UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BOWEN UHLENKAMP AND SADAF LAKHANI,

Plaintiffs, Case No. 21-cv-2662-TNM-MJS v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (“IDEA”) case returns to

the Court after further administrative proceedings before the Hearing Officer on remand.

Originally, Plaintiffs Bowen Uhlenkamp and Sadaf Lakhani (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit in October

2021, after the Hearing Officer dismissed their claims at the administrative level. They challenged

several individualized education programs (“IEPs”) that the District of Columbia Public Schools

(“DCPS” or the “District”) prepared for their minor son, A.U., among other claims. On cross-

motions for summary judgment, the Court rejected several of Plaintiffs’ claims but saw merit in

others, and it remanded to the Hearing Officer to reevaluate whether three challenged IEPs—from

April, May, and December 2019—were substantively sufficient under the IDEA. The Hearing

Officer then reassessed the record and issued a new written decision on those IEPs, concluding,

once again, that DCPS met its burden to demonstrate their substantive adequacy under the statute.

Now, Plaintiffs return to this Court to challenge the Hearing Officer’s determination on remand.

The parties filed a new round of cross-motions for summary judgment, which are before the

undersigned by virtue of a referral for full-case management. After careful consideration of the

1 parties’ briefing, the full administrative record, and the relevant authorities and caselaw, the Court

concludes that the Hearing Officer ignored key evidence surrounding the April and May 2019 IEPs

that reveals their insufficiency but reasonably found, in keeping with the Court’s remand

instructions, that the December 2019 IEP passed muster under the IDEA. So the undersigned

RECOMMENDS that the Court GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART both Plaintiffs’ motion

for summary judgment (ECF No. 67) and the District’s cross-motion (ECF No. 70).

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

Congress enacted the IDEA to help ensure all children with disabilities receive a “free

appropriate public education” or “FAPE.” See

(d)(1)(A). This mandate “requires

an educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress in light of the

child’s circumstances.” Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist.,

, 403 (2017).

The “IEP”—or “individualized education program”—is “the centerpiece of the statute’s

education delivery system[.]” Id. at 391. An IEP is a “comprehensive plan prepared by a child’s

‘IEP Team’” through which “special education and related services are ‘tailored to the unique

needs’ of a particular child.” Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v.

Rowley,

(1982)). 1 More specifically, an IEP must include “a statement of the

child’s present levels of academic achievement and functional performance,” a list of “measurable

annual … academic and functional goals,” and “a description of how the child’s progress toward

meeting the annual goals … will be measured.”

(d)(1)(A)(i). An IEP must also

identify the “special education and related services … that will be provided” to help the child

1 The composition of an “IEP Team” is prescribed by statute,

(d)(1)(B), and generally “includes teachers, school officials, and the child’s parents,” Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 391. 2 “advance appropriately toward attaining the annual goals.” Id. At least annually, the IEP team must

review and revise a child’s IEP “as appropriate.” Id. § 1414(d)(4).

Broadly speaking, the IDEA requires that “‘to the maximum extent appropriate,’ public

schools provide students with disabilities an education in the ‘least restrictive environment’

possible.” Z.B. v. Dist. of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting

(a)(5)(A)). This generally means that the “removal of children from the regular educational

environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that

education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved

satisfactorily.”

(citation and quotation marks omitted). More simply put, “the IDEA requires

that children with disabilities receive education in the regular classroom whenever possible.”

Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 400 (citation and quotation marks omitted); id. at 401 (“[F]or most children,

a FAPE will involve integration in the regular classroom[.]”); Z.B.,

(similar).

Two key principles guide any judicial review of an IEP. First, a court must focus on

“whether the IEP is reasonable, not whether the court regards it as ideal.” Endrew F., 580 U.S. at

399 (emphasis in original). After all, “Congress has not committed to educational perfection.” Z.B.,

; see also Leggett v. Dist. of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[A]

public school district need not guarantee the best possible education or even a potential-

maximizing one.”) (citation and quotations marks omitted). Second, a court must assess an IEP’s

“substantive adequacy” based on information available at “the time each IEP was created rather

than with the benefit of hindsight.” Edward M.R. v. Dist. of Columbia,

(D.C.

Cir. 2025) (quoting Z.B.,

). Putting these principles together, then, “[t]he key inquiry

regarding an IEP’s substantive adequacy is whether, taking account of what the school knew or

3 reasonably should have known of a student’s needs at the time, the IEP it offered was reasonably

calculated to ensure the specific student’s progress.” Z.B.,

.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs’ claims focus on three successive IEPs that DCPS proposed for A.U. in fifth and

sixth grade (the 2018–19 and 2019–20 school years) while he attended Janney Elementary School

(“Janney”) and then Alice Deal Middle School (“Deal”), both public schools in Washington, D.C.

Because the Court’s prior decision addressed the complete factual backdrop here, see Uhlenkamp

v. Dist. of Columbia,

, 231–34 (D.D.C. 2023), this background discussion takes

a more targeted approach, touching only on those details relevant to Plaintiffs’ latest claims.

The April 2019 IEP. DCPS first found A.U. eligible for special education services in April

2019, with an IDEA classification of multiple disabilities, specific learning disability, and other

health impairment. With that eligibility determination, DCPS convened an IEP team (sometimes

called a “multidisciplinary team”) to meet and prepare an IEP, which Plaintiffs attended. The IEP

focused on two areas of concerns—reading, as well as emotional, social, and behavioral

development—and included goals for each. The IEP set two reading goals for A.U., namely that

he: (1) “be able to independently determine one main idea of a text and support it with at least 2

pieces of evidence,” and (2) “be able to independently determine one theme of a fiction text and

support it with at least 2 pieces of evidence.” The IEP prescribed forty-five minutes per week of

specialized instruction in reading to be provided in the general education setting (i.e., “push-in”

support) and sixty minutes per month of behavioral support services outside general education

(i.e., “pull-out” support), plus a range of other classroom aids and services. (See Administrative

4 Record (“AR”) at 200–07.) 2 The aids and services included preferential seating, checklists and

notes for multi-step directions, breaking new information into smaller “chunks,” speech-to-text

technology, multi-modal instruction to address orthographic concerns, and more. (See

.)

