UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FITZGERALD DENNISON, SR.,

Plaintiff, v. No. 24-cv-2301-ZMF MARTIN J. O’MALLEY, Commissioner of Social Security

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On September 16, 2021, Plaintiff Fitzgerald Dennison, Sr., filed for Supplemental Security

Income Benefits (“SSI”). See Admin. R. (“AR”) 151, ECF No. 5.1 An Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”) denied his request. See AR 14. Plaintiff now challenges that decision, claiming that the

ALJ incorrectly found that he was not disabled because the ALJ failed to properly evaluate his

allegations of pain and dysfunction, and the ALJ’s RFC finding was not supported by substantial

evidence. See Pl.’s Mot. J. Reversal (“Pl.’s Mot.”) 2, ECF No. 8.

After considering the parties’ submissions and the Administrative Record, the undersigned

recommends that the Court DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of Reversal and GRANT

Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Affirmance.

1 The Administrative Record contains over fifty exhibits. See ECF No. 5. For ease of reference, the citations to the Administrative Record will cite to the consecutive page numbers provided in the lower right-hand corner of each page.

1 I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Framework

The Social Security Act provides benefits to individuals with disabilities. See

(a)(1). To claim SSI, a plaintiff must prove that they are “disabled.”

An individual is

disabled if they are “unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a

continuous period of not less than twelve months.”

§ 1382c(a)(3)(A). The impairment must

render them unable to return to previous work or “engage in any other kind of substantial gainful

work which exists in the national economy.” Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) uses a five-step evaluation process to

determine whether a claimant is disabled, as defined by the Social Security Act. See

(a). The burden of proof rests with the claimant for the first four steps, then shifts to the

SSA for the last step. See Butler v. Barnhart,

(D.C. Cir. 2004). At step one, the

claimant must prove they are not currently engaged in a “substantial gainful activity.”

(a)(4)(i). At step two, the claimant must show that they have a “severe impairment” or a

“combination of impairments” that “significantly limits [their] physical or mental ability to do

basic work activities.”

§§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(5)(c). At step three, the ALJ must

determine whether the claimant’s impairment(s) meets or is equal to one of the criteria listed in

Appendix 1. See id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the ALJ finds that the claimant meets the requirements,

then they are disabled. See id. If not, then the ALJ proceeds to step four. See id. At step four, the

ALJ must decide if the claimant has the “residual functional capacity” (RFC) to perform the

requirements of their “past relevant work.” Id. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(f). Put another way,

the ALJ must determine “the most [the claimant] can still do despite [their] limitations.” Id.

2 § 416.945(a)(1) (defining RFC). If the ALJ finds that the claimant has the RFC to return to their

previous work, then they are not disabled. See id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If a claimant cannot return

to their previous work, then the ALJ proceeds to step five. See id. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). There, the

ALJ must determine, based on the claimant’s RFC, “age, education, and work experience,”

whether the claimant can find any other work in the national economy. Id. If the claimant cannot

adjust to other work, then they are disabled. See id.

B. Factual Background

1. Medical Evidence

In September 2021, Plaintiff was hospitalized for treatment of his diabetes. See AR 266.

The need for hospitalization likely resulted from his noncompliance with medication and poor diet.

See AR 266. The hospital discharged him following a brief stay with instructions to continue his

diabetes treatment plan. See AR 268. Between September 2020 and February 2023, Plaintiff saw

Dr. Jason Yoon for his primary care appointments. See AR 323–85. During several of these visits,

Plaintiff reported poor compliance with his diabetes treatment plan but did not report any active

diabetes symptoms. See AR 360, 369. On multiple occasions, Plaintiff’s test results showed

elevated blood sugar levels, indicating uncontrolled diabetes. See AR 358, 367, 375, 383. Plaintiff

did not report any back pain during these visits. See AR 324–84. Repeated examinations between

2020 and 2022 of his lumbosacral spine also revealed no abnormal findings. See AR 326–79.

