UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. Crim. No. 25-00187 (EGS) DALONTE HARRISON,

Defendant.

MEMORNDUM OPINION

On July 14, 2025, the Court held a hearing (“July 14, 2025

Hearing” or “Hearing”) on Defendant Dalonte Harrison’s (“Mr.

Harrison”) Motion for Reconsideration and Memorandum in Support

of Pretrial Release (“Motion”). See Def.’s Mot. for Recons. &

Mem. in Support of Pretrial Release (“Mot.”), ECF No. 14; Minute

Entry (July 14, 2025).1 Mr. Harrison is charged with one count of

Unlawful Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition by a Person

Previously Convicted of a Crime Punishable by Imprisonment for a

Term Exceeding One Year, in violation of

(g)(1).

See Indictment, ECF No. 10. The government sought pretrial

detention, and the magistrate judge who previously considered

the matter granted the government’s request. See Gov’t Mem. in

Support of Pretrial Detention, ECF No. 5; Order of Detention

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the page number of the filed document. 1 Pending Trial, ECF No. 17. Mr. Harrison sought reconsideration

of the decision to detain him before this Court, see Mot., ECF

No. 14; and the government again opposed pretrial release, see

Gov’t Opp’n to Def’s Mot. for Recons. of Pretrial Release

(“Opp’n”), ECF No. 15.

At the conclusion of the Hearing, and after careful

consideration of the Motion, the Opposition thereto, the letters

in support of Mr. Harrison, the magistrate judge’s detention

decision, the parties’ arguments, and the entire record, the

Court granted the Motion and released Mr. Harrison to the High

Intensity Supervision Program, imposing strict conditions. See

Conditions of Release, ECF No. 18. The Court concluded that

because the strict conditions set can adequately protect against

the risk of flight and threat to the community, release is

required under the Bail Reform Act (“BRA”). See

. Although a written decision is not required under

(h), the Court memorializes its ruling at the

Hearing and explanation thereof in this memorandum opinion.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

1. Mr. Harrison

Mr. Harrison is a 32-year-old man who has lived in

Washington, D.C. or Prince George’s County, Maryland for his

entire life. See Mot., ECF No. 14 at 5. He is a father who is

2 close with his family, including his children, mother,

grandmothers, and nieces. See Mot., ECF No. 14 at 5 (citing

Letters in Support, ECF No. 6-1); see also Letter from Rodriguez

Norman, ECF No. 6-3. He lives with his grandmother; his fiancé,

who is approximately five months pregnant; and their nine-year-

old son. See Mot., ECF No. 14 at 5 (citing Letter from Rai

Mitchell, ECF No. 6-2).

According to Mr. Rodriguez Norman (“Mr. Norman”),

Supervisor of Cure the Streets, a program with the National

Association for the Advancement of Returning Citizens

(“N.A.A.R.C.”), Mr. Harrison “recently completed the Pathways

Program, a comprehensive 16-week initiative facilitated by the

Office of Neighborhood Safety and Engagement (O.N.S.E.) for

individuals identified as high risk.” Letter from Rodriguez

Norman, ECF No. 6-3. The Pathways Program provides “job

readiness training, mental health support, Cognitive Behavioral

Theory (CBT), and professional development including

interviewing techniques.”

Mr. Norman reports that Mr.

Harrison “not only fulfilled all program requirements but

excelled—earning employment opportunities and obtaining IT

certifications, which reflect his commitment to long-term change

and stability.”

Mr. Norman elaborated on how Mr. Harrison worked to better

his community as part of this program.

Specifically, he

3 described how “Mr. Harrison has contributed his time and energy

to Cure the Streets, a violence interruption program out of the

[District of Columbia] Office of the Attorney General.”

For

example, Mr. Harrison “assisted with canvassing efforts in the

Congress Park neighborhood, played a key role in setting up and

breaking down community events, and has participated in

mediating conflicts involving high-risk youth.”

Mr. Norman

states that this work by Mr. Harrison “has been instrumental in

promoting peace and community engagement in areas that need it

most.”

In summary, Mr. Norman described Mr. Harrison as a

“young man who has demonstrated both personal growth and a

sincere commitment to improving his life and the well-being of

his community” who is “not only working toward bettering his own

life but also actively working to uplift those around him.”

At the July 14, 2025 Hearing, Mr. Harrison’s counsel

represented that Mr. Harrison has now been offered employment.

Mr. Harrison’s job was scheduled to begin on July 21, 2025, and

would be five hours per day for the first month, and then

transition to full-time employment after that. Moreover, Mr.

Vincent Massey (“Mr. Massey”), Executive Director and Founder of

What a Change, Massey Mentoring, Inc. attended the Hearing and

offered to provide his mentorship resources to Mr. Harrison. Mr.

Massey’s not-for-profit organization “provides mentoring to

teens and men in Washington, DC who are on parole and probation

4 to reduce the likelihood of their return to incarceration and

make them productive citizens who can positively impact their

families and communities.” WHAT A CHANGE, MASSEY MENTORING, INC.,

https://www.whatachange.org/vincent-m-v (last visited July 28,

2025).

2. Prior Offenses

Although he has not had any convictions in the last decade2,

Mr. Harrison committed several offenses when he was a teenager

or emerging adult. See Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 13–14. The

government highlights four offenses charged against Mr. Harrison

in the D.C. Superior Court in 2011 and 2012. See

These

offenses began with an Unlawful Entry charge, of which Mr.

Harrison was ultimately convicted, and led to Mr. Harrison being

charged with and convicted of failures to appear. See Opp’n, ECF

No. 15 at 13–14 (citing D.C. Superior Court Case Nos. 2011 CMD

016887; 2011 CMD 022066; 2012 CMD 003158; 2012 CMD 013849).3

2 The government erroneously stated in its Opposition that “[o]n January 22, 2025, [Mr.] Harrison was convicted in Prince George’s County, Maryland of Transporting a Handgun on a Roadway, and sentenced to a three-year sentence, two of which were suspended.” Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 13. This prior proceeding did not occur in 2025; it occurred in 2014–2015. Mr. Harrison apparently pled guilty to this offense on November 7, 2014 then was sentenced on January 22, 2015. See Dkt. in Maryland v. Harrison, Case No. CT141105X (Cir. Ct. 2014-15). 3 These cases pertain to Mr. Demetrius Kavon Blair, which is,

according to the Pretrial Services Agency, an alias for Mr. Harrison. See Pretrial Servs. Report, ECF No. 4. 5 According to the records from these offenses, Mr. Harrison did

not succeed on supervision.

Shortly afterwards, Mr. Harrison committed an offense in

Maryland that is the predicate charge for the government

charging him with violating

(g)(1) in this case.

