UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-352 (CJN)

DONALD TRUMP, et al.,

Defendants.

PERSONAL SERVICES CONTRACTOR ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-469 (CJN)

DONALD TRUMP, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Across these two cases, four organizations challenge what they describe as the unlawful

dismantling of USAID. Three represent employees or contractors at USAID: the American

Foreign Service Association (AFSA) represents USAID foreign service officers, the American

Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) represents USAID civil servants, and the Personal

Services Contractor Association (PSCA) represents USAID personal services contractors, who

perform standard government work for the agency without having been “directly hired” by it. The

fourth organization, Oxfam America, is a humanitarian group that sees its mission as combatting

1 global poverty, inequality, and injustice. Each organization alleges that the government’s actions

taken with respect to USAID, as detailed below, violate the Constitution, the APA, and are ultra

vires.

The Court ultimately cannot reach the merits of any plaintiff’s allegations, however,

because it concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over the claims of AFSA, AFGE, and Oxfam (which

have moved for summary judgment after the Court denied their earlier motion for a preliminary

injunction), and that it likely lacks jurisdiction over the claims of the PSCA (which has moved for

a preliminary injunction). The Court will accordingly grant the government’s motion to dismiss

the AFSA case and will deny the PSCA’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The Court previously recounted many of the facts underlying these cases. See Am. Foreign

Serv. Ass’n v. Trump (AFSA I),

, 11–14 (D.D.C. 2025). But there have been

some further developments since that juncture, so a brief recap is in order before breaking new

ground.

USAID is “the lead international humanitarian and development arm of the U.S.

government.” Cong. Rsch. Serv., U.S. Agency for International Development: An Overview (Jan.

6, 2025). President Kennedy initially created USAID via Executive Order, as an arm of the State

Department. See Exec. Order 10,973 § 102,

(Nov. 3, 1961). But in 1998,

Congress passed a statute that installed the agency as an “independent establishment,” outside of

State.

(a);

(1); but see

(specifying that the

USAID Administrator “shall report to and be under the direct authority and foreign policy

guidance of the Secretary of State”). Since then, Congress has consistently appropriated funds for

2 USAID, including in the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2024. See Pub. L. 118–47,

138 Stat 460 (2024). Relevant here, that Act provides that appropriated funds may not be used to

“implement a reorganization [or] redesign” of the agency without “prior consultation” by the

agency head with appropriate congressional committees.

§ 7063(a); see also id. § 7063(b)

(defining “reorganization” and “redesign” to include actions to “downsize the United States

official presence overseas,” “reduce the size of the permanent Civil . . . [or] Foreign Service,” and

“eliminate, consolidate, or downsize covered departments, agencies, or organizations”).

Until recently, USAID used its appropriated funds to support humanitarian and

development projects in approximately 120 foreign countries—both via its independent work and

via grants awarded to partner organizations and governments. AFSA, ECF No. 51-2 (SOMF) ¶¶ 3–

5. On January 20, 2025, however, President Trump issued an Executive Order directing “a 90-day

pause in United States foreign development assistance,” pending an “assessment of [its]

programmatic efficiencies and consistency with United States foreign policy.” Exec. Order.

14,168,

§ 3(a) (Jan. 20, 2025). The Order further instructed that, at the end of

90 days, “responsible department and agency heads” would determine “whether to continue,

modify, or cease each foreign assistance program based upon the review recommendations.” Id.

§ 3(c).

Secretary of State Rubio implemented that Executive Order in a January 24 memorandum

that paused “all new obligations of funding, pending a review, for foreign assistance programs

funded by or through the [State] Department and USAID.” Dep’t of State, Mem. 25 STATE 6828

¶ 1 (Jan. 24, 2025). The memorandum also directed that, “[f]or existing foreign assistance awards,

contracting officers and grant officers shall immediately issue stop work orders, consistent with

the terms of the relevant award, until such time as the Secretary shall determine, following a

3 review.” Id. ¶ 7. According to the government, a “blanket pause” on foreign aid “was the more

efficient and effective path,” since, given the scale of programming, “an ad hoc review would

[have] unduly burden[ed] the execution of the President’s other foreign policy priorities.” AFSA,

ECF No. 85 (AR) at 121–22. Still, Secretary Rubio did exempt from the pause several categories

of expenditures: foreign military financing for Israel and Egypt; emergency food assistance;

legitimate expenses incurred prior to the date of the memorandum; and salaries and related

administrative expenses for certain direct hire employees, personal services contractors, and

locally employed staff. See Mem. 25 STATE 6828 ¶¶ 12(a)–(e). And Secretary Rubio later also

waived the pause as to spending on “life-saving humanitarian assistance” and “[l]ife-saving HIV

care and treatment services.”1 SOMF ¶¶ 28–30.

Six days later, President Trump appointed Secretary Rubio as the Acting Administrator of

USAID. AR at 16. On February 3, 2025, Secretary Rubio sent a letter to Congress stating that

Peter Marocco was delegated the duties of Deputy Administrator of USAID and would “begin the

process of engaging in a review and potential reorganization of USAID’s activities to maximize

[its] efficiency and align [its] operations with the national interest.” Id.

To effectuate that review and potential reorganization, and in light of alleged

“noncompliance” with those efforts by former agency leadership, Deputy Administrator Marocco

began placing USAID employees on administrative leave and terminating contracts with USAID

personal services contractors (PSCs). See id. at 7, 17–20. By February 7, 2025, USAID had placed

2,140 of its 4,746 direct-hire employees on administrative leave, and had approved the termination

1 Plaintiffs maintain that these waivers were largely ineffectual, due to newly imposed restrictions on who could access payment systems and heightened approval processes before payments could be disbursed, among other changes at the agency. See, e.g., AFSA, ECF No. 51 (MSJ) at 5. 4 of 791 of its 1,239 PSCs. Id. at 7, 19. However, pursuant to a TRO issued in AIDS Vaccine

Advocacy Coalition (AVAC) v. United States Department of State, D.D.C. Case No. 25-cv-400,

and Global Health Council v. Trump, D.D.C. Case No. 25-cv-402, USAID ceased the “generalized

stop work, suspension, or pause of Agency contracts, grants, or other federal assistance awards”

under the Executive Order and Secretary Rubio’s memorandum. Id. at 51; see AVAC v. United

States Dep’t of State,

, 130 (D.D.C. 2025) (summarizing the scope of the

TRO). Nonetheless, consistent with the AVAC TRO, USAID continued to “exercise Agency

discretion to individually examine outgoing payments pursuant to a new Payment Integrity Review

Process, and, as appropriate, to enforce the terms and conditions, including provisions allowing

the Agency to issue stop work or termination notices, contained in USAID awards and contracts.”

AR at 51.

On March 10, 2025, Secretary Rubio announced the conclusion of the “first phase” of the

government’s “full-scope review” at USAID. Id. at 3. Then, on March 28, 2025, “the Department

of State and USAID notified Congress of their intent to undertake a reorganization that would

realign certain USAID functions to the Department of State . . . and discontinue other residual

USAID functions inconsistent with Administration priorities.” Id. State’s and USAID’s

notification specifically proposed that the State Department would “assume responsibility for the

administration of ongoing USAID programming” by July 1, 2025, and that, “by September 2,

2025, USAID’s operations [would] be substantially transferred to State or otherwise wound

down.” Id. at 3–4. The State Department has accordingly expressed its intention to “propose

legislation to authorize abolishing USAID as an independent establishment and to request [that]

future appropriations for the relevant programming be provided directly to the Department.” Id.

at 4.