In August 2022, Plaintiff saw NP Vashtina Ellison-Ruddock for a consultative

examination. See AR 311–18. Plaintiff reported experiencing “on and off mild achy lower back

pain,” with the pain worsening to a 3 to 4 out of 10. AR 311. The pain was “aggravat[ed] by only

prolonged sitting” AR 311. He also reported prior, but not current, use of pain medication for his

back pain. See AR 311. Additionally, Plaintiff reported “diabetes without complications since

3 2018” and stated that he took diabetes medicine twice daily. AR 311. Regarding his history of

seizures, Plaintiff denied having any seizures since 2020. See AR 311. He stated that he did not

need help with his daily activities, which included cooking, light cleaning, laundry, and shopping.

See AR 312. Plaintiff’s physical examination revealed no abnormal findings. See AR 312–14. X-

rays of his lumbosacral spine showed moderate and severe degenerative disc disease, as well as

mild vertebrae displacement. See AR 314. NP Ellison-Ruddock concluded that Plaintiff “ha[d] no

physical limitations.” AR 314. In August 2022, State agency medical consultant Dr. Eduardo Haim

reviewed the record and found that Plaintiff’s physical impairments restricted him to work at the

“medium” exertional level with the need to “avoid even moderate exposure” to environmental

hazards. AR 48–52. Dr. Haim relied on Plaintiff’s lumbar spine x-ray, which revealed moderate

to severe degenerative disc disease and mild vertebrae displacement, as well as his history of

seizures. See AR 51.

2. Social Security Administration Review

On September 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed for SSI. See AR 151. He claimed that his disability

began on July 15, 2020. See AR 43. On February 10, 2022, the State agency denied Plaintiff’s

application, and later on reconsideration. See AR 45, 52. On August 9, 2023, the ALJ held a

hearing. See AR 30. At the hearing, Plaintiff testified about his pain and symptoms. See AR 34–

38. Plaintiff stated that he had lower back pain that prevented him from “walk[ing] far.” AR 34–

35, 37. He described being able to stand for only “five to ten minutes” before needing to sit down

to take a break. AR 38. He further stated that he took medication for his back pain twice a day but

had not sought treatment since approximately a year before the hearing. See AR 35. Additionally,

he stated that he took medicine for his diabetes. See AR 37. He claimed that he sat on his couch

and watched television during the day. See AR 36–37. He also claimed that his adult children

4 helped with groceries, meal preparation, and laundry. See AR 36. Additionally, he reported that he

used medical transportation to pick up his prescriptions and used the elevator in his apartment to

retrieve delivered medication. See AR 36. After Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ asked the

Vocational Expert (“VE”) about a hypothetical individual with Plaintiff’s age and education, and

who had the ability to perform a reduced range of light work. See AR 39–40. The VE explained

that such an individual could find employment, such as: a final inspector, an assembler of electrical

accessories, and an information clerk. See AR 40.

On November 1, 2023, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim. See AR 14. At step one, the ALJ

found that Plaintiff had not engaged in a substantial gainful activity since January 3, 2022. See AR

19. At step two, the ALJ concluded that his “degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, diabetes

[], and obesity” were severe impairments. AR 19.

At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet the criteria in

Appendix 1. See AR 20. The ALJ dismissed his claim for his back impairment because “there

[was] no evidence of listing level signs, symptoms, and objective findings on imaging or in

operative reports and impairment related limitations of musculoskeletal functioning with a

documented medical need for an assistive device or a related . . . gross movements.” AR 20. The

ALJ also dismissed his claim for his diabetes because “there [was] no evidence that his diabetes

as [sic] caused signs or symptoms that [met] the requirements of a listing for another body system.”

AR 20. Additionally, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff’s obesity was “considered in conjunction with

[his] other impairments” but that “there [was] no evidence that his weight ha[d] increased the

5 severity of his co-existing conditions to the extent that the combination of impairments medically

equal[ed] a listing in any body system.” AR 20.

At step four, the ALJ used a two-part process to determine Plaintiff’s RFC. See AR 20.

First, the ALJ found that his impairments reasonably could produce his symptoms. See AR 22.

Second, the ALJ found that the record did not support the alleged “intensity, persistence and

limiting effects of [his] symptoms.” AR 22. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform light

work, except that:

[I]n an eight hour workday, he can sit for six hours while alternating to a standing position for ten minutes during every hour of sitting while remaining on task; and can stand and/or walk for six hours with the ability to alternate to sitting for five minutes during every hour of standing and/or walking while remaining on task. He can lift, carry, push, and pull 20 pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently. In addition, he can occasionally stoop, crouch, and climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He can occasionally operate a motor vehicle.