On August 29, 2014, Mr. Harrison had an initial appearance in

the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland. See Dkt.

in Maryland v. Harrison, Case No. CT141105X (Cir. Ct. 2014-15);

see also Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 13. He was charged with one count

of Transportation of a Handgun on a Roadway, in violation of MD.

CRIM. LAW 4-203(A)(1)(II)(t), which is described as a misdemeanor

in Maryland, even though it is punishable by a year or more of

incarceration. See Dkt. in Maryland v. Harrison, Case No.

CT141105X (Cir. Ct. 2014-15). Mr. Harrison pled guilty and on

January 22, 2015 was sentenced to three years of incarceration

with two years suspended and three years of supervision. See

The government did not allege in its briefing materials nor at

the July 14, 2025 Hearing that Mr. Harrison failed to comply

with the supervision conditions imposed in this case. See also

Pretrial Servs. Report, ECF No. 4 at 3; Add. to Detention Order,

ECF No. 17-1 at 3. This 2014 offense was Mr. Harrison’s most

recent conviction.

In 2017, the government brought a charge against Mr.

Harrison in D.C. Superior Court that was ultimately dismissed in

6 2022 but required Mr. Harrison to be on supervised release

during the case’s pendency. See Mot., ECF No. 14 at 7

(referencing Dkt. in Case No. 2017 CF2 004549 (D.C. Super.

Ct.)). Mr. Harrison represents that his supervision was never

revoked in that case, see id.; and the government conceded this

point at the July 14, 2025 Hearing.

3. Allegations in Current Case

The events that gave rise to Mr. Harrison’s current charge

occurred on June 15, 2025. The government alleges that

shortly after 6:00 p.m., [an unidentified person] called 911 to report that a man with a grey sweatsuit was pointing a gun at people on the 1300 block of Savannah Street SE. According to the caller, there was a fight in the area and a lot of commotion outside. A slim-built [B]lack man who was approximately 5’7” in a grey sweatsuit and a hoodie was pointing a gun at people outside in the alley between 1327 and 1329 Savannah Street SE.

Officers Finn and Griffin with the Metropolitan Police Department responded to the rear of 1327 Savannah Street SE, and found [Mr.] Harrison in the alley matching the description given by the 911 caller. Although [Mr.] Harrison was standing with a group of people, he was the only one who matched the caller’s description. The Officers approached [Mr.] Harrison, and Officer Griffin told [Mr.] Harrison not to bug out, and touched [Mr.] Harrison’s waistband as [Mr.] Harrison tried to pull away.

Officer Griffin felt a gun, and after a brief struggle, the gun was removed from [Mr.] Harrison’s waistband and he was placed in handcuffs.

7 Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 2-3. The government did not identify the

911 caller nor allege that there was any eyewitness

identification of Mr. Harrison as the person who was the subject

of the 911 call.

According to the government, Officer Griffin recovered a

black 9mm Glock 26 with the serial number BGXE455 and an “auto-

sear” device affixed to the rear.

. The gun had one

bullet loaded in the chamber and ten rounds in a magazine

capable of holding twelve. See

The government asserts that

auto-sear devices allow a gun to be continuously fired. See

The government further alleges that “[a]s Officers rolled [Mr.]

Harrison over on the ground and lifted his feet, a second 9mm

Glock magazine fell from [Mr.] Harrison and was recovered. This

one was capable of holding fifteen rounds, and was loaded with

eleven rounds.”

The government also reported that the

officers found “9 white round pills labeled T 192 in a clear

plastic bag and 3 grams of a white powder-like substance” when

they searched Mr. Harrison incident to his arrest.

.

The government determined that someone other than Mr.

Harrison bought the gun at a pawn shop in North Carolina on

December 15, 2023. See

. It also conducted a ballistics

test and found that the gun was used during an incident on

February 17, 2024, during which two individuals shot at a car.

See

The government does not allege that Mr. Harrison was

8 involved in this incident, see

indeed; it conceded at the

July 14, 2025 Hearing that it had no evidence tying Mr. Harrison

to it. Nor does the government allege how or when the gun came

into Mr. Harrison’s possession. See

B. Procedural Background

On June 15, 2025, Mr. Harrison was charged in D.C. Superior

Court with one count of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm (Prior

Conviction), in violation of 22

(a)(1), (b)(1),

and one count of Carrying a Pistol Without a License, in

violation of 22

(a)(1). See Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at

7; Case No. 2025 CF2 006713 (D.C. Super. Ct.). A judge in D.C.

Superior Court held a preliminary hearing at which the judge

found probable cause for both charges and detained Mr. Harrison

pretrial. See Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 7. Mr. Harrison represented

that a hearing to review the D.C. Superior Court’s detention

decision was scheduled to be held on June 26, 2025, but the

government brought charges in this Court before that hearing

could occur. See Mot., ECF No. 14 at 1–2.

Mr. Harrison had his initial appearance in this court

before Magistrate Judge Zia Faruqui on June 24, 2025, after

which the government dismissed his case in D.C. Superior Court.

See Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 7. Magistrate Judge Moxila Upadhyaya

conducted a hearing on the government’s request for pretrial

detention of Mr. Harrison on June 26, 2025, at which she granted

9 the government’s motion and denied Mr. Harrison’s request for

release. See Minute Entry (June 26, 2025). Magistrate Judge

Upadhyaya then issued a written order and addendum on July 14,

2025, nunc pro tunc to June 26, 2025. See Detention Order, ECF

No. 17; Add. to Detention Order, ECF No. 17-1. The Pretrial

Services Agency (“Pretrial”) opposed release and determined that

Mr. Harrison was a “Medium” risk level. See Pretrial Servs.

Report, ECF No. 4.

The government obtained an indictment against Mr. Harrison

on July 3, 2025, charging him with one count of violating

(g)(1). See Indictment, ECF No. 10. Mr. Harrison’s

case was then randomly assigned to this Court. The Court held a

status hearing on July 8, 2025, during which Mr. Harrison’s

counsel stated that they intended to file a motion for this

Court to consider Mr. Harrison’s request for pretrial release.

The Court set deadlines for briefing and a hearing which, as

noted, occurred on July 14, 2025. See Minute Entry (July 14,

2025). At the Hearing, no party called any witnesses. In

addition to hearing the parties’ arguments, the Court also heard

the tape of the 911 call, from Pretrial staff about its

recommendation for conditions if Mr. Harrison were to be

released, and from Mr. Massey about the mentorship services he

could provide. At the Hearing’s conclusion, the Court granted

Mr. Harrison’s Motion and set conditions for his pretrial

10 release. See Minute Entry (July 14, 2025); Conditions of

Release, ECF No. 18.

II. Standard of Review

‘“In our society, liberty is the norm, and detention prior

to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”’

United States v. Munchel,

(D.C. Cir. 2021)

(quoting United States v. Salerno,

(1987));

see also Stack v. Boyle,

(1951) (“Th[e]

traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the

unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the

infliction of punishment prior to conviction.”). As such, “[t]he

Bail Reform Act carefully limits the circumstances under which

detention may be sought to the most serious of crimes.” Salerno,

.

