UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

THOMAS VALENTINE, :

Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 24-1081 (RC)

v. : Re Document Nos.: 26, 29

GEORGE WASHINGTON : UNIVERSITY, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANT DISTRICT HOSPITAL PARTNERS’ MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING DEFENDANTS GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY AND GEORGE WASHINGTON MEDICAL FACULTY ASSOCIATES’ MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Thomas Valentine brings this action pro se against District Hospital Partners,

George Washington University (“GWU”), and George Washington Medical Faculty Associates

(“MFA”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Valentine alleges that Defendants failed to make

reasonable accommodations for his disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”) and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”). District Hospital

Partners moves to dismiss for lack of standing and for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted. GWU and MFA jointly move to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants both motions to dismiss. II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Around 8:00pm on April 11, 2023, Valentine visited George Washington University

Hospital (“GWU Hospital”) to check in on a relative, P.R., who was receiving treatment there for

extreme psychiatric symptoms. 1 See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 18, ECF No. 18. At the time the

hospital required visitors to wear protective face masks. Id. ¶¶ 43, 61. Valentine suffers from a

disability that he claims “prevents him from safely wearing a face mask.” Id. ¶ 14. Upon

arriving at the hospital, Valentine presented the check-in nurse and hospital security a signed

doctor’s note describing his condition. Id. The hospital staff permitted Valentine to sit in the

waiting room without a mask, and shortly after they allowed him to enter P.R.’s hospital room.

Id. ¶ 15. Valentine remained in the ER with P.R. for approximately ten hours overnight, leaving

the room for short intervals when P.R. fell asleep. Id. ¶ 18. During these breaks, Valentine had

limited unmasked interactions with the hospital staff, and when he left the hospital was

“thanked . . . for his assistance in staying with P.R. and keeping P.R. under control” by hospital

staff. Id. ¶ 19.

Valentine left the hospital in the early morning on April 12 and returned that afternoon.

See id. ¶¶ 12, 18, 20. He “checked in with the security desk, showed his doctor’s note[,]” and

was granted access. Id. ¶ 20. Valentine briefly stopped at the hospital gift shop; gift shop

employees told Valentine that he needed to wear a mask in the store. Id. ¶ 22. The gift shop

employees then asked an unidentified concierge employee to confront Valentine. Id. ¶ 23. The

1 Because this action is at the pleadings stage, the Court recounts the facts as alleged in the complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting Bell v. Twombly,

(2007)).

2 concierge employee allegedly asked Valentine, “[w]hat the hell kind of medical condition would

stop you from wearing a mask?” and then allegedly stated, “[t]his is why we’re in the situation

we’re in in this country, people talking about my rights.” Id. ¶ 24. After, Valentine briefly

returned to P.R.’s room, but a male nurse asked Valentine to exit the room and follow him. Id.

¶¶ 29–30. Eventually, Valentine attempted to return to P.R.’s room, but the nurse at the check-in

desk intervened and told Valentine that he needed a mask to return. Id. ¶ 35. After being denied

reentry, Valentine attempted to call various members of ER management and GWU Hospital’s

general counsel but was unsuccessful in reaching anyone. Id. ¶¶ 37–38.

After some time passed, four GWU Hospital employees came to the lobby and began

speaking with Valentine. Id. ¶ 42. Throughout a ten-minute conversation, Valentine “asserted

his rights under the ADA[,]” and the GWU Hospital employees reiterated that all visitors were

required to wear a mask. Id. ¶ 43. The GWU Hospital employees briefly left Valentine in the

lobby, and when one of the four employees returned, she informed Valentine that the hospital

had provided P.R. a private room that Valentine would be allowed in without a mask. Id. ¶ 48.

Finally, a hospital employee instructed Valentine to wait in the lobby for an escort. Id. ¶ 53.

Ultimately, he was able to visit with P.R. in his private room. Id. Valentine has not returned to

the hospital since. See Id. ¶ 63.