5 Also on March 28, 2025, USAID notified its civil and foreign service personnel of a

“consolidated agency-wide Reduction-In-Force” (RIF) action, occasioned by the anticipated

elimination of “substantially all non-statutory positions” at the agency. Id. USAID employees

“received RIF notices specifying one of two final separation dates: either July 1, 2025, or

September 2, 2025.” Id. The government represents that, in advance of those dates, it “returned

to active duty”—i.e., removed from administrative leave—“substantially all its global personnel,”

though employees may still elect to be placed on paid administrative leave. Id. at 5, 7. Employees

who have remained in active status after July 1 are “expected to supervise the responsible

decommissioning of USAID assets and the wind-down of the Agency’s independent operations.”

Id. at 6.

Remaining PSCs’ contracts are likewise being terminated effective July 1, 2025, or

September 2, 2025. Id. at 7. According to the government, throughout the reorganization and RIF,

all PSC contracts have been “terminated consistent with all contractual and other notice periods,

and PSCs will receive any travel and other repatriation accommodations to which they are

generally entitled.” Id. And, the government says, both terminated employees and PSCs will be

eligible for new positions and/or contracts at the State Department, which is “build[ing] its

capacities to administer an expanded set of foreign assistance programs and operations.” Id. at 6–

7.

At the time of the March 28 reorganization and RIF announcement, USAID retained 898

of its 6,239 foreign assistance grants—a remainder that totaled $78 billion in value—as well as

421 “operational and critical service contracts and other agreements.” Id. at 3, 273. The

government attests that stop-work orders on retained awards have now been lifted, and the State

Department has “directed Contracting Officers and Grants Officers to expeditiously process

6 payment requests for both awards where work has now resumed and for terminated awards,

including for legitimate expenses incurred in connection with stop work orders and suspensions.”

Id. at 141 (quotation marks omitted). As to terminated awards, USAID and the State Department

are also making payments for legitimate expenses incurred prior to January 24, 2025, where

counterparties provide sufficient documentation of “verifiable work that the Government []

committed to fund.” Id. at 83.

B. Procedural History

This matter first came before the Court on February 7, 2025, when plaintiffs AFSA and

AFGE—which had the day before filed a complaint alleging that defendants were violating the

Constitution and the APA by “dismantl[ing]” USAID through their funding pause, administrative

leave placements, and related actions—sought a temporary restraining order that would require the

government to “immediately cease actions to shut down USAID’s operations.” AFSA, ECF No. 1

at 2, 23–28; AFSA, ECF No. 9 at 1. After a hearing that same afternoon, the Court entered a limited

TRO that required the government until February 14 to reinstate USAID direct-hire employees

who had been placed on administrative leave and to withhold from placing any additional

employees on administrative leave or evacuating them from their overseas posts. AFSA, ECF No.

15 at 1, 7. As the Court explained, there was a risk that such employees might suffer imminent

and irreparable harm if they were stripped of standard employment benefits while abroad or were

required to repatriate on an expedited basis, in disruption of long-settled expectations. Id. at 2–5.

But the Court did not restrain the government from implementing the 90-day freeze on foreign

assistance funding because, by contrast, plaintiffs had not demonstrated that action would inflict

irreparable harm. Id. at 6–7.

7 The Court’s February 7 Order also converted plaintiffs’ TRO motion into a motion for a

preliminary injunction and scheduled a hearing on that motion for February 13, 2025. Id. at 7. At

that hearing, and as reflected in an Order issued the same day, the Court extended the TRO for

another week to permit itself time to issue an opinion on the motion for preliminary injunction,

and also modified the February 7 Order to clarify that it prohibited only the involuntary evacuation

of USAID employees from their overseas posts. AFSA, ECF No. 31. Also on February 13, 2025,

AFSA and AFGE filed an amended complaint that joined OxFam as a plaintiff and added an ultra

vires claim—albeit not for purposes of the already-filed preliminary injunction motion. See AFSA,

ECF No. 30.

On February 21, 2025, the Court denied AFSA’s and AFGE’s motion for a preliminary

injunction. AFSA I, 768 F. Supp. 3d at 25. The Court concluded, with the benefit of the

governments’ sworn declarations, that plaintiffs and their members did not in fact face a risk of

irreparable harm from the essentially “employment-related injuries” that they alleged their

members were facing: placement on administrative leave, expedited recall from their host

countries, asserted financial and emotional burdens as a result of the freeze on foreign aid, and

possible job loss. Id. at 16–21. As for likelihood of success on the merits, the Court held that it

likely lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate AFSA’s and AFGE’s claims, which were “archetypal

complaints about changed employment conditions and their follow-on effects” that belonged

before statutorily-designated administrative review boards. Id. at 20, 24. Finally, the Court

observed that both plaintiffs and the government had identified plausible harms as a result of the

progression/cessation of the government’s actions with respect to USAID, meaning that the final

two preliminary injunction factors also did not tip in plaintiffs’ favor. Id. at 25.

8 During this period, the PSCA filed its own action, which similarly alleged that defendants

had violated the Constitution and the APA by “dismantl[ing]” USAID. PSCA, ECF No. 1 at 2,

13–16. The PSCA then moved for a TRO that sought essentially the same relief as AFSA and

AFGE had requested in their motion, but as to its members (PSCs) rather than direct-hire

employees. PSCA, ECF No. 6; ECF No. 6-1 at 1–4. The Court conducted a telephonic hearing on

the PSCA’s motion on March 5, 2025, and the next day held a follow-up telephonic hearing at

which it denied that motion orally. See PSCA, ECF No. 23. The Court explained that none of the

alleged harms to the PSCA’s members—which the PSCA had characterized as “identical to those

impacting direct-hires”—met the “high standard needed to warrant preliminary relief.” Id. at 7–

11; see also PSCA, ECF No. 6-1 at 18. The Court also explained that the PSCA was unlikely to

succeed on the merits of its claims because the case “present[ed] as essentially a federal contract

dispute” over which the Court likely lacked jurisdiction. PSCA, ECF No. 23 at 11–15. Finally, as

in AFSA, the balance of the equities was “at a minimum [] in equipoise and perhaps favor[ed] the

government.” Id. at 15.

All of this brings us to the motions now before the Court. On March 10, 2025, the AFSA

plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on all of their claims. AFSA, ECF No. 51 (MSJ). The

government for its part moved to dismiss, and in the alternative, cross-moved for summary

judgment. AFSA, ECF No. 70 (MTD). The PSCA (after filing an amended complaint that added

new defendants and an ultra vires claim), in turn, moved for a preliminary injunction that, like its

previously-sought TRO, would “stop the [allegedly] illegal dismantling and destruction of

USAID.” PSCA, ECF No. 39 at 2 (Mot.). The government opposed that motion. PSCA, ECF No.

45 (Opp.).

9 While all of those motions were being briefed, a motions panel of the Court of Appeals

issued an order in Widakuswara v. Lake (Widakuswara II),

, at *1 (D.C. Cir.

2025), that stayed in part several preliminary injunctions issued in litigation regarding the alleged

dismantling of a different federal agency, the United States Agency for Global Media, on the basis

that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ personnel-termination and grant

termination-related claims.

at *2–3. Thereafter, the en banc Court of Appeals denied a motion

for reconsideration and vacatur of that portion of the motions panel’s order concerning the

government’s “personnel actions,” but granted the motion for reconsideration and vacatur as to

that portion respecting the government’s grant-related actions. See Widakuswara v. Lake

(Widakuswara III),

, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2025); Widakuswara v. Lake

(Widakuswara IV),

, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2025).

II. Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of

establishing the Court’s jurisdiction. See Khadr v. United States,

(D.C. Cir.

2008). In evaluating such a motion, “[t]he Court is not limited to the allegations of the complaint;

instead, the Court may consider such materials outside the pleadings as it deems appropriate.”

Transportation Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Nat’l Mediation Bd.,

, 69 (D.D.C.

2021) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “Where both standing and subject matter

jurisdiction are at issue,” the “court may inquire into either and, finding it lacking, dismiss the

matter without reaching the other.” Moms Against Mercury v. FDA,

(D.C. Cir.

2007).

