UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RFE/RL, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:25-cv-799-RCL

KARI LAKE, in her official capacity as Senior Advisor to the Acting CEO of the United States Agency for Global Media, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is Plaintiff RFE/RL’s Motion [ECF No. 41] for a Preliminary Injunction

(“PI”) seeking to enjoin the defendants, the U.S. Agency for Global Media (“USAGM”) and the

acting leadership of the agency, to restore disbursement of RFE/RL’s congressionally appropriated

funds on a monthly basis pursuant to a lawful and reasonable grant agreement pending resolution

of this lawsuit. For the reasons contained herein, the Motion will be GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART. The Court will GRANT RFE/RL’s relief as it pertains to Fiscal Year (“FY”)

2025, which ends on September 30, 2025, but will DENY the requested relief at this time as it

pertains to the inclusion of specific provisions in future grant negotiations between the parties for

subsequent fiscal years.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court assumes familiarity with the factual and procedural background of this case,

detailed at length in numerous opinions. See RFE/RL, Inc. v. Lake, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-

799-RCL,

(D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2025) (“April TRO”) (providing an overview of

the typical grantmaking process between RFE/RL and USAGM, and ordering the defendants to

1 disburse congressionally appropriated funding to RFE/RL for the month of April); RFE/RL, Inc.

v. Lake, No. 25-cv-799-RCL,

(D.D.C. May 30, 2025) (“May TRO”) (same, for

the month of May); RFE/RL, Inc. v. Lake, No. 25-cv-799-RCL, ECF No. 66 (“June TRO”) (same,

for the month of June); Widakuswara v. Lake, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-1015-RCL,

(D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2025) (“Widakuswara PI”) (ordering the defendants to restore FY 2025

grants with two USAGM networks, Radio Free Asia and Middle East Broadcasting Networks, but

denying similar relief to RFE/RL given the active nature of the parties’ negotiations); RFE/RL,

Inc. v. Lake, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-799-RCL,

(D.D.C. Mar. 25, 2025)

(enjoining the “closeout responsibilities” that the defendants imposed on RFE/RL in their grant

termination letter). The Court reproduces below only those facts as necessary to resolve the

pending motion for a preliminary injunction.

A. Factual and Procedural History

Congress has appropriated funds for RFE/RL every year since the enactment of the

International Broadcasting Act of 1987. First Decl. of Stephen Capus, President & CEO of

RFE/RL (“First Capus Decl.”) ¶ 11, ECF No. 6-3. As is relevant here, on March 15, 2025,

President Trump signed into law the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act,

2025, which appropriated approximately $77 million for RFE/RL to cover the period from March

15 to September 30, 2025. Id. ¶ 20.1

Every year, to facilitate distribution of congressional appropriations, USAGM and RFE/RL

negotiate and enter into a Master Grant Agreement. Id. ¶¶ 13–24; see also International

1 On July 18, 2025, Congress approved a rescission package regarding funds previously appropriated to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting for FY 2025. See Rescissions Act of 2025, H.R. 4, 119th Cong. (as passed by the Senate, July 18, 2025). That rescission package does not impact the funds that have been appropriated to RFE/RL. However, the Court observes that it does reflect the administration’s knowledge of the proper procedure for clawing back appropriated monies—a procedure which is glaringly absent in this lawsuit and the companion lawsuits before this Court regarding USAGM’s other network grantees.

2 Broadcasting Act,

(requiring USAGM to make grants specifically to RFE/RL).

The most recent annual grant agreement between the parties was the FY 2024 Master Grant

Agreement. Following the passage of the First Continuing Resolution, which extended FY 2024

appropriations through December 20, 2024, USAGM and RFE/RL executed a preliminary grant

agreement that extended the terms and conditions of the FY 2024 Master Grant Agreement. April

TRO at *2. And following the passage of the Second Continuing Resolution, USAGM executed

another preliminary grant agreement under those same terms, obligating funds to RFE/RL through

February 28, 2025. Id. at *3.