B. Procedural Background

On April 11, 2024, Valentine, proceeding pro se, sued GWU, MFA, and Universal

Health Services, Inc. (“UHSI”) for violating the ADA and the DCHRA. Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1.

The ADA is a federal law prohibiting discrimination “on the basis of disability in the full and

equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of

any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a

3 place of public accommodation.”

(a). The DCHRA is D.C.’s state-law

analogue that prohibits “deny[ing], directly or indirectly, any person the full and equal

enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any

place of public accommodations” for discriminatory reasons such as actual or perceived

disability.

. Valentine claimed that the three original defendants failed to

“modify their accessibility policies, procedures, or to otherwise reasonably accommodate [him]

[] based on [his] inability to wear a mask due to his disability.” Compl. ¶ 64. Valentine also

alleged violations of the DCHRA because the three original defendants “denied [him] the full

and equal enjoyment of [the hospital’s] goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and

accommodations.”

. He sought a declaration that they violated the ADA and

DCHRA, as well as “a preliminary and permanent injunction requiring [them] to modify their

policies, practices, and procedures, including those regard[ing] face masks, to comply with the

ADA and the DCHRA.”

(a)–(c). He also sought compensatory and punitive damages,

along with his costs and attorneys’ fees. 2

(d)–(e).

UHSI moved to dismiss the allegations against it on June 20, 2024, arguing that GWU

Hospital “is operated by an indirect subsidiary of UHSI.” Def.’s Mot. Dismiss (“UHSI’s Mot.

Dismiss”) at 2, ECF No. 9-1. After further research, Valentine discovered that District Hospital

Partners, a subsidiary of UHSI, is the majority owner of GWU Hospital. Pl.’s Reply Def. UHSI

Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s USHI Opp’n”) at 3, ECF No. 17. This led to Valentine filing an amended

complaint on July 16, 2024, where he named GWU, MFA, and District Hospital Partners as

defendants. See Am. Compl. None of the factual allegations or claims for relief changed.

2 Valentine presumably has no attorneys’ fees because he is proceeding pro se. Cf. Kay v. Ehrler,

(1991) (noting that “a pro se litigant who is not a lawyer is not entitled to attorney’s fees” under a fee-shifting provision) (emphases in original).

4 District Hospital Partners now moves to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Def.’s Mot. Dismiss (“DHP Mot. Dismiss”) at 1,

ECF No. 29-1. District Hospital Partners argues that (1) Valentine’s claim under the ADA must

be dismissed for lack of standing and failure to state a claim; (2) Valentine’s claim under the

DCHRA must be dismissed because it is time-barred and he failed to state a claim; and (3)

Valentine only refers to District Hospital Partners in the “parties” section of the first amended

complaint, which does not state a plausible claim for discrimination. Id. at 5, 13, 16. GWU and

MFA jointly move to dismiss the claims against them under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“GWU Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss”) at 1, ECF No. 26-1. Both GWU

and MFA argue that Valentine failed to plead plausible claims against them because they do not

own or operate the hospital, and no GWU or MFA employee is alleged to have denied Valentine

any services. Id. at 2–3, 14. Valentine filed oppositions to both motions to dismiss. Pl.’s

Response Defs.’ George Washington University & George Washington Medical Faculty

Associates’ Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s GWU Defs.’ Resp.”), ECF No. 31; Pl.’s Response Opp’n Def.

District Hospital Partners’ Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s DHP Opp’n”), ECF No. 38. Defendants filed

replies in support of their motions. Reply Further Supp. Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 32; Reply

Further Supp. Def. District Hospital Partners, LP’s Mot. Dismiss Pl.’s First Am. Compl., ECF

No. 40. The motions to dismiss are thus ripe for review.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under Rule 12(b)(1)

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the law presumes that “a cause lies

outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

(1994). The D.C. Circuit has explained that a motion to dismiss for lack of standing constitutes a

5 motion under Rule 12(b)(1) because “the defect of standing is a defect in subject matter

jurisdiction.” Haase v. Sessions,

(D.C. Cir. 1987). “Because subject matter

jurisdiction focuses on the Court’s power to hear a claim,” the Court must give a plaintiff’s

factual allegations closer scrutiny than would be required for a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to

state a claim. See Grand Lodge of Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Ashcroft,

(D.D.C. 2001).

