UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANTONIO VIARDO,

Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 25-1603 (JEB) FAMILIES USA FOUNDATION, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Antonio Viardo is a former employee of Defendant Families USA Foundation,

Inc., a nonprofit organization that advocates on behalf of healthcare consumers. He was

terminated by Defendant Yael Lehmann, then the Interim Executive Director, ostensibly for poor

performance, missed meetings, and non-responsiveness. In bringing this action under the

Americans with Disabilities Act and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act against both the

organization and Lehmann, he asserted that the true reason was that Families USA viewed his

disability as an unnecessary risk and expense.

Defendants now move to dismiss the counts against Lehmann only. First, they say that

Plaintiff cannot proceed on those counts because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

Second, they argue that Viardo’s claims against Lehmann are time barred. The Court disagrees

and will deny the Partial Motion to Dismiss.

I. Background

The Court, as it must at this stage, draws the facts from the Complaint and assumes them

to be true. Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2000). Families

1 USA hired Viardo in May 2023 “to serve on its executive Senior Leadership Team as Senior

Director of Communications.” ECF No. 1 (Compl.), ¶ 11. In that role, he sought to overhaul the

organization’s communications department “to support, promote, and help secure millions of

dollars’ worth of business revenue and cost savings,” as well as to “develop[] and implement[]

new digital marketing tactics, capabilities, processes and products.” Id., ¶ 14. During his first

performance review, Plaintiff received high marks and was praised as “the best” among previous

communication leaders. Id., ¶ 15.

Viardo suffers from a heart condition that “regularly causes him pain, fatigue, and

shortness of breath, and — under certain triggers — dizziness, nausea, and uncontrolled

drowsiness, all of which are precursors to a potential heart attack or stroke.” Id., ¶¶ 17–18. To

stave off medical emergencies, he requires a flexible work schedule that accommodates

intermittent breaks during symptom flare-ups and allows time for medical appointments. Id.,

¶¶ 19–21. Families USA leadership purportedly was aware of Plaintiff’s condition, id., ¶¶ 23–

30, and encouraged him “to work outside typical business hours and/or remotely to make up for

any lost time.” Id., ¶ 31.

In March 2024, then-Interim Executive Director Lehmann requested to meet with

Plaintiff following his return from health-related leave. Id., ¶ 40. What he thought would be a

routine meeting “to discuss expectations and establish goals for the coming year,” id., ¶ 41,

allegedly turned into an “ambush[]” to terminate his employment. Id., ¶ 42. Lehmann explained

that Plaintiff had been “difficult to reach recently” and that he had “failed to attend a client

meeting,” had “provided a subpar presentation to an important FUSA client,” and had been

“taking too much time off.” Id., ¶ 43.

2 Believing that the reasons for his termination “were a clear pretext for discrimination,”

id., ¶ 48, Plaintiff first filed an administrative complaint with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission. Id., ¶ 9. He then filed this suit after receiving a right-to-sue letter

from the Commission. Id. The Complaint includes four counts. All are lodged against Families

USA, while Counts III and IV also apply to Lehmann individually: disability discrimination

under the ADA (Count I); retaliation for requesting reasonable accommodation under the ADA

(Count II); disability discrimination under the DCHRA (Count III); and retaliation for requesting

reasonable accommodation under the DCHRA (Count IV). Defendants now move to dismiss the

last two counts though only as to Lehmann. See ECF No. 6 (MTD).

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of an action where a

complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, the court must “treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true . . . and must grant

plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Sparrow,

(quoting Schuler v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 1979)) (citation

omitted). The pleading rules are “not meant to impose a great burden,” Dura Pharms., Inc. v.

Broudo,

(2005), and “detailed factual allegations” are thus not necessary. Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007).

A complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting

Twombly,

). The court need not accept as true “a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation,” nor an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. Trudeau

v. FTC,

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain,

, 286

3 (1986)). The facts instead “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”

even if “recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56 (quoting Scheuer

v. Rhodes,

(1974)).