In mid-February, before the expiration of the second preliminary grant agreement, the

parties negotiated a master grant agreement to cover the balance of FY 2025 from February 28 to

September 30, 2025. The negotiations lasted for about two weeks, with USAGM requesting

RFE/RL’s final signature on February 27, 2025. RFE/RL promptly signed that same day, but

USAGM never countersigned and the FY 2025 agreement never took effect. See April TRO at *2

(providing more detail of this recent negotiation).

On March 14, 2025, President Trump announced Executive Order 14238, “Continuing the

Reduction of the Federal Bureaucracy,” which orders the elimination of “non-statutory

components and functions” of USAGM “to the maximum extent consistent with the applicable

law.” The next day, RFE/RL received a letter from USAGM terminating RFE/RL’s grant, stating

that RFE/RL “no longer effectuates agency priorities.” April TRO at *3.

RFE/RL filed this lawsuit on March 18. See Compl., ECF 1. The case has evolved

significantly since this lawsuit was first filed. See April TRO at *3–4 (detailing the evolution of

the proceedings up to the filing of the instant preliminary injunction motion). As is relevant here,

on March 26, USAGM rescinded its termination of RFE/RL’s grant and the parties entered into

3 another preliminary grant agreement to disburse the March 2025 appropriations, subject to the

same conditions as the FY 2024 grant. See First Decl. of Joseph Lataille, Chief Financial Officer

of RFE/RL (“First Lataille Decl.”) ¶ 9, ECF No. 33-1. That preliminary grant agreement expired

at the end of March with no FY 2025 agreement in place.

On April 9, USAGM sent a “proposed” master grant agreement to RFE/RL to cover the

balance of FY 2025. This new master grant agreement contained numerous provisions that have

never been in RFE/RL’s previous grants, many of which RFE/RL viewed as unreasonable poison

pills.2 That same day, RFE/RL filed a renewed motion for a TRO (the “April TRO Mot.”), stating

that the new provisions were “flagrantly illegal” and designed to “set up RFE/RL for failure[] and

give USAGM complete control over RFE/RL.” April TRO Mot. at 2, ECF No. 28. RFE/RL

sought immediate disbursement of its appropriated funds for April “under the same terms and

conditions that were previously in effect and governed the funds disbursed in March 2025.” Id. at

1.

The Court initially withheld ruling on the April TRO Motion. Instead, the Court held

several status conferences with the parties to coordinate the filing of a preliminary injunction

motion and the parallel proceedings in Widakuswara v. Lake, given the significant overlap in issues

presented in that case. On April 22, 2025, the Court issued the Widakuswara PI, restoring

USAGM’s FY 2025 grant agreements with Radio Free Asia and Middle East Broadcast Networks

2 For example, the new agreement included a provision that would allow USAGM to determine the membership of RFE/RL’s Board—an authority that Congress specifically repealed. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023,

Stat 2395, 3915 (2022). To date, USAGM has still refused to remove this provision or even discuss it with RFE/RL, other than insisting that its proposed terms are “reasonable.”

4 through September 30, 2025, but denying relief to RFE/RL because of the ongoing nature of the

FY 2025 grant negotiations.3 Widakuswara PI at *12 n.23.

The same day the Court issued the Widakuswara PI, RFE/RL filed the instant motion for a

preliminary injunction seeking an order requiring USAGM’s entry into a grant agreement for the

balance of 2025. Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (“PI Mot.”), ECF No. 41. RFE/RL characterized the

defendants’ imposition of unreasonable grant conditions and evasive negotiating tactics as

