UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANARIA CABRERA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. No. 25-cv-1909 (DLF)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Seven Job Corps student-enrollees bring this action challenging the Department of Labor’s

(DOL) shuttering of 99 privately operated Job Corps centers. Before the Court is the plaintiffs’

Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Dkt. 3. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the

plaintiffs’ motion and stay the challenged agency action under

.

I. BACKGROUND

The Job Corps is a national program designed to “assist eligible youth to connect to the

labor force by providing them with intensive social, academic, career and technical education, and

service-learning opportunities, in primarily residential centers, in order for such youth to obtain

secondary school diplomas or recognized postsecondary credentials.” Title I, Subtitle C of the

Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 3191–3212. Under the WIOA,

the Department of Labor is required to enter into agreements “for the operation of each Job Corps

center.”

(a)(1)(A). DOL also enters into agreements with the Department of

Agriculture to operate Civilian Conservation Centers in primarily rural areas.

(d)(1). There are currently 123 Job Corps centers nationwide—99 centers operated by

private entities under contracts with DOL, and 24 Civil Conservation Centers operated by the Department of Agriculture pursuant to an inter-agency agreement. See Decl. of Erin McGee ¶¶ 4–

5., Dkt. 20-2.

Under the WIOA, the Department of Labor must comply with certain procedural

requirements “[p]rior to the closure of any Job Corps center.”

(j). Specifically,

DOL must publicly announce the proposed decision to close any center through a publication in

the Federal Register; undertake a “reasonable comment period”; and notify “the Member of

Congress who represents the district” encompassing the center “within a reasonable period of time

in advance of any final decision to close the center.”

In addition, the statute requires DOL to

“establish written criteria” that it “shall use to determine when a Job Corps center supported under

this part is to be closed.”

§ 3211(c); see also Job Corps Center Proposal for Deactivation,

, 25,072 (May 30, 2019) (discussing the Department’s criteria for center closure).

The statute also permits DOL to take actions short of permanent closure for poorly performing Job

Corps centers pursuant to a “performance improvement plan.”

(f)(2).

On May 29, 2025, DOL leadership issued a directive “announcing that performance under

the operations contracts at the 99 contractor-operated Job Corps Centers should be terminated

immediately with all shutdown activities to be completed no later than June 30, 2025.” Decl. of

Jillian Matz ¶ 12, Dkt. 20-1. Following that directive, DOL issued notices of termination or non-

renewal to each Job Corps contractor.

. Those notices instructed contractors to “commence

immediately an orderly shutdown of operations” at their Job Corps centers “[i]n anticipation of the

cessation of operations . . . after June 30th.” Notice of Non-Renewal, Matz Decl. Ex. 3 at 1. The

notices also instructed center operators to promptly separate students from the Job Corps program

and to ensure that there be “no expectation of transfer to another center or return to their current

2 center.”

. DOL did not publish its directive in the Federal Register, establish a comment

period, or inform Congress of its decision. See Matz Decl. ¶ 15.

Also on May 29, DOL issued a press release announcing “a phased pause in contractor-

operated Job Corps centers nationwide” to “occur by June 30, 2025.” DOL Press Release, Decl.

of Adam Pulver Ex. 2, Dkt. 3-2. The press release stated that the Job Corps program was being

shut down because it was experiencing “significant financial challenges under its current operating

structure” and was “no longer achieving the intended outcomes that students deserve.”

(citing

DOL, Job Corps Transparency Report 2025, Apr. 25, 2025, https://www.dol.gov/sites

/dolgov/files/ETA/jobcorps/reports/JobCorps-Transparency-Report-2025.xlsx). It noted that the

shutdown “decision aligns with the President’s FY 2026 budget proposal.” Id.; see also Letter

from Russell T. Vought, Dir., Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, to Sen. Susan Collins (May 2, 2025),

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Fiscal-Year-2026-Discretionary-

Budget-Request.pdf; Job Corps Pause FAQs, Pulver Decl. Ex. 3 at 2 (explaining that the “pause

[of] operations at all centers” was due to the program’s financial straits).

