UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JAMES J. LUKEZIC,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 25-cv-00623 (DLF) FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

James Lukezic brings this action against the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority

(FINRA), the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and David Saltiel, the Director

of the Division of Trading and Markets for SEC. Compl., Dkt. 2. Lukezic seeks injunctive relief

to preclude the defendants from engaging in disciplinary action against him. Before the Court is

the plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Pl.’s Mot., Dkt. 1. For the reasons that follow,

the Court will deny the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Lukezic is an “SEC-registered investment adviser” and a “FINRA-registered broker.” Am.

Compl. ¶ 7, Dkt. 40. He serves as the CEO and Managing Principal of Old Slip Capital

Management, which is a FINRA member firm. Id.

FINRA is Delaware non-profit corporation and a self-regulating organization (SRO) under

the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Alpine Sec. Corp. v. FINRA,

(D.C.

Cir. 2024), cert. denied, No. 24-904,

(U.S. June 2, 2025). Pursuant to that

statutory scheme, SROs exercise a supervisory role over securities markets, and in turn, SROs are subject to SEC oversight.

at 1322–33. When FINRA engages in disciplinary actions against

its members or their associated persons, SEC typically conducts a de novo review of any final

decision or sanction issued by FINRA. Id. at 1326. SEC may “approve, disapprove, or modify

FINRA’s actions,” id., and SEC’s decisions are subject to review by the United States Courts of

Appeals, see 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1).

Around March of 2022, FINRA began investigating Lukezic for engaging in unauthorized

trading. See FINRA Compl. ¶¶ 1, 28, FINRA Disciplinary Proceeding No. 2022073425001 (Dec.

17, 2024), Dkt. 31-3. Beginning in February of 2022, Lukezic allegedly placed six unauthorized

trades “with a total principal value of approximately $1.1 million in the accounts of five customers

without the customers’ authorization,” and provided “false and misleading information” about

those transactions, in violation of FINRA Rules 2010 and 8210. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. FINRA filed a formal

disciplinary complaint against Lukezic in December 2024. See id. Contemporaneously, it filed a

Form U6—Subject of Action in the FINRA Central Registration Depository, pursuant to the

requirements of the Securities Exchange Act. Form U6, Dkt. 31-7; see 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(i)(1),

(5) (requiring FINRA to make information about “disciplinary proceedings” available in a “readily

accessible electronic or other process”).

Lukezic’s disciplinary hearing before FINRA’s Office of Hearing Officers (OHO) is

scheduled to take place on October 6–10, 2025. See Joint Status Rep. at 2, Dkt. 59. Because he

is “person associated with” a FINRA member, FINRA Compl. ¶ 46, he faces the potential

sanctions outlined in FINRA Rule 8310, see FINRA Rule 8310, Dkt. 31-4 (providing that FINRA

may (1) “censure a . . . person associated with a member”; (2) “impose a fine upon a . . . person

associated with a member”; (3) “suspend the registration of a person associated with a member”;

(4) “revoke or cancel the registration of a person associated with a member”; (5) “suspend or bar

2 a . . . person associated with a member from association with all members”; (6) “impose a

temporary or permanent cease and desist order against a . . . person associated with a member”; or

(7) “impose any other fitting sanction.”). If any sanction is imposed by OHO, Lukezic may appeal

that decision before FINRA’s National Adjudicatory Counsel, and any appeal will automatically

stay OHO’s decision. See FINRA Rule 9311, Dkt. 31-4. The Board’s decision, in turn, may be

appealed to the SEC, and such appeal would “automatically stay[] the effectiveness of all sanctions

other than a bar or expulsion issued following a non-expedited disciplinary proceeding.” Alpine,

(citing FINRA Rule 9370(a)). Finally, SEC’s decision is subject to review in

by United States Courts of Appeals. See 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1).

Rather than following that adjudicatory process, on March 3, 2025, Lukezic filed the

instant action and motion for emergency relief in this Court, asserting constitutional violations and

harms to his professional reputation. See Pl’s Mot. On March 7, the Court denied the motion for

TRO for lack of irreparable harm. Order of March 7, 2025, Dkt. 11. Now before the Court is the

Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a

clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Sherley v. Sebelius,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

(2008)). To prevail,

a party seeking preliminary injunctive relief must make a “clear showing that four factors, taken

together, warrant relief: likely success on the merits, likely irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief, a balance of the equities in its favor, and accord with the public interest.”

League of Women Voters v. Newby,

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted). Where a federal agency is the defendant, the last two factors merge. See Am.

3 Immigr. Council v. DHS,

, 36 (D.D.C. 2020). The lack of a likely irreparable

injury alone is enough to defeat a motion for preliminary relief. See Chaplaincy of Full Gospel

Churches v. England,

(D.C. Cir. 2006). And the asserted injury must “directly

result from the action which the movant seeks to enjoin.” Wisc. Gas Co. v. FERC,

(D.C. Cir. 1985).

III. ANALYSIS

The Court’s analysis will begin and end with lack of irreparable harm. Lukezic asserts two

sources of irreparable harm: (1) constitutional violations of his rights under the nondelegation

doctrine, the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, and the Due Process Clause, see Pl.’s Mot.

at 15–16; and (2) “severe economic consequences as a result of FINRA’s allegations,” id. at 17–

18.

A. Constitutional Claims

Start with Lukezic’s nondelegation claim. In general, an alleged constitutional defect in

FINRA’s exercise of enforcement authority is not a standalone basis for asserting an irreparable

harm. Alpine, 121 F.4th at 1332–33. As the D.C. Circuit recently explained in Alpine, a lack of

pre-enforcement government review still leaves open judicial “review . . . after FINRA’s sanctions

take effect.”