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only when the

party seeking the relief, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Cobell v. Norton,

10

(D.C. Cir. 2004). “To warrant preliminary injunctive relief, the moving party

must show (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) that it would suffer irreparable

injury if the injunction were not granted, (3) that an injunction would not substantially injure other

interested parties, and (4) that the public interest would be furthered by the injunction.”

Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England,

(D.C. Cir. 2006). When the

movant seeks an injunction against the government, the final two factors are analyzed as one. See,

e.g., Pursuing Am.’s Greatness v. Fed. Election Comm’n,

(D.C. Cir. 2016).

III. Analysis

The central question in these cases is whether the Court possesses subject-matter

jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims. As the Court will explain in more detail below, it has concluded

that it does not in AFSA, and that it likely does not in PSCA. Each of the employee organizations

seeks relief from quintessentially personnel-related injuries that, as a motions panel of the Court

of Appeals recently confirmed, must be redressed through various administrative review schemes

that Congress has specified by statute. 2 As for OxFam, while it does assert injuries that are

theoretically traceable to non-personnel actions the government has taken with respect to

USAID—namely, termination of USAID grants—it lacks standing to seek relief with respect to

2 The government also contends that AFSA’s and AFGE’s claims of employment-related harm are moot because, whereas plaintiffs’ complaint “primarily challenges the simultaneous mass placement of all USAID workers on administrative leave,” USAID has now restored “substantially all” of its employees to active status—in anticipation of their July or September RIF dates. MTD at 8–9, 12,17. This argument, which the government does not reprise in its reply brief, is too clever by half. Plaintiffs’ complaint squarely challenges what it characterizes as the “dissolution of USAID,” and cites the agency’s placement of its employees on administrative leave as evidence of—rather than the extent of—that purported effort. AFSA, ECF No. 30 at 2–4, 16. While, as discussed below, plaintiffs’ invocation of the word “dissolution” is not a talisman that permits them to circumvent established limits on this Court’s jurisdiction, it does broaden the aperture of plaintiffs’ claims to include current personnel actions at USAID rather than just those taken previously. Cf. MTD at 17 (recognizing that plaintiffs allege “‘mass’ employment-related harms”). 11 them. The AFSA complaint must therefore be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,

and the PSCA has failed to demonstrate it is likely to succeed on the merits of its claims. And

regarding the remaining injunctive relief factors, the PSCA has not demonstrated that it or its

members will suffer irreparable harm before a judgment on the merits as a result of the

government’s actions, or that the equities favor preliminary relief.

A. Jurisdiction

Each plaintiff in these cases strenuously argues that it is challenging the “wholesale

dissolution” of USAID, rather than any more granular action taken by defendants. See, e.g., MSJ

at 15; Mot. at 22. But those contentions are undermined by the nature of the relief plaintiffs seek:

injunctions that would, among other things, recall furlough notices to affected workers, and

declaratory judgments that those actions were unlawful. See AFSA, ECF No. 51-25; PSCA, ECF

No. 39-26. Because plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each form of relief sought, see Town

of Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Ests., Inc.,

(2017), the Court cannot just take plaintiffs

at their word and analyze this case as if there were indeed just one, expansive agency action—the

dismantling of USAID—from which plaintiffs seek relief. Cf. Widakuswara II,

, at *3 (“The ‘dismantling’ that plaintiffs allege is a collection of many individual actions

that cannot be packaged together and laid before the courts for wholesale correction under the

APA.”) (quotation marks omitted). Instead, the Court must look at plaintiffs’ claims and requested

remedies separately and ask, for each, whether it would redress an injury-in-fact that is fairly

traceable to the government’s challenged conduct. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,

,

560–61 (1992). If it would, the Court must next consider whether it has jurisdiction to order that

relief. Here, as the Court will explain, the only relief that plaintiffs have standing to seek is beyond

its capacity to award.

12 1. Standing

Organizational plaintiffs can establish standing in two ways. First, they can demonstrate

that they have suffered “actual or threatened injury in fact” to their own interests that is “fairly

traceable to the alleged illegal action and likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision.”

Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack,

(D.C. Cir. 2015). For this form of

standing, known as “organizational standing,” a “mere setback to [the organization’s] abstract

social interests is not sufficient.” People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. U.S.

Dep’t of Agric.,

(D.C. Cir. 2015). Instead, an organization must allege a

“concrete and demonstrable injury” to its “core business activities,” as distinct from its mere

“issue-advocacy.” Id.; Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med.,

, 395

(2024). Second, if an organization has members, it can also sue based on the cognizable injuries

of its members so long as “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own

right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither

the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the

lawsuit.” Tanner-Brown v. Haaland,

(D.C. Cir. 2024). This latter form of

standing is called “associational standing.”

Start with AFSA, AFGE, and PSCA, which all assert similar theories of injury, and do so

under the rubrics of both organizational and associational standing. As to the former, they allege

that defendants’ actions have interfered with their “strong interest in representing and protecting

their members,” and have as a result “stretched” their resources. MSJ at 12; Mot. at 16–17.

Specifically, the associations point to time and money spent responding to their members’

concerns and inquiries regarding their employment or contract status, as well as to the risk of

membership loss if such relationships are indeed permanently dissolved. See AFSA, ECF No. 9-3

13 ¶¶ 6–8; AFSA, ECF No. 24-17 ¶¶ 21–25; AFSA, ECF No. 51-24 ¶ 12; PSCA, ECF No. 39-4 at 90

¶¶ 16–17. As to associational standing, the associations point to various “emotional, reputational,

and financial harms” that they allege their members have suffered as a result of the government’s

actions with respect to USAID. MSJ at 13; Mot. at 25. In addition to loss of employment and

related monetary injuries, those alleged harms include stress and anguish as a result of returning

to the United States and separating from family abroad, “trauma” due to the closure of USAID

facilities, and anxiety due to “violent anti-USAID rhetoric.” See AFSA, ECF No. 9-9 ¶¶ 5–7;

AFSA, ECF No. 9-12 ¶¶ 4, 7–8; PSCA, ECF No. 37 ¶¶ 53–54.

The government strongly objects to both theories. As for organizational standing, it argues

that AFSA, AFGE, and PSCA have alleged merely a “decision to reallocate their resources,” rather

than the necessary “direct[] . . . interfere[nce]” with their “core business activities.” MTD at 32–

33; see Opp. at 17. And as for associational standing, the government argues, the organizations’

asserted injuries to USAID employees and PSCs turn on “individual [employment] circumstances”

that cannot be assessed union-wide. MTD at 34; see Opp. at 15–16.

The Court need not decide here, however, whether AFSA, AFGE, and PSCA lack standing

entirely. Instead, it is sufficient to observe that, on either theory, the only cognizable harms the

associations assert depend entirely on their members’ employment or contractual relationships

with USAID. Even their alleged intangible injuries—like concerns about family separation,

stigma, and post closures—fall into that category, because those harms affect the associations’

members distinctly “in their capacities as USAID employees” or PSCs. AFSA I, 768 F. Supp. 3d

at 20. Put another way, the associations’ alleged injuries are traceable to the government’s

personnel actions regarding USAID, and would be redressed by relief that addressed those actions.

14 They would not be redressed at all, meanwhile, by an injunction or declaratory judgment that did

something else.

The Court will therefore assume without deciding that AFSA, AFGE, and PSCA have

standing to challenge the government’s actions with respect to the employment or contract status

and related working conditions of USAID’s employees and PSCs, and to seek relief from those

discrete personnel actions. But AFSA and AFSA do not, and PSCA likely does not, have standing

to challenge the government’s non-personnel actions with respect to USAID, such as its grant

terminations, website closures, and lease transfers, see MSJ at 16–17, where the associations have

alleged no concrete and particularized injuries flowing from those actions specifically. 3 See Gill

v. Whitford,

(2018) (“A plaintiff’s remedy must be tailored to redress the plaintiff’s

particular injury.”). Indeed, although the government made these points in its motion to dismiss,

see MTD at 34, AFSA and AFGE offered no clear rejoinder—beyond reiterating their view that,

because their complaint purports to challenge the wholesale “shutdown of the agency,” the Court

need not look behind the curtain and assess their standing to seek the specific relief they request.