Following DOL’s issuance of the termination and non-renewal notices, all 99 privately

operated Job Corps centers across the country began to shut down. Students were informed that

they were to promptly depart the affected centers and find alternative housing. See, e.g., Decl. of

Anaria Cabrera ¶ 10, Dkt. 3-3 (students at the Turner Job Corps Center were told that they had to

leave by the week of June 9, 2025); Decl. of Deondre Burkes ¶ 4, Dkt. 3-4 (students at the Gulfport

Job Corps Center were instructed to find alternative housing by June 11, 2025). The shutdowns

disrupted students’ studies and vocational training and restricted their access to services previously

provided by Job Corps centers. See, e.g., Cabrera Decl. ¶ 12 (describing inability to complete trade

program); Decl. of Athena Sasser ¶ 9, Dkt. 3-6 (describing termination of health care services).

3 On June 18, 2025, the plaintiffs—seven student-enrollees in the Job Corps program—filed

this suit on behalf of themselves and a putative class of student-enrollees at all 99 affected centers.

See Compl. ¶¶ 11–17, Dkt. 1; Mot. for Class Cert., at 1, Dkt. 4. The plaintiffs challenge DOL’s

“closure of the 99 Job Corps centers and indefinite suspension of the Job Corps program,” Compl.

¶ 54, as arbitrary and capricious and not in accordance with law, in excess of statutory authority,

and implemented without observance of procedure required by law, all in violation of the

Administrative Procedure Act (APA),

, Compl. ¶¶ 50–70. The plaintiffs seek a

preliminary injunction “order[ing] the reopening of all 99 Job Corps centers and the resumption of

Job Corps program operations nationwide,” Mot. for Prelim. Inj., at 20, Dkt. 3-1, or a stay of

DOL’s actions under

,

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a

clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Sherley v. Sebelius,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

(2008)). To prevail,

a party seeking preliminary injunctive relief must make a “clear showing that four factors, taken

together, warrant relief: likely success on the merits, likely irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief, a balance of the equities in its favor, and accord with the public interest.”

League of Women Voters of the U.S. v. Newby,

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). Where a federal agency is the defendant, the last two factors merge.

See Am. Immigr. Council v. DHS,

, 36 (D.D.C. 2020). “The factors governing

issuance of a preliminary injunction also govern issuance of a § 705 stay.” District of Columbia

v. USDA,

, 15 (D.D.C. 2020) (citing Cuomo v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n,

, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).

4 III. ANALYSIS

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

To succeed on the merits, “[a] plaintiff must show a likelihood of success encompass[ing]

not only substantive theories but also establishment of jurisdiction,” including standing to sue.

Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack,

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Obama v.

Klayman,

(D.C. Cir. 2015)). The Court will first address the defendants’

jurisdictional arguments before considering the merits of plaintiffs’ APA claims.

1. Jurisdiction

i. Tucker Act

Whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action turns on whether the

plaintiffs’ claims arise out of DOL’s operator contracts, see Opp’n, at 12–14, Dkt. 20, or WIOA’s

statutory scheme, see Mot. at 12–13. The Tucker Act “confer[s] exclusive jurisdiction over breach

of contract claims against the United States seeking more than $10,000 in damages on the Court

of Federal Claims.” Crowley Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. GSA,

(D.C. Cir. 2022)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see

(a), 1491(a). The Act “impliedly

forbid[s] contract claims against the Government from being brought in district court under the

[sovereign immunity] waiver in the APA.” Crowley,

(citation modified).

Whether a claim falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims depends on

(1) “the source of the rights upon which the plaintiff bases its claims” and (2) “the type of relief

sought.” Megapulse Inc. v. Lewis,

(D.C. Cir. 1982).

Under the first prong of the Megapulse test, courts consider whether “the plaintiff’s

asserted rights and the government’s purported authority arise from the statute”; “whether the

plaintiff’s rights exist prior to and apart from rights created under the contract”; and “whether the

5 plaintiff seeks to enforce any duty imposed upon the government by the relevant contracts.”

Crowley,

(citation modified). The mere fact that a case requires “some reference

to or incorporation of a contract” does not render the matter essentially contractual. Megapulse,

. The inquiry instead is whether resolution of a plaintiff’s claims “requires

primarily an examination of the statutes the [agency] has purportedly violated” or the terms of the

contracts themselves. Crowley, 38 F.4th at 1108–09; see also Widakuswara v. Lake,

, at *1 (D.C. Cir. May 28, 2025) (en banc) (adopting Judge Pillard’s reasoning in

, at *6–14 (D.C. Cir. May 3, 2025) (Pillard, J., dissenting)).