The May 2019 IEP. The following month, DCPS convened another meeting to update

A.U.’s IEP, which Plaintiffs again attended. That May 2019 IEP yielded two notable changes. One,

it added written expression as an area of concern and identified a couple of related goals, along

with an additional hour per week of push-in specialized instruction in written expression. And two,

it modified the hour of monthly behavioral support services for A.U. so that it would be split

between push-in and pull-out support—thirty minutes for each. For reading, the IEP carried

forward the same two goals and the same level of specialized instruction. The IEP likewise

maintained the same classroom aids and services as the prior month’s IEP. (See AR at 286–95.)

The December 2019 IEP. For the 2019–20 school year, A.U. advanced to middle school

and started his sixth-grade year at Deal. A few months into the year, an IEP team convened again

to review A.U.’s IEP. Plaintiffs attended the December 2019 IEP meeting, too, along with their

educational consultant, Amy Mounce, who reviewed and provided input on a draft IEP beforehand.

(AR at 399–402.) DCPS adopted much of that input. The resulting December 2019 IEP yielded

several material changes. One, it expanded and built upon the prior goals in reading, written

expression, and emotional, social, and behavioral development. 3 Two, it considerably amplified

2 The District’s filing of the original Administrative Record on April 7 and 8, 2022 spanned dozens of docket entries, followed by numerous “errata.” (ECF Nos. 10–29.) The Court directs the reader to the District’s “Administrative Record Chart” (ECF No. 41-1), which correlates AR pages to the corresponding ECF entries. Separately, in the wake of Plaintiffs’ supplemental complaint after remand, the District filed another administrative record on July 23, 2024 (ECF No. 66), which starts numbering again at page 1. To avoid confusion, the Court refers to the latter submission as the Remand Administrative Record (“RAR”). 3 For reading, in particular, the IEP prescribed three new goals: (1) “With use of a graphic organizer after reading an informational grade level text, [A.U.] will be able to independently determine the main idea of a grade level text and support it with 2 pieces of text evidence scoring 80% on 2 out of 3 tasks”; (2) “When

5 A.U.’s special education service hours, increased to a total of eight hours per week—split across

two hours of push-in support in written expression, two hours of push-in support in reading, and

another four hours of pull-out services in reading. The pull-out reading services would be provided

in the form of a reading intervention class in a small-group setting. Three, the IEP added a new

area of concern—adaptive/daily living skills—along with a corresponding goal. And four, it more

than doubled A.U.’s behavioral support services to two-and-a-half hours per month—thirty

minutes of push-in support and two hours of pull-out services. (See

at 499–513.)

A.U.’s Private School Placement. Shortly after the December 2019 IEP meeting, Plaintiffs

began exploring other schools. In August 2020, Plaintiffs—through legal counsel—advised DCPS

that they were choosing to enroll A.U. at the Siena School (“Siena”), a private school in Maryland,

for his upcoming seventh-grade year and requesting that DCPS fund that placement. (AR at 1021–

22.) The District declined funding based on its position that DCPS made a FAPE available to A.U.

through an appropriate IEP—the December 2019 IEP—and a continued placement at Deal for the

2020–21 school year. (Id. at 825.) All the same, Plaintiffs opted for A.U. to begin seventh grade at

Siena, where the Court understands he remains enrolled today.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed their underlying due-process complaint in January 2021, alleging that DCPS

violated the IDEA by: (1) violating the IDEA’s “child-find” obligation in failing to identify A.U.

as eligible for special education services prior to 2019; (2)–(4) failing to provide an appropriate

IEP for A.U. in April, May, and December 2019; (5) failing to offer an appropriate IEP and

given an instructional grade level passage, [A.U.] will read the passage aloud at a rate of at least (120) words per minutes with (96%) accuracy … and apply (3) teacher-selected intonation and expression skills”; and (3) “Given an unfamiliar instructional grade level passage with (15) teacher-selected words (e.g., words with common prefixes and suffices, multisyllabic, or irregularly spelled words), [A.U.] will read the passage aloud and correctly decode the selected words with (80%) accuracy[.]” (AR at 501–03.) 6 placement prior to the 2021–22 school year, necessitating Plaintiffs’ unilateral placement at Siena;

and (6) failing to properly implement the May and December 2019 IEPs. See Uhlenkamp, 691 F.

Supp. 3d at 234 (citing AR at 1203–04). As relief, Plaintiffs requested reimbursement for tuition

and related expenses they incurred by placing A.U. at Siena, along with related remedies.

Following a four-day administrative hearing in May and June 2021, the Hearing Officer

issued a determination in July 2021 that ruled against Plaintiffs and dismissed their due-process

complaint. (AR at 4–39.) Plaintiffs then timely sought review in this Court. (ECF No. 1, Compl.)

