UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GOUYEN BROWN LOPEZ et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 25-2408 (TJK)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Later this month, the Secretary of Agriculture plans to convey a parcel of land in Arizona

containing an area known as Oak Flat to Intervenor-Defendant Resolution Copper Mining, LLC

(“Resolution”) under a law passed in 2014. 16 U.S.C. § 539p; ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 2, 77. Members of

the Western Apache know Oak Flat as Chí’chil Biłdagoteel, and it is sacred to them. ECF No. 1

¶¶ 1–2. Since Resolution plans to build a mine that will destroy the site, Plaintiffs brought this

suit and moved for a preliminary injunction. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3. They argue that transferring the land to

Resolution violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.,

the First Amendment, the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”),

et seq.,

the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”),

et seq., and the Adminis-

trative Procedure Act (“APA”),

(2)(A).

As Defendants point out, three other cases also challenging the transfer of Oak Flat to

Resolution were brought in the District of Arizona in January 2021 and have been (and are being)

litigated there. ECF No. 7 at 6–7. Indeed, in two of the cases, a preliminary injunction hearing is

scheduled for August 6, 2025.

For that reason and others, they and Resolution move to transfer

the case to the District of Arizona. The Court will grant the motions and transfer the case forthwith. I. Legal Standard

(a) provides that “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the

interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division

where it might have been brought.” A court’s analysis under § 1404(a) proceeds in two steps. “A

court must first determine whether the transferee district is one where the action might have been

brought, and then must balance the private and public interests involved in the proposed transfer

to determine whether the defendant has demonstrated that considerations of convenience and the

interest of justice support a transfer.” City of W. Palm Beach v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,

(D.D.C. 2018) (cleaned up).

District courts have “broad discretion” in adjudicating motions to transfer, McGovern v.

Burrus,

(D.D.C. 2005), and must do so with an “individualized, case-by-

case consideration,” Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp.,

(1988) (quoting Van Dusen v.

Barrack,

(1964)). Although the moving party bears the burden of establishing

that transfer is proper, “courts in this circuit are instructed to guard against ‘the danger that a plain-

tiff might manufacture venue in the District of Columbia . . . [b]y naming high government offi-

cials as defendants.’” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Ross,

(D.D.C.

2018) (quoting Cameron v. Thornburgh,

(D.C. Cir. 1993)).

II. Analysis

The parties do not dispute that the threshold query—whether the case could have been

brought in the proposed venue—is satisfied. Thus, the only question is whether Defendants and

Intervenor-Defendant have met their burden of showing, after weighing the relevant private and

public interests, that considerations of convenience and the interest of justice support a transfer.

For the reasons below, the Court agrees that they have and that transfer to the District of Arizona

is warranted.

2 A. Private-Interest Factors

Courts consider six private-interest factors in a § 1404(a) analysis: (1) the plaintiff’s choice

of forum; (2) the defendant’s choice of forum; (3) whether the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the con-

venience of the parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses, particularly if important witnesses

may be unavailable to testify live in one of the districts; and (6) the ease of access to sources of

proof. City of W. Palm Beach,

.

The Court considers the first three factors together because they are interrelated. Although

a plaintiff’s choice of forum is usually given “substantial deference,” several factors may curtail

that deference. City of W. Palm Beach,

. To begin, “plaintiff’s choice is

entitled to substantially less deference when plaintiff chooses a forum that is not its home forum.”

Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,

(D.D.C. 2018) (internal quotations

omitted). Plaintiffs do not reside in this district. See ECF No. 1 at 1. They therefore “need not be

afforded the substantial deference given to litigants in choosing their home forum.” Niagara Pres.,

Coal., Inc. v. FERC,

(D.D.C. 2013).

Plaintiffs’ choice of forum is diminished further because “the majority of operative facts

took place outside the District of Columbia.” Ross,

(quotation omitted).

For example, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated NEPA, the NHPA, and the APA in issuing

its Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”). ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 129–56. Yet as Defendants explain—

and Plaintiffs do not meaningfully dispute—the “vast majority of the substantive work and public

participation on the Forest Service’s NEPA review and NHPA consultation occurred in Arizona.”

ECF No. 23 at 13. Indeed, the “decisionmaker who will sign the Forest Service’s final record of

decision . . . is the Forest Supervisor for the Tonto National Forest,” in Arizona.

True, Con-

gress passed a law mandating the transfer of Oak Flat, and some of Plaintiffs’ claims challenge the

constitutionality of that law. But “[t]here is certainly no reason why all cases involving the

3 construction or constitutionality of a federal statute should be litigated in the District of Columbia.”

