UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

OLHA NOHA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-01957 (UNA) ) EMBASSY OF THE RUSSIAN ) FEDERATION IN THE USA, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Currently before the court is Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and

Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. Plaintiff’s IFP

Application is granted and, for the reasons explained below, the Court dismisses this matter

without prejudice.

Plaintiff, a resident of Maryland, sues the Embassy of Russian Federation and several of

its officials. See Compl. at 1–3. The Complaint alleges only “the Chernobyl Disaster,” see id. at

5, and nothing else––the remainder of the pleading is blank, see generally id. Pro se litigants

must comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch,

(D.D.C.

1987). Federal Rule 8(a) of requires a complaint to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the

grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009); Ciralsky v. CIA,

, 668–71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that

defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive

answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown

v. Califano,

(D.D.C. 1977). Here, as presented, neither the Court nor Defendants can reasonably be expected to identify Plaintiff’s claims, nor has Plaintiff established

this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Although Plaintiff has also, in the interim, filed numerous submissions containing random

blurbs of information and proposed exhibits, ostensibly intended to amend or supplement the

Complaint, see, e.g., Notices, ECF Nos. 6–10, 13, 14, 17–18, 20–21; Mot. to Amend, ECF No. 16,

these proposed additions fail to comply with Federal Rule 15(a) or D.C. Local Civil Rule 7(i) or

15(i), and to that same end, “Plaintiff’s [C]omplaint is not the legal equivalent of a LEGO set,

something to be recreated,” at her whim and in piecemeal fashion, see Whitman v. Dep’t of Army,

No. 21-03163,

, at *2 (D.D.C. June 5, 2023). In any event, Plaintiff’s additional

submissions are difficult to discern, broadly challenging the “genetic consequences of the

Chernobyl disaster,” see, e.g., Notices, ECF No. 9, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, so even if these submissions

were procedurally sound, they do not assist in making Plaintiff’s intended claims any more

cognizable.

Furthermore, Plaintiff has sued the Russian Embassy and its officials. But “in a suit

involving a foreign state, a plaintiff must satisfy subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA

[Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] before the court can reach claims under the Alien Tort Claims

Act,

.” Soudavar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 67 Fed. App’x 618, 619-20 (D.C.

Cir. 2003) (citing Saltany v. Reagan,

, 440–41 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). The FSIA is the

“sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts,” Argentine Republic v.

Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,

(1989), and provides that a foreign state is

immune from the jurisdiction of the United States courts unless an exception applies, Roeder v.

Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted), or an existing international agreement provides otherwise, Peterson v. Royal Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,

(D.C. Cir. 2005). See

(conferring foreign state

immunity “[s]ubject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at

the time of enactment of this Act”). “Claims against foreign sovereigns that do not fall within the

ambit of a FSIA exception are barred.” Simon v. Republic of Hungary,

(D.C.

Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), rev’d on other grounds, Fed. Rep. of

Germany v. Philipp,

(2021). Notably, embassies qualify as a “foreign state” under

the FSIA, see

(a); Jouanny v. Embassy of France in the United States,

(D.D.C. 2016) (citing Howe v. Embassy of Italy,

, 32–33

(D.D.C. 2014) (collecting cases)), and individual defendants sued in their official capacities as an

officer of a foreign state are also “entitled to the same sovereign-immunity protections under the

FSIA that are afforded to the foreign state,” Nikbin v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.D.C. 2007) (citing Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan,

(D.C. Cir. 1997); El–Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan,

(D.C. Cir. 1996);

Belhas v. Ya’Alon,

, 130–31 (D.D.C. 2006);

(a)).

Plaintiff presents boilerplate assertions contending that Defendants are without absolute

immunity. See Notice, ECF No. 13. She does not cite to a particular exception but notes that

certain international courts have found that Russia has “violated international law,” and committed

“human rights abuses.” See

In citing “international law,” insofar as Plaintiff may be referring

the “expropriation exception,” see

(a)(3), she has failed to draw any commercial

nexus between Defendants’ alleged actions and the United States. And insofar as Plaintiff attempts

to invoke the “terrorism exception,” by using phrases like “war crimes,” see, e.g., Notice, ECF No.

8, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A, it is inapplicable here. Section 1605A applies only if the state was

formally designated by the United States as a sponsor of terrorism at the time of the alleged act of terrorism, or if it was later designated as a sponsor because of the relevant act(s). See 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 1605A(2); Singh v. Commonwealth of Australia,

, 92–93 (D.D.C. 2007).

However, Russia has not been designated by the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism at

the time of the alleged acts, nor is it yet so designated. See 50 U.S.C. App. § 2405(j);

; see also https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/ (list of designated state sponsors

of terrorism) (last visited August 4, 2025).

Finally, although Plaintiff demands $7 trillion in damages in one of her assorted

submissions, see Notice, ECF No. 6, she has failed to establish standing for damages, or any other

relief. “Article III of the United States Constitution limits the judicial power to deciding ‘Cases’

and ‘Controversies.’” In re Navy Chaplaincy,

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting U.S.

Const. art. III, § 2). “One element of the case-or-controversy requirement is that plaintiffs must

establish that they have standing to sue.” Comm. on Judiciary of U.S. House of Representatives v.

McGahn,

, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). A party has

standing for purposes of Article III if he has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly

traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a

favorable judicial decision.”

at 763 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,

(2016)). As pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint and supplemental materials lack any factual allegations

showing that she sustained (or is likely to sustain) an injury resulting from Defendants’ alleged

conduct.

For these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to

(e)(2)(B)(iii) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend, ECF No. 16, is

denied as futile, and her remaining pending Motions, ECF Nos. 3, 4, 12, 19, 22, are all denied as

moot. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: August 5, 2025 __________/s/_________________ JIA M. COBB United States District Judge