UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

AQUIL SUDAH,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 24-2528 (TJK)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Aquil Sudah sues twelve defendants—the District of Columbia and several of its officials

and agencies—asserting an array of violations of federal and District law. He alleges that these

violations occurred in connection with various interactions he had with District employees in 2023

and 2024. Defendants move to dismiss, arguing that Sudah has failed to state a claim against the

District and that he has failed to properly serve the remaining defendants. The Court agrees. And

the Court declines to grant Sudah another chance to serve the remaining defendants because he

has failed to show good cause for not timely doing so, and in any event, providing him more time

would be futile. The amended complaint does not state a claim against the remaining defendants,

and Sudah has not requested another chance to amend. Thus, the Court will dismiss the amended

complaint and the case.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

In his amended complaint, Sudah, proceeding pro se, alleges in scattershot fashion that

over the last few years, the District of Columbia—through its agents in the Metropolitan Police

Department (“MPD”), the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”), and the Child and Family Services Agency (“CFSA”)—violated his constitu-

tional and other rights.

In particular, Sudah alleges that on May 30, 2024, police officers responded to his apart-

ment after someone else reported a crime. ECF No. 9 at 9–10. Then, without informing him of

his rights, they interrogated and arrested him. Id.; ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 29.1 Following Sudah’s arrest,

“US Marshals presented [him] before the Honorable Judge Renee Raymond on a charge of Do-

mestic Violence.” ECF No. 9 at 7. But, Sudah alleges, his initial appearance was defective be-

cause the judge did not give him “reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel.” Id. (quot-

ing D.C. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 5(c)). He also alleges that a few weeks later, on June 17, 2024, the

Superior Court defamed him when its “system” falsely reflected that he had a prior conviction in

Maryland, when instead he had been “awarded” probation before judgment in that case. Id. at 7–

8. Similarly, Sudah alleges that in a March 30, 2024, hearing in another case—stemming from his

2023 arrest for unlawful possession of ammunition and possession of an open container of alco-

hol—the OAG and Attorney Farhad Fatakia violated his rights by failing to “concede” that his

probation before judgment did not count as a prior conviction. Id. at 8; ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 37–38.

Not long after—on July 29, 2024—Sudah alleges that he called the police because “his

live-in girlfriend” was stealing or destroying his possessions while moving out. ECF No. 9 at 11.

Sudah concedes that he called the police asking for their help, but he says he later changed his

mind and invoked his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, thereby purportedly “immunizing”

himself “from being interviewed” and “from [the] police entering his home.” Id. Still, Sudah

alleges that Sergeant Isaac Fernando and his team searched his home, interrogated him and his

1 The Court considers Sudah’s amended complaint “‘in light of’ all [his] filings.” Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Richardson v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 1999)).

2 girlfriend, and ultimately arrested him for simple assault and “Felony Strangulation.” Id. at 12.

Finally, Sudah alleges that since at least April 2023, he has been involved in a long-running

dispute with the CFSA over the custody of his son. He says that from April 2023 to September

2024, the CFSA and its employees—Tessie Sarmiento and Jemeka Brown—repeatedly failed to

follow the proper procedures in their handling of his case. ECF No. 9 at 14–18. He also alleges

that the CFSA improperly brought a child-neglect complaint against him in 2024 based on the

testimony of his son’s mother. Id. at 12–14. According to Sudah, his son’s mother has mental

health problems that make her “unworthy of belief” under D.C. law. Id. at 13. Sudah also alleges

that Sarmiento acted improperly in including in the complaint an allegation that Sudah “may have

a personality disorder.” Id. Sudah alleges that these and other errors deprived him of due process.

Id. at 13–14.

B. Procedural History

In June 2024, Sudah sued the District and several of its officers, employees, and agencies

in Superior Court. ECF No. 1 at 6. Defendants then removed the case to this Court. Id. at 6–7.

