UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

POURIA ESMAEIL POUR, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 25-573 (JEB) MARCO A. RUBIO, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se Plaintiff Pouria Esmaeil Pour is an Iranian F-visa applicant who seeks to attend a

PhD program in the United States; his wife, pro se Plaintiff Sogand Mahboubi, wishes to

accompany him. They are unable to enter this country until their visa applications are approved

by the U.S. Embassy in Doha, Qatar. Plaintiffs contend that the unreasonable delay in obtaining

a final decision on their applications has caused them considerable financial, emotional, and

medical hardships. Invoking the Mandamus Act and the Administrative Procedure Act, they

brought this suit asking the Court to compel the State Department to readjudicate their visa

applications. Defendants State Department, Secretary Marco Rubio, and other Department

employees have now moved to dismiss, asserting both that Plaintiffs do not identify a clear and

nondiscretionary duty requiring the agency to act and that, alternatively, the consular

nonreviewability doctrine bars judicial review. As the first point is persuasive, the Court will

grant the Motion.

1 I. Background

A. Legal Background

Foreign students who wish to pursue a “full course of study” in a U.S. academic

institution may apply for an “F-1” nonimmigrant visa. See

(a)(15)(F). Spouses

and minor children can accompany them by applying for a derivative “F-2” visa.

§ 1101(a)(15)(F)(ii). Typically, all such applicants must appear for an in-person interview with a

consular officer to evaluate their eligibility. Id. § 1202(h). Absent a visa sanction against the

applicant’s country, the officer must either “issue” or “refuse” the visa. See

(a). The visa shall be refused “if (1) it appears to the consular officer from statements in

the application, or in the papers submitted therewith, that [the non-citizen] is ineligible to receive

a visa . . . , (2) the application fails to comply with the [Immigration and Nationality Act], or the

regulations issued thereunder, or (3) the consular officer knows or has reason to believe that such

alien is ineligible to receive a visa.”

(g).

In cases where the officer requires additional information to determine the applicant’s

eligibility, however, he may refuse the visa pending further “administrative processing.”

Administrative Processing Information, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://perma.cc/NK8K-9U8H. The

status of each application is published on the State Department’s website. See Visa Status

Check, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://perma.cc/SBV4-AT2N.

In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Congress enacted the Enhanced Border

Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002. The Act, among other things, imposed new

restrictions on the issuance of visas and more stringent procedures for monitoring the entry and

exit of foreign students and exchange visitors. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1731–32, 1735, 1761–62.

It provides, as relevant here, that non-immigrant visas may not be issued to a non-citizen from a

2 country that has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism “unless the Secretary of State

determines . . . that [the non-citizen] does not pose a threat to the safety or national security of

the United States.” Id. § 1735. Iran has been so designated since 1984. See State Sponsors of

Terrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://perma.cc/CBT2-2C87.

B. Factual Background

With this statutory and regulatory backdrop in mind, the Court proceeds to the facts as

drawn from the Complaint, as required at this stage. Pour is an Iranian F-1 visa applicant who

seeks to attend a fully funded PhD program in Civil Engineering at the University of Texas,

Austin. See ECF No. 1 (Compl.), ¶ 6. Pour’s wife, Mahboubi, is an Iranian F-2 visa applicant

who wishes to accompany her husband. Id., ¶ 7. They applied for these nonimmigrant student

visas and interviewed jointly at the U.S. Embassy in Doha on May 19, 2024. Id., ¶ 13. At the

end of the interview, the consular officer informed Plaintiffs verbally that their “case require[d]

further administrative processing” and told them to contact the Embassy if they did not receive

an update by July 2024. See ECF No. 21-1 (Joint Decl.), ¶¶ 2–3; Compl. ¶ 13. To Plaintiffs’

confusion, the consular officer simultaneously handed them a letter that indicated that their

application was “conditionally approved.” See Compl., ¶ 13; Joint Decl., ¶ 4; ECF No. 1-6

(Conditional Letter). Reflecting the consular officer’s verbal communications, however, Pour’s

application on the Visa Status Check website on May 19, 2024, indicated that his application had

been “adjudicated and refused” and would stay refused while it was “undergoing [administrative]

processing.” ECF No. 1-2 (Visa Status); Compl., ¶ 25.