On cross-motions for summary judgment, former Magistrate Judge Robin M. Meriweather issued

a split-decision report and recommendation on Plaintiffs’ claims—agreeing with both sides in

certain respects—which District Judge Trevor N. McFadden then adopted in full. Uhlenkamp,

. 4 On the one hand, the Court sided with the District on Plaintiffs’ child-find and

implementation claims. It held that the Hearing Officer reasonably determined that DCPS did not

violate the IDEA by not sooner identifying A.U. as eligible for special education services, and it

agreed that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to show that DCPS failed to implement substantial

or significant provisions of the May and December 2019 IEPs. See

at 237–39, 247–50. On the

other hand, the Court sided with Plaintiffs on their challenges to the substantive adequacy of the

April, May, and December 2019 IEPs, ordering a remand to the Hearing Officer on those claims.

at 239–47. The Court declined to pass on Plaintiffs’ tuition-reimbursement claim given that

issue’s interrelatedness to the December 2019 IEP’s adequacy, and it directed the Hearing Officer

to revisit that claim on remand, too, as appropriate.

at 250–51.

The proceedings then returned to the Hearing Officer, who reevaluated the existing record,

including the testimony and evidence presented during the original hearing. In December 2023,

4 Neither Plaintiffs nor the District filed objections to Judge Meriweather’s report and recommendation. 7 the Hearing Officer issued a new determination on remand. (RAR at 4–60.) Although the remand

determination retained some pieces of the original decision, the Hearing Officer expanded

considerably on his factual findings (id. at 28–39 (¶¶ 30–37)) and prepared updated conclusions

of law addressing Plaintiffs’ challenges to the various IEPs (id. at 40–57). The Hearing Officer

ultimately adhered to his prior determinations, concluding that DCPS carried its burden to show

that all three IEPs were reasonably calculated to enable A.U. to make educational progress. (Id.)

The next month, in January 2024, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint in this Court to

challenge the remand determination. (ECF No. 63, Supp. Compl.) Following submission of the

new administrative record, the parties filed dueling motions for summary judgment, which are ripe

for resolution. (ECF No. 67 (“Pls.’ Mem.”); ECF No. 70 (“Def.’s Mem.”).)

LEGAL STANDARDS

Although motions seeking review of a hearing officer’s decision under the IDEA are often

framed as motions for summary judgment, the Court does not follow “a true summary judgment

procedure” in this context. Middleton v. Dist. of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2018)

(quoting L.R.L. v. Dist. of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2012)). Rather, “[a] motion

for summary judgment operates as a motion for judgment based on the evidence comprising the

record and any additional evidence the court may receive.” D.R. v. Dist. of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2009). Put another way, a motion for summary judgment is “the procedural

vehicle for asking the judge to decide the case on the basis of the administrative record.” M.G. v.

Dist. of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2017) (citation omitted).

On judicial review under the IDEA, courts “shall grant such relief as [they] determine[] is

appropriate,” based upon “a preponderance of the evidence.”

(i)(2)(C)(iii); see

also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205–06. In doing so, courts may not “substitute their own notions of

8 sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.” Rowley,

. Rather, courts “must give due weight to the administrative proceedings and afford some

deference to the expertise of the [independent hearing officer] and school officials responsible for

the child’s education.” Gill v. Dist. of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2010) (citation

and quotation marks omitted). In general, “a hearing officer’s findings based on credibility

determinations of live witness testimony are given particular deference where there is no

supplementation of the record.” McAllister v. Dist. of Columbia,

(D.D.C.

2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). But “a hearing decision ‘without reasoned and

specific findings deserves little deference.’” Reid v. Dist. of Columbia,

(D.C.

Cir. 2005) (quoting Kerkam v. Superintendent, D.C. Pub. Schs.,

(D.C. Cir. 1991)).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs mount two overall attacks on the remand determination. First, they insist that the

Hearing Officer wrongly adhered to his original conclusion that the various IEPs were

substantively sufficient under the IDEA. Second, Plaintiffs say the Hearing Officer should have

awarded them tuition and expense reimbursement for Siena for the 2020–21 school year.

I. The IEPs’ Substantive Adequacy

A. The April 2019 IEP

The Court frames its review of the April IEP around the specific instructions given to the

Hearing Officer on remand: to fully and appropriately address “whether the IEP’s lack of

orthographic progressing goals made the April 2019 IEP inadequate and whether additional hours

of specialized instruction [were] warranted.” Uhlenkamp, 691 F. Supp. 3d at 242.

9 Begin with the IEP’s omission of any orthographic processing goal(s). 5 On remand, the

Hearing Officer squarely identified this point and Plaintiffs’ corresponding objection. (See RAR

at 43 (“The IEP acknowledged [A.U.’s] orthographic processing deficit … but did not include a

goal that specifically addressed it.”); see id. (describing testimony from Plaintiffs’ expert

consultant, Ms. Mounce, that A.U.’s “primary reading deficit was orthographic processing” and

that “the IEP was inappropriate because it did not include reading goals specifically addressing

this deficit”).) The Hearing Officer then addressed some of the evidence in the record—including

A.U.’s assessment data, Ms. Mounce’s opinions, and more—to conclude that the IEP’s non-

inclusion of any orthographic processing goal(s) did not render the IEP inadequate. The Hearing

Officer deemed Ms. Mounce’s testimony unpersuasive and reasoned, instead, that A.U.’s

orthographic processing deficit could be addressed through other classroom aids and services

prescribed by the IEP—a perspective the Hearing Officer ascribed to DCPS and its witnesses.

(RAR at 44–46.) Plaintiffs attack this conclusion from several angles, including that it

misconstrues evidence and ignores testimony from DCPS’s own expert who they say

acknowledged that an orthographic processing goal should have been included on the IEP.