AFSA, ECF No. 74 (Pl.’s Reply) at 12.

The PSCA makes a similar if more involved argument, attempting to analogize its claims

to those at issue in cases like INS v. Chadha,

(1983) and Seila Law, LLC v. CFPB,

(2020). Mot. at 26–28. In the PSCA’s view, the logic of those “structural challenge”

cases indicates that it would be a “serious category error” to conclude that the PSCA has standing

to challenge only the personnel-related changes at USAID, as opposed to USAID’s reorganization

3 Plaintiffs’ suggestion that these changes have caused their members to fear a “global humanitarian crisis,” see MSJ at 13, is insufficient to support standing absent an account of why that concern is more than an undifferentiated “generalized grievance” that is “common to all members of the public.” Lujan,

. Plaintiffs offer no such account. 15 (or allegedly, “dismantling”) writ large. Id. at 28. Like AFSA and AFGE, however, the PSCA

gives unduly short shrift to the concept of redressability. The plaintiffs in Chadha, Seila Law, and

the other cases on which the PSCA relies did not have standing based merely on the “constitutional

violations themselves.” Id. Instead, those plaintiffs sought (and won) the cessation, on

constitutional grounds, of specific government actions against them, which unquestionably

redressed their particular injuries. See, e.g., Chadha,

(“If the veto provision

violates the Constitution, and is severable, the deportation order against Chadha will be

cancelled.”); Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 210–11 (explaining that petitioner’s success on separation of

powers claim would excuse it from “comply[ing] with the civil investigative demand” and

“provid[ing] documents it would prefer to withhold”); Andrade v. Lauer,

, 1494–95

(D.C. Cir. 1984) (plaintiffs injured by RIF had standing to challenge it on the grounds that they

were “fired by government officials who were constitutionally disqualified from exercising power

over them”). Here, by contrast, AFSA, AFGE, and PSCA seek declaratory and injunctive relief

that spans far beyond, and thus would not redress, the personnel-related injuries they have alleged.

That is what limits their standing to sue.

Oxfam, for its part, does allege injuries as a result of the cancellation of USAID’s grants. 4

Although Oxfam does not itself receive grant money from USAID, it alleges that the withdrawal

of USAID funding from humanitarian projects abroad has placed an “inordinate burden” on

Oxfam, which has had to reallocate funds and expend additional resources to “account[] for [that]

dramatic change[] in the humanitarian landscape.” AFSA, ECF No. 30-1 (Maxman Decl.) ¶¶ 10–

12. Oxfam further attests that it “implements programs in close collaboration with partner[]”

4 Oxfam is not a membership organization, so it can only demonstrate organizational, not associational, standing. 16 organizations that receive funding from USAID, meaning that grant cuts at USAID will

“jeopardize” Oxfam’s ongoing projects and “generat[e] pressure on Oxfam to incur additional

financial liability.” Id. ¶ 13. According to Oxfam, it “has already been instructed to halt several

projects undertaken with UN agency funding because they rely on [the] U.S. government as a back

donor,” and “adverse impacts to [its] work are likely to spread.” Id. ¶¶ 16–17; see also AFSA,

ECF No. 51-23 (Second Maxman Decl.) ¶ 4.

In making these arguments, which reduce to the theory that Oxfam will be harmed as a

result of harms that USAID’s spending cuts have inflicted on other organizations, Oxfam runs

headlong into the third-party standing doctrine. Parties “generally . . . cannot rest [their] claim[s]

to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties,” because only “the party with the right has

the appropriate incentive to challenge (or not challenge) governmental action.” Kowalski v.

Tesmer,

(2004). Oxfam, however, is attempting to vindicate the monetary

interests of USAID grantees not before the Court, on the grounds that restoring their funding would

permit certain joint projects to proceed and obviate the need for Oxfam to spend more money on

humanitarian projects in their stead. That requires Oxfam to make “two additional showings” to

demonstrate standing: that it has a “close relationship” with the entity that “possesses the right”

and that “there is a hindrance to the possessor’s ability to protect [it]s own interests.”

(quotation marks omitted). Here, even assuming Oxfam has the requisite “close relationship” with

third-party recipients of USAID funds, it has not identified any reason that those recipients could

not bring their own action to restore funding—as some indeed have. See AVAC, 770 F. Supp. 3d

at 129.

Instead, Oxfam contends that the third-party standing doctrine does not apply because the

government’s conduct has, in the manner described above, “injured Oxfam directly.” Pl’s Reply

17 at 10. But even if that were the correct way to frame things, Oxfam’s asserted injuries either are

not fairly traceable to the government’s actions regarding USAID or do not reflect interference

with Oxfam’s “core business activities” sufficient to meet the threshold for organizational

standing. Alliance, 602 U.S. at 395; see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst.,

(2009) (“When the plaintiff is not [it]self the object of the government action or inaction [it]

challenges, standing is . . . ordinarily substantially more difficult to establish.”) (alteration and

quotation marks omitted). Insofar as Oxfam alleges injury because its projects are funded by other

entities that receive funding from USAID, like the U.N., that harm turns on an “independent

variable”: the decision (or lack thereof) by those entities to discontinue the particular programs in

which Oxfam participates. Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. F.A.A.,

, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The

same is true of the (wholly hypothetical) possibility that unidentified foreign persons would “hold

Oxfam responsible for [other organizations’] abrupt and inhumane discontinuation of lifesaving

support.” Second Maxman Decl. ¶ 6. In such circumstances, “causation [is] sufficiently tenuous

that standing should be denied.” Mideast Sys. & China Civ. Const. Saipan Joint Venture, Inc. v.

Hodel,

(D.C. Cir. 1986) (unsuccessful sub-bidder could not sue

government grantor on the theory that it “failed to follow the applicable regulations in

administering the grant” because the final award decisions were made by the grant recipient).

Insofar as Oxfam alleges injury based on its own perceived need to reallocate its resources

to fill gaps previously occupied by USAID, that harm is precisely the sort of “mere setback” to an

organization’s mission that falls below the showing required for organizational standing. PETA,

. As the Supreme Court recently explained, it is “incorrect” that “standing exists

when an organization diverts its resources in response to a defendant’s actions.” Alliance, 602

U.S. at 395; cf. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,

(1982) (housing counseling

18 organization could sue landlord for racial steering because it “perceptibly impaired [the

organization’s] ability to provide counseling and referral services for low- and moderate-income

homeseekers”). “An organization cannot manufacture its own standing in that way.” Alliance,

602 U.S. at 394.

Although its motion for summary judgment focuses on its alleged injuries as a result of

grant terminations by USAID, Oxfam asserts in its reply that it is also injured by the personnel

actions taken at the agency because it “relies on the expertise and logistical assistance of USAID

personnel to perform its work.” Pl’s Reply at 7. As support, it cites to three paragraphs across

two declarations by its President, Abby Maxman. Id. In one, Maxman states that, because USAID

is “home to thought leaders in the development industry,” “[d]issolving the agency will [] have

signification negative ramifications [for] Oxfam and other humanitarian agencies that rely upon

[USAID’s] ingenuity.” Maxman Decl. ¶ 18. In the others, Maxman references USAID-chartered

flights that humanitarian workers from other organizations (presumably including Oxfam) are

invited to join, and expresses concern about the humanitarian consequences of USAID reducing

its staff presence in Africa. Id. ¶ 19; Second Maxman Decl. ¶ 11.

