UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SAAED MOSLEM,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 23-3541 (TJK)

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Saaed Moslem wants records related to the criminal investigation that landed him in federal

prison. To that end, he alleges that he filed requests under the Freedom of Information Act with

several federal agencies. Still without the desired records in late 2023, Moslem sued three agencies

and the Attorney General under FOIA. One defendant—the Department of Justice’s Tax Divi-

sion—moved to dismiss for lack of standing because the only request that Moslem identified as

directed to that agency was submitted neither by him nor by anyone on his behalf. Moslem op-

posed that motion and requested various forms of relief unrelated to this jurisdictional issue, in-

cluding the Court’s recusal, sanctions, and compelled production of records.

Because Moslem moves for recusal based only on disagreements with the Court’s rulings,

that relief is unwarranted. His other miscellaneous requests fare no better. And as for the motion

to dismiss, Moslem has not shown to a preponderance that he personally submitted the FOIA re-

quest to the Tax Division or had someone submit it on his behalf, so he lacks standing to challenge

how the Division handled it. Thus, the Court will deny Moslem’s motion for recusal and other

requests for relief, grant the Tax Division’s motion, and dismiss the case against it. I. Background

Saaed Moslem is serving a sentence in federal prison for a “fraud related offense.” ECF

No. 1 (“Compl.”) at 2. He says that he filed FOIA requests with the Federal Bureau of Investiga-

tion, the Department of Justice’s Executive Office for United States Attorneys (“Executive Office”

or “EOUSA”), and the Internal Revenue Service. See id. at 3–4. Although light on specifics,

Moslem generally asserts that he seeks materials related to his criminal trial. See id. at 6–7. From

the FBI, for example, Moslem requested emails between an alleged “manipulator and fraudster”—

who “entrapp[ed] and ensnar[ed] others”—and the FBI, IRS, and U.S. Attorneys’ Office for New

York’s Southern District. Id. at 3–4, 6. The agency purportedly told Moslem that the records were

exempt from disclosure and, at the time he filed the complaint, had not yet decided his adminis-

trative appeal. See id. at 5. And his other requests were similarly unfruitful for one reason or

another. See id. at 5–6.

Frustrated with the lack of records, Moslem sued four defendants in late 2023: the Depart-

ment of Justice, FBI, IRS, and then-Attorney General Merrick Garland. He lists the specific FOIA

requests underlying his challenge and alleges that each defendant has improperly withheld records

subject to those requests. Compl. at 4, 7–8. So he seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, including

an order directing Defendants to produce responsive records “by a date certain.” Id. at 8. One of

those defendants—the IRS—has been replaced by DOJ’s Tax Division. See Minute Order of July

18, 2024. As the Tax Division explained, Moslem incorrectly identified a FOIA request—

“FOIPA/TAX#11494”—as directed to the IRS when it instead went to the Tax Division. See ECF

No. 10 at 1–2.

Since then, this case has not progressed like a typical FOIA lawsuit. Two components of

DOJ—the FBI and the Tax Division—filed a status report explaining that the FBI was still search-

ing for records and that the Tax Division had responded to one of Moslem’s FOIA requests. See

2 ECF No. 14 at 1–2. 1 The Court ordered them to file another status report in October 2024. But

before that deadline, Moslem moved to compel production from the FBI, the Executive Office,

and the IRS, which was no longer a defendant at that point. After the FBI and the Tax Division

opposed that motion, the Court denied it as premature. The FBI, the Court explained, was pro-

cessing Moslem’s request, so summary-judgment briefing after that processing and production

was the appropriate way to assess whether the agency had complied with its FOIA obligations.