This last point is one the Court’s prior ruling expressly identified as warranting further

focus on remand. The ruling explained that the Hearing Officer “failed to address relevant

evidence” regarding orthographic processing, including the fact that “the District’s own witnesses

said that orthographic goals should have been on the IEP[.]” Uhlenkamp, 691 F. Supp. 3d at 242

5 The parties’ expert witnesses defined orthographic processing as “recognizing parts of words and letters[] and remembering how to put them together,” i.e., “identify[ing] words based on the visualization of that word.” (AR at 1943 (Ms. Mounce); id. at 2425 (Dr. Mallory).) Orthographic processing is closely related to reading fluency: “[I]t’s being able to look at something and break it apart, but immediately recognize it and do it in a pace, as we refer to as the fluency, how quickly, at a pace that allows him to automatically recognize words or recognize how to write words and get that information out.” (Id. at 1943 (Ms. Mounce).)

10 (citing AR at 2472 (testimony of Dr. Mallory)). Plaintiffs complain that the Hearing Officer failed

to address this evidence once again. (Pls.’ Mem. at 26–27.) They are correct.

Specifically, Dr. Mallory—one of DCPS’s experts, who participated in the development of

the April and May 2019 IEPs—agreed in her testimony that A.U. “needed to have services that

addressed [his] orthographic processing deficit.” (AR at 2447.) 6 She acknowledged that the

absence of an IEP goal for the “orthographic piece … may have been an omission,” and she stood

by that testimony in response to follow-up questions from the Hearing Officer directly:

[HEARING OFFICER]: Dr. Mallory, what did you say was … an omission?

THE WITNESS: The lack of a goal for the text orthography, which would have been part of the word attack.

[HEARING OFFICER]: There was no goal for word attack?

THE WITNESS: Right. Before being able to, again, see regular words and be able to identify them accurately.

[HEARING OFFICER]: Okay. That was the orthographic process?

THE WITNESS: Orthographic processing.

(Id. at 2457–58.) Earlier in her testimony, Dr. Mallory said that “a goal related to text orthography

could have been important” and “may have been missed.” (Id. at 2449 (“I’m not saying that … a

goal related to orthographic processing may not have been missed. I’m not saying that it was not

missed …. I’m not saying that it was -- that that was not an oversight.”). And perhaps most directly,

DCPS’s own counsel asked Dr. Mallory on redirect whether A.U. needed orthographic goals on

his IEP as of April or May 2019, and after a largely non-responsive answer at first—which the

Hearing Officer corrected—Dr. Mallory told the Hearing Officer, “it should have been on the IEP.”

6 Dr. Mallory agreed, more specifically, that the results of the March 2019 assessment indicated that A.U. had a learning disability in reading in the areas of both orthographic processing and reading fluency. Orthographic processing, she testified, “is how well a child can identify words based on the visualization of that word,” while reading fluency is “how quickly a child reads.” (AR at 2424–25.) She said A.U. would benefit from specialized instruction in both orthographic processing and reading fluency. (Id. at 2426.) 11 (Id. at 2472.) 7 This final excerpt was the exact evidence the Court highlighted as having been

overlooked the first time around. And even still, the Hearing Officer glossed over it once again,

along with Dr. Mallory’s broader testimony on these points.

More than that, the Hearing Officer did not just elide this testimony but described it as

something altogether different. The remand determination credits Dr. Mallory (i.e., “Witness G”)

as testifying that “orthographic processing could also be addressed through Other Classroom Aids

and Services.” (RAR at 45.) But Dr. Mallory never said that, certainly not as directly as the Hearing

Officer suggested. The remand determination cited no transcript page(s) to support that

characterization, DCPS does not identify testimony to this effect in its briefs, and the Court could

not locate any such testimony through its own review of the record. 8

The Hearing Officer’s continued non-engagement with Dr. Mallory’s actual testimony

regarding orthographic processing goals—even after the Court highlighted the issue directly in its

original ruling—scuttles any reliability as to the remand determination’s factual findings on this

point. E.W. v. Dist. of Columbia,

, at *13 (D.D.C. Nov. 28, 2023) (recognizing

that a hearing officer’s findings may be “disturbed” where the findings “ignored probative

evidence”), report & recommendation adopted,

(Dec. 13, 2023); Shipley v.

Dist. of Columbia,

, at *10 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2020) (same where hearing officer

7 This full exchange went: “Q: At the time in May -- April or May 2019 with the test scores or how he was presenting in the informal tests, we saw the Fountas & Pinnell, all of them, was he presenting as a need to have orthographic goals on his IEP? A: I would say that based on Dr. Schlegelmilch’s report, based on what we had as far as Fountas & Pinnell and a lot of those other things, he seemed -- it seemed like he was, you know, staying afloat. But based on Dr. Schlegelmilch’s data, some of those weaker skills were in that area. [HEARING OFFICER]: It doesn't seem to answer the question. THE WITNESS: So, I could say that it should have been on the IEP. [HEARING OFFICER]: Okay. That answers the question.” (AR at 2472.) 8 Dr. Mallory did say the various classroom aids and supports were “appropriate based on [A.U.’s] needs at the time,” but she did not testify that they were aimed at A.U.’s orthographic processing deficit or were sufficient for that purpose in lieu of any related goal(s). (See AR at 2437–38.)

12 “wholly ignore[d] the conflicting evidence”), report & recommendation adopted,

(D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2020). The Court would be facing a different scenario if the Hearing

Officer had recognized and addressed Dr. Mallory’s testimony on orthographic processing goals

and explained, perhaps, why he believed that testimony was not compelling or significant. Cf.

Jackson v. Dist. of Columbia,

, at *14 (D.D.C. June 2, 2020) (“By noting the

contradictory evidence in the record and explaining why that evidence did not compel an opposite

conclusion, the Hearing Officer did not err.”), report & recommendation adopted,

(D.D.C. June 18, 2020). But that is not what happened. The Hearing Officer’s analysis

on remand did not even acknowledge that testimony, much less engage with it substantively.