Following removal, the Court allowed Sudah to amend his complaint. Min. Order of Sept. 11,

2024. In his amended complaint, Sudah names twelve defendants and brings several claims relat-

ing to the events described above.2 See generally ECF No. 9. Specifically, along with the District,

2 In his amended complaint, Sudah lists both himself and his son as plaintiffs. ECF No. 9 at 1. The Court construes Sudah as seeking to bring the same claims on behalf of his son. See Fed R. Civ. P. 17(c)(1). But even assuming Sudah may properly sue on his son’s behalf under Rule 17, he still may not do so without an attorney. In general, a pro se litigant can represent only himself in federal court. See

(“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel . . . .”); Georgiades v. Martin–Trigona,

(D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[An individual] not a member of the bar of any court . . . may appear pro se but is not qualified to appear in [federal] court as counsel for others.”). This principle extends to barring Sudah from proceeding pro se on his son’s behalf. Berrios v. NYC Hous. Auth.,

(2d Cir. 2009) (“The fact that a minor or incompetent person must be represented by a next friend, guardian ad litem, or other fiduciary does not alter the principle

3 Sudah names Mayor Muriel Bowser, Attorney Fatakia, Officer John Salamone, Sergeant Fer-

nando, Sarmiento, Brown, and Olief “Ginger” Ellis, another CFSA employee (“Individual Defend-

ants”), as well as MPD, the OAG, the Superior Court, and the CFSA (“Agency Defendants”). Id.

at 32.

Sudah alleges that (1) the Superior Court defamed him and violated Superior Court Crim-

inal Rule 5 and his Fifth Amendment due-process rights during the two hearings on May 31 and

June 17, 2024, ECF No. 9 at 7–8; (2) the OAG and Attorney Fatakia defamed him, violated his

due-process rights, and violated provisions of the D.C. Bar Rules of Professional Conduct and

Maryland Code of Criminal Procedure during the hearing on March 1, 2025, id. at 8–9; (3) MPD,

Officer Salamone, and Sergeant Fernando were negligent, falsely arrested him, and violated sev-

eral internal MPD policies, provisions of the U.S. and D.C. Codes, and his constitutional rights

during his two arrests, id. at 9–12; and (4) the CFSA, Sarmiento, Brown, and Ellis defamed him

and violated several provisions of the U.S. and D.C. Codes, CFSA internal guidance, Superior

Court Rules, his Fifth Amendment due-process rights, and a consent decree, in their encounters

with him, id. at 12–18. He asks that the Court grant him $200,000 in damages, vacate the judgment

in the case prosecuted by Attorney Fatakia, order the Superior Court to “erase any evidence of a

conviction pursuant to [his Maryland] Case” and the case prosecuted by Attorney Fatakia, and

enjoin the CFSA and the District from prosecuting its child-neglect suit against him. Id. at 20.

Defendants move to dismiss the amended complaint. ECF No. 11. They argue that the

. . . that a non-attorney is not allowed to represent another individual in federal court litigation without the assistance of counsel. If the representative of the minor or incompetent person is not himself an attorney, he must be represented by an attorney in order to conduct the litigation.”). Thus, the Court will, on its own motion, drop Sudah’s son from the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.

4 Individual and Agency Defendants have not been properly served, that the amended complaint

fails to state a claim, and that—at least for the claims relating to the CFSA and its employees—his

claims are unripe. Id. at 3–4.

II. Legal Standards

“Article III of the Constitution permits federal courts to adjudicate only ‘actual, ongoing

controversies.’” Ramirez v. ICE,

(D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Honig v. Doe,

(1988)). One facet of this rule is the ripeness doctrine. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union

v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 1996). “[R]ipeness is peculiarly a question of

timing,” and “[i]ts basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through premature adjudication, from

entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.” Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Prods. Co.,

(1985) (first alteration in original) (quotations omitted). Claims are unripe, and

federal courts thus lack jurisdiction, when a plaintiff’s claims “involve[] contingent future events

that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.”

