not expressly mandate” preliminary

approval of settlement agreements. Stephens v. Farmers Rest. Grp.,

, 486 n.2

(D.D.C. 2019). And the D.C. Circuit “has not opined about whether judicial approval is required

of FLSA settlements . . . or . . . whether such approval is a prerequisite for subsequent judicial

enforcement of a private settlement.” Carrillo v. Dandan Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2014). Even so, “courts in this district routinely review proposed settlements to avoid

putting ‘the parties in an uncertain position’ regarding the validity of their settlement.” Rivas

Ferrera, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 209 (quoting Carrillo,

).

III. DISCUSSION

In reviewing a proposed FLSA settlement agreement, the court must assure itself of two

things: (1) that “the agreement resolves a bona fide dispute—that is, it reflects a reasonable

compromise over issues that are actually in dispute,” and (2) that “the agreement is substantively

fair.” Rivas Ferrera, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 209 (quoting Davis v. Kettler Mgmt., No. 21-CV-3351,

, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2022)). The court should also review the

reasonableness of any attorney’s fees.

As is the case with most settlements between parties,

there is a “strong presumption in favor of finding the settlement fair.”

(quoting Carrillo,

).

A. Whether the Agreement Resolves a Bona Fide Dispute

A settlement agreement resolves a bona fide dispute if it “reflects a reasonable compromise

over issues that are actually in dispute.” Rivas Ferrera, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 209 (quoting Carrillo,

). In the absence of a genuine dispute, “the statute’s protections for

3 employees trump any purported settlement or waiver of the employees’ rights to bring suit

for FLSA violations.” Carrillo, 51. F. Supp. 3d at 128.

The settlement agreement in this case satisfies this requirement. Both parties disagreed as

to the proper amount of wages owed to Mr. Miller. Mr. Miller asserts that he worked more than

forty hours during most weeks of his employment but was “never paid” at the overtime rate of 1.5

times his normal wages. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 10-11. Michael & Son, meanwhile, claims that Mr. Miller

was at all relevant times exempt from the provisions of the FLSA and DCMWA because he was a

commissioned retail or service employee. ECF No. 12, at 4; see

(i) (exempting an

employee from the statute if his regular pay rate is more than 1.5 times the minimum wage and

“more than half his compensation for a representative period (not less than one month) represents

commissions on goods or services”). Under the agreement, Mr. Miller waives his rights to pursue

the matter further, while Michael & Son resolves the claim while still “den[ying] any and all

liability to [Mr. Miller].” ECF No. 12, at 4. The settlement agreement thus reflects the best

possible resolution of the parties’ disagreement while conserving time and resources.

.

The court therefore concludes that the settlement resolves a bona fide dispute.

B. Whether the Agreement is Substantively Fair

Courts generally consider three factors when evaluating substantive fairness: “(1) whether

the settlement stemmed from employer overreach; (2) whether it was the ‘product of negotiation

between represented parties following arm’s length bargaining’; and (3) ‘whether there exist

serious impediments to the collection of a judgment by the plaintiffs.’” Rivas Ferrera, 747 F.

Supp. 3d at 209 (quoting Carrillo,

).

4 1. Employer overreach

The proposed agreement does not show any clear signs of employer overreach. A typical

indicator of overreach is when a settlement amount lands far from the plaintiff’s original demand.

Here, the parties have not provided estimates as to the damages owed by either side.1 While this

prevents the court from evaluating “where the settlement amount falls between [Mr. Miller’s]

position and [Michael & Son’s position],” Sarceno v. Choi,

(D.D.C. 2015)

(“Sarceno II”), the court recognizes that the parties are usually more knowledgeable about the

particulars of their agreement,

(explaining that “the Court is generally not in as good a position

as the parties to determine the reasonableness of an FLSA settlement” (quoting Crabtree v.

Volkert, Inc., No. 11-CV-529,

, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 14, 2013))). Indeed, the

lack of precise damages figures does not render an agreement unreasonable. Nor does it

necessarily override the “strong presumption in favor of finding the settlement fair.” Rivas

Ferrera, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 209 (quoting Carrillo,

). The settlement calls

for a total payout of $2,000 to Mr. Miller as “disputed unpaid wages” and “disputed liquidated

damages.” ECF No. 12-1, at 2. Given that Mr. Miller only worked at Michael & Son for roughly

nine months, this appears to be a reasonable settlement amount for the claims alleged.

Furthermore, both parties jointly represent that “the amount [Mr. Miller] will receive from

[Michael & Son] pursuant [to] the Agreement is a fair valuation of the amount owed, given the

facts that remain in dispute.” ECF No. 12, at 6.