If this case were on review for the first time, the Court would likely remand to afford the

Hearing Officer an opportunity to address that evidence in the first instance. But the Court already

tried that without success. So the Court instead deems it appropriate to weigh any conflicting

evidence itself de novo. Shipley,

, at *10 (citing Reid,

).

That undertaking is about as straightforward as it comes because there is no real conflict.

After all, experts on both sides opined that A.U. needed specialized instruction to address his

orthographic processing and fluency deficits and that his IEP should have included goals focused

on orthographic processing. (AR at 1941, 2025–27 (Ms. Mounce); id. at 2447, 2449, 2457–58,

2472 (Dr. Mallory).) And experts on both sides acknowledged that the IEP’s only reading goals

were not aimed at addressing those deficits. (Id. at 2025 (Ms. Mounce: “[T]here are two reading

goals that both address comprehension …. There’s nothing that addresses the deficits in

orthographic processing.”); id. at 2462 (Dr. Mallory agreeing that the “a theme goal and a main

idea goal … were not going to address the things that were going on with [A.U.’]s reading … in

terms of the orthographic piece”).) Despite this evidence, the Hearing Officer reasoned that some

13 of the IEP’s classroom aids and services were a reasonable substitute for orthographic processing

goals—even attributing that thinking to DCPS and the team that prepared the April IEP. (RAR at

46 (“[S]chool staff believed that [A.U.’s] orthographic processing deficits could be adequately

addressed through Classroom Aids and Services.”); id. (“Thus, the IEP team reasonably concluded

that [A.U.’s] deficit could be addressed through Classroom Aids and Services.”).) Again, though,

Dr. Mallory never said that, and she was part of the “school staff” and “IEP team” that developed

the April 2019 IEP. In fact, Dr. Mallory said the opposite: that an orthographic processing goal

“should have been included” on the IEP. (AR at 2472.) 9 Without any attempt to explain how that

evidentiary conflict could be consistent with a finding that no orthographic processing goal was

necessary, the Hearing Officer’s determination cannot be squared with the record. The Court

concludes, therefore, that Plaintiffs met their burden to show the Hearing Officer was wrong in

finding the April IEP to be sufficient despite the absence of any orthographic processing goal(s).

That leaves the issue of whether the April IEP prescribed sufficient “hours of specialized

instruction.” Uhlenkamp, 691 F. Supp. 3d at 242. This issue received far less attention from the

parties, which is perhaps understandable since it received far less attention from the Hearing

Officer, too. As best the Court can tell, the Hearing Officer disagreed that A.U. required “an

overabundance of specialized instruction outside general education,” concluding instead that he

needed only “minimal additional support,” which presumably meant the 45 minutes per week of

push-in specialized instruction prescribed by the IEP. (RAR at 46.) The Hearing Officer’s rationale

9 The only other witness the Hearing Officer cited for this proposition was Arielle Edge, another DCPS school psychologist. According to the remand determination, she “opined that the multimodal instruction prescribed in the IEP would address [A.U.’s] orthographic processing needs.” (RAR at 46.) Although true that Ms. Edge testified that “multi-modal instruction would provide [an] access point that would prevent orthographic processing from being a barrier” (AR at 2293), she did not state that it was sufficient to take the place of one or more goals focused on that deficit. And in any case, if the Hearing Officer was crediting this testimony over Dr. Mallory’s statements regarding orthographic processing goals, the remand determination needed to engage with that conflicting testimony and explain as much. It did not. 14 here was likewise grounded in his skepticism of Ms. Mounce’s opinions, which he believed were

“not supported by the record” and “belied” by other evidence. (Id. at 44 (disagreeing that A.U.’s

orthographic processing deficit was “significan[t] to [his] overall profile” and highlighting a

variety of “average range” scores in different reading categories on A.U.’s March 2019

evaluation)). But that analysis, once again, ignores the testimony from DCPS’s own witness—Dr.

Mallory—along these same lines. Dr. Mallory said that A.U. needed specialized instruction to

address his orthographic processing and fluency deficits in reading. (AR at 2426.) Thus, even

assuming the Hearing Officer appropriately viewed Ms. Mounce’s testimony as unpersuasive and

reasonably assessed that A.U. was generally reading at grade level based on information available

to the IEP team in April 2019, Dr. Mallory’s testimony still points strongly toward a need for

additional specialized instruction in certain reading areas to address A.U.’s particular deficits. The

Hearing Officer did not explain why DCPS carried its burden to show that the IEP’s minimal

special education hours were sufficient against those facts.

Accordingly, for these reasons, the Court should find that the Hearing Officer erred in

determining that the April IEP was substantively sufficient. The District did not carry its burden to

show that the IEP was reasonably calculated to ensure A.U.’s educational progress.

B. The May 2019 IEP

Next up is the May IEP. It did not modify any of the reading-related components of A.U.’s

program, whether the goals or the specialized instruction hours. Instead, the May IEP made other

changes, including: (1) adding written expression as an area of concern for A.U., (2) adopting a

few goals focused on written expression, (3) tacking on another weekly hour of push-in specialized

instruction in written expression, and (4) adjusting A.U.’s behavioral support services schedule.