(internal quotation marks

and quotation omitted).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) governs a motion to dismiss for insufficient ser-

vice of process. “Upon such a motion, the plaintiff carries the burden of establishing that he has

properly effected service.” Hilska v. Jones,

(D.D.C. 2003). “To do so, he must

demonstrate that the procedure employed satisfied the requirements of the relevant portions of

Rule 4 [(which governs summonses)] and any other applicable provision of law.” Light v. Wolf,

(D.C. Cir. 1987). “[U]nless the procedural requirements for effective service

of process are satisfied, a court lacks authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defend-

ant.” Candido v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2007). Failure to effect

proper service is thus a “fatal” jurisdictional defect and is grounds for dismissal. See Tom Sawyer

Prods., Inc. v. Progressive Partners Achieving Solutions, Inc.,

(D.D.C.

5 2008).

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint

must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). A plaintiff states a facially plausible claim when he pleads “factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009). The Court accepts as true “all well-pleaded

factual allegations” and “construes reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s

favor.” Sissel v. HHS,

(D.C. Cir. 2014). But “mere conclusory statements” are not

enough to establish a plausible claim, and courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal,

(quoting Twombly,

).

III. Analysis

The Court will dismiss the amended complaint because it fails to state a claim against the

District and Sudah has not shown that he properly served the Individual and Agency Defendants.

The Court also declines to give Sudah another chance to serve the Individual and Agency Defend-

ants because he has failed to show good cause for not timely doing so. And in any event, because

the amended complaint does not state a claim against the Individual and Agency Defendants and

because Sudah has not requested another opportunity to amend, granting him more time to serve

would be futile.

A. The Amended Complaint Fails to State a Claim Against the District

The Court will dismiss Sudah’s claims against the District because he has failed to state a

claim against it.3 To begin, Sudah has not plausibly alleged that the District is liable for any

The Court liberally construes Sudah’s amended complaint as naming the District as a 3

proper defendant for all his claims.

6 violations of his constitutional or other federal rights.4 He brings these claims under

, which provides a cause of action when a person, “under color of” law, “deprives” “any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof . . . of any rights, privi-

leges, or immunities secured by the [federal] Constitution and laws.” See ECF No. 9 at 4.5

For purposes of § 1983, a municipality like the District is a person. Frederick Douglass

Found., Inc. v. District of Columbia,

, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2023). But when suing the

District, a plaintiff “must plausibly allege [1] that the District violated the Constitution and [2] that

the violation was the result of an official custom or policy.”

And to show an official custom

or policy, he must “identify (1) an official policy explicitly adopted by D.C., (2) actions by a D.C.

policymaker with final decision-making authority, (3) repeated behavior by D.C. municipal em-

ployees that have reached the level of a custom, or (4) a failure to act by D.C. that shows deliberate

indifference to the potential for such violations.” Givens v. Bowser,

, 122 (D.C. Cir.

2024). Moreover, he must “plead facts that plausibly support one of those four types of municipal

policies” and “the elements of the relevant type of municipal policy.”

(quotation omitted).

Because it “is not [the Court’s] role” to “try to surmise which theory of municipal liability has the

strongest support in the complaint,” a plaintiff must make his asserted theory plain.

(quotation

4 As a threshold matter, the District argues that Sudah’s claims relating to the CFSA and its employees are unripe. ECF No. 11 at 25–26. The Court disagrees. Sudah’s claims are not based on “contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Texas v. United States,

(1998) (quoting Thomas, 473 U.S. at 580–581). Instead, his claims all stem from completed actions that the CFSA and its employees allegedly have already taken. So these claims are ripe because they are not “riddled with contingencies and speculation that impede judicial review.”

5 Sudah lists several other federal statutes in his amended complaint, including

,

,

,

, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ECF No. 9 at 4–5, 7, 9, 12. But those statutes either provide no cause of action or a cause of action inapplicable here. So the Court limits its analysis of Sudah’s federal claims to § 1983.

7 omitted). Thus, failure to “indicate[] the contours of any type of municipal policy” dooms a claim.

