UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

CHRISTIAN DANIEL, Case No. 1:17-cr-00233-5 (TNM)

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Christian Daniel is serving a ten-year sentence for a drug offense and seeks a sentence

reduction under

(c)(1)(A). He asserts that a reduction is warranted because

intervening legal changes mean he would no longer be a career offender if sentenced today. But

he is wrong. Changes in the law cannot support a reduction in Daniel’s sentence. And even if

they could, he would still be a career offender. Daniel has shown no extraordinary and

compelling reason for a sentence reduction, so the Court denies his motion.

I.

The Court briefly recounts the factual background of this case, which it has previously

detailed several times. In 2018, Daniel pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute heroin. See

Plea Agreement, ECF No. 70; Judgment, ECF No. 99, at 1. The Court sentenced him to a 120-

month prison sentence, which he is now serving. See

.

Since sentencing, Daniel has repeatedly sought to modify his sentence. First, he moved

to vacate the sentence under

. See Mot. to Vacate, ECF No. 113. The Court

denied his motion. United States v. Daniel,

(D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2020). Then, he

sought sentence reductions, twice. See First Mot. to Reduce, ECF No. 133; Second Mot. to

Reduce, ECF No. 143. The Court denied both motions. United States v. Daniel,

(D.D.C. Nov. 18, 2021); United States v. Daniel,

(D.D.C. Sept. 29,

2022) (“Daniel III”). He also unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the denial of his

second motion. See Mot. Recons., ECF No. 157; United States v. Daniel,

(D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2022) (“Daniel IV”).

Now Daniel again moves for a reduced sentence. See Third Mot. to Reduce, ECF No.

165. He asserts that changes in the law and amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines warrant a

reduction. See

at 1–4. Daniel also asks the Court to consider his prison conditions,

rehabilitation efforts, and post-release plans. See

at 5–12.

II.

A defendant must meet a high bar to establish his eligibility for a sentence reduction. See

United States v. Holroyd,

, 17 (D.D.C.), aff’d,

(D.C. Cir.

2020). After considering the

(a) factors, a court may reduce a sentence if it

finds that: (1) “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction”; (2) “the defendant

is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community”; and (3) “the reduction is

consistent with [the Sentencing Commission’s] policy statement.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a); see

also

(c)(1)(A). Under the applicable policy statement, courts may consider any

of the following in determining whether the defendant has shown extraordinary and compelling

circumstances: (1) the defendant’s medical circumstances, (2) the defendant’s age, (3) the

defendant’s family circumstances, (4) whether the defendant is a victim of abuse in prison,

(5) other reasons that are “similar in gravity,” and (6) whether the defendant received an

unusually long sentence. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b).

2 III.

The Court finds that Daniel has not shown an extraordinary and compelling reason to

reduce his sentence. And even if he had, reducing Daniel’s sentence would flout the § 3553(a)

considerations.

A.

The thrust of Daniel’s argument is that if sentenced today he would receive a lesser

sentence because he would not qualify as a career offender. See Third Mot. to Reduce at 2. His

argument turns on United States v. Winstead,

(D.C. Cir. 2018), where the D.C.

Circuit “held that attempted drug offenses do not trigger the career offender guideline.” United

States v. Jenkins,

(D.C. Cir. 2022) (emphasis added). Because his

conviction was for the inchoate crime of conspiracy to distribute heroin, he reasons he should not

be labeled a career offender. See Third Mot. to Reduce at 3. But he is largely rehashing an

argument in one of his prior motions that the Court has already rejected. See Mot. Recons. at 1.

Daniel had asserted that his initial sentence was in error because, under Winstead, he should not

have been designated a career offender. See

In denying that motion, the Court detailed how

Jenkins prohibits the Court from considering alleged sentencing errors as a justification for a

sentence reduction. See Daniel IV at *2.