These alleged injuries are not sufficiently concrete or particularized to confer on Oxfam

standing to challenge broader, non-funding related aspects of the government’s conduct with

respect to USAID. See, e.g., MTD at 21 (“Article III would not countenance granting Oxfam relief

as to USAID employment conditions . . . .”). Oxfam does not explain how it specifically will

suffer “negative ramifications” as a result of the government’s proposed reorganization of

USAID—or even how it specifically has come to rely on USAID’s ingenuity—beyond the already-

discussed relationships between Oxfam and USAID grantees. Nor does Oxfam allege that USAID

charter flights are indeed no longer operative, and, if so, that Oxfam, as opposed to a different

19 organization, has suffered resulting harm. See Lujan,

(“To survive the Secretary’s

summary judgment motion, respondents had to submit affidavits or other evidence showing,

through specific facts, not only that listed species were in fact being threatened by funded activities

abroad, but also that one or more of respondents’ members would thereby be directly affected apart

from their special interest in the subject.”) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). To the extent

that Oxfam’s concerns about USAID’s overseas staff reductions are meant to imply that Oxfam

may be prompted to expend additional resources in support of its humanitarian objectives, that

assertion reduces to the same “manufactured” standing argument the Court rejected above.

***

In sum, AFSA and AFGE have standing only to object to the government’s personnel-

related actions at USAID, which is the only challenged conduct that has caused them particularized

injury. The same is likely true of the PSCA. And Oxfam lacks standing entirely.

2. Channeling

As noted above, in denying preliminary relief in both AFSA and PSCA, the Court concluded

that it likely lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ personnel-related claims because Congress

intended them to proceed exclusively through various statutory schemes of administrative and

judicial review. See AFSA I, 768 F. Supp. 3d at 24; PSCA, ECF No. 23 at 15. As to AFSA and

AFGE, which represent USAID employees, the Court explained at length when denying the

preliminary injunction that the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), Federal Service Labor

Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS), and Foreign Service Act (FSA) likely channel their

members’ claims to various agencies and provide for subsequent review in specific Article III

courts. See AFSA I,

. at 20–21 (discussing

et seq. and

et seq.).

20 As to the PSCA, which represents USAID PSCs, the Court similarly held when orally

denying the TRO that the Contract Disputes Act (CDA), 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–09, likely channels

its members’ claims to either the Board of Contract Appeals or the Court of Federal Claims. See

PSCA, ECF No. 23 at 12, 15. The CDA “applies to any express or implied contract . . . made by

an executive agency for” “the procurement of services,”

(a)(2), and, where

applicable, provides the exclusive procedure for resolving any “claim by a contractor . . . relating

to a contract.”

§ 7103(a)(1); see also Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 2010) (“The [CDA] . . . established a comprehensive framework for

resolving contract disputes between executive branch agencies and government contractors.”). In

particular, the CDA “pre-empts whatever jurisdiction this Court” generally has in contract disputes

to which it applies, and mandates that such disputes be heard “only [in] the appropriate agency

board of contract appeals or directly [in] the Court of Claims,” with the “next appeal l[ying] only

to the Federal Circuit.” Nat’l Star Route Mail Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. United States Postal

Serv.,

, 30–31 (D.D.C. 2016). Moreover, “[a]ll claims by a contractor against

the government relating to a contract covered by the CDA must be submitted first to the contracting

officer for a decision,” before they are presented to any adjudicative body.

Services contracts like those between the PSCA’s members and USAID generally fall

within the CDA’s ambit. See, e.g.,

(applying CDA to claims by association of Postal

Service delivery contractors); Sys. Application & Techs., Inc. v. United States,

(4th Cir. 2022) (applying CDA to claims by Navy services contractor). To be sure, as the Court

noted when denying the TRO, whether the PSCs’ contracts are indeed covered by the CDA hinges

on their precise terms, which the PSCA has never produced in this litigation. PSCA, ECF No. 23

at 13; see also Trauma Serv. Grp. v. United States,

(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[A]ny

21 agreement can be a contract . . . provided that it meets the requirements for a contract with the

Government . . . .”). But the PSCA also has never rebutted the notion that its members have CDA-

covered contracts, as is its burden to do. See Khadr,

. Rather, it has focused its

arguments throughout this litigation on the substance of its claims, which it argues are not

“essentially contractual” as required for CDA channeling. PSCA, ECF No. 14 at 9; Mot. at. 19–

20. The Court previously rejected those arguments, explaining that where the PSCA “ha[s] Article

III standing to sue only because of [its members’] contractual relationships with USAID” and

“expressly seek[s] reinstatement of their contracts,” “it appears likely that [the PSCA’s] claims are

at bottom contractual ones to which the CDA will apply.” PSCA, ECF No. 23 at 13; see also Mot.

at 1–2 (requested relief).

Since the Court reached its respective preliminary determinations about the mandatory

channeling of these organizations’ claims, nothing has changed to persuade it that either of those

determinations was incorrect. To the contrary, subsequent decisions by the Court of Appeals align

with the Court’s initial view. The Court will thus begin with those decisions, and will then turn to

why plaintiffs’ arguments in their summary judgment and preliminary injunction briefing do not

warrant departing from the previous conclusions of this Court or the Court of Appeals.

In Widakuswara v. Lake, a motions panel of the Court of Appeals issued a stay pending

appeal of several injunctions issued in litigation concerning operational changes at the United

States Agency for Global Media (USAGM). See Widakuswara II,

, at *1–2.

Not unlike USAID, USAGM is statutorily tasked with overseeing and disbursing grants to

federally-funded broadcasting networks, including some that operate abroad. Id. at *1. In March

2025, however, President Trump issued an Executive Order that “directed USAGM leadership to

reduce the agency to the minimum level of operations required by statute.” Id. To implement that

22 Executive Order, USAGM leadership—also not unlike USAID leadership—placed employees on

administrative leave, cancelled contracts with PSCs, and terminated funding to grantees. Id. After

“[v]arious plaintiffs, including USAGM employees, contractors, and grantees, filed lawsuits to

challenge these actions,” which they characterized as the “wholesale shuttering of [the agency]”

in violation of the Constitution and the APA, the district court “granted a preliminary injunction

requiring USAGM to (1) restore its employees and contractors to their pre-March 14 status, (2)

restore its FY 2025 grants with [the plaintiff networks], and (3) restore [the Voice of America

network] as ‘a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news,’” in keeping with the

agency’s statutory mandate. Id. at *1, *3; see also Widakuswara v. Lake,

, at

*5, *18 (D.D.C. 2025).

The government sought, and the motions panel granted, a stay pending appeal as to the first

two provisions of the injunction. Widakuswara II,

at *2. The motions panel

concluded that the district court likely lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to issue either form of

challenged injunctive relief—that regarding USAGM’s personnel actions and that regarding its

grant terminations.

As to the former, the panel explained, citing the CSRA, FSLMRS, FSA,

and CDA, that “[t]hese remedial schemes provide the exclusive procedures by which federal

employees may pursue employment- and contractor-related claims.”

(quotation marks and

alterations omitted). The panel rejected plaintiffs’ (and the district court’s) view that the USAGM

litigation fell outside those schemes because it concerned “broad government actions to dismantle

an entire federal agency” rather than “simply a collection of employment disputes.” Id. at *3

(quotation marks and alterations omitted). As the panel explained, the principle that “[f]ederal

employees may not circumvent these statutes’ requirements and limitations by resorting to the

catchall APA to challenge agency employment actions” “applies to a systemwide challenge to

23 agency policy just as it does to the implementation of such a policy in a particular case.” Id. at *2

(quotation marks, alterations, and ellipses omitted). And as to the district court’s grant-related

injunctive relief, the panel similarly concluded that it likely exceeded the district court’s

jurisdiction pursuant to the Tucker Act, which “vests the Court of Federal Claims with jurisdiction

over claims against the United States ‘founded . . . upon any express or implied contract with the

United States.’” Id. at *3 (quoting

(a)(1)).