To deprive someone of their liberty prior to trial, the

government bears the burden of showing that no condition or

combination of conditions can mitigate their risk of flight,

based on a preponderance of the evidence, or danger to the

community, based on clear and convincing evidence. See Munchel,

919 F.3d at 1279–80;

(f) (articulating clear and

convincing evidence standard for dangerousness determination);

United States v. Vasquez-Benitez,

(D.C. Cir.

2019) (citing United States v. Vortis,

, 328–29

(D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (articulating preponderance

11 standard for risk of flight)). “[I]n determining whether there

are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the

appearance of the person . . . and the safety of . . . the

community”, see

(g), courts consider four

factors “(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense

charged, (2) the weight of the evidence against the person, (3)

the history and characteristics of the person, and (4) the

nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the

community that would be posed by the person's release”,

see Munchel,

(internal quotations omitted).

A district court reviews a magistrate judge’s determination

of release or detention de novo. See e.g., United States v.

Blackson, Case No. 23-CR-25,

, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb.

6, 2023) (quotations & citations omitted) (noting how even

though “[n]either

nor § 3145 specifies the

standard of review to be applied by a district court reviewing a

magistrate judge’s release or detention order, and the D.C.

Circuit has not squarely decided the issue . . . both the BRA

and the Federal Magistrates Act . . . support the conclusion,

reached by every circuit to have considered the question, that a

district court reviews a magistrate judge’s release or detention

order de novo”).

12 III. Analysis

A. Pretrial Release or Detention and the Bail Reform Act

As noted, the Supreme Court has made clear that pretrial

release and the preservation of a person’s liberty is to be the

norm; detention is only warranted for “arrestees charged with

serious felonies” who are found to pose a risk of flight or

threat to the community that “no condition of release can

dispel.” Salerno,

; see also Stack,

(“Unless th[e] right to bail before trial is preserved, the

presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of

struggle, would lose its meaning.”). In his Motion, Mr. Harrison

pointed to statistics from the Administrative Office of the U.S.

Courts which show that “nearly everyone released pending trial

appears in court and does not reoffend.” See Mot., ECF No. 14 at

9–10 n. 1 (citing AO Table H-15 (Dec. 31, 2019), available at

Mot. for Bond, United States v. Rodriguez, No. 19-CR-77 (E.D.

Wis. Apr. 2, 2020), ECF No. 41, Ex. 1, archived at

https://perma.cc/LYG4-AX4H (showing a nationwide failure-to-

appear rate of 1.2% and a rearrest rate of 1.9%)).4 Even with the

4 The Court takes Judicial Notice of the most recent Pretrial Services Violations Summary Report which is “For the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2024” and shows similar numbers for rearrest violations (1,234 out of 51,606 cases that were in “Release Status”, 8,434 of which had violations, with 7,703 being “technical violations”). See U.S. District Courts --- Pretrial Services Violations Summary Report For the 12-month Period Ending September 30, 2024, 13 plain language of the BRA, clear guidance from the Supreme Court,

and federal judicial records showing low rates of individuals who

are released on conditions committing offenses or failing to

appear during their release, a significant majority of federal

defendants are detained pending their trial. See United States v.

Abass, No. 25-CR-0079,

, at *5 n.2 (D.D.C. Apr.

11, 2025) (citing Alison Siegler et al., Freedom Denied: How the

Culture of Detention Created a Federal Jailing Crisis, UNIV. CHI.

L. SCH. FED. CRIM. JUST. CLINIC 1, 20–22 (Oct. 2022),

https://freedomdenied.law.uchicago.edu/report (“Between 1983—the

year before Congress enacted the Bail Reform Act—and 2019,

federal pretrial incarceration rates skyrocketed from less than

24% to 75%.”)).5 The stringent standards set in the BRA, as

interpreted by the Supreme Court, recognize that any amount of

time that a person is locked behind bars is significant,

especially when the person has not been convicted of an offense.

See Mot., ECF No. 14 at 6-7 (discussing the role Mr. Harrison

plays in his family); Abass,

, at *5 (describing

collateral consequences of incarceration).

https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2025- 01/jb h15 0930.2024.pdf (last visited July 28, 2025); see also CREW v. Trump,

(D.C. Cir. 2019) (public records can be judicially noticed). 5 As the Supreme Court has observed, the vast majority of

criminal cases, approximately 97% in federal court, result in plea deals and do not go to trial. See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye,

(2012). 14 B. Title

(g) Factors

The government argued, see Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 9–15; and

the magistrate judge agreed, see Add. to Detention Order, ECF

No. 17-1; that all four § 3142(g) factors weighed in favor of

detention. As explained below, the Court disagreed and held at

the July 14, 2025 Hearing that the government failed to meet its

burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that no

combination of conditions would be sufficient to protect the

community; and by a preponderance of the evidence that no

conditions could assure Mr. Harrison’s appearance. See

(f); Vasquez-Benitez,

.6

1. Nature and Circumstances of Offense Charged

The government asserted that the nature and circumstances

of the alleged offense weighed in favor of pretrial detention

because of the facts it alleged related to the unidentified 911-

caller’s statement; that the gun recovered from Mr. Harrison was

loaded; the presence of the auto-sear device; and because Mr.

Harrison was found with suspected narcotics. See Opp’n, ECF No.

6 The government’s brief, and the magistrate judge’s addendum, both focused primarily on the dangerousness question under § 3142, but also based their argument/conclusion on the risk of flight. Because Mr. Harrison has strong ties to the community and a recent history of complying with supervision, the Court concludes that the government has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that no conditions can adequately assure his appearance. See Vasquez-Benitez,

. 15 15 at 10–12.7 In briefing, it primarily focused on the auto-sear

device and cited statistics about how these devices that turn

guns into automatic weapons have become much more common in the

past few years. See id. at 11. It also highlighted the “inherent

danger associated with loaded guns.” See Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 10

(citing Blackson,

, at *7-8). At the Hearing, the

government played the audio from the 911 call and focused on the

allegations in that call as support for its argument that

detention is necessary due to the nature of the charged offense.

It also highlighted that the gun was loaded and could quickly be

used to inflict horrific damage due to the auto-sear device.

In response, Mr. Harrison acknowledged the seriousness of

the allegations, especially related to the loaded gun and auto-

sear device. But he also highlighted how he is not charged with

a violent offense and does not have a history of committing

violent offenses. Indeed, Courts have repeatedly held that

possession of a firearm is not a crime of violence. See e.g.,

United States v. Bryant, Order, ECF No. 15 in Case No. 25-cr-97

at 2 (citing United States v. Gloster,

(D.D.C.