Id. (quotation omitted).

Sudah’s § 1983 claims against the District fail because he has not plausibly pleaded the

existence of any relevant official policy or custom. In his opposition, Sudah gives the conclusory

assertion that all four theories of municipal liability “have . . . been established in [his] amended

complaint.” ECF No. 13 at 2. But his amended complaint contains no allegations that come close

to meeting this standard. See generally ECF No. 9. Without a theory of municipal liability, his

federal claims against the District fail. Givens, 111 F.4th at 122.

The Court will also dismiss Sudah’s non-federal claims against the District because he has

conceded them. “[W]hen a plaintiff files a response to a motion to dismiss but fails to address

certain arguments made by the defendant, the court may treat those arguments as conceded, even

when the result is dismissal of the entire case.” Stephenson v. Cox,

(D.D.C. 2002). In their motion to dismiss, Defendants advance several arguments for why Sudah’s

non-federal claims fail to state a claim. ECF No. 11 at 17–19, 21–25, 27–28. For example, they

argue that Sudah’s claims premised on the Rules of Professional Conduct fail because those Rules

“do not give rise to a private cause of action for their violation.” ECF No. 11 at 17 (quoting

Papageorge v. Zucker,

(D.C. 2017)). They say the same about his claims

premised on the cited D.C. Code provisions, Superior Court rules, and MPD and CFSA internal

policies and guidance.6

at 21–23, 27. As for his tort claims, Defendants argue that Sudah has

not pleaded facts that would support the elements for the claimed torts, that the District is

6 Defendants only expressly mention Superior Court Neglect Rule 1, but the logic of their argument extends to Sudah’s claims related to other provisions of the Superior Court Rules. Sim- ilarly, the logic of their argument about the provisions of the D.C. Code extends to Sudah’s citation to § 6-220 of the Maryland Code of Criminal Procedure, which does not appear to create a cause of action against the District of Columbia or its agents.

8 absolutely immune from liability for some of them, and that his negligence claim is preempted by

his intentional-tort claims. Id. at 17–18, 23–25. Finally, Defendants argue that Sudah’s claims

related to a consent decree stemming from a different case are meritless because he has not shown

that he falls within the scope of that decree. Id. at 27. In his three-page opposition, Sudah does

not respond to any of these arguments. See generally ECF No. 13. So the Court will “treat those

arguments as conceded” and dismiss Sudah’s non-federal claims on that basis. Stephenson,

.

Even beyond Sudah’s failure to address the substance of these arguments, he appears to

affirmatively concede them by consenting to the “disposal” of his non-federal claims. ECF No.

13 at 2. The arguments discussed above appear in subparts C, D, and E of part II of Defendants’

argument section. ECF No. 11 at 12, 19, 25. And in his opposition, Sudah says, “In Response to

Argument II C, D, E,” “[a]s the court sees fit, disposal of particular claims are conceded. However,

[Sudah] assert[s] that all of his claims satisfy deprivation of Due Process, Constitutional Rights,

and rebut ‘Good faith’ of any actions taken by defendants.” ECF No. 13 at 2. Because Sudah’s

non-federal claims are, by definition, not premised on due process or other constitutional rights,

that proviso to his affirmative concession does not save his non-federal claims. Finally, Sudah’s

mention of “Good faith” appears to reference portions of Defendants’ motion in which they argue

that, for some of Sudah’s tort claims, they are immune from suit because of their purported good

faith. ECF No. 11 at 23, 24, 27. But for the reasons described above, Sudah has conceded other

arguments aimed at these tort claims that are similarly dispositive, such as the lack of a cause of

action and his failure to plead facts supporting the elements of the causes of action he purports to

bring. So his refusal to concede “Good faith” does not save those claims, either.

For these reasons, the Court will dismiss all the claims in the amended complaint against

9 the District.

