UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SHAYLA REEFER,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 23-cv-03099 (DLF)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Shayla Reefer, a former Criminal Research Specialist for the District of Columbia

Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), brings this employment action against the District of

Columbia. Before the Court is the District’s Motion to Dismiss or for a More Definite Statement,

Dkt. 24. For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Soon after starting her position with MPD as Criminal Research Specialist, Reefer began

experiencing “difficulty with her after-work sleep,” Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 16, Dkt. 19, and

“strange paralytic episodes at work.” Id. ¶ 17. Around July 3, 2020, she applied for reasonable

accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for several diagnoses: “loss of

concentration, sleeplessness, major depression, ADHD, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder,” and

“[a]nxiety.” Id. ¶ 23.

On July 26, while commuting to work, Reefer had a “seizure-like” episode which caused

a car accident. Id. ¶ 39. Afterwards, she continued to seek reasonable accommodation. Id. ¶ 40.

On September 1, while working at home, she suffered a “more pronounced seizure-like episode” requiring emergency support. Id. ¶ 43. Because the District had not granted her requested

accommodation, Reefer began short-term disability leave on September 3. Id. ¶ 45.

In January 2021, Reefer was diagnosed with “a circadian rhythm disorder.” Id. ¶ 19.

Reefer defines the disorder as the “daily . . . cycle of physical and mental behaviors . . . which

impact individuals[’] biological clocks . . . responsible for producing ‘circadian rhythms.’” Id.

¶ 21. She alleges that her disorder “interfere[s] with functionality, concentration, [and]

consciousness,” id. ¶ 57, “manifest[s] by seizure-like spells,” id., and was provoked by her

“unreliable night shift hours,” id. ¶ 20.

Reefer’s employment responsibilities included “answering a high volume of phone calls,”

“notifying MPD upper management of . . . incidents reported,” and “monitoring all radio traffic

for her assigned District.” Id. ¶ 14. Because Reefer was “required to be conscious and alert

throughout her work shift,” id. ¶ 19, her disorder interfered with her ability to perform “material

functions during her seizure-like states of ‘semi-consciousness,’” id. According to Reefer’s

neurologist, her disorder was “triggered by the impact of inconsistent and unreliable” work hours,

id. ¶ 19, and “resolvable by modification/adjustment of work shift hours,” id. ¶ 20. Under such

medical advice, she reapplied for the accommodation of “a shift change to daytime work with

reliable hours” on January 8. Id. ¶¶ 24, 26. Reefer alleges that this accommodation “would

address” her disorder and render her “fully able to perform all the duties and responsibilities of her

job.” Id. ¶¶ 26.

On January 25, the District fired Reefer for the “gross misconduct” of contacting Human

Resources and Payroll against instructions. Id. ¶ 51. Reefer alleges that the District “never

activated the interactive process of negotiation in good faith” in response to her accommodation

requests. Id. ¶ 28. Instead, the District “aggressively requested more and more information from

2 [her],” id. ¶ 29, and “falsely claimed [her] performance was substandard,” id. ¶ 34. None of

Reefer’s performance evaluations stated that her work was “defective, deficient, or otherwise

wanting before [she] requested reasonable accommodation.” Id. ¶ 22. And while her disorder

made it difficult to perform “some of her duties and responsibilities,” id., Reefer alleges she

“worked hard and performed at a very high level during her conscious . . . performance,” id. ¶ 42.

Reefer’s operative Complaint, Dkt. 19, alleges denial of reasonable accommodation and

unlawful retaliation under the ADA, see

et seq., and the D.C. Human Rights Act

(DCHRA), see

et seq. The District moves to dismiss both counts for failure

to state a claim or, in the alternative as to Count I, moves for a more definite statement. See Dkt.

24.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to move to

dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain factual matter sufficient to

“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). A facially plausible claim is one that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009). Well-pleaded factual allegations are “entitled to [an] assumption of truth,”

, and

the Court construes the complaint “in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all

inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged,” Hettinga v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 2012) (citation modified). But the Court need not accept “a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation” nor an inference unsupported by the facts alleged in the pleadings.

3 Trudeau v. FTC,

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain,

(1986)).

Rule 12(e) allows a party to move for a more definite statement of a pleading “which is so

vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

A motion for a more definite statement is appropriate “when a defendant is unclear about the

meaning of a particular allegation in the complaint.” Thorp v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2015) (citation modified). Rule 12(e) motions are not a “substitute for discovery,”

Potts v. Howard Univ.,

(D.D.C. 2010), and are granted “only where the

Complaint is so egregiously deficient that the allegations are entirely inscrutable or

incomprehensible,” Jenkins v. Mason Harriman Grp., No. 23-cv-629 (RCL),

at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2023). As under Rule 8(a), see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Potts,

, “a plaintiff need not allege all facts necessary to prove its claim so long as [she] provides

enough factual information to make clear the substance of that claim,” Wilson v. Gov’t of D.C.,

(D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Caribbean Broad. Sys. v. Cable & Wireless PLC,

(D.C. Cir. 1998)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Denial of Reasonable Accommodations

To state a claim under the ADA 1 for denial of reasonable accommodations, a plaintiff must

allege that “(1) she was a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the employer had notice of her

disability; and (3) the employer denied her request for a reasonable accommodation.” Waggel v.

George Washington Univ.,

, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citation modified). The District

1 The Court analyzes DCHRA claims with the same standard as ADA claims. See Hodges v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2013).