Under the second prong, courts ask whether a plaintiff seeks to enforce a statutory mandate

or obtain a contractual remedy—such as money damages, Crowley,

, or specific

performance, Perry Cap., LLC ex rel. Inv. Funds v. Mnuchin,

(D.C. Cir. 2017).

“[T]he mere fact that an injunction would require the same governmental restraint that specific

(non)performance might require in a contract setting is an insufficient basis to deny a district court

the jurisdiction otherwise available and the remedial powers otherwise appropriate.” Megapulse,

.

Here, the plaintiffs assert that DOL violated statutory mandates by failing to comply with

WIOA’s procedural requirements. See Crowley,

; Aids Vaccine Advoc. Coal. v.

U.S. Dep’t of State,

, 137 (D.D.C. 2025). They do not allege that DOL

breached any contract. See, e.g., Opp’n at 5 (explaining that DOL was permitted to terminate the

contracts under their Termination for Convenience clauses). Indeed, the parties agree that the

plaintiffs are not party to any contract with DOL and cannot assert rights arising out of DOL’s

operator contracts. Opp’n at 15; Reply at 4, Dkt. 28; see Crowley,

. Thus, the

6 plaintiffs’ asserted rights exist independently of any contract between DOL and the Job Corps

center operators.

Nor do the plaintiffs seek a contractual remedy. Instead, they seek an injunction barring

DOL from taking any actions that violate the WIOA. Mot. at 1–2. An injunction would afford

the plaintiffs “non-monetary relief that has [independent] considerable value”—that is, the

resumption of services that plaintiffs had enjoyed in the absence of the contested agency action.

Kidwell v. Dep’t of the Army Bd. for Corrections of Military Records,

(D.C. Cir.

1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). While that may result in DOL’s performance of

contractual duties to parties other than the plaintiffs, that indirect result does not render the relief

plaintiffs seek contractual. See Megapulse,

. Because DOL has not made a

contractual promise to the plaintiffs, the remedy they seek is not properly characterized as one for

specific performance. See Crowley,

.

The cases on which DOL relies are inapposite. Unlike in Dep’t of Educ. v. California,

, 986 (2025), and Vera Inst. of Just. v. DOJ, No. 25-cv-1643 (APM),

,

at *13 (D.D.C. July 7, 2025), the plaintiffs in this action are not parties to any contract with DOL.

Nor do they seek the fulfilment of a contractual promise owed to them. See California, 145 S. Ct.

at 968; see also California v. Dep’t of Educ.,

, 96–97 (1st Cir. 2025); cf. Vera Inst.,

, at *13. As discussed, their claims do not “depend on whether the contract[s]

permitted termination in the[se] circumstances,” and the parties’ dispute is therefore not “‘entirely

contained within the terms of the contract.’” Contra Opp’n at 13 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.

United States,

(D.C. Cir. 1985)).

Because the present dispute stems from the language of the WIOA itself, the Tucker Act

does not the divest the Court of subject matter jurisdiction.

7 ii. Article III Standing

“In the context of a preliminary [relief] motion, [courts] require the plaintiff to show a

substantial likelihood of standing under the heightened standard for evaluating a motion for

summary judgment.” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Presidential Advisory Comm’n on Election Integrity,

(D.C. Cir. 2017) (citation modified). The plaintiff “bear[s] the burdens of

production and persuasion.” Qualls v. Rumsfeld,

(D.D.C. 2005) (citing

Cobell v. Norton,

(D.C. Cir. 2004)). A plaintiff’s “inability to establish a

substantial likelihood of standing requires denial of the motion for preliminary injunction.” Food

& Water Watch,

. To establish standing, a plaintiff must show: (1) an “injury in

fact”; (2) a “causal connection between the injury” and the challenged action; and (3) a likelihood

that the “injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,

, 560–61 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The plaintiffs allege injuries—“loss of training, vocational services, housing, and health

services”—stemming from the shutdown of the Job Corps centers. Mot. at 10. It is well

established that the termination of a government benefit to which a plaintiff claims a legal

entitlement constitutes a cognizable injury. See Hardaway v. D.C. Housing Auth.,

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (collecting cases). Further, the plaintiffs’ injuries are directly traceable to

the challenged action—DOL’s allegedly unlawful closure of Job Corps centers—and redressable

by injunctive relief setting aside that agency action.