B. Sudah Has Failed to Show That the Individual and Agency Defendants Were Served, and Dismissal of His Claims Against Them Is Appropriate

The Court will next grant Defendants’ motion as to the Individual and Agency Defendants

because Sudah has not shown that they have been properly served. “When a defendant challenges

service of process in a federal court proceeding, the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the procedure

[he] employed satisfied the’” relevant service requirements. Candido,

(altera-

tion in original) (quoting Wilson v. Prudential Fin.,

(D.D.C. 2004)). In

cases removed from Superior Court, service is proper so long as it conforms with either District

law or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Magowan v. Lowery,

, 65–66

(D.D.C. 2016). Defendants argue that the “individual and agency Defendants have not been served

at all” under either set of rules. ECF No. 11 at 8. Thus, Sudah must show that he properly served

them. Candido,

.

Sudah does not come close to doing so. In his opposition, he points to a document he

purportedly attached that would allow the Court to “rul[e] on proper service.” ECF No. 13 at 1.

But as far as the Court can tell, no such attachment exists. See generally

In the entire three-

page document, nothing outside of that vague reference to a missing document—and an unsup-

ported allegation that MPD and the OAG “afford petitioners alternative avenues of service,” id.—

addresses whether Sudah has satisfied his service requirements. So Sudah has not met his burden,

and the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Individual and Agency Defendants. Tom Sawyer

Prods., Inc.,

.

Perhaps anticipating this result, Sudah also asks that “[i]f the court maintains that service

is insufficient or ‘unperfected,’” he be permitted “to perfect service.” ECF No. 13 at 1. If a plain-

tiff fails to effect service, “the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must

10 dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a

specified time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Rule 4(m) provides that district courts have discretion when

determining whether to dismiss for failure to timely effect service. See Mann v. Castiel,

, 375–76 (D.C. Cir. 2012). But if “the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure,” a court “must

extend the time for service for an appropriate period.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

The Court will deny Sudah’s request for additional time to serve the Individual and Agency

Defendants and will dismiss the claims against them. Sudah has not shown good cause for his

failure—in fact, he has offered no explanation at all. ECF No. 13 at 1. Moreover, as explained

below, allowing him to serve the amended complaint would be futile because it does not state a

claim against either the Individual or Agency Defendants. Gregory v. United States/U.S. Bankr.

Ct. for Dist. of Colo.,

(10th Cir. 1991) (affirming dismissal for failure to serve

because “proper service of process would be futile” based on the merits of the claims). And Sudah

has not requested a chance to amend it, as he has done before.7 Thus, dismissal would hardly

“subvert justice” or be “unfairly prejudic[ial]” to Sudah. Candido,

.

1. The Amended Complaint Does Not State Claims Against the Individual Defendants

The Court starts with the Individual Defendants.8 For two of them—Mayor Bowser and

Ellis—Sudah’s amended complaint contains no allegations about their actions or roles with respect

to any of his claims. Simply put, because Sudah “fails to implicate [them] in any of the complaint’s

7 Sudah apparently amended his complaint before the case was removed to this Court, in addition to doing so afterward. See ECF No. 1 at 6. 8 Sudah does not always specify whether he brings his claims against these defendants in their individual or official capacities. The Court will accordingly construe Sudah’s amended com- plaint as advancing both types of claims. But since an official-capacity claim is “equivalent to a suit against the municipality itself,” those claims fail for the reasons discussed above with respect to the District. Atchinson v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 1996).

11 allegations,” he fails to state a claim against them. Hilska,

.9

As for Sudah’s non-federal claims against Attorney Fatakia, they fail for the same reasons

his non-federal claims against the District do: Sudah conceded them. And the amended com-

plaint’s federal claims fail because Attorney Fatakia is immune from liability for them, Kalina v.

Fletcher,

, 123–26 (1997), an argument which he also conceded. Despite Defendants’

assertion of that immunity, ECF No. 11 at 16, Sudah does not address it in his opposition, ECF

No. 13 at 3 (responding to other of Defendants’ immunity arguments). Thus, the Court treats this

argument as conceded. Stephenson,

.