1 While Mr. Miller is the plaintiff in this action, Michael & Son also brought a breach-of-contract claim arising out of the same events in Virginia state court. See ECF No. 12, at 2; Michael & Son Servs. Inc. v. Miller, No. GV23003760-00 (Fairfax Gen. Dist. Ct., Feb. 28, 2023). Michael & Son voluntarily dismissed that claim in favor of arbitration. ECF No. 12-1, at 1. Upon execution of the settlement agreement, both parties will resolve “all matters between and among them,” including the breach-of-contract dispute.

5 In addition, Mr. Miller’s counsel—Zipin, Amster, & Greenberg LLC—“has extensive

experience in litigating wage and overtime claims.” ECF No. 12, at 6. Their judgment and

expertise serve as significant safeguards against the risk of employer overreach. See Rivas

Ferrera, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 210. As other judges of this court have held, counsel’s “‘extensive

experience in pursuing and defending FLSA actions generally and familiarity with the underlying

facts’” enables the court to “credit their representation ‘that the amounts agreed upon are a

reasonable compromise.’” Id. (quoting Sarceno II,

).

Because these considerations reassure the court that there was no employer overreach in

this case, and because other indicators of such overreach are lacking, see Sarceno v. Choi,

(D.D.C. 2014) (“Sarceno I”) (explaining that (a) a plaintiff’s ignorance as to

his rights under the FLSA, (b) a lack of consultation between the plaintiff and an experienced an

attorney, and (c) a language barrier for the plaintiff were all suggestive of employer overreach),

this first requirement is satisfied.

2. Arm’s-length bargaining

The agreement was also the product of arm’s-length negotiations between Mr. Miller and

Michael & Son. “The hallmarks of an ‘arm[’s] length negotiation’ involve parties with similar

access to counsel after meaningful discovery and the absence of duress or coercion.” Sarceno I,

. Both parties in this case are represented by counsel and—as explained

above—Mr. Miller’s attorneys possess substantial wage-and-hour litigation experience. The

parties have also exchanged informal discovery, conducted detailed reviews of evidence, and

conferred numerous times by phone and email before arriving at the proposed settlement. ECF

No. 12, at 6. This is more than sufficient to satisfy the second requirement. See, e.g., Rivas

Ferrera, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 210 (holding the second requirement to be met where the parties

6 “thoroughly investigated potential claims and defenses, conducted meaningful informal discovery,

and participated in several virtual conferences to try to reach an agreement”).

3. Impediments to the collection of a judgment

The settlement also removes obstacles to recovery for Mr. Miller. Resolving a dispute

short of trial or the completion of arbitration eliminates significant risks inherent in all litigation.

By reaching an agreement that fully resolves the dispute now, both parties will avoid accruing

additional fees and costs. The agreement also conserves time and energy. Both parties represent

that they have “considered the potential value of [Mr. Miller’s] claims, considered the strength of

[Michael & Son]’s defenses and breach of contract counterclaim, and concluded that the proposed

settlement provides a fair and reasonable resolution of all claims.” ECF No. 12, at 6. This third

requirement is therefore satisfied.

C. Whether the Attorney’s Fees Award is Reasonable

Finally, the court concludes that the attorney’s fees in the agreement are reasonable. Per

the settlement, Mr. Miller’s counsel will receive $18,000 for their services. ECF No. 12-1, at 2.

While courts are generally “reluctant to approve a settlement where the plaintiffs’ attorneys receive

more in compensation than the plaintiffs themselves,” it is not an absolute bar to approval.

Carrillo,

. Here, the attorney’s fee amount and negotiation were kept entirely

separate from Mr. Miller’s recovery. See

(approving the attorney’s fee amount in part because

it “appear[ed] to have been negotiated separately from the amount the plaintiffs will receive”).

Both parties also state that under the Laffey Matrix—a mechanism for calculating the typical value

of a lawyer’s services in DCMWA and DCWPCL cases—Mr. Miller’s counsel would be entitled

to more than $30,000 in attorney’s fees. ECF No. 12, at 7. In light of the significant discount

taken by Zipin, Amster, & Greenberg LLC and the heavy presumption in favor of settlement

7 approval, the court concludes that the attorney’s fee amount in the agreement is sufficiently

reasonable to warrant approval. See Rivas Ferrera, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 211 (concluding that an

attorney’s fee amount was reasonable in part because it significantly undercut “the lodestar figure

for Plaintiffs’ counsel”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant the parties’ Joint Motion to Dismiss and

Approve Settlement, ECF No. 12. A contemporaneous order will issue.

LOREN L. ALIKHAN United States District Judge Date: June 23, 2025

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