Without citing any legal authority, DOL contends that its efforts to mitigate harms to the

Job Corp enrollees eliminated their injuries in fact. See Opp’n at 16–17. But the only “efforts”

the agency points to is providing enrollees with lists of available government resources. See Hr’g

Tr., at 61:12–17, Dkt. 41. These meager efforts fall well short of redressing plaintiffs’ asserted

8 injuries. See, e.g., Sasser Decl. ¶ 9 (describing continued lack of access to medical services

provided by the Quentin Burdick Job Corps center); Decl. of Tiffany Davis ¶¶ 10–13, Dkt. 3-9

(describing plaintiff C.D.’s having to move out of a Job Corps dormitory and into temporary

housing following shutdown of Job Corps centers).

Accordingly, at this juncture, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have met their burden of

demonstrating a substantial likelihood of standing.

2. The plaintiffs’ APA claims

Under the APA, a reviewing court shall set aside a final agency action found to be

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” or taken

“without observance of procedure required by law.”

(2)(A), (D). Absent exceptions

not relevant here,

§ 701(a), the APA authorizes judicial review of each “final agency action for

which there is no other adequate remedy in a court,” id. § 704.

As a preliminary matter, DOL argues—for the first time in its supplemental brief—that the

named plaintiffs may challenge only the shutdown of the seven individual Job Corps centers at

which they were enrolled. Defs.’ Suppl. Br., at 5, Dkt. 46. Not only is this argument forfeited,

see Klayman v. Judicial Watch, Inc.

(D.D.C. 2018), it is well settled that,

under the APA, a plaintiff may seek redress for an agency action which applies a “particular

measure across the board” to downstream decisions, Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n,

,

890 n.2 (1990). The evidence in the record, including DOL’s own declarations, plainly shows that

the agency issued a single directive that resulted in the shutdown of all privately operated Job

Corps centers across the nation. See, e.g., Matz Decl. ¶ 12 (describing receipt of “an instruction”

from Department leadership “announcing that performance under the operations contracts at the

99 contractor-operated Job Corps Centers should be terminated immediately”); Job Corps Pause

9 FAQs at 1 (“A pause in Job Corps operations occurred on May 29th when the Department of Labor

halted contracts at the 99 contract-operated centers.”). Accordingly, the plaintiffs may challenge

DOL’s across-the-board action under the APA, and not simply the terminations of operator

contracts that affected individual Job Corps centers.

Turning to the statute itself, the WIOA requires DOL to engage in certain procedures—

including a period of notice and comment—before closing any Job Corps center. See

(j), 3211(c). The Department failed to comply with these statutory requirements. Opp’n

at 18. Thus, the success of the plaintiffs’ APA claims largely turns on whether the shutdowns

constituted “closures” under the WIOA. 1

To interpret the WIOA, the court begins with its text. Advanced Energy United, Inc. v.

Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n,

(D.C. Cir. 2023). The WIOA does not define

what it means to “close” a Job Corps center, so the Court considers the term’s ordinary meaning.

FCC v. AT&T Inc.,

(2011). The term “close” means “to suspend or stop the

operations of” something, Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003), or “to

conclude” or “bring to an end,” Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Here, the agency issued

termination and non-renewal notices directing each privately operated Job Corps center to

immediately cease all work except that “necessary to provide a safe, orderly and prompt shutdown

of center operations.” Notice of Termination, Pulver Decl. Ex. 4 at 1. That action plainly falls

under the ordinary meaning of closure.

1 Because the Court will conclude that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their APA claims under

(j) and 3211(c), it will not reach the remainder of the plaintiffs’ claims at this juncture, see Mot. at 15–17, including that the Department’s “indefinite suspension of Job Corps program operations” is a distinct agency action under the APA,

.

