UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TODD M. HARPER, et al.,

Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 25-01294 (AHA) v.

SCOTT BESSENT, et al.,

Defendants.

Order

On July 22, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, concluding

their removal as National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”) Board members was unlawful.

Harper v. Bessent, No. 25-cv-01294,

, at *13 (D.D.C. July 22, 2025). The Court

issued a declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction ordering de facto reinstatement.

The

government has moved to stay the Court’s order pending appeal. ECF No. 31. As discussed herein,

the government’s motion does not satisfy the stay criteria. The stay motion and reply, like the

government’s merits arguments, fail to appreciate that the NCUA’s predominant role is overseeing

financial institutions in a manner similar to the Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation, rather than exercising “considerable executive power.” Trump v. Wilcox,

, 1415 (2025).

“A stay is an intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review

and accordingly is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result to the

appellant.” Nken v. Holder,

(2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). The court considers: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a

stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the

proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.”

.

The government has not satisfied these criteria. For the reasons in the Court’s opinion, the

government is not likely to succeed on the merits of its argument that NCUA Board members must

be removable at will. See Harper,

, at *3–10. In its stay motion, the government

simply states that it “respectfully disagrees with the Court’s analysis” and reiterates arguments that

the Court has already rejected. ECF No. 31 at 3–4. This falls well short of the “strong showing”

required to obtain a stay pending appeal. See Nken,

.

The government points to recent stay orders in cases involving the removal of executive

officers. ECF No. 31 at 2–3 (citing Wilcox,

; Grundmann v. Trump, No. 25-5165,

(D.C. Cir. July 3, 2025); LeBlanc v. U.S. Priv. & C.L. Oversight Bd., No. 25-

5197,

(D.C. Cir. July 1, 2025)). The government offers only a conclusory

assertion that “the Supreme Court’s logic” in staying the orders at issue in Wilcox “compels the

same result here.” Id. at 4; see Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. at 1415 (“The stay reflects our judgment that the

Government is likely to show that both the [National Labor Relations Board] and [Merit Systems

Protection Board] exercise considerable executive power.”). As Plaintiffs observe, however, the

NCUA Board does not resemble agencies at issue in those decisions because “[i]t does not set

federal policy for society at large in broad areas like labor (as the NLRB and the [Federal Labor

Relations Authority] do), and it also does not oversee the functioning of the executive branch by

considering federal-employee appeals (like the MSPB).” ECF No. 33 at 3; cf. Seila Law LLC v.

Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,

, 215 (2020) (“[T]he contours of the Humphrey’s

Executor exception depend upon the characteristics of the agency before the Court.”). Instead, the

2 NCUA, much like the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, regulates

private financial institutions. ECF No. 33 at 3; see Harper,

, at *9 (discussing

similarities between the NCUA and the Federal Reserve and noting that the government “all but

concedes that its position as to the NCUA would lead to the same conclusion as to the Federal

Reserve”); see also Swan v. Clinton,

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Independence from

presidential control is arguably important if agencies charged with regulating financial institutions,

such as the NCUA, are to successfully fulfill their responsibilities; people will likely have greater

confidence in financial institutions if they believe that the regulation of these institutions is

immune from political influence.”).

The government has also failed to show irreparable harm or that the balance of the equities

and the public interest support a stay. It returns to the argument that the Supreme Court’s analysis

in Wilcox “controls here.” ECF No. 31 at 5; see also Trump v. Boyle,

, No. 25A11,

(U.S. July 23, 2025) (“Although our interim orders are not conclusive as to the

merits, they inform how a court should exercise its equitable discretion in like cases.”). But again,

the government was likely to show those agencies exercise “considerable executive power.”

Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. at 1415; see also Boyle, 606 U.S. at __,

(granting stay

because “the Consumer Product Safety Commission exercises executive power in a similar manner

as the National Labor Relations Board, and the case does not otherwise differ from Wilcox in any

pertinent respect”). As this Court has explained, the NCUA does not wield the kind of substantial

executive power that would preclude for-cause removal protection, and the agency’s independence

is particularly important because of its key role as a financial regulator. Harper,

, at *8–9. The government has not made any showing specific to this case that Plaintiffs’

continued service on the NCUA Board constitutes an intrusion on executive power warranting a

3 stay. Cf. Associated Press v. Budowich, No. 25-5109,

, at *4 (D.C. Cir. June 6,

2025) (noting that “a stay is an exercise of equitable discretion, and therefore ‘[t]he propriety of

its issue . . . depend[s] upon the circumstances of the particular case” (alterations and omission in

original) (quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States,

, 672–73 (1926))). 1 On the other

side of the scale, the Court has already concluded that Plaintiffs and the NCUA Board would be

irreparably harmed absent injunctive relief because they “have been deprived of the ability to carry

out their congressional mandate.” Harper,

, at *13 (quoting Wilcox v. Trump,

, 236 (D.D.C. 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-5057 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 7, 2025)).

The government does not explain why its stay arguments would not apply equally to removal of

the Chair of the Federal Reserve or Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Board members—

indeed, neither its stay motion nor reply mentions the agencies, let alone propose a meaningful

limiting principle.

For these reasons, the government’s motion for a stay pending appeal, ECF No. 31, is

denied.

AMIR H. ALI United States District Judge

Date: July 24, 2025

1 The government offers a generalized assertion that the Court’s order is “an extraordinary intrusion into the President’s authority.” ECF No. 31 at 2. It offers no support for that assertion that is grounded in the actual role of the NCUA; indeed, the stay motion and reply do not even mention that the NCUA Board convened for a meeting this morning with Plaintiffs present, let alone suggest any harm to executive authority or function. See ECF No. 33 at 5–6.

4