III. Analysis

The DCHRA makes it unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge,

any individual” based on that individual’s “actual or perceived . . . disability.”

-

1402.11(a)(1)(A). The Act further provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory

practice to coerce, threaten, retaliate against, or interfere with any person in the exercise or

enjoyment of . . . any right granted or protected” thereunder.

§ 2-1402.61(a). As courts have

observed, the statute “announces a broad prohibition against discriminatory acts by an

employer,” and its intent is to “eliminate discrimination in the District of Columbia.” Kambala

v. Chechhi & Co. Consulting, Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2017) (quotation marks

omitted).

In their current Motion, Defendants seek dismissal of the DCHRA counts against

Lehmann only. They contend both that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

before filing suit in this Court and that the DCHRA claims are time barred. The Court addresses

each of those issues in turn.

A. Exhaustion

Defendants initially argue that Viardo failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to

Lehmann because he did not file a charge of discrimination directly aimed at her. See MTD at

ECF pp. 4–5. The question, however, is whether the DCHRA contains any exhaustion

requirement at all. Defendants support their position by relying on guiding principles from the

ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

To bring a civil action under either

4 statute, “a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination

with the EEOC.” Cooper v. Henderson,

(D.D.C. 2016); see also 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (Title VII exhaustion requirements); id., § 12117(a) (ADA section

adopting remedies and procedures set forth in Title VII). But that requirement has little bearing

on Defendants’ position here.

It is true that the DCHRA is often interpreted in parallel with the ADA and Title VII

given the similarities among the statutes. Pressley v. Mgmt. Support Tech., Inc.,

, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2023) (comparing DCHRA with ADA); Wicks v. Am.

Transmission Co. LLC,

(D.D.C. 2010) (comparing DCHRA with Title

VII). But their parallel journey diverges when it comes to exhaustion. Unlike Title VII or the

ADA, the DCHRA provides employees with two separate paths to address discriminatory

practices. First, they may file a complaint with the D.C. Office of Human Rights (DCOHR).

See

(a). Alternatively, they may “file a private cause of action in a court

of competent jurisdiction.”

§ 2-1403.16(a). As a court in this district previously explained,

at least in the context of private-sector employees, the latter option does not require exhausting

administrative remedies before pursuing a claim in a court with proper jurisdiction. Ndondji v.

InterPark, Inc.,

(D.D.C. 2011) (“Nothing in the plain language of the

DCHRA suggests that an exhaustion requirement applies to non-District of Columbia

government employees.”).

As the DCHRA is bereft of any exhaustion requirement, the Court will deny Defendants’

request to dismiss Counts III and IV on that ground.

5 B. Statute of Limitations

Defendants next assert that Plaintiff’s DCHRA counts against Lehmann are time barred.

“A DCHRA claim must be filed with the [DCOHR] or any court of competent jurisdiction within

one year of the alleged conduct.” Clay v. Howard Univ.,

(D.D.C. 2015)

(citing

(a), 2-1403.16(a)). If an employee opts to file a complaint with

the DCOHR first, “[t]he timely filing of a complaint with the Office . . . shall toll the running of

the statute of limitations while the complaint is pending.”

(a).

To begin, there is no question that the suit against Families USA was timely filed. All

parties agree that the determinative date of the allegedly discriminatory or retaliatory conduct

was March 7, 2024, when Plaintiff’s employment was terminated. See MTD at ECF p. 2; ECF

No. 8 (Pl. Opp.) at 1. Following his termination, Viardo filed a charge of discrimination with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on July 8, 2024. See Compl., ¶ 9. In doing so, his

charge was “automatically cross-filed with the [DCOHR] pursuant to a ‘worksharing agreement’

between the two agencies.” Ellis v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.,

(D.D.C.