It is the plaintiff's burden to establish that he has standing. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,

(1992). For standing, the plaintiff must show that he suffered “an (1) ‘injury in

fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)

actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical’—(2) which is ‘fairly traceable’ to the

challenged act, and (3) ‘likely’ to be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” Nat’l Treasure Emps.

Union v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Lujan,

-

61). The D.C. Circuit has explained that the injury alleged must be “certainly impending.”

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas,

(1990)).

B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Under Rule 12(b)(6)

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)). A motion

to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint, not a plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the

merits. Gill v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C 2012). A plaintiff’s factual

allegations must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the

assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true,” allowing the court to draw a

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56. “Threadbare

6 recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are

insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Iqbal,

. At the pleading stage, a

plaintiff need not allege all the elements of his prima facie case. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema

N.A.,

, 511–12 (2002).

IV. ANALYSIS

At the outset, the Court notes that pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards

than complaints drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007) (per curiam). A

court can “examine other pleadings to understand the nature and basis of . . . pro se claims” as

alleged in the complaint. Gray v. Poole,

(D.C. Cir. 2002). Although the

standard for a pro se complaint is less stringent, the complaint still must “(1) contain a short and

plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . . [and] (2) a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Bair v.

Obama Admin., No. 14-1257,

, at *1 (D.D.C Feb. 24, 2015) (granting a

defendant’s motion to dismiss because a pro se plaintiff failed to make any claim suitable for

decision).

The Court starts by analyzing District Hospital Partners’ motion to dismiss. The Court

then turns to the GWU Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

A. Claims Against District Hospital Partners

Valentine raises claims against District Hospital Partners under two statutory

provisions—the ADA and DCHRA. District Hospital Partners moves to dismiss both claims.

The Court finds that Valentine’s ADA claim must be dismissed for lack of standing, and his

DCHRA claim must be dismissed because Valentine failed to state a claim for which relief can

be granted.

7 1. ADA Claim

District Hospital Partners argues that Valentine cannot establish a qualifying injury-in-

fact for his ADA claim because there is no concrete risk of future harm. DHP Mot. Dismiss at

5–8. The Court agrees.

“Article III of the Constitution limits the power of the federal judiciary to the resolution

of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Maguire v. FBI,

(D.D.C. 2017).

Thus, “[a] party invoking federal court jurisdiction must show they meet the ‘irreducible

constitutional minimum’ of Article III standing.” Nat’l Cap. Presbytery v. Mayorkas,

, 240 (D.D.C. 2021) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,

(2016)).

That constitutional minimum requires that a plaintiff show an injury in fact, causation, and

redressability. Spokeo,

. And for standing, the question of “whether a case or

controversy exists” is asked “at the time the litigation is commenced.” Brookens v. Am. Fed’n of

Gov’t Emps.,

(D.D.C. 2018) (citing Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona,

(1997)). A plaintiff’s alleged injury must be “concrete and particularized” and

“actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan,

(internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

Valentine’s ADA claim turns on the injury-in-fact requirement. Because Valentine

cannot seek monetary damages under the ADA, he is limited to declaratory or injunctive relief.

See Am. Bus Ass’n v. Slater,

(D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that in a private ADA

action, the available remedies do not include monetary relief). Where a party seeks only

declaratory or injunctive relief, past injuries are insufficient to establish standing. E.g., Dearth v.