7 In its brief, the government argued that Mr. Harrison “created an even greater risk to himself, the community, and the officers involved in his arrest by attempting to prevent the officer from performing a protective pat down and struggling with the officers after the firearm was identified”, Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 12, but did not charge him with any related offense nor rely on this allegation at the July 14, 2025 Hearing. 16 1997)); see also United States v. Singleton,

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that possession of a firearm by a

person previously convicted of a crime punishable by a year or

more of incarceration is not a “crime of violence” under the

BRA).8 Even though the government alleges that the 911 call

demonstrates that Mr. Harrison was pointing the gun at people

prior to when the police arrived, it has not charged him with

any violent or threatening conduct. See Indictment, ECF No. 10.

The Court emphatically agrees that guns, especially loaded

and automatic weapons, pose a significant risk of danger to

communities everywhere. Here, the Court must determine whether

the government has shown by clear and convincing evidence that

no combination of conditions can adequately protect the

community if Mr. Harrison is released. See

(f).

When making such an assessment, the Court must keep in mind the

BRA’s requirement that pretrial detention be reserved for the

most serious offenses. See Salerno,

.

8 Congress subsequently amended the BRA in 2006 to permit pretrial detention for “any felony that is not otherwise a crime of violence that involves a minor victim or that involves the possession or use of a firearm or destructive device (as those terms are defined in section 921), or any other dangerous weapon . . . .”

(f)(1)(E);

, 120 STAT. 587, 617 (2006). Title

(f)(1)(E) is the basis for which the government sought detention of Mr. Harrison. See Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 10. 17 As Mr. Harrison argued at the July 14, 2025 Hearing, the

scene to which police officers arrived on June 15, 2025 featured

Mr. Harrison as one of several people standing in an alleyway

allegedly with a gun tucked into his waistband. The government

does not allege that the officers saw anyone pointing a gun at

other people. Nor did the government allege that people appeared

afraid or running into their homes, as described in the call.

Moreover, there was no indication that a shooting had occurred,

nor any other eyewitness account describing the scene reported

in the 911 call. If the allegations from the 911 call were

substantiated, they would indeed be deeply troubling. But it is

also important to note that there are no allegations that any

violence resulted from these alleged acts nor any use of the

loaded gun and auto-sear device.

What is more persuasively alleged is that the officers

recovered the loaded gun, fitted with the auto-sear device with

the potential to inflict a tremendous amount of harm, from Mr.

Harrison’s person. The question is therefore whether the risk

that Mr. Harrison could have used an effectively automatic

weapon allegedly in his possession shows that no combination of

conditions can adequately secure his appearance and the safety

of the community while his charge is pending. In answering this

question, it is helpful to consider how other judges on this

Court have decided similar issues.

18 Mr. Harrison cited ten cases in which other judges on this

Court have released people on conditions notwithstanding the

concerning facts related to gun charges alleged against them.

See Mot., ECF No. 14 at 4 (citing United States v. Bryant, Case

No. 25-cr-97 (Faruqui, J.) (Bates, J.); United States v. Abass,

Case No. 25-cr-79 (Faruqui, J.) (Chutkan, J.); United States v.

Gaskins/Gaines, Case No. 25-cr-39 (Faruqui, J.) (Upadhyaya, J.)

(Ali, J.); United States v. Belton, No. 25-cr-168 (Sharbaugh,

J.) (Boasberg, J.) (McFadden, J.); United States v. Robinson,

Case No. 24-cr-95 (Faruqui, J.) (Chutkan, J.); United States v.

Yates, No. 24-cr-89 (Faruqui, J.) (Reyes, J.); United States v.

Griffith, Case No. 24-cr-56 (Harvey, J.) (Mehta, J.); United

States v. Wiggins, Case No. 23-cr-109 (Meriweather, J.)

(Boasberg, J.); United States v. Jones, Case No. 23-cr-154

(Faruqui, J.) (Chutkan, J.); United States v. Hicks, Case No.

19-cr-288 (Harvey, J.) (Leon, J.)). In all of these cases, the

defendant(s) was charged at a minimum with unlawful possession

of a firearm. See

The government sought detention in all of

these cases, but the court denied each request and released the

defendants with strict conditions. See

In several cases, the

government appealed release decisions made by magistrate judges.

See

In each case that was appealed, however, the district

judge affirmed that the defendant should be released. See

None of the defendants had their release revoked pretrial, and

19 in several cases, judges modified conditions to be less

restrictive upon a defendant’s request.

In United States v. Bryant, the defendant was charged with

one count of violating

(g)(1). See Indictment,

ECF No. 1 in Case No. 25-cr-97. The government sought pre-trial

detention, arguing that the defendant had “numerous significant

felony convictions” that included carjacking, attempted robbery,

and illegal possession of a firearm. See Mem. in Support of

Pretrial Detention, ECF No. 6 in Case No. 25-cr-97. The

government alleged that after receiving a tip from an unknown

person about someone possessing a gun, officers observed the

defendant pull a firearm out of his front waistband and hand it

to another person in a crowd. See

The magistrate judge

ordered the defendant released on conditions. See Minute Entry

(Apr. 15, 2025). The government appealed, and the district judge

agreed with the magistrate judge that the defendant should be

released on conditions pending trial. See Order, ECF No. 15 in

Case No. 25-cr-97. The case is still pending, and the defendant

remains released on conditions. See generally Dkt. in Case No.

25-cr-97.

In United States v. Abass, Case No. 25-cr-79, the defendant

was charged with one count of violating

(g)(1).

See Indictment, ECF No. 1 in Case No. 25-cr-79. The government

sought pre-trial detention and alleged that when the defendant

20 exited a vehicle and ran from police, he dropped a gun to the

ground. See generally Mem. in Support of Pretrial Detention, ECF

No. 6 in Case No. 25-cr-79. The government also alleged that the

defendant was found with suspected narcotics. See

The

magistrate judge who conducted the detention hearing denied the

government’s request and released the defendant on conditions.

See Minute Entry (Apr. 11, 2025) in Case No. 25-cr-79. The

government sought emergency review of the release decision, but

the district judge affirmed the defendant’s release. See Minute

Entry (Apr. 14, 2025) in Case No. 25-cr-79. The defendant’s case

is still pending, the defendant remains released on conditions,

and the district judge has since granted his request to modify

his conditions of release to permit him to go to work. See

generally Dkt. in Case No. 25-cr-79.

In United States v. Gaskins/Gaines, two defendants were

each charged with violating

(g)(1). See

Indictment, ECF No. 12 in Case No. 25-cr-39. The government

sought pretrial detention of both defendants and alleged that

while police officers were on routine patrol, they saw the

defendants attempting to gain entry into a building and then run

down an ally when they saw the officers. See Mem. in Supp. of

Pretrial Detention, ECF No. 16 in Case No. 25-cr-39; Mem. in

Supp. of Pretrial Detention, ECF No. 17 in Case No. 25-cr-39.