Starnes v. McGuire,

, 925 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1974). And though Plaintiffs note that some

high-ranking federal officials in the District may have had some role in finalizing the EIS and

conveying Oak Flat to Resolution, ECF No. 20 at 15–16, “[i]t is settled law that ‘mere involvement

on the part of federal agencies, or some federal officials who are located in Washington D.C. is

not determinative.’” Alabama,

(quoting Shawnee Tribe v. United States,

, 25–26 (D.D.C. 2002)). “Instead, there must be a real connection between the

District of Columbia and this litigation that goes beyond the presence of federal agency officials

who are generally regulating and overseeing the administrative process.”

(cleaned up). But

to repeat, Plaintiffs do not meaningfully contest that most of the actions necessary to facilitate the

transfer of Oak Flat, including the production of the EIS, occurred in Arizona.

Moreover, while a defendant’s choice of forum is not usually afforded deference like a

plaintiff’s, courts find that this factor is relevant when the defendant’s preferred forum is the same

as where the claims arose. See City of W. Palm Beach,

(finding that de-

fendants “proffered legitimate reasons for preferring” their chosen forum because of its close nexus

with the factual allegations); see also Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Bosworth,

(D.D.C. 2001) (finding that defendants “have legitimate reasons for preferring the [transferee

district]” because the permits at issue were located there). And again, Plaintiffs’ claims under

NEPA, the NHPA, and the APA all turn on actions federal employees took while preparing the

EIS in Arizona. Thus, since most of the relevant decision-making processes giving rise to the

claims unfolded in Arizona, and since Defendants seek transfer there, both the “defendant’s choice

of forum” and “where the claim arose” strongly support transfer.

The last three “convenience” factors—convenience of the parties, witnesses, and access to

sources of proof—are neutral. “In an APA case, ‘neither the convenience of the parties and

4 witnesses nor the ease of access to sources of proof weighs heavily in the analysis.’” Tuttle v.

Jewell,

(D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Pueblo v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n,

(D.D.C. 2010)); see also Neighbors Against Bison Slaughter v. Nat’l Park

Serv., No. 19-cv-3144,

, at *6 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2019) (holding the same for

claims arising under the APA and NEPA). Because this case “involves judicial review of an ad-

ministrative decision . . . neither discovery, witnesses, nor a trial will be required.” Alabama,

(quotation omitted).

In sum, the Court finds that the private-interest factors weigh modestly in favor of transfer.

B. Public-Interest Factors

As for the public-interest factors, the Court must consider: (1) the transferee forum’s fa-

miliarity with the governing laws and the pendency of related actions in that forum; (2) the relative

congestion of the calendars of the potential transferee and transferor courts; and (3) the local in-

terest in deciding local controversies at home. City of W. Palm Beach,

.

The first factor strongly favors transfer, for purposes of judicial economy and to minimize

the risk of competing obligations on Defendants that inconsistent judgments could cause. As

Plaintiffs themselves concede, three other cases also challenging the transfer of Oak Flat to Reso-

lution were brought in the District of Arizona, in part by other members of the Western Apache,

and have been proceeding there since 2021. ECF No. 20 at 10–11. In two such cases, after mul-

tiple rounds of briefing, a preliminary injunction hearing is scheduled for August 6, 2025. ECF

No. 7 at 7. Even though the precise contours of the claims and legal theories in those other cases

may not be identical to those present here, they cover broadly the same areas of law—including

the First Amendment, RFRA, NEPA, and the NHPA—and involve the same administrative record.

See Shawnee Tribe v. United States,

(D.D.C. 2002) (finding transfer to a

district with pending related litigation warranted because, even though “the posture” of the related

5 case “may be somewhat different,” “it still involves central questions regarding the future of” the

property at the core of both cases). “When lawsuits involving the same controversy are filed in

more than one jurisdiction, the general rule is that the court that first acquired jurisdiction has

priority.” Biochem Pharma, Inc. v. Emory Univ.,

(D.D.C. 2001). Thus,

“the presence of closely related litigation in the District of” Arizona is a “significant factor weigh-

ing in favor of transferring this case.” Barham v. UBS Fin. Servs.,

(D.D.C. 2007). “[G]iven the multiple prior lawsuits in the District of [Arizona] challenging” the

transfer of Oak Flat, “it is clear that the transferee court has relevant knowledge of the parties and

facts that favors transfer.” Alaska Indus. Dev. & Exp. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 23-cv-

3126,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2024) (internal quotation marks and quotation

omitted).