10 The plaintiffs contend that the Court’s inquiry ought to end here. See Mot. at 13. But the

words of a statute must be read “in their context and with a view to their place in the overall

statutory scheme.” Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA,

, 320 (2014) (citation modified). As

DOL points out,

(f)(2) permits the agency to take certain remedial actions, such

as replacing a center operator, relocating a center, or closing a center, with respect to individual

Job Corps centers that fail to meet certain statutory performance criteria.

(f)(2).

Seizing on this provision, DOL contends that it effectuated a statutorily authorized “pause”—as

opposed to a “closure”—when it shuttered operations at all 99 privately operated Job Corps

centers. Opp’n at 18–19.

This argument fails because DOL’s across-the-board shutdown extended far beyond any

“pause” contemplated by the statute. The agency suspended operations at all 99 privately operated

Job Corps centers without any expectation of future reopenings. See infra at 13. And it effected

the mass shutdown without complying with any of the statutory requirements that must precede a

“pause” in operations. Opp’n at 18. DOL failed to conduct an individualized assessment or

develop a performance improvement plan for any of the 99 centers. Id.;

(f)(2).

It instead suspended all operations based on the perceived failures of the Job Corps program as a

whole. See Job Corps Pause FAQs at 2 (noting that “[t]he Job Corps program has been in a

financial crisis for years” as justification for DOL’s action).

DOL’s nationwide shutdown was not only unprecedented, but also inconsistent with its

historic “standard of practice.” Opp’n at 18 (explaining that DOL has “long differentiated between

a center ‘closure’ and a ‘pause’ or ‘suspension’ of center operations”); see Loper Bright Enters. v.

Raimondo,

, 386 (2024). Earlier “pauses” left open a realistic possibility that Job

Corps center operations would be resumed. For instance, DOL “paused” operations for two years

11 at the Homestead Job Corps center before ultimately closing the center because necessary

improvements would be cost-prohibitive. See Job Corps Center Proposed for Closure,

, 35,994 (Aug. 2, 2017). During that pause, DOL actively evaluated the feasibility of

reopening the center. See

(discussing post-suspension survey conducted by the Job Corps’

Engineering Support Contractor). DOL engaged in similar efforts before it proposed closing the

Gainesville and Barranquitas Job Corps centers. See Job Corps Centers Proposed for

Consolidation and Deactivation of Non-Operational Job Corps Centers,

, 18–19

(Jan. 2, 2019).

Here, in contrast, DOL’s notices of termination and non-renewal instructed Job Corps

center operators to inform departing students that “[t]here should be no expectation of transfer to

another center or return to their current center.” See, e.g., Notice of Termination at 7. DOL’s May

29 press release stated that the Department’s “decision aligns with the President’s FY 2026 budget

proposal,” DOL Press Release, Dkt. 3-2, Ex. 3, which recommended the elimination of the Job

Corps entirely, see Letter from Russell T. Vought to Sen. Susan Collins. And during the hearing

on the motion, DOL confirmed that as of the date of the hearing it had made no determination to

reopen any center. See Hr’g Tr. at 23:9–14, 40:8–20; see also Nat’l Job Corps Ass’n (NJCA) v.

DOL, No. 25-cv-4641 (ALC),

, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2025) (“DOL concedes

that there are no discussions concerning the consolidation or reopening of any of the centers.”).

Nothing in the record indicates that DOL has any plan to do so. 2 Hr’g. Tr. at 37:8–38:3.

2 Government counsel represented at the hearing that DOL officials are engaged in ongoing discussions with Congress about the Job Corp program, but plaintiffs’ counsel suggested—and DOL did not dispute—that those discussions primarily concern amending the WIOA to permit the instant closures. See Hr’g Tr. at 60:7–21.

12 Nor did DOL’s actions conform to its past characterization of the term “pause.” Although

the agency insists that it has no formal definition of the term, Defs.’ Supp. Br. at 2 n.1, a 2024

DOL Memorandum explicitly defines “pausing” as “not exercising an option year, relocating

students to other centers, and establishing a caretaking contract of the facilities,” McGee Decl. Ex.