AR 20. In formulating the RFC, the ALJ relied on the opinions of medical professionals who

examined Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s own statements, and Plaintiff’s medical records. See AR 21–24. The

ALJ also determined that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. See AR 24.

At step five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could find another job in the national economy.

See AR 24–25. The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff was unable to “perform the full range of light

work” due to “additional limitations” in the RFC. AR 24–25. The ALJ referred to the VE’s

testimony regarding a hypothetical individual with Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and

RFC, who could work as a final inspector, electrical accessories assembler, and information clerk.

See AR 25. The ALJ found the VE’s testimony credible. See AR 25. Thus, the ALJ determined

that Plaintiff was not disabled. See AR 25.

On August 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed his complaint in this court. See Compl. 3, ECF No. 1.

On October 27, 2024, Judge Friedrich, with the parties’ consent, referred this case to the

6 undersigned for all purposes. See Min. Order (Oct. 27, 2024). Pending before this court are

Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of Reversal and the Defendant Social Security Commissioner’s

Motion for Judgment of Affirmance. See Pl.’s Mot.; Def.’s Mot. J. Affirm. & Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. J.

Reversal (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 11.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When reviewing the SSA’s disability determination, the district court acts in an appellate

role and must uphold the determination “if it is supported by substantial evidence and is not tainted

by an error of law.” Smith v. Bowen,

(D.C. Cir. 1987). “Substantial evidence

is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”

Butler

(quoting Richardson v. Perales,

(1971)). The standard is

highly deferential, requiring “more than a scintilla,” but is satisfied by “something less than a

preponderance of the evidence.” Fla. Mun. Power Agency v. FERC,

, 365–66 (D.C.

Cir. 2003) (quoting FPL Energy Me. Hydro LLC v. FERC,

, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

As such, the “reviewing court may neither reweigh the evidence presented to it nor replace the

Commissioner’s judgment ‘concerning the credibility of the evidence with its own.’” Goodman v.

Colvin,

(D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Crosson v. Shalala,

(D.D.C. 1995)).

That said, the ALJ must establish a “logical bridge” between their conclusions and the

evidence so that a reviewing court “‘may assess the validity of the agency’s ultimate findings and

afford a claimant meaningful judicial review.’” Lane-Rauth v. Barnhart,

(D.D.C. 2006) (quoting Scott v. Barnhart,

(7th Cir. 2002)). “[T]he plaintiff bears

the burden of demonstrating that the Commissioner’s decision was not based on substantial

7 evidence or that incorrect legal standards were applied.” Settles v. Colvin,

(D.D.C 2015) (internal quotations marks and brackets omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff raises two challenges to the ALJ’s decision. See Pl.’s Mot. at 2. First, he argues

that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate his allegations of pain and dysfunction. See id. at 3. Second,

he claims that the ALJ’s RFC finding was not supported by substantial evidence. See id. at 4.

A. Plaintiff’s Allegations of Pain and Dysfunction

An ALJ may find a claimant’s allegations of pain and dysfunction “inconsistent with the

overall evidence of record” when “the frequency or extent of the treatment sought by [the claimant]

is not comparable with the degree of the [claimant’s] subjective complaints, or if the [claimant]

fails to follow prescribed treatment.” Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p,

,

at *9 (Oct. 25, 2017). In doing so, however, the ALJ must “consider[] possible reasons [the

claimant] may not comply with treatment or seek treatment consistent with the degree of [their]

complaints.” Id.; see Goodman,

(finding that the ALJ correctly compared

the claimant’s subjective complaints of pain with her failure to follow prescribed treatments, after

considering reasonable explanations for her noncompliance, including lack of health insurance);

Tiana O. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-2051,

, at *11 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2023) (finding

that the ALJ incorrectly evaluated the claimant’s subjective complaints about her mental health

limitations, in part because the ALJ failed to consider reasons for her treatment noncompliance).

This inquiry is required only if the ALJ “conclude[s] that [the claimant] would be deemed disabled

8 and eligible for benefits but for [their] noncompliance with treatment.” Darlene M. v. Kijakazi,

No. 20-cv-1817,

, at *23 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2021).