The Court previously remanded on this claim because the Hearing Officer “provided only a

15 conclusory assertion that the May 2019 IEP is adequate because the student’s situation had not

materially changed in one month.” Uhlenkamp, 691 F. Supp. 3d at 244. The remand determination

did better, but the Hearing Officer still grounded his finding that the May IEP was appropriate in

the antecedent finding that the April IEP was appropriate. (RAR at 48 (“The May IEP added

additional services to the April IEP that I concluded had provided a FAPE. Therefore, I conclude

that DCPS has met its burden of proving that it is more likely than not that the IEP it developed on

May 30, 2019 was reasonably calculated to enable [A.U.] to make academic progress.”).) This

reasoning fails because the same deficiencies in the April IEP—the absence of orthographic

processing goals and related specialized instruction—carry forward to the May IEP.

Beyond that, the parties’ briefing largely debates whether the Hearing Officer properly

considered the import of two reading assessments administered between the April and May IEPs:

the Scholastic Reading Inventory (“SRI”) test, which showed A.U. performing below basic grade

level, and the Fountas and Pinnell assessment (“F&P”), which showed A.U. performing more or

less on grade level. (See RAR at 21 (describing results); Pls.’ Mem. at 36; Def.’s Mem. at 13–15.)

The Hearing Officer discounted the significance of the lower score in reliance on a DCPS witness

who said the SRI results were “an outlier based on [A.U.’s] classroom performance and all other

assessment data.” (RAR at 48.) Plaintiffs call that conclusion wrong, while the District defends it

as appropriate. But setting aside whether the Hearing Officer reasonably weighed the competing

evidence on that point, the fact remains that the May IEP—like the April IEP—did not include any

goals that related to orthographic processing, which DCPS’s own expert, Dr. Mallory, said should

have been included. (AR at 2472.) The IEP’s two reading goals remained unchanged and focused

on comprehension rather than the orthographic and fluency deficits that needed support. So the

Court’s analysis of the April IEP’s deficiency maps directly onto the May IEP.

16 For this reason, the Court should likewise hold that the Hearing Officer erred in finding the

May IEP to be substantively sufficient because the District did not carry its burden to show that

the IEP was reasonably calculated to ensure A.U.’s educational progress.

C. The December 2019 IEP

That leaves the December IEP. The Court remanded on this claim because it found that the

original decision “glossed over key issues … such as A.U.’s orthographic processing deficits and

[his] stutter” and otherwise “failed to address several of Plaintiffs’ arguments.” Uhlenkamp, 691

F. Supp. 3d at 245–47. In reassessing the evidence and arguments surrounding the December IEP,

the Hearing Officer determined on remand that it met the IDEA’s mandate: the IEP was reasonably

calculated to enable A.U. to make progress based on his circumstances. The Court agrees.

As a starting point, the Court believes it helpful to compare the December IEP to the two

preceding IEPs that missed the mark. The December IEP updated and meaningfully expanded upon

A.U.’s reading goals, adding two new goals focused on fluency while retaining one modified

comprehension-related goal. (AR at 502–03.) Thus, in contrast to the reading goals in the earlier

IEPs, which focused exclusively on comprehension, the December IEP crafted goals that were

better aimed at A.U.’s deficits in orthographic processing and fluency. More, the December IEP

increased A.U.’s specialized education hours fourfold, up from around two hours weekly to eight

hours weekly. (Id. at 509.) Half those hours (four out of eight) were allocated to dedicated pull-out

education in reading, meaning A.U. would receive targeted reading instruction every day from a

special education teacher in a small-group environment. Simply put, the December IEP filled in—

reasonably, even if not perfectly—the main gaps that rendered the prior IEPs inadequate. It

included goals targeting A.U.’s specific reading deficits, and it expanded considerably on A.U.’s

17 special education instruction including through a targeted reading intervention in a more hands-on

setting. These modifications alone go a long way toward showing the sufficiency of the IEP.

The remand determination hooked into these points. The Hearing Officer observed, as a

general matter, that the updated reading goals addressed not only “reading comprehension,” but

also “reading fluency” and “reading aloud and decoding.” (RAR at 53.) For this reason, the

Hearing Officer explained, he was unpersuaded by Ms. Mounce’s various criticisms about the

overall focus of the reading goals. (See id.) Plus, the Hearing Officer pointed out that none of the

final reading goals were included in the original draft IEP, meaning that Ms. Mounce’s input on

the draft “had a discernible impact on the development of the IEP goals” in the final version. (Id.)

More, as to the increased instruction, DCPS placed A.U. in a “reading intervention program,” a

specialized “reading support class for five days each week.” (Id. at 56.) DCPS witnesses explained

that this program—the Strategic Adolescent Reading Intervention (“STARI”)—“would address

fluency, comprehension, and decoding.” (Id. at 52–53.) Particularly with these “additional

services,” the Hearing Officer concluded that the IEP “would reasonably be expected to enable

[A.U.] to continue to make academic progress.” (Id. at 57.) This time around, the Court agrees that

the Hearing Officer’s determination on that score was reasonable and reasonably supported.

Plaintiffs insist otherwise. Their arguments are meandering and often difficult to follow,

largely due to their choice to brief their challenges through what amounts to a paragraph-by-

paragraph commentary on how the remand determination differs from the original decision. (Pls.’

Mem. 36–44.) Even still, the Court distilled their points as best it could. None persuades.

The most consistent objection Plaintiffs raise is that the Hearing Officer improperly

weighed the evidence and should have reached different conclusions based on the record presented.