9 at 7. But here, DOL did not give enrollees the opportunity to relocate to any other Job Corps

center. Contra 82 Fed. Reg. at 35,994 (describing relocation of students to other Job Corps centers

in Florida during the Homestead Center’s period of inactivity). Indeed, the agency’s termination

and non-renewal notices directed center operators to separate students from the Job Corps program

entirely, without any expectation of transfer or return. See, e.g., Notice of Termination at 7. To

be sure, not every cessation of center operations necessarily constitutes a “closure” subject to

WIOA’s mandatory procedures. But the Court need not determine the precise boundary between

a “pause” and a “closure” because the record unequivocally demonstrates that DOL unlawfully

“closed” all 99 privately operated Job Corps centers, in violation of the WIOA.

At bottom, DOL’s position is entirely circular: So long as the agency uses the term “pause”

and never makes a final decision to “formally close” a center, it is authorized to shutter any Job

Corps center indefinitely. See Hr’g Tr. at 20:15–21:21; Defs.’ Suppl. Br. at 2, n.1. In DOL’s view,

the WIOA’s procedural mandates hinge on the terminology the agency chooses to use, allowing it

to sidestep its statutory obligations entirely. See Hr’g Tr. at 21:2–22:2. That cannot be correct.

Because DOL unlawfully “closed” all 99 privately operated Job Corps centers, in violation

of the WIOA, see

(j), 3211(c), the Court finds that the plaintiffs have established

a likelihood of success on the merits of their APA claims, see

(2)(A), (D).

13 B. Irreparable Harm

To establish irreparable harm, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the harm is “certain and

great, actual and not theoretical, and so imminent that there is a clear and present need for equitable

relief” and (2) the harm is “beyond remediation.” Newby, 838 F.3d at 7–8 (citation modified).

The plaintiffs have done so here.

As a result of the Department’s decision to close all 99 of its privately operated Job Corp

centers, student-enrollees have lost (or soon will lose) access to essential services. See Mot. at 18–

19. Some have already lost housing and healthcare. See, e.g., Sasser Decl. ¶¶ 7–9 (describing loss

of housing and medical services). Others have lost vocational and educational opportunities. See,

e.g., Cabrera Decl. ¶ 12 (describing inability to complete Certified Nurse Assistant program). Still

others expect to become homeless if their centers close. See, e.g.,

(anticipating being

homeless without Job Corps center residence); Davis Decl. ¶ 15. Courts routinely find such harms

irreparable. See, e.g., Brown v. Artery Org., Inc.,

(D.D.C. 1987)

(wrongful eviction); NJCA,

, at *9 (“impending homelessness”); Risteen v

Youth for Understanding, Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2002) (loss of health insurance

benefits); Tanner v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

(D.D.C. 2006) (loss of

specific job opportunities, training, and competitive advantages). The certainty and imminence of

such harms are all the greater in cases involving at-risk individuals, as here. See Risteen,

n.4 (collecting cases). And DOL has not shown that its mitigation efforts—which

consist solely of providing a list of community resources to displaced enrollees, Hr’g Tr. at 61:12–

17—had or will have any measurable effect on the plaintiffs’ conditions. The Job Corps student-

enrollees have shown that they have experienced and are likely to continue to experience

irreparable harm absent an injunction. Thus, this factor also favors the plaintiffs.

14 C. Balance of Harms and Public Interest

The two remaining factors—the balance of the equities and the public interest—“merge

when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder,

(2009).

DOL contends that it will be harmed by an injunction because it will have to continue to

spend funds appropriated by Congress for a program that it believes does not accord with

government priorities and fails to “produce good value and outcomes for program participants and

others.” Opp’n at 28 (citation modified). But the government “cannot suffer harm from an

injunction that merely ends an unlawful practice or reads a statute as required to avoid

constitutional concerns.” R.I.L.-R v. Johnson,

(D.D.C. 2015) (quoting

Rodriguez v. Robbins,

(9th Cir. 2013)).

In any event, DOL’s asserted harms are outweighed by the loss of housing, educational

and vocational opportunities, and healthcare services that plaintiffs would suffer in the absence of

an injunction. Accord NJCA,

, at *9. Further, “[t]he public interest is served

when administrative agencies comply with their obligations under the APA.” Northern Mariana

Islands v. United States,

(D.D.C. 2009). Accordingly, these factors weigh

in plaintiffs’ favor.