Still, aside from that concession, it is easy to see why Attorney Fatakia is immune. Under

§ 1983, “acts undertaken by a prosecutor . . . which occur in the course of his role as an advocate

for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,

(1993). Indeed, “prosecutors” are “absolutely immune from damages liability . . .

for making false or defamatory statements in judicial proceedings (at least so long as the statements

were related to the proceeding).” Burns v. Reed,

, 489–92 (1991). So when a plaintiff

sues a prosecutor over actions that fall within that realm of absolute immunity, courts properly

grant the prosecutor’s motion to dismiss on immunity grounds. E.g., Bundy v. Sessions,

(D.D.C. 2019), aff’d,

(D.C. Cir. 2020). Sudah alleges that

Attorney Fatakia was acting in his role as a prosecutor when he allegedly violated Sudah’s federal

rights. ECF No. 9 at 8–9. So he is immune from any § 1983 claims relating to that proceeding.

Burns, 500 U.S. at 489–92.

9 Though not included in his list of defendants, Sudah includes MPD Chief Pamela Smith and Commander Colin Hall as intended service recipients. ECF No. 9 at 1. To the extent that Sudah intended to include them, claims against them fail for the same reasons as those against Mayor Bowser and Ellis.

12 The amended complaint similarly does not state a claim against the remaining Individual

Defendants. Again, Sudah has conceded his non-federal claims. And without any District-law

claims, the amended complaint alleges only that the remaining Individual Defendants violated Su-

dah’s federal rights. See ECF No. 13 at 2. But when a plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim alleging that

officials have violated his federal rights, he must show both that a violation occurred and that “the

particular right in question—narrowly described to fit the factual pattern confronting the officers—

was clearly established.” Dukore v. District of Columbia,

, 1144–45 (D.C. Cir.

2015) (citation omitted). To do so, he must identify “existing precedent [that] ‘squarely governs’

the specific facts at issue.” Hedgpeth v. Rahim,

(D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Kisela

v. Hughes,

, 104 (2018)). And if he fails to show that his asserted right was clearly

established after a defendant officer asserts qualified immunity, courts properly grant the officer’s

motion to dismiss. E.g., Turpin v. Ray,

, 198–99 (D.D.C. 2018); Jones v.

Kirchner,

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal of a complaint on qualified-im-

munity grounds when the plaintiff had not shown that the right at issue was clearly established at

the time of the purported violation).

Sudah has not made that showing here. He merely cites some general principles of quali-

fied immunity reflected in case law. ECF No. 13 at 3. But he does not discuss the facts of those

cases or explain how any shows “existing precedent [that] ‘squarely governs’ the specific facts at

issue.” Hedgpeth,

(quoting Kisela,

).

For these reasons, Sudah’s amended complaint does not state a claim against the Individual

Defendants.

2. The Agency Defendants Are Not Amenable to Suit

“[I]n the absence of explicit statutory authorization, bodies within the District of Columbia

government are not suable as separate entities.” Sibley v. U.S. Supreme Ct.,

,

13 344 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Daskalea v. Wash. Humane Soc’y,

(D.D.C.

2007)). Sudah has identified no statute authorizing him to sue any of the Agency Defendants.

Indeed, he now argues that he never intended to sue them separately and only included them for

“process of service [sic] purposes.” ECF No. 13 at 1. He claims that the Agency Defendants are

“joined parties” being sued “under one defendant: The District of Columbia.”

(emphasis omit-

ted). Whatever Sudah means by that, these entities are not separately amenable to suit.10 So the

amended complaint does not state a claim against them either.

IV. Conclusion

For all the above reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. A separate

order will issue.

/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: July 25, 2025

10 Though he does not name it as a defendant, Sudah also seems to suggest at one point in the amended complaint that he seeks to bring claims against Ward 6. ECF No. 9 at 6. For the reasons explained above, Ward 6—to the extent it is an entity part of the District of Columbia government—is not amenable to suit either.

14