The officers alleged that they saw both defendants throw guns

21 while fleeing, which they later allegedly matched to the

defendants using DNA and other evidence. See Mem. in Supp. of

Pretrial Detention, ECF No. 16 in Case No. 25-cr-39. Both

defendants had recent arrests and convictions. See id.; Mem. in

Supp. of Pretrial Detention, ECF No. 17 in Case No. 25-cr-39.

Both magistrate judges who considered whether to release or

detain the defendants pretrial ultimately decided to release

them. See Minute Order (Feb. 19, 2025) in Case No. 25-cr-39;

Minute Order (Mar. 6, 2025). The government appealed, and the

district judge affirmed the magistrate judges’ decisions to

release the defendants on conditions. See Minute Order (Feb. 28,

2025) in Case No. 25-cr-39; Minute Order (Mar. 10, 2025) in Case

No. 25-cr-39. Both defendants’ cases are pending, and they both

appear to remain in compliance with their conditions of release.

See generally Dkt. in Case No. 25-cr-39.

In United States v. Belton, the defendant was charged with

violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and

(a)(1),

(b)(1)(C) (possession with intent to distribute). See

Information, ECF No. 17 in Case No. 25-cr-168. The government

sought to detain the defendant pre-trial and alleged that police

officers observed the defendant while on patrol, and once he

noticed the officers, the defendant ran away while holding his

waistband. See Mem. in Support of Pretrial Detention, ECF No. 5

in Case No. 25-cr-168. The officers allegedly observed the

22 defendant throw a gun while running away and they recovered

sizable quantities of a cocaine-based substance and suspected

fentanyl from the defendant after his arrest. See

The

defendant was initially also charged with violating

(c)(1)(A)(i), Using, Carrying, and Possessing a Firearm

During, in Relation to, and in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking

Offense, which carries a rebuttable presumption of detention.

See id.9 Nevertheless, the magistrate judge reviewing the

detention request concluded that the defendant had rebutted the

statutory presumption. See Minute Order (Mar. 28, 2025) in Case

No. 25-cr-168. The government appealed this decision and sought

to stay the release order, and the Chief Judge for this Court

affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s release order. See Minute Entry

(Mar. 31, 2025). The defendant’s case is still pending, and he

remains released on conditions. See generally Dkt. in Case No.

25-cr-168.

In United States v. Robinson, the defendant was charged

with one count of violating

(g)(1). See

Indictment, ECF No. 11 in Case No. 24-cr-95. The government

sought pre-trial detention and alleged that the defendant fled

from police while carrying a loaded firearm and then threw the

9 The government initially included the

(c)(1)(A)(i) charge in the defendant’s Complaint, but did not include this charge in the Information, which was obtained after the detention hearing. 23 firearm into an active street. See Mem. in Support of Pretrial

Detention, ECF No. 6 in Case No. 24-cr-95. At the time, the

defendant was on supervised probation following two convictions

for assault with a dangerous weapon and carrying a pistol

without a license. See

The defendant also tested positive

for fentanyl while previously on supervised release. See

The

magistrate judge released the defendant on conditions, and the

government indicated that it would appeal but withdrew its

appeal of the magistrate judge’s decision. See Minute Entries

(Feb. 15, 2024) in Case No. 24-cr-95. The defendant’s case is

now closed, but his supervised release was not revoked during

its pendency; rather, it was modified at certain points to be

less restrictive. See generally Dkt. in Case No. 24-cr-95.

In United States v. Yates, the defendant was charged with

one count of violating

(a)(1), (b)(1)(C)

(possession with intent to distribute cocaine); and one count of

violating

(c)(1)(B)(ii) (using, carrying, and

possessing a machinegun in furtherance of a drug trafficking

offense). See Indictment, ECF No. 1 in Case No. 24-cr-89. The

government alleged that officers recovered a loaded handgun with

a conversion device to make it a machinegun and an extended

twenty-two round capacity magazine with eighteen additional

rounds of ammunition from the defendant’s person. See Emergency

Mot. for De Novo Review of Magistrate’s Release Order, ECF No. 7

24 in Case No. 24-cr-89. The government sought pre-trial detention,

but the magistrate judge released the defendant on conditions.

See Minute Order (Apr. 15, 2024) in Case No. 24-cr-89. The

government sought emergency review and to stay the magistrate

judge’s release order, arguing that there were two rebuttable

presumptions of detention which could not be overcome. See

Emergency Mot. for De Novo Review of Magistrate’s Release Order,

ECF No. 7 in Case No. 24-cr-89. The district judge agreed with

the magistrate judge that the defendant should be released on

conditions. See Minute Order (Apr. 16, 2024) in Case No. 24-cr-

89. The government ultimately dismissed the case, but during its

pendency, the court did not revoke the defendant’s release. See

Consent Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 29 in Case No. 24-cr-89.

In United States v. Griffith, the defendant was charged

with one count of violating

(g)(1). See

Indictment, ECF No. 1 in Case No. 24-cr-56. The government

sought pre-trial detention, highlighting how the defendant had

four prior convictions, including one for attempted robbery. See

Mem. in Supp. of Pretrial Detention, ECF No. 8 in Case No. 24-

cr-56. The government alleged that officers had observed the

defendant standing in a pavilion in a playground, run away when

officers approached, and then found a gun on the ground near the

playground where the defendant previously had been. See

The

magistrate judge who reviewed the detention request released the

25 defendant on conditions. See Minute Entry (Feb. 9, 2024) in Case

No. 24-cr-56. The case is now closed, but the defendant’s

release was not revoked during its pendency. See generally Dkt.

in Case No. 24-cr-56.

In United States v. Wiggins, the defendant was charged with

one count of violating

(g)(1); one count of

violating

(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (possession with

intent to distribute cocaine); one count of violating 21 U.S.C.

806(a) (possession with intent to distribute cocaine within

1,000 feet of a school); and one count of violating

(c)(1)(A)(i) (possession of a firearm during a drug

trafficking offense). See Indictment, ECF No. 1 in Case No. 23-

cr-109.10 The government alleged that the defendant possessed a

machinegun while attempting to distribute narcotics and had

engaged officers in a high-speed chase, crashed his car, then

attempted to flee. See Mem. in Supp. of Pretrial Detention, ECF

No. 7 in Case No. 23-cr-109. The government sought pretrial

detention and alleged, inter alia, that there were two

rebuttable presumptions of detention. See

The magistrate

judge denied the government’s request for detention and released

the defendant on conditions. See Minute Entry (May 26, 2023) in

10The government ultimately obtained a Superseding Information that charged the defendant with only one count of violating

(g)(1), to which the defendant pled guilty. See Superseding Information, ECF No. 18 in Case No. 23-cr-109. 26 Case No. 23-cr-109. The case is now closed, but the defendant’s

release was not revoked during its pendency. See generally Dkt.

in Case No. 23-cr-109.