2009) (citing

(a)(4)(ii)(A)). The clock was therefore tolled until the EEOC

issued him a right-to-sue letter on February 28, 2025. See Compl., ¶ 9; Pappas v. District of

Columbia,

, 83 (D.D.C. 2021) (“Once the EEOC . . . issues a right to sue

letter, the statute of limitations begins to run anew.”) (citation omitted). Letter in hand, he filed

this suit against Defendants on May 19, 2025. Excluding tolling time, therefore, Viardo clearly

filed within one year.

Defendants instead contend that Viardo “only ever filed an EEOC charge of

discrimination against Families USA.” MTD at ECF p. 5 (emphasis added). In other words,

6 they assert that the DCOHR charge did not toll the statute of limitations as to Lehmann because

that filing never addressed her as a respondent to the EEOC proceedings.

As a general rule, persons not specifically named in an EEOC charge cannot be sued in

subsequent litigation. EEOC v. Metzger,

(D.D.C. 1993). Yet the rule is not an

inflexible requirement that reduces an EEOC charge to a box-checking exercise. U.S. Equal

Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Sol Mexican Grill, LLC,

, 15 (D.D.C.

2019) (“[T]he naming requirement ‘was never intended to be rigid . . . .’”) (quoting McManus v.

Washington Gas Light Co.,

, at *5 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 1991)). An individual not

named in an EEOC charge may nevertheless be appropriately named in a subsequent lawsuit so

long as she had “actual notice of the EEOC proceeding or [had] an identity of interest with the

party or parties sued before the EEOC.” Metzger,

. Requiring an unnamed

party to have knowledge of the proceedings or shared interests with a named party vindicates the

filing requirement’s purpose: “to give parties notice of discrimination charges and to facilitate

conciliation by the EEOC.” Anyaibe v. Gilbert Sec. Serv. Inc.,

, at *3 (D.D.C.

May 18, 1995).

The Court believes that Plaintiff’s EEOC charge falls within that narrow exception.

While Viardo named Families USA as the respondent in his EEOC charge, he directly referenced

the Interim Executive Director more than ten times throughout the charge’s details. See MTD,

Exh. A (EEOC Charge) at ECF pp. 10–11. More importantly, her “particular position[]” makes

it “fair to infer [that she] had notice of [Viardo’s] EEOC charge or had a sufficient identity of

interest” with Families USA. Lanier v. Smedberg,

, at *8 (D.D.C. July 29,

2025). As Interim Executive Director, Lehmann held the “most senior position within FUSA

and maintain[ed] responsibility and/or discretion with respect to the hiring and/or termination of

7 other executives.” Compl., ¶ 13. What is more, the charge identified Lehmann as the key figure

behind Plaintiff’s firing, and Families USA’s response centered largely on defending her conduct

and decisions. See Pl. Opp., Exh. 1 (EEOC Charge Resp.) at 3–6.

Lehmann’s circumstances differ from cases where courts have barred subsequent suits

against parties not named in an EEOC charge. For example, in Metzger, a law-firm partner

could not be sued when the partnership had notice of an EEOC charge, but there was no evidence

that the individual partner “was mentioned in the details of the charge before the EEOC.”

. In Clay, frequent references to a university executive in EEOC charges were

insufficient to toll the statute of limitations because the executive “was no longer an employee or

officer . . . at the time Plaintiff filed her EEOC charges.”

. Finally, in

Newman v. Amazon.com, Inc.,

(D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2022), the court likewise

declined to impute a company’s knowledge of an EEOC charge to an individual referenced in

that charge because he was “simply an employee” who “did not have an ‘identity of interest’

with the company.”

.

The circumstances here, conversely, lead to a reasonable inference that Lehmann either

had notice of Plaintiff’s EEOC charge or a sufficient identity of interest with Families USA. The

Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff’s discrimination charge was sufficient to toll the DCHRA

statute of limitations against Lehmann as well. There is thus no basis to dismiss the counts

against her.

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court will deny Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss. A separate

Order so stating will issue this day.

8 /s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG Chief Judge Date: August 13, 2025

9