“transparent pretext to achieve their objective of shutting down RFE/RL.” Id. at 3. Specifically,

since April 9, the only change USAGM made to their version of the master grant agreement was

to extend certain 24-hour deadlines to 14-day deadlines, while still refusing to budge on or even

engage in discussion regarding what RFE/RL called the “most egregious” provisions. Id. at 9–10;

see Emails Between USAGM and RFE/RL, PI Mot. Ex. 1 at 4, ECF No. 41-6 (USAGM

representing in an April 16 email to RFE/RL that “the agency is willing to change most of the 24-

hour deadlines to 14 days”). Everything else remained unchanged. Viewing the negotiations as

futile, RFE/RL emphasized its urgent need for funding and referred back to the pending April TRO

motion by asking the Court to “promptly enter a TRO concerning April funds while the Court

considers a preliminary injunction.” Id. at 2. The defendants soon thereafter filed an Opposition,

challenging this Court’s jurisdiction to enter the requested relief and insisting that negotiations

were active and ongoing. Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 44. On April

28, the Court held a hearing on RFE/RL’s preliminary injunction motion and the April TRO

Motion. Min Entry for Mot. Hr’g Apr. 28, 2025.

3 As context, Radio Free Asia and Middle East Broadcast Networks had already executed FY 2025 grants with USAGM. USAGM terminated those grants, and USAGM never rescinded those terminations. Thus, in granting the Widakuswara PI, the Court reviewed USAGM’s termination of those FY 2025 grants as “final agency action” reviewable under the APA. See Widakuswara PI at *12. RFE/RL sits in a different posture because RFE/RL and USAGM never successfully entered a FY 2025 grant.

5 The next day, on April 29, the Court entered the April TRO ordering the disbursement of

RFE/RL’s April funds “under the same terms and conditions applicable to the most recent master

grant agreement between the parties, in materially identical terms to the agreement between the

parties pertaining to March 2025.” April TRO at *10. In other words, the Court ordered an

“extender” or “mini-agreement” mirroring the March preliminary grant agreements. April TRO

at *10. The Court reserved ruling on the preliminary injunction motion, however, because the

Court only intended to “to throw RFE/RL a lifeline while negotiations could meaningfully take

place.” April TRO at *7.

But the negotiations soon broke down even further. By the end of May, the parties had

still made no progress towards reaching an agreement. RFE/RL filed a new TRO motion seeking

access to its May funding, reporting that “[a]ll that USAGM has done since this Court’s April 29,

2025 TRO is send RFE/RL different iterations of the same email—punctuated by multiple days of

silence—failing to engage with RFE/RL’s substantive objections.” May TRO Mot. at 1, ECF No.

56-1. The Court, finding that “the parties [were] in virtually the exact same situation that they

were in one month ago,” adopted its reasoning from the April TRO and granted RFE/RL’s motion.

See May TRO *1–2.

Thereafter, USAGM simply stopped responding to RFE/RL. RFE/RL reached out to

USAGM three times in the month of June, and all three emails went unanswered. See Fourth Decl.

of Joseph Lataille, Chief Financial Officer of RFE/RL (“Fourth Lataille Decl.”) at ¶¶ 2–6, ECF

No. 62-2. USAGM has provided no explanation, to either RFE/RL or this Court, for its continued

silence. Near the end of June, RFE/RL filed another TRO Motion seeking access to its June

funding. The Court, left with “no choice but to conclude, based on the record before it, that

USAGM has no intention of negotiating with RFE/RL or ever distributing the congressionally

6 appropriated funds absent court intervention,” granted its third identical TRO to keep RFE/RL

afloat. June TRO at 2–3.

Rather than continue this predictable and unfortunate pattern, the Court turns to the instant

preliminary injunction, which is now ripe for review.4

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A preliminary injunction “is a stopgap measure, generally limited as to time, and intended

to maintain a status quo or ‘to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits

can be held.’” Sherley v. Sebelius,

, 781–82 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Univ. of Tex.

v. Camenisch,

(1981)). It is an “extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded

upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,

Inc.,

(2008). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that

he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence

of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is

in the public interest.”