Plaintiffs did not receive any further instructions by the July 2024 deadline indicated by

the consular officer. See ECF No. 1-3 (Email Commc’ns) at ECF p. 10. Fearing that Pour would

lose his offer of admission, waiver of tuition, and other benefits if he was unable to enter the

3 United States in time for the Fall 2024 semester, see Compl., ¶¶ 15–16, Plaintiffs emailed the

Embassy nine more times over the next eight months requesting an update on the status of their

applications. Id., ¶ 21; see Email Commc’ns at ECF pp. 1–9. These entreaties were to no avail.

In its replies, the Embassy repeatedly stated that Plaintiffs’ visas remained in administrative

processing with no further action required from Plaintiffs. Id.; see also Email Commc’ns at ECF

pp. 1–4, 7, 10–11. Having deferred enrollment twice already and facing the possibility of having

to defer once more, see Compl., ¶¶ 15–16, Pour began suffering “serious mental and

cardiovascular symptoms” because of the uncertainty surrounding his situation. See Joint Decl.,

¶ 8. On February 25, 2025, Plaintiffs sued Secretary of State Marco Rubio, along with the

Department itself and several of its unnamed employees, see Compl., ¶¶ 8–10, claiming that the

agency’s delays — over nine months at the time of filing — are unreasonable. They ask the

Court to compel “Defendants to adjudicate Plaintiffs’ visa applications within thirty (30) days”

pursuant to the Mandamus Act,

, and the Administrative Procedure Act,

(1). See Compl. at 11–13. The Government now moves to dismiss the Complaint

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim for relief. See ECF No. 19

(MTD) at 1.

II. Legal Standard

Defendants’ Motion invokes the legal standards for dismissal under Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). When a defendant brings a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to

dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, “[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of establishing

jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Bagherian v. Pompeo,

, at *2

(D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2020) (quoting Didban v. Pompeo,

, 174 (D.D.C. 2020)).

The court “assume[s] the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and

4 ‘construe[s] the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be

derived from the facts alleged.’” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC,

(D.C. Cir.

2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi,

(D.C. Cir. 2005)).

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007). Although

“detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,

,

“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, [if] accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Twombly,

). Although a plaintiff may survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion even if “‘recovery is

very remote and unlikely,’” the facts alleged in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes,

(1974)).

When plaintiffs represent themselves, the standard articulated above is relaxed. “A

document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully

pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007) (cleaned up). In this Circuit, such leniency extends

beyond the complaint, as “a district court must consider together all allegations that pro se

plaintiffs make in their pleadings — including in their oppositions — when resolving a motion to

dismiss.” Elghannam v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bds. of Pharmacy,

, 60 n.1 (D.D.C.

2015) (citing Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2015)).

III. Analysis

Contending that their visa applications have been unreasonably delayed, Plaintiffs ask

this Court to compel the State Department to expeditiously process them. They seek a writ of

5 mandamus under

or an order compelling agency action under the APA,

(1). See Compl. at 11–13.

A. Legal Framework

“The remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary

circumstances.” Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell,

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation

omitted). To proceed to the merits, parties “must first establish that the agency has violated a

crystal-clear legal duty” and that they have “no other adequate means to attain the relief [they]

desire[].” In re Ctr. for Biological Diversity,

(D.C. Cir. 2022) (quotation

marks and citation omitted) (“Absent a violation of a clear duty, this court is powerless to grant

mandamus.”). “These . . . threshold requirements are jurisdictional; unless all are met, a court

must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.” Am. Hosp. Ass’n,

. Even after

the jurisdictional hurdle is met, however, mandamus relief is warranted only when the court

“finds compelling equitable grounds.” In re Ctr.,

(quotation marks omitted). For

the court to grant mandamus on an unreasonable-delay claim, the hexagonal TRAC factors guide

the court’s equity analysis. See Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr. (TRAC) v. FCC,

(D.C. Cir. 1984) (outlining six factors that courts must consider when determining

unreasonableness of agency delay).

