UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

SHANNON STAFFORD,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24 - 1586 (LLA) v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Shannon Stafford, proceeding pro se, brought this suit in the Superior Court of the

District of Columbia against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), alleging Fourth

Amendment violations. ECF No. 1-1. The FBI removed the action to this court, ECF No. 1, and

moves for dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), ECF No. 13.

For the reasons explained below, the court will dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

The following factual allegations drawn from Mr. Stafford’s complaint, ECF No. 1-1, are

accepted as true for the purpose of evaluating the motion before the court, Jerome Stevens Pharms.,

Inc. v. FDA,

(D.C. Cir. 2005). The court further takes judicial notice of

“public documents filed on a court docket.” Lewis v. Parker,

, 195 n.6

(D.D.C. 2014) (citing Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp.,

, 1222

(D.C. Cir. 2005)).

1 In November 2019, a jury found Mr. Stafford guilty of Intentional Damage to a Protected

Computer, in violation of

(a)(5)(A) and (c)(4)(B), and Attempted Intentional

Damage to a Protected Computer, in violation of

(a)(5)(A)-(B) and (c)(4)(B).

Jury Verdict, United States v. Stafford, No. 17-CR-380 (D. Md. Nov. 15, 2019), ECF No. 86. The

court later sentenced Mr. Stafford to a 366-day term of incarceration followed by a three-year term

of supervised release. Judgment, Stafford, No. 17-CR-380 (D. Md. Sep. 25, 2020), ECF No. 102,

at 2-3. The terms of Mr. Stafford’s supervised release included a mandatory condition that

Mr. Stafford “cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer.”

.

Mr. Stafford initially appealed his sentence but then dismissed the appeal. Order, Stafford,

No. 20-4510 (4th Cir. Feb. 8, 2021). He then moved to vacate his conviction and sentence alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel. Motion, Stafford, No. 17-CR-380 (D. Md. Dec. 16, 2021), ECF

No. 146. The court denied his motion, Stafford, No. 17-CR-380,

, at *1

(D. Md. Mar. 24, 2023), Mr. Stafford appealed again, and the Fourth Circuit dismissed his appeal

for lack of a certificate of appealability, Stafford, No. 23-6478,

, at *1

(4th Cir. Sept. 18, 2023).

In February 2024, Mr. Stafford sued the FBI in the Superior Court of the District of

Columbia. ECF No. 1-1. In his complaint, Mr. Stafford explains that the FBI collected his DNA in

2019 as part of its investigation into his criminal case, and he asserts that his DNA was collected

again in 2021 when he was in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

. Mr. Stafford

alleges that he was later informed by his probation officer that the FBI had lost his DNA sample.

. Since then, Mr. Stafford has refused to allow the collection of another DNA sample,

,

arguing that it violates the Fourth Amendment,

. He seeks an injunction to prevent the FBI

from collecting another DNA sample,

.

2 The FBI removed the action to this court under

(a)(1), ECF No. 1, and

now moves to dismiss the complaint, ECF No. 13. Mr. Stafford opposes the motion to dismiss.

ECF No. 15.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and it is generally presumed that “a cause

lies outside [of] this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

(1994). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the court must dismiss an action

unless the plaintiff can establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the court possesses

subject-matter jurisdiction.

Pleadings by pro se litigants are generally held “to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner,

(1972) (per curiam). This

liberal construction “is not, however, a license to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”

Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates,

(D.D.C. 2009). Thus, “even a pro se

plaintiff must meet his burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction to survive a Rule 12(b)(1)

motion to dismiss.” Smith v. Scalia,

(D.D.C. 2014).

III. DISCUSSION

The court begins, as it must, with subject-matter jurisdiction. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a

Better Env’t,

(1998); see Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd.,

(D.D.C. 2011) (explaining that when a defendant files a motion to dismiss pursuant to both

Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6), “the court must first examine the Rule 12(b)(1) challenge[]”

because a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction renders all other defenses and objections moot).

Here, the FBI argues that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of

derivative jurisdiction. ECF No. 13-1, at 4-5. That doctrine arises from the theory “that a federal

3 court’s jurisdiction over a removed case derives from the jurisdiction of the state court from which

the case originated.” Merkulov v. U.S. Park Police,

(D.D.C. 2014)

(quoting Cofield v. United States,

(D.D.C. 2014)). If the state court lacked

jurisdiction over a suit, the federal court does not “acquire jurisdiction” through removal and must

dismiss the case. Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Balt. & O. R. Co.,

(1922). 1 The

doctrine requires dismissal “even if Plaintiff could have filed his complaint in federal court in the

first instance” but instead files in state court. Cofield,

(quoting Lambert Run

Coal Co.,

); see Arizona v. Manypenny,

, 242 n.17 (1981).

While Congress has “eliminated derivative jurisdiction as a barrier to actions removed

under

,” Johnson v. D.C. Metro. Transit Auth.,

(D.D.C. 2017), “the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction still applies to claims removed under [28

U.S.C. §] 1442,” Merkulov,

(collecting cases). Thus, because the FBI

removed this case under Section 1442(a)(1), see ECF No. 1, the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction

applies.

The central inquiry in the derivative-jurisdiction analysis is “whether, prior to removal, the

Superior Court . . . had jurisdiction of the subject matter” of the suit. McKoy-Shields v. First Wash.

Realty, Inc., No. 11-CV-1419,

, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2012). The answer here

is no.

As a general matter, “the United States cannot be sued without its consent.” Settles v. U.S.

Parole Comm’n,

(D.C. Cir. 2005). Congress may waive the United States’

sovereign immunity for certain claims, but such a waiver “must be unequivocally expressed.” United

1 “The term ‘State court’ includes the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.”

(d)(6).

4 States v. Mitchell,

(1980) (quoting United States v. King,

(1969)).

Through the Administrative Procedure Act, the United States has waived its sovereign immunity

when a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in federal court,

, but the United States has

not waived its sovereign immunity to be sued for injunctive relief in a state court like the Superior

Court of the District of Columbia, Williams v. Pretrial Servs. Agency for D.C., No. 23-CV-1859,

, at *3, (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2024); see McCain v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,

No. 23-CV-3288,

, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 29, 2023) (holding that the Superior

Court did not have jurisdiction over a claim brought against a federal agency). Accordingly,

because the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Stafford’s Fourth Amendment claim

seeking injunctive relief, this court did not “acquire jurisdiction” through removal and must

dismiss the case. Lambert Run Coal Co.,

.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant the FBI’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 13,

and dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. A contemporaneous order will issue.

LOREN L. ALIKHAN United States District Judge

Date: July 22, 2025

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