. “Where, as here, the government is a party, the latter two factors

of the preliminary analysis merge into one, because the interest of the government is taken to be

identical to the interest of the public.” RFE/RL, --- F.Supp.3d at ---,

, at *2 (citing

Nken v. Holder,

(2009)). Courts in this Circuit have adopted a “sliding scale”

4 For the sake of comprehensiveness, the Court briefly recounts the appellate proceedings in this case. On May 1, the defendants appealed the April TRO to the D.C. Circuit. See Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, ECF No. 50. On May 7, the D.C. Circuit motions panel issued a stay of the April TRO, see Order, RFE/RL, Inc. v. Lake, No. 25-5158, (D.C. Cir. May 7, 2025), Doc. #2114775, but the court sitting en banc subsequently issued an administrative stay of the motions panel stay, see Order, RFE/RL, Inc. v. Lake, No. 25-5158 (D.C. Cir. May 7, 2025), Doc. #2114884. With the April TRO in effect, the defendants complied and disbursed RFE/RL’s April funds. On May 22, 2025, having fully complied with this Court’s TRO, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss their appeal voluntarily. Mot. to Dismiss Appeal, RFE/RL, Inc. v. Lake, No. 25-5158, Doc. #2117062. On July 1, the D.C. Circuit granted Defendants’ motion for voluntary dismissal and denied RFE/RL’s request to vacate the motions panel’s stay order. See Order, RFE/RL, Inc. v. Lake, No. 25-5158 (D.C. Cir. July 1, 2025), Doc. #2123323. The en banc D.C. Circuit then denied RFE/RL’s motion for reconsideration and dissolved the administrative stay of the motions panel’s stay order. See Order, RFE/RL, Inc. v. Lake, No. 25-5158 (D.C. Cir. July 1, 2025), Doc. #2123325. No aspect of this case remains pending before the D.C. Circuit.

7 approach to the preliminary relief analysis, “whereby a relatively strong showing on one of these

factors may partially offset weakness in another, although some non-speculative showing of

irreparable harm is essential.”

(citing CityFed Fin. Corp. v. Off. of Thrift Supervision,

, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).

III. The Tucker Act Does Not Deprive this Court of Jurisdiction

The defendants maintain their position that this Court lacks jurisdiction because the Tucker

Act directs this case to the Court of Federal Claims (CFC). The Tucker Act confers on the CFC

jurisdiction over “any claim against the United States founded . . . upon any express or implied

contract with the United States.”

(a)(1).

The Court remains unpersuaded by the defendants’ argument and reiterates its holding

from the April TRO: the Tucker Act does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction because RFE/RL’s

asserted rights are not based in any contract, but rather, are rooted in the International Broadcasting

Act and the continuing resolutions to the 2024 Consolidated Appropriations Act. See April TRO

at *4–5. To reiterate, there is currently no existing contract between the parties for disbursement

of FY 2025 congressional appropriations. RFE/RL has not alleged the breach of any contract with

the federal government—the extended FY 2024 grant agreement between the parties expired on

its scheduled end-date on March 31. The issue presented by the pending motion is that the parties

are at an impasse in trying to enter a new grant agreement. It would be nonsensical for this Court

to send this case to the CFC, as the defendants insist, when there is no “express or implied contract”

between the parties for the CFC to review.

IV. RFE/RL is Entitled to Relief on its APA Claim

The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) permits judicial review of “final agency

action” and requires a court to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and

8 conclusions” that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance

with law.”

, 706(2)(A). Broadly, RFE/RL argues that USAGM’s decision to

impose unlawful, unreasonable, and unworkable grant conditions violates the APA. PI Mot. at 18,

28–38.

A. PI Factor 1: Likelihood of Success on the Merits

i. Final Agency Action

To constitute final agency action: (1) “the action must mark the consummation of the

agency’s decisionmaking process” and (2) it “must be one by which rights or obligations have

been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” Bennett v. Spear,

,

177–78 (1997). “The finality requirement” is applied in a “‘flexible and pragmatic way.” Ciba-

Geigy Corp. v. EPA,

(D.C. Cir. 1986) (internal quotations omitted). The Court

addresses each Bennett prong in turn.