Plaintiffs must meet a similarly high standard under the APA before the court can

“compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”

(1). Such

judicial restraint is rooted in concerns about judicial review of non-final agency action. TRAC,

(“Postponing review until relevant agency proceedings have been concluded

permits an administrative agency to develop a factual record, to apply its expertise to that record,

and to avoid piecemeal appeals.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

6 The court can likewise proceed to analyze the TRAC factors only when “a plaintiff asserts that

an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.” Norton v. S. Utah

Wilderness All.,

(2004). Because “the standards for obtaining relief” under both

the Mandamus Act and the APA are “essentially the same,” courts evaluate these two claims

together. See Viet. Veterans of Am. v. Shinseki,

, 659 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see

also Karimova v. Abate,

, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 24, 2024) (“Those two paths to

compulsory relief share a common threshold . . . .”).

Defendants argue that this case should be dismissed because Plaintiffs have not identified

a clear and nondiscretionary duty that requires a consular officer to take further action on their

applications. See MTD at 4. They claim that the officer has no further responsibility to

readjudicate an application that was refused and placed into administrative processing under

§ 221(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,

(g). See MTD at 5. Plaintiffs

disagree, asserting that a § 221(g) refusal is “merely a temporary procedural status” that does not

absolve the agency from having to render a final decision on their visa applications. See Opp. at

6. They maintain that this continuing duty, which “require[s] timely adjudication of visa

applications,” can be found in the APA, the INA and its implementing regulations, and the

Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM). Id.

The Court examines each provision in turn to determine whether it imposes a clear and

nondiscretionary duty on agencies to readjudicate a visa application after it is placed in

administrative processing.

7 B. Clear and Nondiscretionary Duty

1. Administrative Procedure Act

Plaintiffs first contend that portions of the Administrative Procedure Act,

(b) and § 706(1), provide the statutory authority needed to compel agency action. See

Compl., ¶¶ 44–46. Section 555(b) mandates that “within a reasonable time, each agency shall

proceed to conclude a matter presented to it.” Section 706(1) enables courts to compel agencies

to take action that is “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” Plaintiffs assert that the

agency’s failure to take final action on their applications violates its duty to act under these two

provisions of the APA.

The D.C. Circuit addressed this issue just last year in Karimova. The plaintiff there

requested mandamus and APA relief to compel consular officers to make a “final decision” on

her immigrant-visa application after it had been placed into administrative processing.

Karimova,

, at *2–3. The Government moved to dismiss her claims on

consular-nonreviewability grounds and, alternatively, because there had been no unreasonable

delay.

. The district court granted the motion, holding that, while judicial review was

available, her visa application had not been unreasonably delayed. Quiros v. Amador,

, 43 (D.D.C. 2023), aff’d sub nom. Karimova,

, at *3. After de

novo review, the Circuit affirmed the dismissal on a different ground, holding that § 555(b) does

not provide a “clear, non-discretionary duty” because it is a “statement of general, good-

governance principles,” and its “non-specific directive . . . leaves officials ample room for

judgment based on the circumstances.” Karimova,

, at *3–4. Most

importantly, it was explicit that this section of the APA does not place a “crystal-clear legal

duty” on consular officers to terminate “any potentially beneficial follow-on administrative

8 processing” after having already “adjudicated a visa application.”

(citation omitted). In

doing so, it emphasized that the case was “not standard administrative fare” because of the

judiciary’s historically limited role in immigration policy, making general provisions such as

§ 555(b) especially unsuitable as a source of a mandatory duty. Id. at *5; see also United States

ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,

(1950) (“It is not within the province of any

court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review the determination of the political branch of

the Government to exclude a given alien.”).

Although the Court of Appeals did not discuss § 706(1), that section also cannot act as a

source of independent duties for consular officers because it is just as “general[] and indistinct[]”

as § 555(b). Karimova,

, at *4. Given Karimova’s holding, Plaintiffs cannot

rely on either of these APA sections to establish a clear and nondiscretionary duty for agency

officials to act after administrative processing.