See Minute Order of Nov. 15, 2024. And although Moslem has not named the Executive Office

as a defendant, the Court did not rest on that deficiency. See id. Instead, it explained that Moslem’s

motion was premature as to that agency too because the Executive Office seemed to be processing

the requests. See id. And finally, the request to the Tax Division that Moslem challenged was not

identified in his complaint, so that challenge was “not properly before this Court.” Id. The Court

did not decide the merits of Moslem’s FOIA claim, which—as the Court explained—could pro-

ceed as “typical FOIA case[s]” do. Id.

In that vein, the Court granted the Tax Division’s request for a summary-judgment briefing

schedule. Complying with that schedule, the Tax Division moved for summary judgment—or,

alternatively, to dismiss—on one ground: the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim

against the Tax Division because Moslem did not make the FOIA request identified in his com-

plaint. See ECF No. 21-2 at 1–4. Moslem opposed that motion and simultaneously requested that

the Court recuse from this case. And he injected still more requests for relief when responding to

the Tax Division’s opposition: he again sought to compel document production and “Vaughn In-

dices,” and he asked for sanctions against (unspecified) defendants. ECF No. 28 at 13.

1 As it turns out, the request that the Tax Division discussed in this status report— “[R]equest #11513”—was not identified in Moslem’s complaint. ECF No. 14 at 2.

3 II. Legal Standards

“Summary judgment is appropriately granted when, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the non-movants and drawing all reasonable inferences accordingly, no reasonable

jury could reach a verdict in their favor.” Lopez v. Council on Am.-Islamic Rels. Action Network,

Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2016). “The evidence presented must show ‘that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “Where the nonmoving party is proceeding pro se, courts in

this jurisdiction will construe the non-moving party’s filings liberally.” Cunningham v. DOJ,

(D.D.C. 2014), aff’d, No. 14-5112,

(D.C. Cir. Oct. 21, 2014).

“However, a pro se litigant still has the burden of establishing more than ‘[t]he mere existence of

a scintilla of evidence’ in support of [her] position.”

(first alteration in original) (quoting An-

derson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

(1986)).

When a defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the jurisdictional challenge may

be either “facial” or “factual.” See Am. Oversight v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,

, 152 (D.D.C. 2020). The former “contests the legal sufficiency of the jurisdictional alle-

gations,” so “the Court must accept” the allegations as true and “construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the” plaintiff.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But a factual

challenge takes aim at the truth of those allegations. So when resolving this kind of Rule 12(b)(1)

motion, the Court “may not deny” it just “by assuming the truth of the facts alleged.” Ranchers-

Cattlemen Action Legal Fund, U.S. Stockgrowers of Am. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,

, 333 (D.D.C. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Instead, the Court “must

go beyond the pleadings and resolve any disputed issues of fact” necessary to decide the motion.

Put another way, the “plaintiff’s allegations” receive “no presumption of truthfulness,” and he

“bears the burden of providing the facts supporting subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance

4 of the evidence.” Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1350 (May 2025 update).

III. Analysis

A. The Court’s Recusal Is Unwarranted

Moslem contends that the Court is biased and must recuse itself. See ECF No. 24 at 13;

ECF No. 28 at 13. That claim brings into play

, under which a federal judge must

“disqualify himself” if “his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” For the “appearance of

bias or prejudice” to “be disqualifying,” though, it “must stem from an extrajudicial source.” Klay-

man v. Jud. Watch, Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2017) (citation omitted). And the

standard is objective: would a “reasonable and informed observer . . . question the judge’s impar-

tiality”?

(citation omitted). “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never” clear that high bar. United

States ex rel. Stephenson v. Powell, No. 18-cv-927 (TJK),

, at *1 (D.D.C. May

1, 2019) (quoting Liteky v. United States,

(1994)). That is because a judge’s

“error, of course, is by itself hardly a basis for imputing bias or even the appearance of partiality.”

Klayman,

(citation omitted).

Moslem runs headlong into that essential limit on § 455 because he just vents frustrations

with the Court’s ruling. Take his word for it: he points to putative “errors in Judge Timothy J.