Holder,

(D.C. Cir. 2011). So, Valentine must show that he is suffering an

ongoing injury or faces an immediate threat of injury from District Hospital Partners’ alleged

8 ADA violations. See Valentine v. Wash. Nat’ls. Baseball Club, LLC, No. 22-cv-1299,

, at *3–*4 (D.D.C. January 20, 2023) (dismissing plaintiff’s ADA claims because he

could not show his injury was ongoing or that he faced an immediate threat of injury).

Valentine has not done so. Valentine, who lives in Ohio, has not alleged concrete plans

to visit GWU Hospital in the future. See Am. Compl. ¶ 63. Instead, he alleges that it is

“reasonably likely” that he will have to visit GWU Hospital in the future because he has many

family members in D.C. and the surrounding area.

But for Valentine to be re-exposed to

District Hospital Partners’ alleged ADA violations again, it would require one of his D.C.-area

relatives to need medical care, for that relative to be admitted to GWU Hospital, for the hospital

to have a mask mandate in effect, 3 for Valentine to visit the relative there, and for a hospital

official under District Hospital Partners’ authority to force Valentine to comply with the mask

mandate despite his disability. These allegations fail to move Valentine’s alleged injury from

conjectural or hypothetical to actual or imminent. See Lujan,

.

When courts evaluate the likelihood of a plaintiff returning to the place of an alleged

ADA violation, they look at several factors: “(1) the plaintiff’s proximity to the defendant’s

place of public accommodation; (2) the plaintiff[’]s past patronage; [and] (3) the definitiveness

of the plaintiff’s plan to return.” McKnight-Nero v. Walmart, Inc., No. 20-cv-1541,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Macy’s Inc.,

(W.D. Pa. 2013)). Here, none of those factors supports a likelihood of

Valentine returning to the hospital. First, he is domiciled in Ohio, while the hospital is located in

the District of Columbia. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 10. Second, Valentine does not allege any

3 As of October 30, 2024, GWU Hospital no longer required visitors to wear masks. Whether GWU may institute a mask mandate in the future is speculative. See Valentine,

, at *4.

9 interactions with District Hospital Partners other than the events that took place on April 11 and

12, 2023. See Am. Compl. Finally, Valentine has no definitive plan to return. His hypothetical

plans to return depend on several scenarios that would have to align almost perfectly for him to

return to GWU Hospital under similar conditions. See

. Valentine’s ability to satisfy

these factors is hypothetical at best.

For the reasons stated above, Valentine has failed to meet his burden to show standing for

the requested declaratory and injunctive relief for his ADA claim against District Hospital

Partners. The Court will therefore dismiss that claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under

Rule 12(b)(1).

2. DCHRA Claim

District Hospital Partners argues that Valentine’s DCHRA claim should be dismissed

because it is time-barred under the DCHRA’s statute of limitations, and because he fails to allege

sufficient facts to state a claim. DHP Mot. Dismiss at 13, 16. The Court disagrees that the claim

is time-barred but agrees that Valentine has failed to state a claim. 4

a. Whether the Claim is Time-Barred

A statute of limitation defense may be raised by a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6). See Momenian v. Davidson,

(D.C. Cir. 2017). At the time the

actions in the amended complaint took place, private causes of action under the DCHRA were

required to “be filed . . . within one year of the unlawful discriminatory act.”

-

4 Unlike the ADA, the DCHRA provides for monetary damages, see

- 1403.16, so the ADA standing analysis does not apply to Valentine’s DCHRA claim. See Am. Compl. ¶ 74 (seeking monetary damages under the DCHRA); see also Valentine,

at *3 n.2 (construing a similar DCHRA claim to encompass only monetary damages).

10 1403.16(a) (2023). 5 For Valentine’s DCHRA claim against District Hospital Partners to be

timely, he would have needed to bring that claim on or before April 12, 2024. See Am. Compl.