Plaintiffs respond that Karimova is not dispositive because it is an unpublished decision

regulated by D.C. Circuit Rule 36(e)(2). See Opp. at 14. Under that Rule, “a panel’s decision to

issue an unpublished disposition means that the panel sees no precedential value in that

disposition.” The Government counters, however, by citing to another D.C. Circuit rule, which it

claims makes unpublished circuit decisions still binding on district courts. See MTD at 5 n.2

(citing D.C. Cir. R. 32.1(b)(1)(B) (“All unpublished orders or judgments of this court, including

explanatory memoranda[,] . . . may be cited as precedent.”)). Courts in this district have taken

opposite approaches to these potentially conflicting rules in determining the binding nature of

Karimova. See Datta v. Rubio,

, at *6 n.3 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2025) (collecting

cases). Other courts, declining to wade into this debate, have concluded that Karimova’s

reasoning is persuasive in granting Government motions to dismiss. See, e.g., Naseri v. Rubio,

9

, at *6 (D.D.C. July 7, 2025); Doroodchi v. Rubio,

, at *4

(D.D.C. July 7, 2025).

This Court adopts this last position. Regardless of whether Karimova is actually binding,

it is still a case decided by the Circuit that contains reasoning that the Court finds persuasive as

to the APA. That Act, accordingly, is not the source of a nondiscretionary duty.

2. INA and Federal Regulations

Reaching for other arrows in their quiver, Plaintiffs clarify in their Opposition that they

rely on statutory and regulatory provisions beyond the APA, including the INA and its

implementing regulations. See Opp. at 6. They maintain that such provisions create a “statutory

scheme” under which “consular officers are required to complete adjudication of each visa

application following an interview” — a “clear, non-discretionary obligation.”

. It is true

that Karimova seems to squarely reject only § 555(b) as a source of clear and nondiscretionary

duties, leaving open the possibility that such duties might come from another source. See

, at *3 (“Karimova argues that Section 555(b) — and only Section 555(b) — places

a clear, non-discretionary duty on her consular officer.”) (cleaned up).

Following that reasoning, Plaintiffs cite district-court decisions that have distinguished

Karimova by concluding that a clear and nondiscretionary duty derives from the INA and its

regulations if not the APA. See Opp. at 14 (citing Haeri Mehneh v. Blinken,

,

at *6 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2024) (finding duty under INA and federal regulations); Aramnahad v.

Rubio,

, at *8 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2025) (same)).

This Court cannot join their company. Its reading of the relevant statute and regulations

for nonimmigrant visas yields the conclusion that they do not provide a clear and

10 nondiscretionary duty for consular officers to act after administrative processing. In explaining

why, the Court begins with the text and then distinguishes the aforementioned cases.

a. Text

The relevant provision from the INA requires that “[a]ll nonimmigrant visa applications

shall be reviewed and adjudicated by a consular officer.”

(d). The implementing

regulations similarly require that after “a visa application has been properly completed and

executed in accordance with the provisions of the INA,” then “the consular officer must issue the

visa [or] refuse the visa.”

(a). While such provisions do indeed create a

nondiscretionary duty for consular officers to act, they stop short of giving Plaintiffs the “right to

compel further consular action after a consular officer has considered and refused the Visa

Applications at issue here.” MTD at 1–2; see also Doroodchi,

, at *4

(“Section 1202(d) likewise does not create a duty to further adjudicate a visa placed into

administrative processing.”). Under the plain text of the statute, the verb “shall” in the INA

creates a mandatory duty for consular officers to “review[] and adjudicate[]” nonimmigrant visa

applications. See

(d); see also Naseri,

, at *10 (“This Court

agrees with the general proposition that ‘shall’ usually indicates a mandatory duty.”) (citing

Ballou v. Kemp,

, 558–59 (D.C. Cir. 1937)). But that initial adjudication is all that

they are required to do. See Yaghoubnezhad v. Stufft,

, 99–101 (D.D.C.

2024).

An adjudication, as established by the implementing regulations, occurs “when a visa

application has been properly completed and executed in accordance with the provisions of the

INA” and “the consular officer [has] issue[d] the visa [or] refuse[d] the visa.”

(a). In this case, the relevant “provision[] of the INA” is

(g), which is

11 the section that enables consular officers to refuse a visa and place it into further administrative

processing. See

(a) (stating that “[n]onimmigrant visa refusals must be based

on legal grounds, such as . . . INA 221(g) . . . or other applicable law”); see also Administrative

Processing Information, supra. Indeed, the agency’s internal guidelines indicate that the

consular officer’s initial decision is an adjudication. See 9 FAM § 302.1-8(B)(c) (“A refusal

under INA 221(g) is, legally, a refusal on a visa application, even if that refusal is eventually

overcome.”). The Government therefore discharged its nondiscretionary duty when it refused

Plaintiffs’ applications under INA § 221(g). See Karimova,

, at *3

(“[Plaintiff] received the ‘refused’ decision that the law expressly authorizes . . . .”) (quoting

); see, e.g., Ibrahim,

, at *3 (“[O]ne cannot read Karimova as

saying anything other than a 221(g) refusal and placement in administrative processing was a

conclusion.”).