Plaintiffs moved for en banc reconsideration of the motions panel’s stay, which the en banc

Court granted in part—only as to the panel’s stay of the district court’s grant-related injunction,

and only as to the plaintiffs that had demonstrated resulting irreparable harm. See Widakuswara

III,

, at *1–2 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (en banc). The Court concluded that the

government had “not made the requisite ‘strong showing’ of a likelihood of success on the merits”

of its Tucker Act channeling argument.

at *1 (quoting Nken v. Holder,

(2009)). Yet—and most relevant here—the Court denied reconsideration of the panel’s stay of the

district court’s personnel-related injunction, which, again, embraced claims by both USAGM

employees and contractors, leaving intact the panel’s reasoning on that score. See Widakuswara

IV,

(D.C. Cir. 2025) (en banc).

To be sure, the government does not argue that the motions panel’s reasoning is binding

on the Court, see, e.g., AFSA, ECF No. 89 at 5–6, and the Court will not treat it as such. See, e.g.,

S. Educ. Found. v. United States Dep’t of Educ.,

, at *10 & n.4 (D.D.C. 2025)

(“Widakuswara II is an unpublished opinion that may not be binding on this Court.”). But the

motions panel’s decision on that question remains in force, and at a minimum it offers highly

persuasive authority for the proposition that plaintiffs here must pursue their personnel-related

24 claims—whether brought on behalf of USAID employees or PSCs—through the statutory schemes

the Court previously identified.

Plaintiffs resist that proposition by pointing to the provision of the district court’s

injunction that the panel did not address, which, again, ordered the government to “restore [Voice

of America] programming such that USAGM fulfills its statutory mandate.” Widakuswara,

, at *18. Plaintiffs’ argument is twofold. First, they analogize the relief they request

to that unchallenged provision of the injunction, insofar as they similarly seek an order “prohibiting

Defendants from shutting down USAID’s operations in a manner not authorized by” statute.

AFSA, ECF No. 88 at 7; see also PSCA, ECF No. 50 at 12–13. As explained above, however, that

argument overlooks that the only relief plaintiffs have standing to seek is the restoration of USAID

employees and PSCs to their pre-Executive Order status, including any working-conditions

adjustments. That personnel-related relief is precisely what the motions panel held exceeds a

district court’s jurisdiction under the applicable channeling statutes.

Plaintiffs also point to statements that members of the en banc Court made about the

unchallenged provision of the injunction when denying reconsideration of the panel’s order on

personnel-related relief. Namely, Chief Judge Srinivasan joined by six judges wrote that “[t]he

court’s denial of en banc reconsideration . . . should not be understood to accept or treat with the

government’s assertion” that the district court lacks authority under the third provision of its

injunction to order “personnel actions” beyond those the government deems “necessary or

appropriate to carry out its statutory mandate.” Widakuswara v. Lake, No. 25-5144 (Order of May

28, 2025) (Srinivasan, C.J., respecting the denial of reconsideration en banc); see also

(Pillard,

J., respecting the denial of reconsideration en banc) (disagreeing with the merits of the motions

panel’s stay but deeming the “standard for the full court’s intervention [] unmet because nothing

25 in the [] stay order prevents the district court from enforcing the unchallenged prong 3 of the

injunction”). In plaintiffs’ view, these statements “reflect[] that a majority of D.C. Circuit judges

were not persuaded by the motions panel’s conclusion that the district court likely lacked

jurisdiction to enjoin USAGM’s personnel actions in any way whatsoever.” AFSA, ECF No. 88

at 8 (quotation marks omitted); see also PSCA, ECF No. 50 at 13. But there is significant daylight

between what the district court’s personnel-related injunction initially required and what certain

members of the en banc Court appear to have suggested might be appropriate. In any event, the

motions panel’s stay order remains binding in that case on this question, and at the very least it

supports the Court’s initial jurisdictional analysis in both of these cases.

Plainitiffs also resist that analysis on its own terms, Widakuswara II notwithstanding. But

plaintiffs’ renewed objections—which differ little from their arguments in earlier briefing—are

unpersuasive.

1. AFSA and AFGE

AFSA and AFGE first try to resuscitate the premise the Court (like the Widakuswara II

motions panel) dismissed at the outset: that this is not a channel-able employment dispute because

plaintiffs are instead challenging the “dismantling of a federal agency, of which the en masse

termination of employees is but one part.” MSJ at 15. But as the Court has already explained,

plaintiffs’ only Article III injuries stem wholly from the government’s actions with respect to their

members’ employment status. Because AFSA and AFGE lack standing to challenge any other

“part” of USAID’s dismantling (and Oxfam lacks standing entirely), the breadth of plaintiffs’

complaint alone does not take this case outside the personnel-related review schema at issue.

Of course, as the Court recognized in AFSA I, a comprehensive statutory scheme only

precludes district court jurisdiction if the specific “claims at issue are of the type Congress intended

26 to be reviewed within the statutory structure.” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd.,

, 489 (2010) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). The Supreme Court has

identified three factors relevant to that inquiry: (1) whether denying district court jurisdiction

could “foreclose all meaningful judicial review” of the claim; (2) whether the claim is “wholly

collateral” to the statute’s review provisions; and (3) whether the claim is “outside the agency’s

expertise.” Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich,

, 212–13 (1994). The Court remains

convinced that none of these considerations pushes AFSA’s and AFGE’s claims outside of the

relevant statutes.

AFSA and AFGE focus their efforts primarily on the second Thunder Basin factor, arguing

that their claims are “collateral” to the relevant statutory schema because they challenge more than

just “personnel actions.” MSJ at 18, 20. But the cases on which AFSA and AFGE rely undermine

rather than bolster their point. Indeed, warrantless searches, property conversion, the installation

of hidden cameras, and rape are not mere adverse employment events that must be challenged in

other fora. See Stewart v. Evans,

(D.C. Cir. 2002); Manivannan v. Dep’t of

Energy,

(3d Cir. 2022); Gustavson v. Adkins,

, 888–90 (7th Cir.

2015); Brock v. United States,

, 1424–25 (9th Cir. 1995). But termination of

employees via a RIF and related changes to employee working conditions surely are. See, e.g.,

Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury,

(2012) (declining jurisdiction over constitutional

claims against federal statute conditioning employment on Selective Service registry because “[a]

challenge to removal is precisely the type of personnel action regularly adjudicated by the MSPB

and the Federal Circuit within the CSRA scheme”); AFSA I, 768 F. Supp. 3d at 22 (explaining that

review under CSRA is available for “any claim that an employee has suffered a ‘significant change

in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions’ in a manner that ‘violates any law, rule, or

27 regulation implementing . . . the merit system principles’”) (quoting

(a)(1),

(a)(2)(A)(xii), and (b)(12));

(explaining that the FSLMRS permits adjudication of union claims

over employment conditions) (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 7121–22); id. (noting that the FSA contains a

“sweeping definition of ‘grievance’” that “would permit a foreign USAID employee or union

representative to challenge before the FSGB or FSLRB the whole range of actions to which

plaintiffs [] object”) (citing

(a)(1)).

AFSA and AFGE also argue that, in the context of this case, channeling their claims would

wholly foreclose judicial review (violating the first Thunder Basin factor), because such review

might not be available for some years—by which time USAID would “long since [have] ceased to

exist.” MSJ at 19. To start, it is not clear that the relief plaintiffs have standing to seek, i.e., their

members’ reinstatement, would indeed be out of reach after USAID’s operations are wound down

or assimilated into the State Department. Although the FLRA has held that the termination of an

agency by legislation moots a pending unfair labor practice proceeding, see Cmty. Servs. Admin.,

, 763 (1982), it is currently speculative when or whether such legislation will in fact

be passed as to USAID. And in any event, the Supreme Court has “made clear” that the mere

“expense and disruption of protracted adjudicatory proceedings on a claim do not justify

immediate review.” Axon Enter., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n,

, 192 (2023) (quotation

marks omitted). Where plaintiffs simply “claim[] that the relief [they] seek[] would be harder to

get if [they] proceed[] first before” the relevant administrative bodies, not that proceeding before

those bodies would itself inflict harm, the judicial review factor does not tip in their favor. Nat’l

Treasury Emps. Union (NTEU) v. Trump,

, 9 (D.D.C. 2025); cf. Axon, 592 U.S.

at 180, 191 (claims challenging the constitutionality of ALJ appointments could not be channeled

to ALJs).