¶ 12. But Valentine added District Hospital Partners as a defendant on July 16, 2024, past the

one-year statute of limitations. See Am. Compl. For the claims against District Hospital

Partners to relate back to the date of the original complaint, Valentine must satisfy the three

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). See Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A.,

(2010).

Rule 15(c) provides that an amended pleading “relates back to the date of the original

pleading” when (1) the amendment asserts a claim arising from the “conduct, transaction or

occurrence” in the original pleading; (2) the party to be added “received such notice of the action

that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits”; and (3) the party to be added “knew or

should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake

concerning the proper party’s identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B), (C). So Rule 15(c)

“governs when an amended pleading ‘relates back’ to the date of a timely filed original pleading

and is thus itself timely, even though it was filed outside an applicable statute of limitations.”

Krupski,

.

Valentine’s amended complaint satisfies the first Rule 15(c) requirement because the

factual allegations have not changed, just the identity of the corporation that Valentine believed

owned GWU Hospital. Compare Compl. at 1 (naming UHSI as the majority owner of GWU

Hospital), with Am. Compl. at 1 (naming District Hospital Partners as the majority owner of

5 The D.C. Council has recently established a two-year statute of limitations for DCHRA claims, but that change does not apply retroactively. See

(a); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.,

(1988) (holding that statutes should not be given retroactive effect unless their language requires that result).

11 GWU Hospital). The second Rule 15(c) requirement is met for two independently sufficient

reasons. First, when a newly named defendant and the original defendant share counsel at the

time of service, both defendants are considered to have constructive notice of the action. See

Woods v. District of Columbia, No. 20-0782,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Dec. 29, 2022)

(holding that Rule 15(c)’s notice requirement is met when the present and putative defendant

share counsel during the time of service); see also 6 Mary Kay Kane & Howard Erichson,

Federal Practice & Procedure, § 1498.1 (3d ed. 2025) (discussing how constructive and actual

notice both satisfy Rule 15(c)); Page v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp.,

(D.D.C.

1990) (describing that constructive notice requires evidence that the putative defendant should

have known of the suit based on its relationship to the original defendant). UHSI and District

Hospital Partners shared the same counsel at the time of service, so District Hospital Partners had

constructive notice of this action when UHSI was served. See Pl.’s DHP Opp’n at 16. Second,

when defendants share a qualifying “identity in interest,” including when the newly named

defendant is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the original defendant, courts impute the notice

received by the original defendant onto the party sought to be added. See Bayatfshar v.

Aeronautical Radio, Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2013) (holding that a wholly owned

subsidiary received constructive notice of an action when its parent corporation was served);

Hernandez Jimenez v. Calero Toledo,

, 102–03 (1st Cir. 1979) ( “The identity in

interest principle is often applied where the original and added parties are a parent corporation

and a wholly owned subsidiary”). Because District Hospital Partners is a wholly owned

subsidiary of USHI, that principle applies here.

The third requirement is also met because District Hospital Partners “knew or should

have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the

12 proper party’s identity.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). “[S]imply reading the plaintiff’s

allegations in [his] original complaint” would have informed the parent corporation, USHI, that

Valentine had intended to sue District Hospital Partners. See Lee v. Toshiba Mach. Co. of Am.,

, 1033–34 (E.D. Tenn. 1992) (holding that when a plaintiff filed suit against a

wholly owned subsidiary, the parent corporations were deemed to have received adequate notice

within the limitations period under Rule 15(c)). UHSI is the parent company of District Hospital

Partners, so when UHSI received the complaint detailing actions that took place within the

hospital owned by District Hospital Partners, District Hospital Partners should have known the

action would have been brought against it but for the plaintiff’s mistake. See Staren v. Am. Nat.