In United States v. Jones, the defendant was charged with

one count of violating

(g)(1). See Indictment,

ECF No. 1 in Case No. 23-cr-154. The government sought

detention, see Oral Mot. (May 11, 2023), and the magistrate

judge denied the government’s motion and released the defendant

on conditions. See Minute Entry (May 16, 2023). The government

ultimately dismissed the case, see Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 46

in Case No. 23-cr-154, but during the case’s pendency, the

defendant’s release was not revoked, and instead it was modified

on several occasions to provide less restrictive conditions, see

generally Dkt. in Case No. 23-cr-154.

In United States v. Hicks, the defendant was charged with

one count of violating

(g)(1) and one count of

violating

(a) (simple possession of a controlled

substance). See Indictment, ECF No. 6 in Case No. 19-cr-288. The

government sought pre-trial detention, arguing that the

defendant fled from police, dropped a loaded firearm while

fleeing, then picked up the firearm and threw it into a grassy

area. See Mem. in Supp. of Pretrial Detention, ECF No. 5 in Case

No. 19-cr-288. The officers also allegedly found a cocaine-based

substance on the defendant. See

The magistrate judge denied

27 the government’s motion and released the defendant on

conditions. See Minute Entry (Aug. 29, 2019) in Case No. 19-cr-

288. The case is now closed, but during its pendency, the

defendant’s release was not revoked. See generally Dkt. in Case

No. 19-cr-288.11

To summarize, many of these cases involved factual

allegations that the defendant fled from police and, while doing

so, dropped or threw a gun away from them, sometimes into busy

areas and even once next to a playground. In two of the cases,

the government alleged that the defendant possessed a gun that

was outfitted with a device to turn it into an automatic weapon.

See Emergency Mot. for De Novo Review of Magistrate’s Release

Order, ECF No. 7 in Case No. 24-cr-89; Mem. in Supp. of Pretrial

Detention, ECF No. 7 in Case No. 23-cr-109. In both of those

cases, the defendants faced charges including those related to

possession of a firearm or machine gun during a drug trafficking

offense. In both cases, the government argued that there was a

rebuttable presumption of detention, but the court still

released the defendants on conditions which were not revoked

during the case’s pendency.

11After completing his term of incarceration, the defendant successfully completed the Court’s Re-Entry Program on January 18, 2024. See Minute Entry (Jan. 18, 2024) in Case No. 19-cr- 288. 28 The government does not address these cases in its written

submission, but attempted at the Hearing to distinguish gun

charges in cases where individuals were allegedly found with a

gun, ran from the police, and threw the gun while fleeing from

the allegations at issue here regarding the auto-sear device and

the 911 call. But even with this distinction, the government did

not address cases in which a defendant was alleged to have an

enhancement that would turn a gun into an automatic weapon and

was still released. In its brief, the government cited a case

where another judge on this court recognized the inherent

dangerousness of guns, but it did not argue how the facts of

that case compared to those alleged in this case beyond that

inherent dangerousness. See Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 10–11 (citing

Blackson,

, at *7–8).

In deciding that this factor weighed in favor of detention,

the magistrate judge recited the facts alleged in the

government’s Motion for Pretrial Detention, noting the penalty

Mr. Harrison faces if convicted and the allegations in the 911

call. See Add. To Detention Order, ECF No. 17-1 at 2; Gov’t Mem.

in Support of Pretrial Detention, ECF No. 5 at 2–8; Opp’n, ECF

No. 15 at 2–9.12 The magistrate judge agreed with the government

12The government’s Opposition to Mr. Harrison’s Motion was nearly identical to its prior Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Pretrial Detention. Compare Mem. in Support of Pretrial Detention, ECF No. 5, with Opp’n, ECF No. 15. 29 that this was “not . . . a mere possessory offense”, but did not

elaborate on her rejection of Mr. Harrison’s arguments; address

the scene to which officers arrived; consider any of the cases

that Mr. Harrison cited; nor address the fact that Mr. Harrison

has not been charged with any conduct beyond allegedly

possessing a firearm. See Add. To Detention Order, ECF No. 17-1;

see also Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 12.

Viewed in the context that the Court described above,

however, the government has failed to show by clear and

convincing evidence that the nature and circumstances of the

alleged offense require pretrial detention. Accordingly, the

Court concludes that this factor weighs in favor of release. In

reaching this conclusion, the Court again emphasizes the severe

risk that guns, particularly automatic weapons, pose. For this

reason, the Court imposed strict conditions of release, which

include home-detention with electronic monitoring.

2. Weight of the Evidence

The magistrate judge determined that the weight of the

evidence of Mr. Harrison’s possession of the gun, including the

auto-sear attachment, and additional ammunition was strong. See

Similarly, Mr. Harrison’s Motion was practically identical to his prior Motion for Release and Opposition to the government’s Motion for Pretrial Detention. Compare Def.’s Mot. for Release & Opp’n to Gov’ts Mot. for Pretrial Detention, ECF No. 6; with Mot., ECF No. 14. 30 Add. to Detention Order, ECF No. 17-1 at 3. This Court agrees

that the weight of the evidence as to the charged offense is

relatively strong. Although this Court did not receive any live

testimony, the government alleges that the gun with the auto-

sear device and extra rounds were recovered from Mr. Harrison’s

person and submitted screenshots of body-worn camera footage

supporting this allegation. See Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 3–4.

Even though Mr. Harrison did not concede that the weight of

the evidence of the charged offense is strong, he argued that

this factor alone cannot be dispositive, see Mot., ECF No. 14 at

5; and that the evidence supporting uncharged allegations by the

government is weak. The magistrate judge did not consider the

reliability or strength of the evidence of the uncharged

allegations. See Add. to Detention Order, ECF No. 17-1.

On the second issue, this Court agrees with Mr. Harrison

that the evidence with respect to the other factual allegations

that the government made is less persuasive. First, in its

brief, the government alleged that police officers found

“suspected narcotics” on Mr. Harrison as part of a search

incident to arrest. See

at 6–7. But, as reiterated at the

July 14, 2025 Hearing, the government has not confirmed whether

these substances were indeed unlawful narcotics. The government

also confirmed at the Hearing that it has not charged Mr.

Harrison with any offense related to his possession of these

31 items. Therefore, the Court gives little weight to the

government’s arguments that it should consider the presence of

alleged drugs as part of this offense.13

Second, the government confirmed at the July 14, 2025

Hearing that there is no evidence tying Mr. Harrison to the

February 17, 2024 incident where police officers found evidence

that shots were fired from the gun that was allegedly found on

Mr. Harrison more than a year later. The Court does not give

this allegation of the gun’s involvement in the February 17,

2024 incident any weight here.