Kelly’s justification regarding EOUSA in the November 15, 2024 Ruling.” ECF No. 24 at 7. For

example, Moslem believes that the Court wrongly stated that the Executive Office was not a proper

defendant even though Moslem did not sue that specific agency. Id. This gripe omits that the

Court did not rest on that observation; it instead ruled that Moslem’s motion was premature even

if the Executive Office were a proper defendant. See Minute Order of Nov. 15, 2024. In any

event, this argument boils down to Moslem’s belief that the Court erred when addressing his mo-

tion to compel. And that “dissatisfaction with” the November 2024 “ruling” is possibly a “ground

for appeal—not for recusal.” Klayman,

(quoting Liteky,

).

5 Moslem’s other complaints fall into the same bucket. He insists that the Court “ignore[d]”

that the Executive Office has “excessive[ly] delay[ed]” its response to the FOIA requests such that

the agency has “constructive[ly] deni[ed]” them. ECF No. 24 at 8. This alleged judicial error rests

on shaky ground too. After all, the “penalty” for an agency “not adher[ing] to FOIA’s explicit

timelines” is that it “cannot rely on the administrative exhaustion requirement to keep cases from

getting into court”—not that the agency may be compelled to produce documents immediately.

Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC,

, 189–90 (D.C. Cir. 2013). But even if

the Court erred as Moslem suggests, he offers no reason to think that the error is more than the

run-of-the-mill judicial mistake that does not warrant recusal. So too for his claims that the Court

improperly relied on “[t]echnicalities” and did not demand evidence that the Executive Office is

working through its response to Moslem’s requests. ECF No. 24 at 8–9; accord ECF No. 19 at 2

(FBI representing in signed opposition that the Executive Office “is in the process of responding

to the requests that [Moslem] identified”).

Nor can Moslem escape this problem by dressing up his claims of error as something more

than judicial mistakes. A claim that a judge must recuse for violating his “duty” to “ensure com-

pliance with federal laws like FOIA” is just a claim that a judge must recuse anytime he allegedly

errs when overseeing a FOIA case. ECF No. 24 at 10. And that proposition cannot be right, since

it would empower every litigant to force recusal anytime he disagrees with a judge’s ruling. The

same defect pervades Moslem’s other theories, all of which rest on purported judicial mistakes.

See

at 2–3, 10 (arguing that the Court failed to perform its duties impartially and to “uphold the

integrity and independence of the judiciary”);

at 10–11 (asserting that the November 15 order

shows that the Court is “complicit[] in concealing government misconduct”); id. at 11 (claiming

that the Court has “conspir[ed] to deprive” Moslem “of his constitutional rights”); id. at 12 (citing

6 various criminal statutes and a law providing for private lawsuits against state officials as a “legal

framework for accountability of Judge Timothy J Kelly”). Id. Simply put, invoking these lofty

concepts is different from showing that a judge has undermined them. And Moslem, while long

on the former, is short on the latter.

Changing tune in reply, Moslem asserts that the Court has exhibited a “pattern[] of bias”

that goes beyond alleged one-off judicial mistakes. ECF No. 28 at 7. But underneath this altered

label is the same substance: claims that the Court has (1) criminally conspired against Moslem by

denying a motion to compel, see id. at 8–9; (2) been “complicit[] in concealing misconduct,” see

id. at 8; and (3) undermined both judicial integrity and the “duty to perform duties diligently,” see

id. at 8–11. These claims, to be sure, are “baseless” and unsupported. Osei v. Standard Chartered

Bank, No. 18-cv-1530 (RC),

, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2019). And that defect is

an independent problem for Moslem. See

But beyond that, Moslem continues to “rest[] entirely

on judicial rulings,” which underlie all his claims of conspiracy and complicity. SEC v. Loving

Spirit Found. Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2004). Nor does he explain why his disagreement

with how the Court decided his motion to compel warrants departure from the rule that judicial

decisions—even if erroneous—“virtually never provide a basis for recusal.”