Daniel now tries to reframe his argument, claiming that he is not challenging his original

classification as a career offender. See Third Mot. to Reduce at 2–3. Instead, he says that the

intervening change in the career offender requirements brought about by Winstead—the

exclusion of inchoate offenses—warrants a sentence reduction. See

at 3–4. In other words,

he asks the Court to reduce his sentence because he would not be a career offender if sentenced

3 today. See

at 2–3. Daniel also contends that a 2023 amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines

abrogated Jenkins and allows the Court to consider changes in law. See id. at 4.

But none of these arguments get him anywhere. Under the amended version of the

Guidelines, a court may only consider intervening legal changes “[i]f a defendant received an

unusually long sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment.” U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.13(b)(6). Daniel does not meet those criteria.

The amendment also forecloses Daniel’s reliance on United States v. Johnson.

(D.D.C. 2022). There, a court did consider Winstead’s change in law when granting

a sentence reduction. See

at 91–92. But that case was decided before the 2023 amendment.

Under the current Guidelines, “a change in the law (including an amendment to the Guidelines

Manual that has not been made retroactive) shall not be considered for purposes of determining

whether an extraordinary and compelling reason exists.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(c). Thus, Johnson

does not help Daniel and he cannot use the changes in law he identifies as a basis for a sentence

reduction.

Daniel’s arguments also fail for an even simpler reason: He still qualifies as a career

offender under the amended Guidelines. When Winstead was decided, courts were relying on

the commentary to § 4B1.2 to justify counting inchoate crimes as qualifying offenses. See

Winstead,

. But the actual text of § 4B1.2 did not say that attempted offenses

triggered the career offender provision. See id. So the commentary strayed from the plain text

because it broadened what offenses counted toward career offender status. Winstead clarified

that the commentary could not expand the definitions contained in the congressionally authorized

text of the Sentencing Guidelines. See id. at 1091–92. As the D.C. Circuit explained, “[i]f the

Commission wishe[d] to expand the definition of ‘controlled substance offenses’ to include

4 attempts, it [would have to] seek to amend the language of the guidelines by submitting the

change for congressional review.” Id. at 1092.

And that is precisely what happened. The 2023 amendment shifted the relevant portion

of the commentary into the text of the Guidelines. See Sentencing Guidelines for U.S. Courts,

-01, 28276 (May 3, 2023) (“The amendment addresses this circuit conflict by moving,

without change, the commentary including certain inchoate and accessory offenses in the

definitions of ‘crime of violence’ and ‘controlled substance offense’ to the text of the

guideline.”). The applicable guideline itself, not the commentary, now says that inchoate

offenses count toward career offender status. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(d) (“‘[C]ontrolled substance

offense[s]’ include . . . conspiring to commit any such offense.”). Thus, if Daniel were sentenced

today, he would be a career offender. Nothing about that presents an extraordinary and

compelling circumstance warranting a sentence reduction under § 3582(c).

B.

Daniel also claims that his prison conditions, participation in rehabilitation programs, and

post-release plans all support early release under the “other reasons” catchall. See Third Mot. to

Reduce at 5–11; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5). The Court finds that Daniel’s dissatisfaction with his

prison conditions does not satisfy the high bar of demonstrating an extraordinary and compelling

circumstance. After all, a prisoner’s general unhappiness with prison conditions is far from

being “most unusual” or “having little or no precedent.” Jenkins,

(cleaned up).

And Daniel’s gripes focus generally on things happening to other prisoners, not specifically to

him. Daniel’s rehabilitation efforts and post-release plans, while admirable, do not justify early

release. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(d) (“[R]ehabilitation of the defendant is not, by itself, an

extraordinary and compelling reason.”).

5 More, several of the § 3553 factors weigh against a sentence reduction. As the Court

previously explained, the “nature and circumstances of” Daniel’s offense, his “history and

characteristics,” and the need “to protect the public from further crimes” make his existing

sentence appropriate. See Daniel III,

, at *3.

In sum, Daniel has not shown extraordinary and compelling reasons that merit a

reduction in his sentence. And even if he had, reducing his sentence would stray from the

§ 3553(a) factors.

IV.

For the reasons, it is

ORDERED that Daniel’s [165] Motion for a Reduction is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

2025.07.11 14:25:46 -04'00' Dated: July 11, 2025 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.

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