Bank & Tr. Co.,

(7th Cir. 1976); Raynor Bros. v. Am. Cyanimid Co.,

, 384–85 (9th Cir. 1982). Because all three Rule 15(c) requirements are met,

Valentine’s DCHRA claim against District Hospital Partners relates back to the date of his

original complaint and is not time-barred.

b. Whether Valentine Failed to State a Claim

District Hospital Partners also argues that Valentine failed to state a claim under the

DCHRA because he has not alleged a qualifying disability. DHP Mot. Dismiss at 9–10 (arguing

that Valentine “fails to plausibly allege a disability that substantially limits one o[r] more major

life activities”); see also id. at 16. The DCHRA prohibits “deny[ing], directly or indirectly, any

person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and

accommodations of any place of public accommodations” for discriminatory reasons such as

actual or perceived disability.

. The DCHRA defines a “disability” as a

“physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities

13 of an individual having a record of such an impairment or being regarded as having such an

impairment.”

§ 2-1401.02(5A).

Even considering all of Valentine’s filings, as the Court must, see Brown v. Whole Foods

Market Grp., Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2015), he has not alleged any facts tending to

show that his disability limits or impairs a major life activity. Both complaints state in a

conclusory fashion that Valentine’s disability is one that “substantially limits/impairs his major

life activities.” Am. Compl. at 6 n.1; Compl. at 3 n.1. Valentine’s other filings refer to

additional facts about his disability but do not actually articulate those facts. See, e.g., Pl.’s DHP

Opp’n at 13. Valentine must allege specific facts that would plausibly allow a factfinder to

conclude that his condition qualifies as a disability within the meaning of the DCHRA. See

Twombly,

(holding that a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face”). He has not done so. The Court will therefore grant District

Hospital Partners’ motion to dismiss Valentine’s DCHRA claim against it pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6).

In a similar case alleging a DCHRA violation based on his inability to wear a mask,

Valentine provided “ample detail . . . [that] clarifie[d] the nature of his alleged disability and why

that disability prevents him from wearing face masks.” Valentine,

at *6. He

also “specifically show[ed] how his alleged disability poses substantial limitations on his ‘major

life activities[]’ . . . [a]nd he tie[d] the challenges he faces wearing face masks directly to those

limitations.”

(quoting

(5A)). To allow Valentine the opportunity to

provide those factual details in this action, the Court will grant him leave to file a second

amended complaint against District Hospital Partners. See Firestone v. Firestone,

,

14 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Leave to amend a complaint is within the court’s discretion and should be

given “freely” “when justice so requires.”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)).

B. Claims Against George Washington Defendants

Valentine raises claims against GWU and MFA under the same two statutory provisions,

the ADA and DCHRA. GWU and MFA move to dismiss the claims against them because none

of the factual allegations in the complaint are tied to GWU or MFA. At the time of Valentine’s

visit in 2023, GWU had “no ownership interest whatsoever in the hospital[,] nor did it have any

role in managing the hospital,” and

MFA did not employ any: gift shop employees who worked at the hospital; hospital concierge employees who worked at the hospital; Emergency room nurses who worked at the hospital; Emergency department managers who worked at the hospital; hospital Patient Experience personnel who worked at the hospital; or hospital security guards or other hospital security personnel.

GWU Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 8. GWU and MFA submitted signed declarations from employees

stating that neither entity had ownership in GWU Hospital. See Ex. A to GWU Defs.’ Mot.,

ECF No. 26-2; Ex. B to GWU Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 26-3. Valentine claimed to be unaware that

“GWU had sold its stake in the hospital the year before the incident.” Pl.’s GWU Defs.’ Resp.

¶ 8. After discovering this information, Valentine stated that he had no reason “to dispute the

veracity of GWU and [MFA’s] assertions and affidavits regarding their relationships with the

hospital.” Id. ¶ 11. Valentine has conceded that GWU and MFA should be dismissed as parties

to his action. Id. ¶ 19. The Court will therefore dismiss the ADA and DCHRA claims against

GWU and MFA.

15 V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, both Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 26, 29) are GRANTED.

An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.

Dated: July 21, 2025 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

16