To recap, the record shows that USAGM transmitted a “proposed” grant agreement to

RFE/RL on April 9, 2025. The only change from this proposal that USAGM has even considered

is extending the deadline for language deletion services from 24-hours to 14-days, which USAGM

expressed a willingness to do in an email to RFE/RL on April 16. But USAGM has stonewalled

RFE/RL on every other issue, including provisions that would fundamentally change the decades-

old working relationship between RFE/RL and USAGM—including increased oversight,

expedited deletion of entire language departments, stringent reporting and audit requirements, and

removal of professional independence.

When the defendants filed their PI opposition at the end of April, they represented that

“USAGM is in active negotiations with [RFE/RL]” and insisted that, rather than obtaining

preliminary relief from the Court, RFE/RL could instead “engage with USAGM regarding its

9 concerns about the grant terms.” PI Opp’n at 16. As explained supra, the Court took USAGM at

its word and granted only modest relief to keep RFE/RL operational while negotiations progressed.

But now, over three months later, continuing to accept such a characterization would irresponsibly

ignore the on-the-ground reality. USAGM has refused to engage with RFE/RL on the FY 2025

Master Grant Agreement for approximately seven weeks as of the date of this Opinion. Notice,

ECF No. 68. And USAGM’s total abdication of communication is taking place over a period in

which monthly disbursements of congressional allocations would typically be occurring at the

beginning of each month. In short, “the record does not show” that the agency “established these

terms on a tentative or interlocutory basis, that it is amenable to further negotiation of them, or that

it has been even slightly receptive to [RFE/RL’s] recent efforts to reopen those discussions.”

Giuseppe Bottiglieri Shipping Co. S.P.A. v. United States,

(S.D. Ala.

2012). At this point, the record supports only one conclusion—that USAGM has made a final

decision to cease negotiations and instead present the FY 2025 grant agreement as a “take it or

leave it” ultimatum to RFE/RL. Imposition of these grant conditions in the “proposed” FY 2025

grant agreement, which USAGM has not altered or changed in any way since April 16, constitutes

“the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process.” Bennett,

.

The second prong of the Bennett test asks whether the agency action “determine[s]” “rights

or obligations” or is an action from which “legal consequences will flow.” Bennett,

. Again, the Court resolves this question in the affirmative. Here, “legal consequences clearly

flow from the imposition” of a grant condition, because “[r]eceipt of the grant[] is conditioned” on

accepting it. State ex rel. Becerra v. Sessions,

, 1031–32 (N.D. Cal. 2018).

USAGM has presented the new conditions as a fait accompli, giving RFE/RL no option but to

either close shop or accept the new terms in order to access the congressionally appropriated

10 funds—which will define RFE/RL’s legal relationship with USAGM and its ability to operate as

a federally funded news organization.

The Court therefore concludes that USAGM’s imposition of new grant terms on RFE/RL

for FY 2025 is a final agency action. The question then becomes whether USAGM’s decision to

present a radically altered grant agreement in contravention of decades of grantmaking practice,

refuse to defend the substance of any said changes, and then cease responding to the recipient is a

violation of the APA—all this, when federal broadcasting statutes mandate the formation of grant

agreements with that specific recipient and federal appropriations law designates a line-item dollar

amount of funding to that recipient. For reasons explained infra, the Court concludes that it is.

ii. “Committed to Agency Discretion by Law,”

(a)(2)

Under § 701(a)(2) of the APA, “agency action is not subject to judicial review to the

extent that such action is committed to agency discretion by law.” Lincoln v. Vigil,

, 190–91 (1993) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Specifically, judicial review is

barred when “a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s

exercise of discretion,”

, including situations where the agency decision “involves a

complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise.”

(quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830). This is a “a very narrow exception” to the presumption of

reviewability of agency action under the APA, and it only applies “in those rare instances where

‘statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.’” Citizens to

Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,

(1971) (quoting S. Rep. No. 752, 79th

Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945)), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders,

(1977).