(describing a mo-

tion relying on judicial rulings as “frivolous”). Sprinkling in citations to cases involving egregious

judicial misconduct gets Moslem nowhere. See Gonzalez v. Comm’n on Jud. Performance,

(Cal. 1983) (removing judge from office for over a dozen counts of “wilful

[sic] misconduct and conduct prejudicial,” including multiple cases in which the judge “intention-

ally exploited his judicial office to attempt to influence the disposition of criminal matters”); In re

Braswell,

, 850–51 (N.C. 2004) (censuring judge for failing to recuse from a case

in which the plaintiff “had an unrelated lawsuit pending against” the judge).

7 For all these reasons, the Court will deny Moslem’s request for recusal and address the

merits of the Tax Division’s motion.

B. The Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over the Tax Division

Some brush-clearing is necessary before assessing Moslem’s standing. In its motion, the

Tax Division appears to move primarily for summary judgment under Rule 56, see ECF No. 21 at

1, which would explain its statement of undisputed material facts, see ECF No. 21-1. But the Tax

Division focuses on moving to dismiss in the memorandum supporting that motion. Rule 12(b)(1),

it explains, covers “motion[s] to dismiss for lack of standing,” and Moslem lacks standing to sue

the Tax Division because he did not submit the challenged FOIA request. ECF No. 21-2 at 1–2

(citation omitted); see also id. at 4 (requesting only that the Court “dismiss [Moslem’s] claims

against the Tax Division for lack of standing” (emphasis added)). For two reasons, the Court will

construe the Tax Division’s motion as one to dismiss. First, the substance of the Division’s argu-

ment is geared towards that relief, no matter how the motion is stylized. And second, the Tax

Division presses the kind of factual jurisdictional challenge that the caselaw contemplates for Rule

12(b)(1) motions. Indeed, when “[f]aced with a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction,”

district courts “may proceed as [they] never could under Rule 12(b)(6) or [Rule] 56” because “[n]o

presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s allegations” and because “the existence of disputed

material facts will not preclude” evaluation of “the merits of jurisdictional claims.” San Diego

Cnty. Credit Union v. Citizens Equity First Credit Union,

(9th Cir. 2023)

(citation omitted).

Now to that jurisdictional argument. Because “Article III confines the federal judicial

power to the resolution of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’” a plaintiff invoking federal-court jurisdic-

tion must establish that he has standing—that is, a “personal stake in the case.” TransUnion LLC

8 v. Ramirez,

(2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This per-

sonal stake must exist as to “each defendant.” Murthy v. Missouri,

(2024). And

part of this necessary showing is the injury-in-fact requirement, which insists on an injury that is

“concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.” TransUnion LLC,

. For “stand-

ing purposes,” a FOIA “requester is injured-in-fact . . . because he did not get what the statute

entitled him to receive.” Zivotofsky ex rel. Ari Z. v. Sec’y of State,

(D.C. Cir.

2006). The flip side is that a party generally “does not have standing to bring a lawsuit” challeng-

ing how an agency handled a FOIA request “if [the] party has not made a request within the mean-

ing of” the statute. Wetzel v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,

(D.D.C.

2013). That is why “[c]ourts have consistently concluded that if an attorney submits a FOIA re-

quest on behalf of a client” but does not include “the client’s name . . . on the request,” then “only

the attorney has standing to pursue relief under the statute.” Snarr v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

No. 19-cv-1412 (ABJ),

, at *4 (D.D.C. July 6, 2020) (dismissing for lack of

“subject matter jurisdiction”); see also, e.g., Smartflash, LLC v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Office,

No. 22-cv-1123 (BAH),

, at *4–6 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2023).