1. Plaintiff’s Noncompliance with Treatment

Darlene M. clarifies when an inquiry into a claimant’s noncompliance with treatment is

warranted.

, at *23. In Darlene M., the ALJ found at step three that the

claimant’s impairments did not meet or equal the severity of any listed impairments, largely

because medical testing, treatment notes regarding claimant’s physical condition, and claimant’s

own reports of her daily activities were inconsistent with her “statements as to the intensity,

persistence, and limiting effects of [her] symptoms.”

. The court found that the ALJ

properly discounted the claimant’s subjective testimony concerning the limiting effects of her

symptoms because “the ALJ noted [the claimant’s] noncompliance with treatment merely as a

factor” in their decision.

. Critically, the ALJ did not make claimant’s noncompliance the

only thing barring relief. See

Similarly, the ALJ here appropriately discounted Plaintiff’s subjective testimony

concerning the limiting effects of his symptoms. See AR 20–23. As in Darlene M., the ALJ “noted

[Plaintiff’s] noncompliance with treatment merely as a factor” in reaching his conclusion.

, at *23; see AR 21–23. The ALJ did not conclude that Plaintiff would have been

eligible “but for [his] noncompliance with treatment.” Darlene M.,

, at *23; see

AR 21–23. The ALJ found the objective medical evidence, including physical examinations and

medical opinions, as well as Plaintiff’s own prior statements about his daily activities inconsistent

9 with his “statements as to the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of [his] symptoms.”

Darlene M.,

, at *6; see AR 20–23.

First, the ALJ noted that physical examinations of Plaintiff’s lumbosacral spine revealed

no abnormal findings. See AR 22. “While ‘an ALJ may not reject a claimant’s subjective

complaints based solely on a lack of medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of

pain . . . it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis.’” Ragudo v. Saul,

, 1134 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (quoting Burch v. Barnhart,

(9th Cir.

2005)). Such medical evidence includes “physical examinations” of a claimant’s “lumbar spine.”

at 1134–35 (finding that the ALJ properly considered plaintiff’s relatively normal physical

examinations findings in his determination that plaintiff’s testimony was not credible).

Second, that Plaintiff did not attribute any functional limitations to his diabetes at his

consultative examination and stated he had no complications from diabetes. See AR 21–22, 311.

An ALJ can consider a claimant’s failure to “complain[] of any issues concerning his [health

condition]” during medical visits as a basis for discrediting the claimant’s “current claim of

ongoing, disabling symptoms.” Petty v. Colvin,

, 210 (D.D.C. 2016).

Defendant claims that Plaintiff’s “noncompliance with his diabetes medication is irrelevant to his

ability to work according to his own testimony[,]” where he stated that “his diabetes did not prevent

him from working; only his back pain allegedly did.” Def.’s Mot. at 12. Plaintiff refutes

Defendant’s characterization of his testimony, arguing that “Plaintiff testified that in addition to

his back, he also had diabetes” and “reported that he was not able to work due to diabetes.” Pl.’s

Resp. Def.’s Mot. J. Affirm. (“Pl.’s Resp.”) 2, ECF No. 13. This line of argumentation is

10 unnecessary because the ALJ ultimately found Plaintiff’s diabetes to “contribute[] to limiting

[Plaintiff] to light exertional work.” AR 23.

Third, Plaintiff’s daily activities included going on frequent walks, choosing not to use the

elevator at home, and requiring no assistance with cleaning, cooking, shopping, or doing laundry.

See AR 311–12. “An ALJ may assess a claimant’s credibility by comparing [the claimant’s]

subjective complaints of pain with [their] statements regarding [their] daily activities.” Goodman,

233 F. Supp. 3d at 107–08. (finding that the ALJ appropriately considered the plaintiff’s ability to

“perform numerous regular tasks and household chores[,]” including cooking, cleaning, and

grocery shopping, as a basis for discounting her subjective complaints of pain); see, e.g., Ali v.

Colvin,

(D.D.C. 2017) (finding that the ALJ appropriately considered the

plaintiff’s daily activities of “preparing meals, house and yard work, shopping by mail and

computer, handling money, watching TV and reading” as a basis for discounting parts of her

testimony).

Tiana O. illustrates when an ALJ improperly relies on a claimant’s noncompliance with

treatment in determining disability benefits.