11 Here, there are several sources of “law to apply” permitting meaningful judicial review of

RFE/RL’s substantive APA claim. USAGM does not have boundless discretion in deciding

whether or not to make grants available to RFE/RL—most obviously, congressional

appropriations dictate exactly how much money USAGM must distribute to RFE/RL, via grant

agreements, in a given fiscal year. If USAGM had no limits on its discretion in making grants to

RFE/RL, then the appropriations statute would be devoid of any force. Furthermore, the

International Broadcasting Act provides guardrails for the grantmaking relationship between

USAGM and RFE/RL: the grants for RFE/RL “shall be available . . . for the purposes of carrying

out” RFE/RL’s historic functions, the grant agreement “shall establish guidelines for such

grants,” and the USAGM CEO “shall respect the professional independence and integrity of . . .

the grantees of the agency.”

(f), (g), § 6204(b) (emphasis added). As RFE/RL

rightly points out, even where a statute confers “broad discretion,” final agency action remains

reviewable unless “the statutory scheme, taken together with other relevant materials, provides

absolutely no guidance as to how that discretion is to be exercised.” Pl.’s Reply at 10–11, ECF

No. 45 (quoting Make The Rd. N.Y. v. Wolf,

, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2020)). For these

reasons, the Court concludes that the International Broadcasting Act and relevant congressional

appropriations statutes provide sufficient guidance for judicial review of USAGM’s imposition

of a grant agreement.

iii. “Arbitrary and Capricious,”

(2)(A)

The APA requires a court to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and

conclusions” that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law.”

(2)(A). An agency has acted arbitrarily and capriciously if

it has “relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to

12 consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs

counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a

difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

(1983). “The scope of judicial review under the arbitrary-

and-capricious standard ‘is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the

agency,’ but the court must confirm that the agency has fulfilled its duty to ‘examine the relevant

data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection

between the facts found and the choice made.” Ark Initiative v. Tidwell,

(D.C.

Cir. 2016) (quoting State Farm,

).

As far as this Court is aware, it is unprecedented for an agency to demand that entirely

new terms govern its decades-old working relationship with a grantee entity and then stop

responding, particularly when the agency is statutorily obligated to grant yearly congressional

appropriations to that specific entity by name. Clearly, USAGM has fallen short of its duty to

“articulate a satisfactory explanation” for its final grant agreement because it has offered no

explanation at all. And without any explanation from USAGM to justify its new grant

agreement, the Court cannot discern any reasonable basis to explain USAGM’s drastic change in

course.

To be sure, Congress has passed legislation defining the contours of USAGM’s

grantmaking relationship with RFE/RL. For example, the International Broadcasting Act lists

provisions that the grant agreement with RFE/RL “shall include,” such as “that a grant be used

only for activities which the Agency determines are consistent with the purposes” of the statute,

and that RFE/RL “justify in detail each proposed expenditure of grant funds.”

(g)(1), (5). The Act also provides an avenue for cancelation of the grant and redirection

13 of the grant funds to another entity. See

§ 6207(d) (“If the Chief Executive Officer [of

USAGM] determines at any time that RFE/RL, Incorporated is not carrying out the functions

described in this section in an effective and economical manner, the Agency may award the grant

to carry out such functions to another entity.”); 2024 Appropriations Act, div. F, tit. I,

; 170 Cong. Rec. at H2087 (giving USAGM limited discretion to “reprogram” up to five

percent of funds among different programs, but only if it gives the House and Senate

Appropriations Committees fifteen days’ advance notice). But when USAGM changed course

with the presentation of the FY 2025 agreement, it never once referred to any of these federal

statutes. Failure to invoke any of the governing statutes in taking such drastic action to alter the

parties longstanding grantmaking relationship further confirms that the defendants’ action was

arbitrary and capricious and must be “set aside.”

(2)(A).