D. Remedy

Under this Circuit’s precedent, the scope of relief under the APA is not party-restricted.

See Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,

(D.C. Cir. 1988)

(“[W]hen a reviewing court determines that agency regulations are unlawful, the ordinary result is

that the rules are vacated—not that their application to the individual petitioners is proscribed.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). In a preliminary posture, the APA authorizes courts to “stay

15 an agency order pending review.” In re GTE Serv. Corp.,

(D.C. Cir. 1985);

see

.

DOL resists this conclusion. Defs.’ Suppl. Br. at 3–5. It first argues that a § 705 stay

cannot be entered after an agency action has already taken effect. See id. at 4. But it provides no

authority in support. While some courts have held that an agency may not issue a § 705 stay for

an already-effective action because that would amount to an amendment requiring a period of

notice and comment, see Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Regan,

, 8 (D.D.C.

2023), that reasoning plainly does not apply to courts.

DOL further contends that any relief under the APA should be limited to the parties before

the Court. See Defs.’ Suppl. Br. at 3–5. But just as vacatur under § 706 is not a party-specific

remedy, see Nat’l Mining Ass’n,

, neither is a stay under § 705. Both provisions

specify what courts are authorized to do with respect to agency actions, not parties. See

(a court may “issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of

an agency action or to preserve status or rights”);

§ 706 (a court may “set aside agency action”

found to be in violation of the APA). Courts in this circuit have thus consistently applied § 705 to

permit wholesale, rather than party-specific, stays of agency action. See, e.g., In re GTE,

; Gomez v. Trump,

, 203 (D.D.C. 2020); USDA, 444 F. Supp. 3d at 48;

see also West Virginia v. EPA,

, 1126 (2016) (staying agency rule under

).

Relatedly, DOL argues that § 705—which permits a court to issue “all necessary and

appropriate process” to stay an agency action,

(emphasis added)—incorporates

traditional equitable principles, including that relief be limited to the parties before the reviewing

court. Defs.’ Suppl. Br. at 4–5 (citing Starbucks Corp. v McKinney,

(2024);

16 Trump v. CASA, Inc.,

, 2563 (2025)). But DOL fails to explain why non-party-

specific relief is objectionable only when issued in a preliminary posture. Moreover, there is good

reason to think that Congress did not intend to wholly incorporate traditional equitable principles

when specifying the kinds of relief a court may grant under the APA. See Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd.

of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys.,

, 838 (2024) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). In non-

APA cases, “background equitable principles may control” because “Congress has rarely

authorized courts to act directly on federal statutes or to prohibit their enforcement against

nonparties.” Id. (citation modified). In contrast, the APA permits courts to act directly on agency

actions. See

, 706. And pre-APA cases confirm that an interim form of vacatur

was understood by both courts and Congress to be the ordinary preliminary remedy in a challenge

to an unlawful agency action. See, e.g., Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC,

, 9–10

(1942); cf. Corner Post, 603 U.S. at 840 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (discussing pre-APA statutes

authorizing courts to set aside agency actions). The better reading of the “necessary and

appropriate process” language in § 705 is that “relief should only involve postponing the effective

date of the portions of the [agency action] that [the plaintiff] actually challenges and for which it

has shown a likelihood of success on the merits.” Career Colls. and Schs. of Tex. v. Dep’t of

Educ.,

, 255 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. granted on other grounds,

(2025).

Because the plaintiffs have shown that each of the four preliminary injunction factors

weigh in their favor, they are entitled to a stay of DOL’s directive to close all 99 privately operated

Job Corps centers. Nat’l Wildife Fed’n,

n.2. Accordingly, the Court will stay the

challenged action under

.

17 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary

Injunction, Dkt. 3, and enters a stay under the APA. 3

, 706(2)(A), (D). A separate

order consistent with this decision accompanies this memorandum opinion.

________________________ DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH United States District Judge July 25, 2025

3 Because the Court grants a stay under

, and not a preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it will deny DOL’s request for an injunction bond. See Opp’n at 29. Rule 65(c) provides that a court may issue a preliminary injunction “only if the movant gives security in any amount that the court considers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P 65(c). But § 705 of the APA contains no such requirement, and DOL cites no authority that supports requiring a bond in these circumstances.

18