. In Tiana O.,2 the ALJ found at

step three that the claimant’s noncompliance with medication and treatment suggested that his

“symptoms were [not] as severe as alleged” and there was “no evidence of financial restrictions,

side effects, or other issues that prevented the claimant from continuing treatment.”

. The

court held that the ALJ erred in finding the claimant’s subjective complaints were inconsistent

with his failure to seek treatment because the ALJ “misstated the record as to [the claimant’s]

2 The court’s ruling in Tiana O. primarily addressed the ALJ’s findings regarding the claimant’s mental impairments and related inconsistent treatment and noncompliance.

. But the underlying legal principle remains the same for physical impairments where inconsistent treatment and noncompliance may be a feature of the condition itself and contribute to worsening symptoms. See

at *11 (citing 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App’x 1, § 12.00(G)(2)(b)).

11 noncompliance with treatment.” Id. The record demonstrated that the claimant had attended

several treatment appointments. See id. And the ALJ “failed to adequately consider the reasons

underlying [the claimant’s] noncompliance with treatment.” Id.

In contrast, the ALJ here did not conclude that if Plaintiff’s “symptoms were as severe as

alleged[,]” he would have complied with his diabetes treatment plan. Id.; see AR 21. Rather, the

ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s diabetes was a severe impairment in part because of Plaintiff’s

“chronic non-compliance with treatment.” AR 23. The ALJ also did not conclude that there was

nothing “that prevented [Plaintiff] from continuing treatment.” Tiana O.,

, at

*12; see AR 21–23. Furthermore, unlike Tiana O., the treatment records here did not suggest that

the ALJ “misstated the record as to [Plaintiff’s] noncompliance with treatment.”

, at *12; see AR 21–23. The ALJ correctly cited medical records that demonstrated:

Plaintiff’s consistently poor compliance with his diabetes treatment plan, including self-reports;

elevated blood sugar readings; and a prior diabetic episode. See AR 23. The ALJ did not “rely

solely on [Plaintiff’s] treatment noncompliance” to conclude that Plaintiff’s diabetes failed to meet

the severity of a listed impairment. Tiana O.,

, at *11. It is true the ALJ did not

consider the reasons underlying Plaintiff’s noncompliance with treatment. See AR 21–23. But,

because the ALJ did not “rely solely” on noncompliance in denying disability benefits, the ALJ

was not required to “consider[] possible reasons [Plaintiff] may not comply with treatment.” SSR

16-3p,

, at *9; Tiana O.,

, at *11. Instead, the ALJ looked to

12 various sources of information to make his conclusion. See AR 21–25. This distinguishes the

present case from Tiana O.

.

B. Plaintiff’s RFC

When formulating a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must provide a comprehensive and detailed

narrative discussion that:

Contain[s] a thorough discussion and analysis of the objective medical and other evidence, including the [claimant’s] complaints of pain and other symptoms and the [ALJ’s] personal observations, if appropriate; . . . a resolution of any inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole; and . . . a logical explanation of the effects of the symptoms, including pain, on the [claimant’s] ability to work.

SSR 96-8p,

, at *7 (July 2, 1996). The ALJ’s narrative discussion must cite

specific evidence in the record and “explain[] which evidence [the ALJ] found credible and why.”

Pinkney v. Astrue,

(D.D.C. 2009); see

In other words, an ALJ may not

“simply list[] all of the evidence without clearly explaining which particular pieces of evidence

led [them] to [their] conclusion.” Lane-Rauth,

(finding the narrative

discussion insufficient where the ALJ listed evidence without explaining its support for his

conclusion or reasons for discounting contrary evidence). Ultimately, a narrative discussion is

sufficient when it “strikes the proper balance between” conflicting evidence in the record, even if

the ALJ “could have been clearer in articulating the support for [the] precise limitation.” Roshelle

S. B. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-2842,

, at *4 (D. Md. Sept. 23, 2022).

1. The ALJ’s Evaluation of Plaintiff’s Credibility

Pinkney provides a baseline for what an ALJ needs to do when explaining the rationale

behind their RFC determination.

. There, the ALJ found that the claimant had

the RFC to perform work at the medium exertional level, in part because “the objective medical

evidence” and “[the claimant’s] testimony at the hearing” were inconsistent with the claimant’s

13 alleged “degree of difficulty performing . . . activities of daily living.”