The key jurisdictional question, then, is whether Moslem has shown by a preponderance

of the evidence that he made the FOIA request to the Tax Division or that the requester specified

that he made it on Moslem’s behalf. See Ameen v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 21-cv-1399 (BAH),

, at *3–5 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2021). He has not. The Tax Division’s declarant,

Carmen Banerjee, has been responsible for processing all FOIA requests submitted to the Division

for over a decade. See ECF No. 21-3 (“Banerjee Decl.”) ¶¶ 1–2. She and one government-infor-

mation specialist—whom Banerjee supervises—are tasked with “processing and responding to the

FOIA requests” that the Tax Division “receives.” Id. ¶ 5. And according to Banerjee, “[a] person

9 other than the named Plaintiff” here “submitted by email the FOIA request [that] the complaint

identifies as FOIPA/TAX#11494” in November 2021 and that was denied on December 21 of that

year. Compare id. ¶¶ 6, 10, with Compl. at 6 (alleging that “a request to the IRS

(FOIPA/TAX#11494 CMB:DFITGER) . . . was made in 2021” and “acknowledged in a December

21, 2021 correspondence” denying the request). Banerjee also explains that this FOIA request

“did not state that the request was made on behalf of” Moslem. Banerjee Decl. ¶ 9.

The Tax Division’s letter denying Request #11494 corroborates Banerjee’s description. In

that denial, Banerjee appears to quote the language of the request: “I”—the unidentified re-

quester—“am requesting information through 2021” about “the criminal tax investigation and sub-

sequent federal prosecution of Saaed Moslem.” Banerjee Decl. at 4. The problem was that the

requester was “not entitled to any third-party [tax] return information of another” without “written

consent from that taxpayer.” Id. And the request did not include “such a written consent” from

the relevant taxpayer: presumably, Moslem. Id. So to sum up, the government official in charge

of FOIA requests to the Tax Division provided a sworn declaration stating that someone other than

Moslem submitted the FOIA request without claiming that he made it on Moslem’s behalf, and

the letter denying the request supports that explanation. 2

Moslem tries to dance around this evidence but fails to carry his “burden of establishing”

jurisdiction by showing either that he submitted the request or that someone else did so on his

behalf (and indicated as much to the Tax Division). Wetzel,

. To begin, he

claims that the Tax Division is wrong about who submitted the FOIA request because Moslem

2 To complete the record, the Court ordered the Tax Division to file—ex parte and under seal—the disputed FOIA request. The Tax Division complied, see ECF No. 33-1, and this filing confirms the Tax Division’s representations. Nothing about the request suggests that Moslem made the request or that the requester made it on his behalf.

10 “explicitly stated in his complaint that he submitted this request.” ECF No. 24 at 3. That does not

help him for two reasons. First, Moslem’s “factual allegations . . . are not entitled to a presumption

of validity” in this context. Am. Oversight, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 153. And second, in the complaint,

Moslem did not allege that he submitted Request #11494. Instead, he says that this request “was

made in 2021” but never identifies who made it. Compl. at 6. That ambiguous allegation also

contrasts with his descriptions of personal involvement with other requests. See id. at 4 (identify-

ing a request to the FBI and alleging that “Plaintiff submitted an [sic] FOIA request”); id. at 5

(identifying a different request and alleging that Moslem received a letter “in response to Plaintiff’s

request”).

True, Moslem appears to title this portion of his response to the Tax Division’s motion—

which he claims to submit “under the penalty of perjury”—as “Plaintiff Submitted FOIA Request

#11494.” ECF No. 24 at 1, 3. But this conclusory sentence alone is hardly enough to carry the

day for him. Moslem provides no other details supporting the claim that he submitted the FOIA

request. Nor does he address the sworn statement of the Tax Division’s declarant, which explains

that someone other than Moslem submitted the request. More still, Moslem fails to explain why

the Tax Division would have sent the response letter that it did if Moslem had personally made the

FOIA request.