Third, Mr. Harrison argued at the July 14, 2025 Hearing

that the Court should view the allegations from the 911 call on

June 15, 2025 in the context of its unsubstantiated source and

whether it comports with the scene to which officers arrived

shortly after the call was placed. On the first issue, Mr.

Harrison argued that because the government has not identified

the caller nor verified their account of events, the call has

questionable credibility. On the second, Mr. Harrison argued

that the chaotic scene of people running into their homes due to

a person pointing a gun was not the scene to which the officers

arrived. The officers arrived around 6:15 p.m., shortly after

13At the Hearing, it was also mentioned that Mr. Harrison was not alleged to have been using narcotics at the time of his arrest. See also Pretrial Servs. Report, ECF No. 4 at 2. 32 the 911 call was received. See Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 3.

Screenshots from body-worn camera footage when the officers

arrived showed people standing around in the alleyway and one

woman sitting on a front porch, which is a sharp departure from

the description of people running scared into their homes. See

(government’s screenshot upon police arrival). The

government did not respond to these arguments at the Hearing.

The Court therefore concludes that the evidence from the 911

call, which is the basis for the government’s allegation that

Mr. Harrison was pointing the gun at people, is relatively week.

It is important to clarify the impact of these conclusions.

Because the allegations related to suspected narcotics, the

gun’s history, and the 911 call are not required for Mr.

Harrison’s § 922(g)(1) charge, the Court’s conclusion that the

evidence of these allegations is relatively weak does not alter

the Court’s other conclusion that evidence of the alleged §

922(g)(1) charge is relatively strong and weighs in favor of

detention.14 It does, however, have some bearing on how the Court

evaluates the government’s arguments about Mr. Harrison’s

14As the government highlighted at the Hearing, courts have also previously noted that the weight of the evidence may heighten the risk of flight. See Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 12–13 (citing Blackson,

, at *10). But the government has not pressed this argument further, and the Court does not conclude that the strength of the evidence for the charged offense poses a risk that Mr. Harrison will fail to appear that is unmitigable by strict conditions. 33 alleged dangerousness. Despite the Court’s conclusion with

respect to this factor, it continues to evaluate Mr. Harrison’s

case consistent with the presumption of innocence. See

(j) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed as

modifying or limiting the presumption of innocence.”).

3. History and Characteristics

When considering the history and characteristics of the

accused, a court shall take into account both:

(A) the person's character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings; and

(B) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was on probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or local law.

(g)(3)(A)-(B). Here, both sub-factors weigh in

favor of release.

The government argued that this factor weighed in favor of

detention due to Mr. Harrison’s 2011 and 2012 offenses and

failure to appear at court as well as his Maryland conviction in

2014-2015. It did not address the other aspects of his history

and characteristics including his family support, ties to the

District of Columbia, nor participation in the Pathways Program.

34 Mr. Harrison argued that the Court should consider his

entire history. See Mot., ECF No. 14 at 5-7. Although Mr.

Harrison’s history includes the failures to appear in 2011 and

2012, he points out that it also includes his compliance with

supervision related to his 2014-2015 offense in Maryland and

while his ultimately-dismissed charge in D.C. Superior Court was

pending from 2017–2022. See

Moreover, Mr. Harrison

highlights how he has had no convictions in the past decade and

that his prior convictions were relatively minor, non-violent

offenses. See

He also argued that he has strong family

support, see Letters of Support, ECF No. 6-1, 6-2, & 6-3; life-

long ties to the District of Columbia area; and a new job offer.

The magistrate judge determined that Mr. Harrison’s history

and characteristics “weigh[] heavily in favor of pretrial

detention” and predominately relied on Mr. Harrison’s offenses

in 2011, 2012, and 2014-2015. Add. to Detention Order, ECF No.

17-1 at 3. The magistrate judge briefly acknowledged Mr.

Harrison’s support from his family, but concluded, presumably

based on the 2011-2012 incidents, that she had “no confidence”

Mr. Harrison would comply with conditions if released.

.

As the Court noted at the July 14, 2025 Hearing, the 2011-

2012 offenses and instances in which Mr. Harrison failed to

appear or comply with supervision occurred when Mr. Harrison was

a teenager or emerging adult (18-20 years old), now at least

35 twelve years ago.15 When the Court asked the government at the

Hearing why it should not look at Mr. Harrison’s more recent

history of complying with supervision related to his 2014-2015

conviction in Maryland and 2017-2022 dismissed charge in D.C.

Superior Court, the government had no answer. It simply

reiterated its view on the seriousness of the alleged offense.

Nor did the magistrate judge’s detention decision account for

this more recent history of compliance with supervision. See

Add. to Detention Order, ECF No. 17-1. Accordingly, even though

Mr. Harrison’s past instances of non-appearance and non-

compliance are concerning, they must be considered in light of

his more recent history of success on supervision. See also

Munchel, 991 F.3d at 1280–81. Moreover, Mr. Harrison highlighted

at the July 14, 2025 Hearing that he has no history of

committing violent offenses, an aspect of his record that the

magistrate judge also failed to address.16

15 The District of Columbia has recognized the distinction between children and emerging adults as opposed to older offenders. See e.g., Incarceration Reduction Amend. Act,

(c)(10) (directing courts to consider at resentencing “[t]he diminished culpability of juveniles and persons under age 25, as compared to that of older adults, and the hallmark features of youth, including immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences”). 16 On the contrary, the magistrate judge posited that “Mr.

Harrison might have been involved in other violent altercations, where the firearm he possessed in this case was discharged in a residential area at least 3 times on February 17, 2024.” Add. to Detention Order, ECF No. 17-1 at 3–4. But Mr. Harrison was not charged with any related offense; rather, the government 36 Moreover, Mr. Harrison highlighted his close family ties;

engagement in the Pathways Program; and willingness to obtain

mentorship services from Mr. Vincent Massey as further evidence

of his history and characteristics that weigh in favor of

pretrial release. Members of Mr. Harrison’s family attended the

July 14, 2025 Hearing and the Court remarked upon the importance

of Mr. Harrison having his family’s support, which it cautioned

Mr. Harrison not to take for granted. Further, Mr. Harrison’s

counsel represented that Mr. Harrison was offered employment set

to begin on July 21, 2025. This employment offer, in addition to

Mr. Harrison’s successful engagement in the Pathways Program,

demonstrate his potential and efforts to change his path.