The federal regulations impose no additional obligations to act after the application is

placed in administrative processing. “Nothing in federal law speaks to the ability of a consul,

after making that decision, to hold onto the application in case circumstances later change in the

applicant’s favor . . . .” Karimova,

, at *4. Plaintiffs emphasize throughout

their Opposition that their applications were conditionally approved initially, see Opp. at 10, 13,

but that does not change the fact that their applications were ultimately adjudicated and refused

under § 221(g). The Court, accordingly, finds that the INA and federal regulations for

nonimmigrant visas do not create an independent duty for agencies to readjudicate a visa after

placing it into administrative processing.

12 b. Cases

Hoping to garner more traction, Plaintiffs cite to multiple cases, including some from this

district, see Opp. at 14, that have found a nondiscretionary duty to follow up after administrative

processing. See, e.g., Haeri Mehneh,

, at *6; Aramnahad,

, at

*8–10; Motevali v. Rubio,

, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2025). These cases can be

distinguished, however, because they concern immigrant visas, which are governed by a different

set of regulations from nonimmigrant visas. Compare

(procedures for refusing

immigrant visas), with

§ 41.121 (procedures for refusing nonimmigrant visas). In most

cases, plaintiffs pointed to

(e) as providing a duty to reconsider their claims

after a § 221(g) refusal. See, e.g., Aramnahad,

, at *8; Haeri Mehneh,

, at *6 (“Section 42.81(e) of the INA creates a nondiscretionary duty requiring consular

officers to reconsider within a reasonable time visa applications refused under Section 221(g)

and placed under administrative processing.”). They may be correct that a nondiscretionary duty

exists for immigrant visas, as those regulations state that “the case shall be reconsidered” if “the

applicant within one year from the date of refusal adduces further evidence tending to overcome

the ground of ineligibility.”

(e). But such regulations do not apply to Plaintiffs,

who applied for nonimmigrant F-visas. Those regulations are found in § 41.121 instead, which

has no such equivalent provision mandating readjudication. While large parts of these two

regulations are similar, this omission is a fatal difference.

Plaintiffs’ claims can also be differentiated on factual grounds. One of the only cases that

pertains to nonimmigrant visas emphasized the fact that the consular officer requested more

information from the plaintiff. See, e.g., Karbasian v. U.S. Dep’t of State,

, at

*7 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2025) (distinguishing Karimova by referring to FAM provision that

13 recommends re-adjudication “[w]hen the applicant has presented additional evidence”)

(alteration in original) (quoting 9 FAM § 306.2-2(A)(a)(1)). While the Court disagrees that this

FAM provision can provide a source of duties, as explained below, Plaintiffs never even claim

that they were requested to provide new information, nor do their email communications show

that it happened. See Email Commc’ns; cf. Aramnahad,

, at *8 (plaintiffs could

point to fact that “the consular officer . . . requested Plaintiffs provide additional documentation

after placing their application in administrative processing, which Plaintiffs provided”). This

factual distinction thus also dooms Plaintiffs’ claim.

3. Foreign Affairs Manual

Plaintiffs attempt to fire one last volley by pointing to the FAM, an internal policy

manual used by consular officers around the world, to create a nondiscretionary duty. See Opp.

at 6 (“Plaintiffs properly rely on provisions such as 9 FAM [§] 504.11-3(A) and 9 FAM

[§] 403.12 to demonstrate that the Department’s legal and procedural obligations remain

unfulfilled.”). As a threshold matter, the Court is skeptical that any provision in the FAM

provides a source of nondiscretionary duties; in fact, Plaintiffs themselves concede that the FAM

is “technically non-binding.” Opp. at 6. The Court agrees, since the FAM is a set of internal

agency guidelines and policies that does not purport to bind officers’ actions. See Stone v. U.S.