. Even if Lukezic is “the subject of an arguably unconstitutional

regulatory action,” his constitutional arguments are properly raised “within the context of an

administrative enforcement proceeding.” John Doe Co. v. CFPB,

(D.C. Cir.

2017) (collecting cases). Where raising a claim in an actual enforcement proceeding does not

“somehow foreclose all meaningful judicial review,”

(citation modified), a constitutional

violation is not per se irreparable harm. Moreover, the harms from “many types of sanctions

imposed by FINRA, short of expulsion, can be undone later.” Alpine,

.

4 Ultimately, “only immediate, unreviewable expulsion justifies preliminary relief; every FINRA

sanction short of such expulsion does not.” Smith v. FINRA, No. 25-cv-447 (JEB),

, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2025); see Alpine, 121 F.4th at 1330–31 (“Alpine has not

demonstrated at this time that it is entitled to a preliminary injunction against any sanctions short

of expulsion.”)

Here, Lukezic does not allege an imminent, unreviewable expulsion. See generally Compl.

Indeed, he cannot. Because he is not a FINRA “member”—that is, a broker-dealer firm—Lukezic

does not face even the possibility of expulsion; at most, he faces a “bar” from associating with any

FINRA member firm. See Alpine,

n.3. (“[A] bar may be meaningfully different

from expulsion of a FINRA member firm since a person barred from trading securities can pursue

other work while appealing to the SEC, while a firm organized for the purpose of trading securities

cannot.”). Thus, in this context, Alpine squarely forecloses the contention that any allegedly

unconstitutional delegation to SEC or FINRA gives rise to an irreparable injury.

Lukezic’s claims of irreparable harm based on the Seventh Amendment and the Due

Process Clause are no different. It is well established that in the Seventh Amendment context, “the

harm resulting from the denial of a jury trial can be remedied on appeal, even after the case has

already been tried” because a reviewing court can “simply order[] a new trial.” Ponte v. FDIC,

No. 24-cv-2379 (APM),

, at *8 (D.D.C. Oct. 11, 2024) (collecting cases).

Likewise, in the Due Process context, an injury must be “above-and-beyond being required to

participate in a constitutionally defective proceeding.” Meta Platforms, Inc. v. FTC,

, 82–83 (D.D.C. 2024). Where subsequent judicial review “could fully vindicate” Lukezic’s

claims of constitutional violations, there is no irreparable harm. John Doe Co.,

(citation modified). Here, if Lukezic is ultimately sanctioned by FINRA, he may obtain judicial

5 review of that sanction, his constitutional claims, and any procedural deficiencies in FINRA’s

adjudicative process through the judicial review scheme set forth in the Securities Exchange Act.

Alpine,

(citing Deaver v. United States,

(Rehnquist, C.J.,

in chambers)).

B. Monetary Loss and Reputational Harm

Lukezic’s next theory of irreparable harm is based on the loss of profits and reputational

goodwill stemming from FINRA’s publications about the pending proceedings. Mot. at 17–18.

But in the D.C. Circuit, it is “well settled that economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute

irreparable harm,” Wisc. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674, “especially when it is nothing more than

speculation about how third parties might respond to routine regulatory investigations,” John Doe

Co., 849 F.3d at 1134–35. “Monetary loss, even irretrievable monetary loss, may constitute

irreparable harm only if it is so severe as to cause extreme hardship to the business or threaten its

very existence.” Mylan Lab’ys Ltd. v. FDA,

(D.D.C. 2012). “[E]ven

unrecoverable economic losses do not constitute irreparable harm . . . if they do not spell financial

disaster for the moving party.” Watson Lab’ys, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-cv-1344 (ABJ),

, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2012). The “loss of business opportunities, market share, and

customer goodwill are typically considered to be economic harms.” Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v.

Exp.-Imp. Bank of the U.S.,

(D.D.C. 2012)

Lukezic does not meet the high bar required to show that the “very existence” of his

business is threatened. Mylan Lab’ys,

; Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Jackson,

(D.D.C. 2011) (“While Mr. Johnson’s representations raise legitimate concerns

about the current and future health of his company, his declaration falls short of what is necessary

to merit a finding of irreparable harm.”). Summary allegations of “lost profit,” and even the loss

6 of an alleged $25 million funding opportunity, fall short. Lukezic Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, Dkt. 1-3; see Mylan

Lab’ys, Inc. v. Leavitt,

(D.D.C. 2007) (“Monetary figures are relative,

and depend for their ultimate quantum, on a comparison with the overall financial wherewithal of

the corporation involved.”).

Also fatal to Lukezic’s motion, these economic harms do not directly stem from Lukezic’s

asserted constitutional violations. See Wisc. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674 (noting an irreparable injury

must be a “direct result” of the challenged agency action). Lukezic asserts that his lost business

results from “FINRA’s continuous publication of false allegations” against him. Lukezic Decl.

¶ 8. But FINRA’s publication of Lukezic’s alleged misconduct is distinct from any violations of

his due process rights, jury trial rights, or the nondelegation doctrine. 1 FINRA is required to

maintain its Central Registration Depository of disciplinary actions under 15 U.S.C. § 78o-

3(i)(1)(B), and Lukezic does not purport to challenge the constitutionality of that statute.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the Court finds that Lukezic has not shown that he will suffer irreparable harm

absent immediate relief. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Dkt. 1, is DENIED.

________________________ DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH August 10, 2025 United States District Judge

1 Lukezic alleges, for the first time in his reply brief, Dkt. 43, that FINRA’s publication constitutes defamation per se. But he does not assert defamation claims in his complaint, and the Court will not consider claims or issues raised for the first time in a reply brief. See Am. Wildlands v. Kempthorne,

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief to be forfeited).

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