(See Pls.’ Mem. at 44 (“Had the [Hearing Officer] weighed the evidence properly, he should have

18 found that DCPS failed to prove the December 2019 IEP appropriate[.]”).) For instance, Plaintiffs

say the Hearing Officer wrongly credited certain of A.U.’s assessment and testing results over

others, placed too much weight on A.U.’s grades (which Plaintiffs call “inflated”), and neglected

to appropriately evaluate evidence of A.U.’s executive functioning deficits. These all boil down to

disagreements about how the Hearing Officer weighed the evidence. And those types of arguments

cannot carry the day. Garris v. Dist. of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2016)

(“[T]hese objections are about how the Hearing Officer weighed the evidence .... That Plaintiffs

draw a different conclusion from that evidence does not make the Hearing Officer’s alternative

conclusion improper.”); A.W. v. Dist. of Columbia,

, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 19,

2014) (reiterating that IDEA plaintiffs cannot secure reversal simply because “some evidence in

the record, if given substantial weight, could support a finding in their favor”).

Beyond that, Plaintiffs voice disagreement with the STARI program—A.U.’s daily reading

intervention class—as insufficient to address A.U.’s reading deficits because STARI was not an

intervention to specifically target orthographic processing. (Pls.’ Mem. at 41.) On this point,

though, the Hearing Officer credited the testimony of Ms. Edge (i.e., “Witness D”) (see RAR at

34–35), who testified that STARI was designed to address a wide range of reading skills, including

“decoding,” “word patterns,” and taking “orthography” and other “basic reading skills” and

applying them “in the context of reading comprehension.” (AR at 2287–88;

at 2317–18 (Ms.

Edge testifying similarly).) In other words, even though STARI was not singularly focused on

orthographic processing, as other DCPS witnesses acknowledged (see AR at 2507, 2571), the

program’s multi-faceted approach to reading skills was something DCPS believed would help

improve A.U.’s reading deficits. The Hearing Officer’s decision to credit that explanation was

reasonable. After all, unlike the clear contradictions created by Dr. Mallory’s testimony regarding

19 the April and May IEPs—i.e., that they should have included orthographic processing goals—no

DCPS witness testified the December IEP should have included a different reading intervention or

that the STARI program was not enough to support A.U.’s specific circumstances, even though

Plaintiffs pressed that contention at various points in the administrative hearing.

Relatedly, Plaintiffs argue that the Hearing Officer improperly brushed aside Ms. Mounce’s

objections about the specific benchmarks in the IEP’s reading goals. She took issue with the first

reading goal’s target that A.U. would read and comprehend grade-level text. But the Hearing

Officer found that objection unpersuasive because A.U.’s assessment data, considered as a whole,

showed that his reading comprehension skills—notwithstanding other deficits—were largely

average compared to his same-aged peers. (RAR at 50.) On the second goal’s target that A.U.

should read at 120 words per minute, Ms. Mounce objected because the recent data showed he was

reading at a meaningfully slower rate. In the Hearing Officer’s view, however, the fact that this

target was a “stretch objective” did not necessarily render the goal inappropriate, especially since

A.U. would be receiving “significantly more individualized reading instruction than [he] had ever

before received.” (Id.) The remand determination’s engagement with and rejection of these

objections from Ms. Mounce was reasonable, as was the overall assessment that the reading goals

were appropriate. See Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 402 (observing that “every child should have the

chance to meet challenging objectives,” such that IEPs should be “appropriately ambitious”).

Plaintiffs separately argue that the Hearing Officer failed to consider A.U.’s stutter. (Pls.’

Mem. at 20–22, 39.) The remand determination acknowledged that A.U. developed a stutter in

sixth grade, before the development of the December 2019 IEP. But the Hearing Officer reasoned

that the IEP’s failure to explicitly address the stutter did not render it inadequate because there was

“no persuasive testimony, expert or otherwise, that stuttering impaired [A.U.’s] ability to access

20 the curriculum in the general education environment.” (RAR at 56.) That is not to say there was

no testimony presented on the subject. A.U.’s special education reading teacher, Kendra Wells,

described A.U.’s stutter when he read aloud in class but said that it was variable—“a day to day

thing”—and that A.U. was often able to mitigate it, at least somewhat, by using a fidget to help

with feelings of anxiety. (AR at 2560–61.) But as the Hearing Officer noted, there was nothing in

the record to show that Plaintiffs—through Ms. Mounce or otherwise—pressed DCPS to

implement any changes to the IEP based on concerns about A.U.’s stutter; Ms. Mounce did not

include anything about A.U.’s stutter in the draft IEP she marked up, and her meeting notes do not

indicate that she or A.U.’s parents asked for more support on the issue. (Id. at 446–56, 514–18.)10

On balance, the Hearing Officer evidently evaluated this point alongside the fact that the December

IEP provided A.U. with targeted reading instruction every day in a small-group setting, to include

practice reading aloud. Plus, inasmuch as the stutter was reportedly attributable to A.U.’s anxiety,

the December IEP increased the behavioral support hours to help A.U. advance on his emotional,

social, and behavioral development goals, including to better manage anxiety. (AR at 507–09.)

Given all this, it was reasonable for the Hearing Officer to conclude that the IEP was not inadequate

on the basis that it did not include even more support focused explicitly on the stutter.

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the IEP was improper because it did not memorialize all the

hours of support A.U. was receiving in Math and ELA. In other words, Plaintiffs appear to be

complaining about services that A.U. did receive, but that were not written into the IEP for some

reason. (Pls.’ Mem. at 6 (“A.U. received and needed daily inclusion in ELA and Math … but it

was not on his IEPs.”); see AR at 2085 (Ms. Mounce testifying about the December IEP that A.U.