Finally, Mr. Harrison agreed to seek mentorship services

from Mr. Massey. The Court ordered Mr. Harrison to seek these

services as a condition of his release and warned that a failure

to do so could lead to revocation. At the Hearing, the Court

heard from Mr. Massey about the mentorship that he is willing to

provide to Mr. Harrison; how his mentorship has supported

successful compliance with supervision in other cases17; and how

conceded that it does not allege Mr. Harrison was involved in this incident. This incident has no bearing on the Court’s analysis. 17 According to Mr. Massey, he has assisted approximately fifteen

returning citizens who are in this court’s Re-Entry Court and attempting to successfully reintegrate after serving sentences of incarceration. In total, Mr. Massey has provided guidance and support to “300+ [h]igh risk individuals and violent 37 he plans to support Mr. Harrison as he prepares to begin his new

job and comply with his other conditions of release. The Court

recognized Mr. Massey’s significant contribution to public

service and safety by supporting individuals who are involved in

the criminal legal system and attempting to chart a better path

forward.

In summary, Mr. Harrison’s strong record of appearing for

court and complying with supervision since his 2011 and 2012

offenses, which the government conceded at the July 14, 2025

Hearing; non-violent and remote criminal history; strong family

and community ties; and record of engaging in and willingness to

continue to engage in programs and opportunities to secure

employment and other ways to mitigate the risk of unlawful

conduct lead the Court to conclude that strict conditions of

release can adequately mitigate his risk of flight and danger to

the community. Accordingly, this factor weighs strongly in favor

of release.

4. Nature and Seriousness of Danger if Released

Both the government and Mr. Harrison agree that the fourth

factor requires a forward-looking analysis of whether there is a

specific, articulable threat that cannot be mitigated by

offenders[.]” WHAT A CHANGE, MASSEY MENTORING, INC., https://www.whatachange.org/vincent-m-v (last visited July 28, 2025). 38 conditions. See Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 14–15 (citing Munchel,

; United States v. Hale-Cusanelli,

(D.C. Cir. 2021)); Mot., ECF No. 14 at 8 (citing Munchel,

(Katsas, J., concurring)). The D.C. Circuit has

recently articulated the required analysis:

Thus, a defendant’s detention based on dangerousness accords with due process only insofar as the district court determined that the defendant’s history, characteristics, and alleged criminal conduct make clear that he or she poses a concrete, prospective threat to public safety.

Munchel,

; see also

(quoting Salerno, 418 U.S.

at 751) (alteration & emphasis in original) (“In Salerno, the

Supreme Court rejected a challenge to this preventive detention

scheme as repugnant to due process and the presumption of

innocence, holding that ‘[w]hen the Government proves by clear

and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified

and articulable threat to an individual or the community, we

believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, a court

may disable the arrestee from executing that threat.’”). The

question is therefore whether the government has shown that Mr.

Harrison poses an “identified and articulable threat” to the

community that cannot be adequately mitigated if he is released.

Id. at 1282.

In its briefing, the government pointed to the “history of

the gun found in [Mr.] Harrison’s waistband”; Mr. “Harrison’s

39 wielding of a loaded firearm modified to act as a machinegun,

and pointing it at people in the neighborhood”; and Mr.

“Harrison’s possession of suspected narcotics” as

“demonstrat[ing] and “heighten[ing] the danger [Mr.] Harrison

poses to our community.” Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 15. It made the

same argument at the Hearing. The magistrate judge similarly

relied on the “history of the firearm found in Mr. Harrison’s

waistband”, including its origin and the 2024 incident; as well

as the allegations in the 911 call; the auto-sear device and

loaded gun; and the “suspected narcotics” to conclude that this

factor weighed in favor of detention. See Add. to Detention

Order, ECF No. 17-1 at 4.

Mr. Harrison argued that the government “has not and cannot

provide specific evidence to support a finding that [he]

currently poses an unmitigable threat to public safety”; and

that “safety can be assured by stringent conditions of release.”

Mot., ECF No. 14 at 8. The Court agrees.

As previously noted, Mr. Harrison’s counsel persuasively

argued at the Hearing that the evidence with respect to the

gun’s history, 911 call, and suspected narcotics is relatively

weak. The government conceded that there are no facts or

evidence to support that Mr. Harrison was previously involved in

the gun’s history. It also conceded that it had not charged Mr.

Harrison with any drug-related offenses, and that it still has

40 not confirmed whether the substances allegedly found on Mr.

Harrison were unlawful narcotics. As for the 911 call, the

government did not contest Mr. Harrison’s arguments about its

reliability or alleged inconsistencies with the scene to which

the police officers arrived; nor did it assert that there has

been any further verification of the call’s contents. Even if

the Court were to credit these allegations, the government has

not demonstrated how the risk posed from the conduct alleged

cannot be adequately mitigated by strict conditions.

The government did not argue that Mr. Harrison’s alleged

possession of the loaded auto-sear equipped gun by itself is a

specific, identifiable threat that cannot be mitigated by strict

conditions. See Opp’n, ECF No. 15 at 15. Nevertheless, the Court

concludes that stringent conditions could mitigate the risk

posed by Mr. Harrison’s alleged possession of this gun.

Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of release.

For all these reasons, the Court holds that the first,

third, and fourth

(g) factors weigh in favor of

Mr. Harrison’s pretrial release and that the strict conditions

that the Court imposed will adequately protect against the risk

of flight and danger to the community.

41 C. Conditions

At the July 14, 2025 Hearing, the Court adopted the

conditions that Pretrial recommended in addition to the

requirement that Mr. Harrison obtain mentorship services from

Mr. Massey. The conditions that the Court imposed are that Mr.

Harrison must:

• Submit to supervision by and report for supervision to the Pretrial Services Agency, Washington D.C.;

• Continue or actively seek employment;

• Surrender any passport to Pretrial;

• Not obtain any passport or other international travel document;

• Not possess a firearm, destructive device, or other weapons;

• Not use or unlawfully possess a narcotic drug or other controlled substances defined in

, unless prescribed by a licensed medical practitioner;

• Submit to testing for a prohibited substances, if required by the Pretrial office or supervising officer;

• Participate in location monitoring with Home Detention and submit to GPS-location monitoring;

• Timely report any contact with law enforcement to Pretrial; and

• Maintain weekly contact with Mr. Vincent Massey.

See Conditions of Release, ECF No. 18. The Court subsequently

ordered Mr. Harrison to participate in bi-weekly status hearings

with Magistrate Judge Faruqui to discuss Mr. Harrison’s

42 compliance with supervision and aid in addressing any challenges

that may arise. See Minute Order (July 16, 2025). The next

hearing before Magistrate Judge Faruqui is set to occur on July

29, 2025. See Minute Order (July 18, 2025).

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons explained at the July 14, 2025 Hearing and

memorialized above, the Court GRANTED Mr. Harrison’s Motion for

Reconsideration and Pretrial Release, ECF No. 14, and ordered

Mr. Harrison released on conditions.

SO ORDERED.

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge July 28, 2025

43