In addition to these shortcomings, Moslem contradicts his conclusory assertion about per-

sonal submission by later focusing on the permissibility of third-party FOIA requests. For exam-

ple, he says that “[e]ven if another individual submitted the request on Plaintiff’s behalf, agencies

are required to process such requests when proper authorization is provided.” ECF No. 24 at 4.

And he doubles (and triples) down on his third-party-authorization theory in a later filing. There,

he claims that “FOIA permits requests by authorized third parties.” ECF No. 28 at 1. He also

11 accuses the Tax Division of failing “to seek authorization from Plaintiff” before denying the re-

quest—authorization that would have been unnecessary had Moslem himself submitted the re-

quest. Id. at 2. Relatedly, Moslem faults the Tax Division for not giving him a DOJ form “to

verify authorization for third-party requests.” Id. (emphasis added). And to ice a well-frosted

cake, Moslem claims that “Request #11494” was “constructive[ly] assign[ed]”—either to himself

or some unknown person—because he “explicit[ly] identifi[ed]” it “in his complaint.” Id. Either

way, constructive assignment to anyone would not have been required for Moslem to pursue a

FOIA claim had he personally submitted the FOIA request. So especially in light of these argu-

ments and the factual predicates for advancing them, Moslem has not carried his burden of show-

ing that he submitted the challenged request.

Moslem raises a few other issues, but none changes the result. True enough, an individual

can have “standing to bring a FOIA challenge” if a third party—say, an attorney—submits a FOIA

request and “clearly indicate[s] that it is being made on behalf of” that individual. Smallwood v.

DOJ,

(D.D.C. 2017) (citation omitted). In pressing this point, though,

Moslem is right on the law but has not shown that this exception applies here. The Tax Division

official responsible for FOIA requests explains that “[R]equest #11494 did not state that [it] was

made on behalf of” Moslem. Banerjee Decl. ¶ 9. Her declaration tracks “the agency’s response,”

which “indicates that it was not aware that” the requester “was making a request for” Moslem.

Smallwood,

; see also Banerjee Decl. at 4 (explaining that the FOIA request

lacked “written consent” authorizing release of records containing the tax “return information of

another”). And all Moslem does to counter this evidence is state the legal rule—i.e., a person can

have standing if a third-party request shows that the requester clearly made it on the person’s

behalf—without ever saying (or showing) that the requester here told the Tax Division that he was

12 requesting records for Moslem. To the contrary, Moslem suggests that the requester did not do so.

If the requester had, then the Tax Division would not have needed to ask for “clarification or

additional documentation from” Moslem about the request. ECF No. 24 at 4. Nor would the

Division have needed “to seek authorization from” him. ECF No. 28 at 2.

Relatedly, Moslem cannot cure this defect by claiming that he somehow assigned to him-

self (or possibly an unknown person) the rights to the FOIA request by identifying it in his com-

plaint. See ECF No. 28 at 2. If FOIA plaintiffs could do that, they could always dodge the rule

requiring personal submission—or submission on another’s behalf—just by naming the request

when they sue. But the caselaw forecloses that result. See, e.g., Smallwood, 266 F. Supp. 3d at

220–21 (“[C]ourts routinely dismiss FOIA suits where an attorney filed the initial request without

indicating that the request was made on behalf of the plaintiff.”); Smartflash, LLC,

, at *6. And sensibly so: a party cannot unilaterally assign a FOIA claim to himself, and

Moslem’s “assignment” rests only on him identifying the request in his complaint. Cf. Nat’l Sec.

Counselors v. CIA,

(D.D.C. 2012) (“Agencies can and should shift the

vast majority of any burden to the assignees themselves, requiring them to submit whatever docu-

mentation the agency deems sufficient to validate an assignment . . . .”). Nor has Moslem even

suggested anyone else to whom he might have constructively assigned the FOIA request—or how

that would give him standing.