Dep’t of State,

, at *10 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2022) (“That the Foreign Affairs

Manual offers guidance . . . does not mean that such [actions] are ministerial, non-discretionary

acts.”); Viet. Veterans of Am. v. Sec’y of the Navy,

(D.C. Cir. 1988). Given

the baseline presumption that “consular officers have broad discretion . . . ‘to admit noncitizens

immune from judicial inquiry or interference,’” Karimova,

, at *4 (quoting

Dep’t of State v. Muñoz,

, 907 (2024)), it is highly unlikely that Plaintiffs would

14 find a “crystal-clear legal duty,” id. at *3 (quotation marks omitted), from internal guidelines that

are not meant to be legally binding.

Even if the Court were to assume that some provision in the FAM could be binding,

Plaintiffs have not identified any. Neither of the two guidelines that they point to operates as a

source of nondiscretionary duties. They cite language in 9 FAM § 504.11-3(A)(6)(a), which

states that “[u]nder no circumstances should a decision of the question of eligibility be made

before the Department’s [advisory opinion] is received.” While this guideline applies only to

immigrant visas and is thus technically inapplicable, there is an almost identical guideline about

advisory opinions for nonimmigrant visas in § 403.10-3(B)(a)(3). Regardless, the FAM is

abundantly clear that seeking such an opinion prior to a § 221(g) refusal is purely discretionary.

See id., § 302.1-8(C) (“An [advisory opinion] is not required for a potential INA 221(g) refusal;

however, if you have a question . . . you may request an [advisory opinion] . . . .”).

Plaintiffs next maintain that 9 FAM §§ 403.10 and 403.12 require “consular posts to

conduct ongoing internal review of refusals,” which means that “officers must either issue or

refuse a visa only after a full review.” Opp. at 5 (emphasis omitted); accord id. at 13. This is

once again an inaccurate representation of the guidelines. For starters, the applicant must first

“present[] additional evidence” for the consular officer to “re-open and re-adjudicate the case,”

which never occurred in this case. See 9 FAM § 403.10-4(B)(a). More importantly, there are no

mandatory provisions attached to post-adjudication review of nonimmigrant visas. In the section

for nonimmigrant visas, the FAM includes only discretionary language, stating that “[r]eviewing

officers must review as many [nonimmigrant visa] refusals as is practical, but not fewer than 10

percent of refusals.” 9 FAM § 403.12-3(A)(a) (emphasis added); see also

(c)

(“Nonimmigrant refusals must be reviewed, in accordance with guidance by the Secretary of

15 State, by consular supervisors, or a designated alternate . . . .”). Such language suggests that

“only a small fraction of all visa refusals receives supervisory review” and that “[t]his review is

not automatic,” a reasonable assumption to make in light of the volume of applications received

by consular officers. Yaghoubnezhad, 734 F. Supp. 3d at 100; cf. Blessing v. Freestone,

(1997) (refusing to compel government action under different discretionary standard

because “any individual plaintiff might still be among the 10 . . . percent of persons whose needs

ultimately go unmet”), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in Medina v. Planned

Parenthood S. Atl.,

, 2233–34 (2025). Even if Plaintiffs could somehow establish

that the FAM is a source of nondiscretionary duties, which they concede they cannot, see Opp. at

6, they have failed to point to any guidelines that require consular officers to act after

administrative processing.

* * *

The Court acknowledges that the upshot of Karimova may be to “give[] agencies carte

blanche to administratively process noncitizens’ visa applications ad infinitum with no avenue

for judicial review.” Datta,

, at *8 (following Karimova as persuasive authority

regardless). That may warrant concern, and Plaintiffs’ anguish over their inability to study at a

respected program in the United States indeed deserves sympathy. This Court nonetheless lacks

jurisdiction to compel the agency to adjudicate their visas. Regardless of Plaintiffs’

dissatisfaction with the nation’s immigration laws, such a “statutory gap” is “best filled by

Congress, not this Court,”

, as “those types of claims generally fall outside the Judicial

Branch’s wheelhouse.” Karimova,

, at *5. Plaintiffs’ suit must accordingly

be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim for relief.

16 IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. A

separate Order so stating will issue this day.

/s/ James E. Boasberg JAMES E. BOASBERG Chief Judge Date: August 14, 2025

17