Furthermore, “when an agency changes course . . . it must ‘be cognizant that

longstanding policies may have engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into

account.’” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,

, 30 (2020)

(quoting Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro,

, 222 (2016)). RFE/RL has been

funded by the U.S. government since its inception seventy-five years ago, and USAGM has

always reliably distributed those funds via grant agreement. Up until now, the parties’ annual

grant negotiations for each fiscal year were routine, pro forma affairs: the parties would only

“discuss and implement ‘minor’ changes” over the course of a couple weeks. April TRO at *1.

To now introduce terms that have never been in any prior grant agreement with RFE/RL, fail to

engage with RFE/RL on the substance, and then ultimately go dark—presumably as an attempt

to strong arm RFE/RL into accepting the proposed agreement as their pool of money runs dry—

makes a mockery of the APA’s requirement to consider reliance interests, let alone the “decades

14 of . . . reliance” interests at play here. Ass’n of Am. Univs. v. Dep’t of Energy, --- F. Supp. 3d ---,

No. 25-cv-10912-ADB,

(D. Mass. 2025) (quoting Encino Motorcars, 579

U.S. at 222).

It should go without saying that “government officials must have some freedom to raise

issues and questions, to express preliminary views, and to bargain and debate, without risking

that their actions will transform the matter from negotiations into litigation about the

negotiations.” Robishaw Eng’g Inc. v. United States,

(E.D. Va. 1995).

If any of these typical negotiating strategies had occurred, the Court would likely not be

intervening in the same way. And indeed, the defendants represented to the Court that such

negotiations were taking place between the parties throughout April and May. But the last

several weeks have made clear that the government has not engaged with RFE/RL on any issues

and has not bargained or debated over any of the radically different terms. Based on this truly

extraordinary record, the Court finds that USAGM’s abrupt imposition of an unprecedented FY

2025 grant agreement with no justification is final, arbitrary and capricious agency action. The

first preliminary injunction factor is satisfied.

B. PI Factor 2: Irreparable Harm

In opposing RFE/RL’s showing of irreparable harm, the defendants state that RFE/RL can

forestall any impending irreparable harm to its business by “engag[ing] with USAGM to try to

address the terms it contends are unworkable.” PI Opp’n at 21. But this avenue, as explained

supra, is foreclosed as a product of the defendants’ own obstruction.

Otherwise, the defendants make familiar attempts to undermine RFE/RL’s showing of

irreparable harm: that monetary harm is generally not irreparable, and that the purported harm to

RFE/RL of losing its congressional funding does not “threaten its very existence” to justify

15 preliminary relief. PI Opp’n at 20 (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy,

(D.D.C. 1981)). But the facts here paint a much more dire picture. RFE/RL receives 99%

of its funding from congressional appropriations. Over the last several months, in the face of

USAGM’s flagrant disregard for its funding responsibilities, RFE/RL has had to repeatedly brace

for the worst. That means gearing up for mass furloughs, cancelation of programming, and

inevitable damage to the global influence that RFE/RL has built over decades. At the end of each

month, given RFE/RL’s consistently compelling case for temporary relief, the Court has granted

interim relief to keep RFE/RL afloat. The reasoning that informed each of this Court’s prior grants

of preliminary relief to RFE/RL applies equally now. Therefore, the second preliminary injunction

factor is satisfied.

C. PI Factors 3 and 4: Balance of the Equities and Public Interest

As was the case when this Court granted the April, May, and June TROs, the balance of

the equities and the public interest continue to favor RFE/RL.

These factors “merge when the government is the opposing party.” Am. Ass’n of Pol.

Consultants v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin.,

, 365 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Nken,

). “There is a substantial public interest ‘in having governmental agencies abide

by the federal laws that govern their existence and operations.’” Newby, 838 F.3d at 12 (citation

omitted). As explained supra, RFE/RL is likely to succeed on the merits of its APA claim, and

“[t]here is generally no public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful agency action”—here, the

agency’s unexplained 180-degree turn on its proposed grant agreement, and the subsequent

abandonment of negotiations, with a statutorily-designated grantee organization. Shawnee Tribe

v. Mnuchin,

, 102 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Newby, 838 F.3d at 12).