10 The meeting notes do refer to A.U.’s stutter, but it was raised by A.U.’s reading teacher, Ms. Wells, not Ms. Mounce or Plaintiffs. (AR at 516.) And Ms. Wells, according to the notes, went on to describe her ideas and efforts for how to help A.U. improve that issue and others. There is no other mention of the stutter. 21 was receiving specialized support from a special education teacher, Mr. Silberman, that “was not

captured” on the IEP).) In so arguing, Plaintiffs rely on two out-of-circuit cases for the proposition

that “the failure to include support a student is receiving on an IEP has been found to be

justification for a parent unilaterally placing a student.” (Pls.’ Mem. at 6.) Setting aside whether

those cases are truly comparable or analogous, controlling precedent in this Circuit dooms the

argument. Our Court of Appeals recently rejected a claim based on an IEP’s omission of certain

services where the student received them all the same. Edward M.R.,

(“[T]he

record shows that [student] did receive research-based instruction in speech and language, and in

occupational therapy, even if his IEPs were silent on the matter. As such, his substantive rights

weren’t affected, and his claim fails.”). Plaintiffs’ argument here likewise fails. 11

* * *

On a careful review, the Court concludes that the Hearing Officer appropriately reevaluated

the December IEP on remand, affording due consideration to the entirety of the record and

Plaintiffs’ various objections and arguments. Stated differently, the Hearing Officer issued “a well-

reasoned administrative decision that is supported by the evidence in the administrative record.

Nothing more is required to sustain that decision.” Edward M.R. v. Dist. of Columbia,

, 116 (D.D.C. 2023), aff’d,

(D.C. Cir. 2025). The Court recognizes Plaintiffs’

belief that DCPS could have done more to support A.U. through the December IEP, but the Court

11 At another point, Plaintiffs say the Hearing Officer should have considered a variety of testing data and performance results after A.U. started at Siena for the 2020–21 school year. (Pls.’ Mem. at 43.) That argument fails because none of that information was available to the IEP team at the time they prepared the December 2019 IEP. Philpot v. Dist. of Columbia,

, at *4 (D.D.C. May 6, 2025) (“Instead of evaluating an IEP’s adequacy based on subsequent progress that a student may or may not achieve, the Court must ask whether the IEP was appropriately designed and implemented so as to convey a meaningful benefit.”) (cleaned up) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted,

(D.D.C. May 28, 2025); Pavelko v. Dist. of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2018) (“[T]he adequacy of an IEP can be measured only at the time it is formulated, not in hindsight.”). 22 remains mindful that the IDEA does guarantee “the best possible education or even a ‘potential-

maximizing one.’” Leggett,

(quoting Rowley,

n.21). The IDEA

requires “an educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress in light

of the child’s circumstances.” Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 403 (emphasis added). And here, the remand

determination reasonably concluded that the December 2019 IEP met that obligation.

II. Plaintiffs’ Requested Relief

Having found that the April and May 2019 IEPs were substantively inadequate, but that

the December 2019 was sufficient under the IDEA, the Court turns to potential remedies.

As the Hearing Officer noted, Plaintiffs withdrew their claim for compensatory education

at the administrative level, opting instead to seek relief solely in the form of reimbursement for

tuition and related expenses for A.U.’s placement at Siena. (RAR at 39 (“Plaintiffs are seeking

virtually no relief for the allegedly inappropriate IEPs developed in April and May 2019.”).)

Plaintiffs do not disagree. They acknowledge they are not seeking compensatory education for the

April and May IEPs, but say their complaints about those earlier IEPs “are still relevant” because

“DCPS used them as a starting point for the December IEP.” (ECF No. 63, Supp. Compl. ¶ 36

n.5.) In any case, the supplemental complaint cabins the relief requested to an award of “all

expenses related to the unilateral placement of their son at Siena School related to the 20-21 school

year,” following the allegedly deficient December 2019 IEP. (Id. ¶ 78.)

Because Plaintiffs did not—and do not—seek any relief associated with the deficient April

and May 2019 IEPs, the Court does not need to consider any remedy in connection with those

claims. Instead, the only remedy that Plaintiffs seek—reimbursement for their unilateral placement

at Siena—hinges on a finding that the December 2019 IEP was inadequate. (See Pls.’ Mem. at 44

(recognizing that their reimbursement claim is contingent on a ruling that “DCPS did not prove

23 the December 2019 IEP appropriate”); see also Supp. Compl. ¶ 77 (reflecting that their “Placement

Claim” turns on the finding that the December 2019 IEP was inadequate).) And because DCPS

provided A.U. with a FAPE through the December 2019 IEP, the Court need not reach Plaintiffs’

request for relief in the form of tuition and expense reimbursement. S.M. v. Dist. of Columbia,

, at *7 n.3 (D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2020) (“Because the Court has determined that DCPS

did not deny [student] a FAPE ... it does not further consider Plaintiffs’ request for tuition

reimbursement.”); Pinto v. Dist. of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2014) (similar).

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For these reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court GRANT IN PART

and DENY IN PART both Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 67) and the

District’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 70). The Court should GRANT

Plaintiffs’ motion as to their claims challenging the substantive adequacy of the April and May

2019 IEPs but DENY their motion as to the substantive adequacy of the December 2019 IEP and

their request for reimbursement associated with their unilateral placement of A.U. at Siena. The

Court should instead GRANT the District’s motion as to the substantive adequacy of the December

2019 IEP and rule that Plaintiffs are not entitled to their reimbursement remedy.

Dated: August 8, 2025 MATTHEW J. SHARBAUGH United States Magistrate Judge

24 * * *

The Court hereby advises that, pursuant to

(b)(1)(C) and LCvR 72.3(b),

any party who objects to a report and recommendation must file a written objection within fourteen

(14) days of the party’s receipt of the report and recommendation. The written objections must

specifically identify the portion of the report or recommendation to which objection is made and

the basis for such objections. Failure to file timely objections to the findings and recommendations

set forth in this report may waive that party’s right of appeal from an order of the District Court

that adopts such findings and recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn,

(1985).

25