4 contends that Reefer has not plausibly alleged that she was either qualified or disabled. See Mot.

to Dismiss at 1, Dkt. 24-1. Alternatively, the District contends Reefer should be required to make

a more definite statement as to whether “her seizure-like episodes have ceased and, if so, when.”

Id. at 12. The Court disagrees.

1. Qualified Individual

An individual is “qualified” if she can “perform the essential functions” of her employment

“with or without reasonable accommodation.”

(8). If a plaintiff cannot perform

her work unaccommodated, a plaintiff must show that “with a reasonable accommodation . . . [s]he

can perform the essential functions of the job.” Saunders v. Galliher & Huguely Assocs.,

(D.D.C. 2010) (citing Flemmings v. Howard Univ.,

(D.C.

Cir. 1999)). The plaintiff must establish she was qualified “at the time the employer denied her

request for accommodation.” Minter v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2015).

The District contends that because Reefer did not claim her seizures abated after taking

disability leave in 2020, she has failed to show an ability to perform her work’s essential functions

with reasonable accommodation. See Mot. to Dismiss at 9–10. None of Reefer’s employment

functions—answering phone calls, reporting emergencies, and monitoring radio traffic, Sec. Am.

Compl. ¶ 14—could be performed during “seizure-like states of ‘semi-consciousness,’” id. ¶ 19.

See Clark v. Champion Nat’l Sec., Inc.,

, 584 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[M]aintaining

consciousness is a basic element of any job.”). Even so, these seizure-like states and Reeder’s

disorder were “provoked” by her work’s night-shift hours. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 24. And her doctor

concluded that with her requested accommodation—“a shift change to daytime work with reliable

hours,”

¶ 26—she could “fully . . . perform all of the duties and responsibilities of her job

description,”

5 Drawing all reasonable inferences in Reefer’s favor, see Hettinga,

, as the

Court must, she has alleged sufficient facts to support her claim that “a shift change to daytime

work with reliable hours” would have allowed her to remain conscious and alert. See Sec. Am.

Compl. ¶ 26, 19. Ultimately, Reefer may fail to prove that she was qualified. But at least at this

stage, she has adequately alleged that she could perform the essential functions of her position

with a reasonable accommodation. See Pappas v. District of Columbia,

, 95

(D.D.C. 2021).

2. Disability

A “disability” is defined as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits

one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C)

being regarded as having such an impairment.”

(1). The ADA explicitly directs

that this definition “shall be construed in favor of broad coverage.”

§ 12102(4)(A). The

impairment need only “substantially limit[] the ability of an individual . . . as compared to most

people in the general population.”

(j)(1)(ii).

Reefer has sufficiently alleged a disability. Her circadian rhythm disorder is an impairment

which substantially limits her ability to work. See Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57, 19;

(2)(A) (by statutory definition, “working” is a “major life activity”). Although “[Reefer’s]

inability to remain conscious for certain portions of the day” does not substantially limit her ability

to work “a broad range of jobs of various classes,” see Mot. to Dismiss at 8 (citation modified),

her seizure-like episodes caused a car accident while commuting to work, see Sec. Am. Compl.

¶ 39, and required emergency medical care while working at home, see

. Neither of those

episodes were tied to “the particular demands of [Reefer’s] position.” Abdul-Azim v. Howard

6 Univ. Hosp.,

(D.C. 2019). As alleged, Reefer’s disorder substantially limits her

ability to work jobs which require consciousness—as most jobs do, see Clark, 952 F.3d at 584.

Because Reefer has plausibly alleged that she is both qualified and disabled, the Court will

deny the District’s motion to dismiss Count I.

3. More Definite Statement

In the alternative, the District asks the Court to order Reefer to plead whether “her seizure-

like spells ceased after she stopped working the night shift.” Mot. to Dismiss at 12; see Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(e). The District does not assert that Reefer’s complaint is vague or ambiguous. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Rather, it asks Reefer to prove that she was qualified. See Mot. to Dismiss

at 12. But see Wilson,

(quoting Caribbean Broad. Sys.,

) (“[A]

plaintiff need not allege all facts necessary to prove its claim so long as [she] provides enough

factual information to make clear the substance of that claim.”). As explained in Section III.A.1,

supra, Reefer has sufficiently alleged that she is qualified. Thus, the Court will deny the District’s

motion for a more definite statement.

B. Unlawful Retaliation

To state a disability-retaliation claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that “(1) [s]he

engaged in protected activity; (2) [s]he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3)

there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Woodruff v. Peters,

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing Smith v. District of Columbia,

(D.C.

Cir. 2005)). To satisfy the first element, the plaintiff must show that she was disabled, cf. Vogel

v. D.C. Office of Plan.,

(D.C. 2008), or that she had a reasonable “good faith”

belief that she was disabled, cf. Howard Univ. v. Green,

(D.C. 1994).

7 The District contends Reefer did not demonstrate a disability nor a “good faith” belief. See

Mot. to Dismiss at 10. But as explained in Section III.A.2, supra, Reefer plausibly alleged a

disability. Thus, the Court will deny the District’s motion to dismiss the unlawful retaliation claim.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 24, is DENIED. It is further

ORDERED that the defendant’s Motion for a More Definite Statement, Dkt. 24, is

DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

________________________ DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH July 11, 2025 United States District Judge

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