This earlier-filed litigation also factors into the Court’s analysis because it raises the specter

of forum-shopping. “[T]he transfer provisions in the U.S. Code, which grew out of the common

law doctrine of forum non conveniens, were in part intended to prevent forum shopping.” Schmid

Lab’ys, Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.,

(D.D.C. 1986). Thus, courts in

this district have found “that transfer is warranted in the interest of justice” when plaintiffs sue “in

the District of Columbia only in order to benefit from this Circuit’s” precedents.

.

As Defendants point out, Plaintiffs’ decision to sue in this district follows a Ninth Circuit

decision in one of the three suits pending there that would appear to doom many of their First

Amendment and RFRA claims. See Apache Stronghold v. United States (Apache I),

(9th Cir. 2024). The Court expresses no views on the Ninth Circuit’s decision but notes that

it has been criticized. See Apache Stronghold v. United States (Apache II),

(2025)

(Gorsuch, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). Still, under these circumstances—where

identically situated plaintiffs have litigated (and are litigating) these and related claims in Arizona

6 in lawsuits filed years ago, the Court cannot “encourage, or even allow, a plaintiff to select one

district exclusively or primarily to obtain or avoid specific precedents, particularly in circum-

stances such as these where the relevant law is unsettled and the choice of forum may well dictate

the outcome of the case.” Schmid Lab’ys, Inc.,

.

The second factor is neutral. Though the parties dispute the relative congestions of this

district and the District of Arizona, “[g]iven the lack of evidence that this court’s docket is sub-

stantially more congested than that of the District of Arizona,” or vice versa, “the [C]ourt holds

that this factor does not” weigh in either side’s favor. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA,

(D.D.C. 2009).

The final factor—the local interest in deciding local controversies at home—is “perhaps

[the] most important factor.” Pres. Soc. of Charleston v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,

(D.D.C. 2012); see also Alabama,

(“The interest in having local

controversies decided at home is preeminent.” (cleaned up)). And local interest is at its zenith

when the challenged action, the decision-making process that led to it, and its impact, all occur

locally. See Alabama,

. Such is the case here. “The controversy is centered

on property located in [Arizona], and land commonly has been considered a local interest.” In-

trepid Potash-N.M., LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,

(D.D.C. 2009). Fur-

thermore, as explained above, most of the major steps in the decision-making processes—espe-

cially for purposes of Plaintiffs’ NEPA, NHPA, and APA claims—occurred in Arizona. And the

effects of the land transfer would be most directly felt by Arizona residents because it would re-

shape “the local economy” and environment. Id.; see also Alaska Indus.,

, at *3

(“[T]he Refuge is located in Alaska, and therefore any decisions regarding oil and gas exploration

in the region will have acute economic and environmental impacts in Alaska.”). Even assuming

the decision to transfer Oak Flat is one facet of a broader national policy to increase resource

7 extraction, “[t]he controversy is localized in the sense that it involves [Arizona] lands, hence there

is a strong local interest in having this case heard in [Arizona].” S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Norton,

(D.D.C. 2004). Moreover, “the pendency of multiple court cases challeng-

ing the project ‘demonstrates that other parties in [the transferee district] are interested’ in the

controversy.” Kinsella v. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., No. 22-cv-2147,

,

at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting Villa v. Salazar,

(D.D.C. 2013)). The Court agrees that “this case should be litigated within the view and reach

of the people who will be most vitally affected by its outcome.” Seafreeze Shoreside, Inc. v. U.S.

Dep’t of Interior, No. 21-cv-3276,

, at *5 (D.D.C. June 27, 2022) (quotation

omitted).

In response, Plaintiffs argue that this controversy “easily qualifies as a case of national

significance.” ECF No. 20 at 17. But “even accepting that this case touches upon some national

concerns, it is beyond cavil that the [conveyance of Oak Flat] most directly affects [Arizona] lands,

livelihoods, waters, and wildlife.” Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell,

(D.D.C. 2015). “The implications of a decision resolving this dispute will be felt most acutely in

[Arizona] where local citizens are directly affected and therefore the local interest in this case

outweighs the national interest.” W. Watersheds Project v. Pool,

(D.D.C.

2013).

Thus, the Court finds that the public-interest factors weigh strongly in favor of transfer,

and considering both the private and public factors together, transfer is warranted.

8 III. Conclusion

For all the above reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ and Intervenor-Defendant’s

Motions to Transfer Venue, ECF No. 7, 12. A separate order will issue transferring the case forth-

with.

/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: August 1, 2025

9