28 Finally, these plaintiffs reprise their argument that their claims are not within the

competency of the relevant agency adjudicators, who “are generally ill suited to address structural

constitutional challenges.” Carr v. Saul,

(2021). But Thunder Basin’s “expertise”

factor “will be satisfied so long as the agency’s expertise is applicable to the ‘threshold questions

that may accompany’ otherwise broader claims,” and plaintiffs’ suit plainly poses at least

“preliminary” employment-related questions where such issues are the only ones they have

standing to raise. AFSA I, 768 F. Supp. 3d at 23 (quoting Payne v. Biden,

(D.C.

Cir.), judgment vacated as moot,

(2023) (mem.)); cf. Axon, 598 U.S. at 195 (noting

that Elgin relied on agency “expertise on a raft of ordinary employment issues surrounding the

employee’s contention that the Equal Protection Clause barred his discharge”). Plaintiffs’

conclusory assertion that they seek review only of “agency action and constitutional abuses,” MSJ

at 20, does not persuade the Court otherwise. See, e.g., NTEU, 770 F. Supp. 3d at 11 (“[A]lthough

the FLRA may lack expertise on the constitutional claims, the agency could moot the need to

resolve the unions’ constitutional claims by finding that the President’s actions violated the RIF

statute.”) (quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[w]here plaintiffs are entitled to review before

the MSPB, FLRA, FSGB, or FSLRB and subsequent judicial review, there is no reason to fear that

plaintiffs’ constitutional claims could wholly evade consideration.” AFSA I, 768 F. Supp. 3d at

24. For instance, even if the MSPB “determine[s] that it lacks authority to decide” a constitutional

issue, “[t]he Federal Circuit can then review the MSPB decision, including any factual record

developed by the MSPB in the course of its decision on the merits.” Elgin,

.

2. PSCA

The PSCA begins essentially where AFSA and AFGE started, by arguing that its claims

are not “at their essence” contractual because they are styled as constitutional, APA, and ultra vires

29 challenges to the government’s actions regarding USAID. Mot. at 19. But “[w]hether a claim is

at its essence contractual . . . depends both on the source of the rights upon which the plaintiff

bases its claims, and upon the type of relief sought (or appropriate).” Crowley Gov’t Servs., Inc.

v. GSA,

(D.C. Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted). Here, the only rights that

the PSCA likely has standing to press are the contract rights of its members, which thereby define

the universe of relief that the Court could order in this case.

Of course, “the mere fact that a court may have to rule on a contract issue does not, by

triggering some mystical metamorphosis, automatically transform an action . . . into one on the

contract and deprive the court of jurisdiction it might otherwise have.”

. Even when

claims “depend on the existence and terms of a contract with the government,” they may still be

heard in district court if they “turn[] on more than just contractual terms.” Cemex Inc. v. Dep’t of

the Interior,

, 276 (D.D.C. 2021). But when, similar to AFSA, the

fundamentally contract-based issue is seemingly the only issue the Court could rule on, the logic

necessarily runs the other way. Cf. Crowley, 38 F.4th at 1104–05, 1108–09 (APA and ultra vires

claims for improper auditing of contract performance were not rooted in contract rights);

Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis,

(D.C. Cir. 1982) (suit to enjoin under Trade

Secrets Act the release of data contractually acquired by the government was not a contract action);

Cemex, 560 F. Supp. 3d at 274, 276 & n.4 (D.D.C. 2021) (acknowledging that plaintiffs “may not

elude the Court of Federal Claims’ exclusive jurisdictional purview by ‘disguising’ contract claims

as something else” but holding that claims seeking vacatur of agency adjudication of contract

dispute on APA and due process grounds were not “essentially contractual”) (quoting Megapulse,

).

30 Here, unlike in Crowley, Megapulse, and Cemex, it appears “possible to conceive of [the

PSCA’s] dispute [with the government] as entirely contained within the terms of [its members’]

contract[s],” because “[t]he question presented by the complaint could be phrased as whether the

contract forbids termination under these conditions.” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 1985); see PSCA, ECF No. 37 at 21–22 (seeking the reinstatement of

contracts and the obligation of contract funds). That is especially true where the PSCs’ contracts

include “termination-for-convenience clause[s],” permitting the PSCA to “challenge the

termination”—which, again, is the only source of its injuries—“based solely on contract

principles.” 5 Ingersoll-Rand,

; see PSCA, ECF No. 39-16 ¶ 1. Accordingly, “[t]hat

the termination also arguably violates certain other [provisions of law] does not transform the

action into one based solely on those [provisions].” Ingersoll-Rand,

. And “the fact

that [the PSCA] here alleges both statutory and constitutional violations,” rather than straight

contract claims, also “does not change the [CDA] analysis.” Nat’l Star Route Mail Contractors,

; see also Ingersoll-Rand,

(collecting cases for the proposition

that “where plaintiff was awarded contract and government terminated for convenience, cause of

action is on the contract despite plaintiff’s allegations of statutory and constitutional violations”).

Nor does it mean that the PSCA’s claims fall outside the “unique expertise of the Court of

Federal Claims.” Nat’l Star Route Mail Contractors,

(alteration omitted).

Like AFSA and AFGE, the PSCA argues that its claims “do not belong before a specialized

tribunal” because they turn on “questions of administrative and constitutional law” rather than

5 The PSCA’s original complaint specifically averred that the PSCs’ contracts include “convenience to the agency” clauses, and complained that USAID failed to provide the “minimum notice” required for termination under those clauses. PSCA, ECF No. 1 ¶ 32. The amended complaint omits but does not disavow those allegations. See generally PSCA, ECF No. 37. 31 questions about “the merits of PSCs’ terminations.” Mot. at 22. As discussed, though, the likely

“substance of Plaintiff’s claims is that the [government] [has] improperly terminate[d] [PSC]

contracts,” which indeed “calls for knowledge of the government contracting process.” Nat’l Star

Route Mail Contractors, 223 F. Supp. 3d at 32–34 (Court of Federal Claims had sufficient

expertise regarding association’s due process and statutory claims over proposed termination of

postal route contracts).

Turning to the remedy prong of the Crowley analysis, the PSCA argues that channeling its

claims through the procedures set by the CDA would be inappropriate because, according to the

PSCA, neither the Court of Federal Claims nor the Board of Contract Appeals can provide the

declaratory and injunctive relief that it seeks. Mot. at 21. Yet, while it is true that “[t]he Claims

Court does not have the general equitable powers of a district court to grant prospective relief,”

Bowen v. Massachusetts,

(1988), it does have authority to award equitable relief

in certain “statutorily defined circumstances,” including (1) when an order “directing restoration

to office or position” is necessary “[t]o provide an entire remedy” and (2) when a claimant presents

for adjudication a “nonmonetary dispute[]” “concerning termination of a contract.” H&M Assocs.,

LLC v. United States,

, 184 (2023);

(a)(2); see also Bowen,

n.40 (noting that “Congress has . . . given the Claims Court certain equitable powers

in specific kinds of litigation”) (citing

(a)(2)). The PSCA asserts without further

explanation that neither context is “present here,” Mot. at 21 n.12, but it is not clear to the Court

why that is.

More importantly, though, a “plaintiff may not sidestep the restrictions of the CDA merely

by avoiding a request for damages.” Ingersoll–Rand,

. Here, it is likely that the

only the relief the PSCA has standing to seek is the reinstatement of its members’ contracts with

32 USAID or a declaration that they were wrongfully terminated. The “practical result” of granting

that “request for declaratory and injunctive relief would be [the] reinstatement of [their] terminated

contracts.”