Moslem’s remaining contentions falter too. He insists that Supreme Court precedent “man-

dates agencies [to] clarify deficiencies with requesters” and that FOIA requires agencies to “notify

the requester of deficiencies.” ECF No. 28 at 2 (citing DOJ v. Tax Analysts,

(1989),

and then purporting to quote

(a)(6)(A)(ii)). To begin, Moslem never explains how

this argument helps him establish standing—a jurisdictional issue separate from the merits of how

13 the agency handled the FOIA request. In any event, Moslem is wrong on his own terms. The

question in Tax Analysts was whether FOIA “requires” DOJ “to make available copies of district

court decisions that it receives” when “litigating tax cases.”

. Moslem identifies

no part of that opinion addressing the duty to “clarify” deficient FOIA requests, and the Court sees

none. And although he purports to quote § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii) for the rule that agencies must “notify

the requester of deficiencies,” no such language appears in that provision or elsewhere in § 552.

Instead, § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii) requires agencies to “make a determination with respect to any appeal

within twenty days.” Moslem may be referring to the provision permitting the agency to “toll[]”

the “20-day period” if “necessary to clarify with the requester issues regarding fee assessment.”

Id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii)(II) (emphasis added). But that narrow allowance for the agency is a far cry

from a general mandate to inform requesters of deficiencies before denying requests.

Finally, Moslem fares no better by pointing to a different FOIA claim. He briefly asserts

that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction based on “FOIA Request #11513,” which he admits

he did not “cite[] in the complaint.” ECF No. 28 at 3. The Court already held that this omission

means that any challenge to how the Tax Division addressed this request is “not properly before

this Court.” Minute Order of Nov. 15, 2024. And the Court’s “jurisdiction” turns on “the current

complaint as pleaded—not” on “some hypothetical amended complaint” in which Moslem may

try to include this FOIA request. Robinson v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 22-cv-1098 (TJK),

, at *4 (D.D.C. July 13, 2023). “[J]urisdiction,” after all, “follows the operative

pleading.” Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger,

(2025). That pleading says

nothing about FOIA Request #11513, so this request cannot “create federal jurisdiction where it

was once wanting.”

. Only “an amended pleading” can do that.

In sum, for Moslem to have standing to sue the Tax Division, he needed to allege that it

14 caused him to suffer an injury in fact. On that score, his complaint rests on a single FOIA request.

He has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he made this request or that the

requester indicated that he made it on Moslem’s behalf. How the Tax Division handled the FOIA

request, then, cannot provide Moslem with an injury “for standing purposes.” Wetzel,

(citation omitted). So the Court will grant the Tax Division’s motion under Rule 12(b)(1)

and dismiss the case against it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 3

C. Moslem’s Other Requests for Relief Are Unavailing

With little or no argument, Moslem requests a smattering of other relief in his responses to

the Tax Division’s motion. He seeks orders requiring the Tax Division and other agencies to

search for records and produce “non-exempt portions.” ECF No. 24 at 12–13. And he wants that

production to happen “[i]mmediate[ly].” ECF No. 28 at 13. Beyond that relief, Moslem also asks

for in-camera review of withheld records, the production of “Vaughn Indices,” and sanctions for

“agency bad faith” under

(a)(4)(E).

These requests fall flat for several reasons, some common across all and some specific to

each. Generally, if Moslem wants the Court to grant relief, he should file a motion rather than

shoehorn his requests into an opposition—especially because those requests relate to agencies that

did not even join the opposed motion. And gesturing at relief without explaining why it is war-

ranted is not enough; the Court will not “construct” Moslem’s “legal arguments” for him. Johnson

3 A district court need not hold a “formal hearing on” a Rule 12(b)(1) motion so long as “the nonmoving party” has an “opportunity to be heard.” Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1350. Moslem had that chance. He opposed the Tax Division’s motion, see ECF No. 24, and then elaborated on the jurisdictional issue in a later filing, see ECF No. 28. In those filings, Moslem also chose to discuss issues irrelevant to the jurisdictional question. He contended, for example, that the Court criminally conspired to deprive him of his rights by denying a motion. See, e.g., ECF No. 24 at 11; ECF No. 28 at 9. And he challenged the actions of other agencies who had not moved to dismiss or for summary judgment. See ECF No. 24 at 5–6; ECF No. 28 at 4–6. Still, the question is whether he had an opportunity, not how well he used it.

