UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

S.R.B. KENNETH, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-01916 (UNA) ) TYPSA GROUP, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Currently before the Court are Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and his

Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. Upon review, Plaintiff’s

IFP Application is granted and, for the reasons explained below, this matter is dismissed without

prejudice.

Plaintiff is as “a Kenyan national currently seeking asylum in South Sudan.” Compl. at 1.

He sues the country of Spain and TYPSA Group, “a Spanish multinational engineering firm.” Id.

Plaintiff states that “he is the founder and CEO of Ruwatex Africa Ltd, a company engaged in

international consultancy and infrastructure facilitation,” id., and that, at an unknown point in time,

Ruwatex Africa Ltd “entered into a consultancy agreement with TYPSA to facilitate payments for

the Lower Ewaso Ng’iro South River Multipurpose Dam project in Kenya,” see id. at 2. Plaintiff

then contends that, sometime thereafter he, by and through Ruwatex Africa Ltd, “secured official

government endorsements and financial commitments on TYPSA’s behalf . . . but TYPSA refused

to pay Plaintiff’s agreed commission.” See id. He further alleges that “TYPSA lobbied the

Kenyan government through the Spanish Prime Minister and embassy to obstruct Plaintiff’s

contractual enforcement, violating international norms and endangering Plaintiff’s life.” Id. He raises assorted tort claims, citing to the the Alien Tort Statute, alleges that the Defendants violated

the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, (“RICO”), and demands $100 million in

damages. Id. at 1–3.

The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth

generally at

and 1332. Under those statutes, federal jurisdiction is available

only when a “federal question” is presented, or the parties are of diverse citizenship and the amount

in controversy exceeds $75,000. A plaintiff seeking relief in the district court must at least plead

facts that bring the suit within the court's jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), and failure to plead

such facts warrants dismissal of the action, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Although Plaintiff claims

to rely on both diversity and federal question jurisdiction, see Compl. at 1, he has failed to establish

jurisdiction through either avenue.

First, Spain is immune from suit. See Delta Foods Inc. v. Republic of Ghana,

(D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that immunity “goes to the subject matter jurisdiction of the

court.”). In “a suit involving a foreign state, a plaintiff must satisfy subject matter jurisdiction

under the FSIA [Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] before the court can reach claims under the

Alien Tort Claims Act,

.” Soudavar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 67 Fed. App’x

618, 619-20 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (citing Saltany v. Reagan,

, 440–41 (D.C.

Cir. 1989)). The FSIA is the “sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our

courts,” Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,

(1989), and

provides that a foreign state is immune from the jurisdiction of the United States courts unless an

exception applies, Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing

), or an existing international agreement provides otherwise, Peterson v. Royal

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (citing

)). Any claims “against foreign sovereigns that do not fall within the ambit of a FSIA exception are barred.”

Simon v. Republic of Hungary,

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted), rev’d on other grounds, Fed. Rep. of Germany v. Philipp,

(2021).

Plaintiff does not directly address Spain’s immunity, and there is no indication that it falls

into any FSIA exception. Although Plaintiff mentions “international norms,” see Compl. at 1,

insofar as he may be referring the “expropriation exception,” see

(a)(3), he has

failed to identify the “international law” at issue, if any, and moreover, has failed to draw any

cognizable commercial nexus between Spain’s alleged actions and the United States. He also

vaguely states that “Defendants’ conduct affected U.S. interests, involved U.S.-linked contracts

(including military engagements),” see Compl. at 1, perhaps invoking the “commercial activity

exception” see

(a)(2). But even if Plaintiff had adequately alleged that Spain

engaged in some commercial activity, which the Court does not concede, he fails to allege facts

showing that Spain’s alleged actions caused a direct effect in the United States. See

§

1605(a)(2). In fact, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding any connection to the United States are

boilerplate, at best, and “threadbare recitals . . . supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009).

Second, TYPSA also cannot be sued. It cannot be in diversity because “diversity

jurisdiction does not exist in suits between aliens,” Edlow Intern. Co. v. Nuklearna Elektrarna

Krsko,

(D.D.C. 1977); see also Saadeh v. Farouki,

, 56 n.2

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that there could be no diversity jurisdiction because the plaintiff and the

defendant––an entity both incorporated and with its principal place of business in a foreign

country––were both aliens). Because Plaintiff and TYSPA are both aliens, there can be no

diversity of citizenship. See

. Nor has Plaintiff established federal question jurisdiction. See

§ 1331. Although

Plaintiff invokes RICO, see Compl. at 1–2, he cannot bring a RICO claim against either Defendant.

“[A] private RICO plaintiff . . . must allege and prove a domestic injury to [his] business or

property” for the Court to have jurisdiction over his RICO claim. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European

Cmty.,

, 346 (2016) (emphasis added). “[I]n assessing whether there is a domestic

injury, courts should engage in a case-specific analysis that looks to the circumstances surrounding

the injury,” and if “those circumstances sufficiently ground the injury in the United States, such

that it is clear the injury arose domestically, then the plaintiff has alleged a domestic injury.”

Yegiazaryan v. Smagin,

(2023). Plaintiff’s overbroad allegation that TYSPA

“engaged in U.S. military and municipal contracts,” Compl. at 1, does not establish that his own

injuries arose domestically. Indeed, Plaintiff himself concedes that he suffered “international

injury.” See Compl. at 1.

For these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. See

(e)(2)(B)(iii); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum

Opinion.

Date: August 7, 2025 __________/s/_________________ JIA M. COBB United States District Judge