V. Scope of Relief

16 The Court will grant relief to RFE/RL to the extent that it pertains to the FY 2025 grant

agreement. However, the Court construes RFE/RL’s request for relief as asking for a

determination on the substantive legality on a host of grant terms for any future grant agreement

with USAGM.5 But at this juncture, the Court is not equipped to go through each challenged term

of the FY 2025 agreement and determine the legality of each one moving forward, particularly

when the defendants have not substantively responded to RFE/RL’s challenges to the new terms

(other than to offer conclusory assertions that the terms are “reasonable” and that RFE/RL is

simply “unhappy” with them). Opp’n at 11–12. Perhaps USAGM could conjure up legitimate

reasoning to explain its drastic departure from years of grantmaking experience with RFE/RL. The

Court takes no position on that matter here. The problem as it stands is that there is no reasoning

from USAGM to explain its new negotiating position. USAGM’s final action in presenting a non-

negotiable FY 2025 grant agreement in the middle of the fiscal year, upending decades of prior

relations between the parties, came with no justification. The record is too sparse for the Court to

make a forward-looking determination of the legality of challenged provisions when USAGM has

refused to offer any reasoned explanation for its action.6

Therefore, the Court cabins the scope of its relief to remedy USAGM’s illegal action

regarding the FY 2025 grant agreement by “set[ting] aside” the agency’s presented version of the

FY 2025 grant agreement as arbitrary and capricious.

(2)(A). Furthermore, the

5 For example, in RFE/RL’s proposed order, RFE/RL asks for the Court to enjoin USAGM from imposing: “[a]ny condition making a default or late payment on any real property or real estate a material breach of the agreement”; “[a]ny condition requiring the deletion or a similar winding down of language services in 14 days”; “[a]ny condition requiring RFE/RL to inform the USAGM CEO of communications or meetings, whether formal or informal, by any of its directors, employees, officers, contractors, staffers, affiliates, and board members, or any other related persons, with House and Senate staff and Members and any other entity within the Executive Branch and to provide an accounting of those meetings from the prior year or to provide an accounting of such communications or meetings moving forward”; to name a few. See Notice Regarding Filing of Proposed Order, ECF No. 46. 6 This is not to say that courts are never able to review the legality of individual grant provisions—conceivably, at some future juncture, such granular intervention may be warranted.

17 Court’s preliminary relief here will mirror the relief that it has ordered for the last three months—

that USAGM and RFE/RL enter into a grant agreement for FY 2025 that is materially identical to

their prior master grant agreement and the extender agreements that have governed the parties’

relationship for the last several months. The Court believes this interim relief is properly tailored

to ensure that USAGM and RFE/RL are engaged in an agreement that follows the statutory

mandates of the operative congressional appropriations acts and the International Broadcasting

Act.

VI. The Court Will Not Impose Bond

For the reasons already given by this Court at every similar juncture in this case and related

ones, the Court will not impose bond. Because of the fragile and desperate financial position of

RFE/RL, the imposition of bond would defeat the very purpose of the preliminary relief ordered

here. See Widakuswara PI at *17; April TRO at *8; May TRO at *2; June TRO at 3.

VII. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, upon consideration of the plaintiff’s Motion [ECF No. 41] for a

Preliminary Injunction, the defendants’ Opposition thereto, the plaintiff’s Reply, and the entire

record herein, RFE/RL’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 41] will be GRANTED

IN PART. The defendants must immediately enter into a master grant agreement with Plaintiff

for Fiscal Year 2025 under the same terms and conditions applicable to the most recent master

grant agreement between the parties, in materially identical terms to the prior extender grant

agreements between the parties for March, April, May, and June. The defendants must also (i)

restore disbursement of RFE/RL’s congressionally appropriated funds to RFE/RL on a monthly

basis pending final resolution of this lawsuit, and (ii) file monthly status reports on the first day of

each month apprising the Court of the status of their compliance with the accompanying Order.

18