15 v. Panetta,

(D.D.C. 2013) (citation omitted).

Those threshold problems aside, Moslem has not shown that he is entitled to any of this

relief. Start with the sanctions request. Moslem does not say which agency he wants the Court to

sanction, so this request stumbles at the starting line. In any event, he identifies no sanctionable

conduct. And the provision under which he seeks sanctions provides only for “reasonable attorney

fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any” FOIA case “in which the complainant

has substantially prevailed.”

(a)(4)(E) (emphasis added). But as revealed by his

requests to compel production, Moslem has not yet prevailed in any way. So he has not shown

that sanctions are appropriate.

On that note, Moslem has also failed to show that the Court should compel “IRS, FBI, [or]

EOUSA” to search for records, immediately produce them, and provide Vaughn indices. ECF

No. 24 at 12. The IRS is no longer a defendant. See Minute Order of July 18, 2024. And as

explained, Moslem lacks standing to challenge how the IRS’s replacement, the Tax Division, han-

dled his FOIA request. So any “mot[ion] to compel” the Tax Division to take these actions falters

because the “request” to that agency is not “at issue” in “the current action” anymore. Brestle v.

Lappin,

(D.D.C. 2013) (citation omitted).

The other two agencies—the FBI and Executive Office—have been complying with the

Court’s orders about processing, so there is nothing to compel from them either. Both have

searched for and identified responsive records. See ECF No. 31 at 1, 4. And when they did, the

agencies informed the Court that they were categorically withholding records under FOIA Exemp-

tion 7(A), see

at 1–4, which exempts “records or information compiled for law enforcement

purposes” to the extent that production “could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforce-

ment proceedings,”

(b)(7)(A). So to move the case along, the FBI and Executive

16 Office proposed a schedule for summary judgment on whether Exemption 7(A) applied. See ECF

No. 31 at 4. The Court set that schedule because “FOIA cases are typically and appropriately

decided on motions for summary judgment.” Rodriguez v. U.S. Dep’t of Army,

(D.D.C. 2014); see also Minute Order of Apr. 15, 2025. But these agencies later acknowl-

edged that an impending decision in Moslem’s Second Circuit appeal will soon “make the Exemp-

tion 7(A) withholding inapplicable.” ECF No. 32 at 2. Thus, because the FBI and Executive

Office “will need to fully process the responsive records” once Exemption 7(A) falls away, they

asked to vacate the summary-judgment schedule. Id. at 3. Agreeing with that plan, the Court

vacated the briefing schedule and ordered these two agencies to provide a proposal for further

proceedings within two weeks of the Second Circuit’s ruling or by August 1, 2025—whichever

comes first. See Minute Order of June 2, 2025.

Like most FOIA requesters, Moslem would prefer to get his requested records faster. But

that desire is not enough to short-circuit the typical FOIA process with a motion to compel imme-

diate production. The agencies have searched for records and will need to assess them for potential

exemptions and production shortly based on the Second Circuit’s ruling. So on this record, Mos-

lem’s request to compel is unavailing.

IV. Conclusion and Order

For all the above reasons, it is hereby ORDERED the Tax Division’s Motion, ECF No. 21,

is construed as a motion to dismiss and is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that the Tax

Division is DISMISSED as a Defendant. It is further ORDERED that Moslem’s requests for

relief in his responses to that motion—including his Motion for Recusal, ECF No. 25, and his

Motion to Compel, ECF No. 29—are DENIED.

/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge

17 Date: July 17, 2025

18