. Thus, “the essence of [the PSCA’s] claim is a request for specific

performance.”

at 79–80 (request for order “reinstating” contract “amount[ed] to a request for

specific performance”). And even assuming that the Court of Federal Claims could not order that

relief, the Court of Appeals has nonetheless “indicated that a complaint involving a request for

specific performance must be resolved” by that Court, where, at minimum, plaintiffs will “have

available . . . a damages remedy for wrongful termination of the contract.”

at 80 (citing

Spectrum Leasing Corp. v. United States,

, 894–95 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Megapulse,

). “To hold that the CDA does not apply merely because, under that scheme, plaintiff

cannot receive all its requested [relief], would intolerably upset the congressional purpose

underlying the Act”—which is to establish “a scheme for the resolution of contract disputes” that

“includes a deliberate limitation on certain types of remedies.”

***

For the reasons above, the Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over AFSA’s and

AFGE’s claims. The Court further concludes that it likely lacks jurisdiction over the PSCA’s

claims, and thus that the PSCA has not established a likelihood of success on the merits.

B. Remaining Preliminary Injunction Factors

The Court’s jurisdictional conclusions do not end the matter as to the PSCA. Because the

PSCA seeks a preliminary injunction, the Court must also consider whether it has demonstrated

that it or its members will suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction, as well as whether the

equities and the public interest favor an injunction. See Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454

33 F.3d at 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Pursuing Am.’s Greatness,

. The PSCA has not met

its burden on either score.

1. Irreparable Harm

The standard for irreparable injury is “high”: it requires injuries that are “certain, great,

actual, and imminent,” as well as “beyond remediation.” Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co. v. FDA,

(D.D.C. 2008); Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches,

. The PSCA

cannot satisfy that standard, especially when considering the heightened showing required for

injunctive relief in government personnel matters—as this case ultimately is. See Sampson v.

Murray,

, 83–84 (1974).

The PSCA points first to the termination notices that all PSCs have received. Mot. at 38

(citing PSCA, ECF No. 39-4 at 90 ¶ 16). Although the PSCA acknowledges that “job loss is not

normally an irreparable harm,” it contends that “this is not a normal situation” because USAID is

“by far the biggest employer in the humanitarian aid sector,” and provides essential funding for

“almost all other employers in the sector.”

Thus, in the PSCA’s estimation, and on its

assumption that decreased United States’ foreign aid spending will cause the sector to

“disintegrate[],” “for the vast majority of PSCs, the loss of employment [at USAID] means the

loss of an entire career.”

To be sure, in some circumstances, “massive economic disruption”

like that alleged by the PSCA “can be irreparable harm.” Id.; see TikTok Inc. v. Trump,

, 113 (D.D.C. 2020) (finding that TikTok was irreparably harmed by government

actions “[f]unctionally shutting [it] down”). But it is the plaintiff’s burden to “substantiate the

claim that [such] irreparable injury is likely to occur” and “provide proof . . . indicating that the

harm is certain to occur in the near future,” Wis. Gas Co. v. FERC,

, 674 (D.C. Cir.

1985) (quotation marks omitted), and the PSCA has not done so here. It has not provided, for

34 instance, any declarations from terminated PSCs unable to find new work, or from other

humanitarian aid organizations attesting to hiring freezes. Without that kind of concrete evidence,

it is wholly speculative whether the complete professional lockout that the PSCA presages could

eventually befall its members. 6

The PSCA next makes various arguments about irreparable harm that it alleges will accrue

to USAID and the world writ large absent a preliminary injunction. It predicts that, without relief

before judgment, USAID will permanently lose “institutional capacity,” since “[o]nce USAID’s

infrastructure—its workforce, systems, contracts, and global partnerships—is dismantled, it

cannot easily be restored.” Mot. at 39. And the PSCA further alleges that this injury will culminate

in injuries to USAID’s implementing partners, who have had to “lay off employees, stop or limit

operations, or even close their doors” as a result of the changes at USAID, and to humankind,

which will face “[i]mmiseration, instability, hunger, disease, and death . . . if USAID does not do

the work that Congress has mandated it to do.” Id. at 41–42. Whatever the validity of these

concerns, they are not concerns about irreparable harm to the PSCA or its members specifically.

The Court noted when denying the TRO that such generalized allegations of irreparable injury are

insufficient for preliminary relief, and the same is true today. See PSCA, ECF No. 23 at 7; Winter

v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

(2008) (noting that “the applicant” must be “likely

to suffer irreparable harm before a decision on the merits”).

6 In a single line, the PSCA notes that “PSCs’ personal information is being published on the widely publicized DOGE website,” seemingly suggesting that this also inflicts irreparable harm. Mot. at 39 (citing PSCA, ECF No. 6-13 ¶¶ 3, 8; ECF No. 6-15 ¶¶ 3–4; ECF No. 39-4 at 102 ¶ 21). But despite including a provision in its proposed order that would require defendants to “[c]ease disclosing [PSCs’] personal identifying information on and remove that information from all DOGE websites,” PSCA, ECF No. 39-26 ¶ (h), the PSCA never attempts to link this requested relief with the substance of its claims, which it maintains challenge the “dismantling and destruction of USAID.” Mot. at 2. It is thus unclear how this theory of irreparable harm could support a preliminary injunction. 35 2. Balance of the Equities and Public Interest

As the Court explained when denying the PSCA’s TRO motion and in AFSA I, plaintiffs

and the government have each identified plausible interests on either side of the equities ledger in

these cases. See PSCA, ECF No. 23 at 15–16; AFSA I, 768 F. Supp. 3d at 25. Although the facts

on the ground have shifted somewhat since then, those asserted interests generally have not. On

one hand, the PSCA claims that without injunctive relief USAID will cease to exist, decades of

“efforts to project U.S. ‘soft power’” will be wasted, and drastic humanitarian consequences will

ensue. Mot. at 43. On the other hand, the government claims that enjoining its “reorganization of

USAID” would prevent it from aligning the United States’ foreign aid programs with American

values—including by quashing objectionable projects that “serve to destabilize world peace by

promoting ideas in foreign countries that are directly inverse to harmonious and stable relations

internal to and among countries.” Opp. at 41 (quoting Exec. Order No. 14, 169,

§ 1).

As the Court has said before, it is difficult to weigh these assertions against each other,

seeing as they differ not only directionally but also in kind. See AFSA I, 768 F. Supp. 3d at 25.

What the Court is ultimately most moved by, then, are the same jurisdictional principles that form

the core of these cases. It is likely that the only harms as to which the PSCA has standing to seek

relief are those regarding the termination of its members’ voluntarily entered contractual

agreements with USAID, and it is also likely that such terminations must and be addressed (and,

if unlawful, will be redressed) under the CDA. See Widakuswara II,

, at *5.

On the other hand, issuing preliminary relief requiring the reinstatement of PSCs would intrude

into Executive Branch personnel matters and expand the judicial role. See

at *5–6 (“[T]he

Executive Branch has a significant interest in maintaining control over personnel matters” and

36 “[t]he public has an interest in the Judicial Branch’s respect for the jurisdictional boundaries laid

down by Congress.”). Where the PSCA has not demonstrated any irremediable injury and where

Congress meanwhile has “limited the resolution of . . . potentially costly [personnel] claims”

implicating the public fisc to “specialized tribunals” like the Court of Federal Claims, id. at *6, the

Court concludes that neither the equities nor the public interest favor a preliminary injunction.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny the AFSA plaintiffs’ motion for summary

judgment, AFSA, ECF No. 51, and will grant the government’s motion to dismiss, AFSA, ECF No.

70. The Court will deny the PSCA’s motion for a preliminary injunction, PSCA, ECF No. 39.

Orders in both cases will accompany this Opinion.

DATE: July 25, 2025 ________________________ CARL J. NICHOLS United States District Judge

37