. The ALJ supported

this finding by citing specific medical evidence, including test results and professional opinions,

that indicated the claimant’s impairments were “only moderately limiting.”

at 16–17.

Like in Pinkney, the ALJ here “did more than merely list the evidence.”

at 17–18; see

AR 20–24. Specifically, the ALJ here “explained which evidence he found credible and why” in

determining Plaintiff’s RFC. Pinkney, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 17–18; see AR 20–24. In his narrative

discussion, the ALJ addressed how Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his functional limitations

conflicted with both the medical examinations and his prior statements about his daily activities.

See AR 22. For instance, the ALJ noted that during Plaintiff’s consultative examination, Plaintiff

reported mild lower back pain worsened by prolonged sitting, while Plaintiff also stated that he

regularly took walks and managed chores like cooking and cleaning independently. See AR 21–

22. But Plaintiff’s testimony presented a contrary picture: Plaintiff stated that he watched

television all day and relied on his adult children to grocery shop and cook for him. See AR 36.

The ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements at the consultative examination more credible, in part,

because Plaintiff’s testimony was “inconsistent with the treatment record[,] which regularly

document[ed] unremarkable physical examination results[,]” and “the objective [medical] findings

at the . . . consultative examination during which. . . [Plaintiff] had no significant findings.” AR

22. Such “[c]redibility determinations are ‘solely within the realm of the ALJ.’” Moore v.

Berryhill,

(D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Callaway v. Berryhill,

(D.D.C. 2018)).

Furthermore, the ALJ relied on the opinions from NP Ellison-Ruddock and Dr. Haim. See

AR 21, 23. The ALJ is not beholden to these medical opinions when “assessing and determining

[Plaintiff’s] RFC” but is “nonetheless required to consider and evaluate any such [medical

14 opinions] as opinion evidence.” Goodman,

(finding that the ALJ properly

afforded great weight to the State agency medical consultant’s RFC assessment). Both medical

professionals concluded that Plaintiff had no significant physical limitations and could perform

work at the medium exertional level. See AR 21, 23. The ALJ credited this opinion evidence. See

AR 23. In fact, this was the only credible opinion evidence in the record. See AR 23–24. Plaintiff

“point[ed] to no specific evidence beyond [his] own testimony that would contradict the ALJ’s

finding.” Goodman,

; see Pl.’s Mot. at 4–7; Pl.’s Resp. at 3–4. Thus, the

ALJ’s RFC finding is supported by substantial evidence. See Goodman,

.

Despite these findings, the ALJ still acknowledged the physical limitations imposed by

Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease. See AR 23–24. “[W]hen analyzing the narrative discussion,

courts in this Circuit have considered an ALJ’s imposition of limitations that are more restrictive

than opined by consultative examiners as a factor that can weigh in the Commissioner’s favor.”

Katrina M. v. O’Malley,

, 10 (D.D.C. 2024) (citing Said S. v. O’Malley, No. 22-

cv-362,

, at *10 (D.D.C. May 14, 2024)). Here, the ALJ viewed the overall

evidence and concluded that a reduction to a range of light exertional work with several postural

limitations was more reasonable than the less restrictive limitations put forth by the medical

experts. See AR 23–24. This more restrictive limitation “weigh[s] in the Commissioner’s favor.”

Katrina M., 752 F. Supp. 3d at 10.

2. The ALJ’s Sit-stand Restriction

Roshelle S. B. demonstrates the level of explanation and evidence that courts have deemed

adequate to support a sit-stand restriction in the RFC.

. In Roshelle S. B., the

ALJ found that the claimant had the RFC to perform sedentary work, with the need to sit for about

5 minutes after every 15 to 20 minutes of standing or walking. See

. The court rejected the

15 claimant’s argument that the ALJ failed to adequately explain the basis for this sit-stand option.

See

. The court noted that the ALJ “could have been clearer in articulating the support for

[his] precise limitation”; however, the court concluded that the ALJ’s findings “str[uck] the proper

balance between [the claimant’s] hearing testimony” regarding her inability to walk and “[the

claimant’s] documented history of improved mobility.”

. The RFC assessment also

reflected the claimant’s own statements about being able to walk without the use of a cane. See

Finally, the ALJ “cited repeatedly to records summarizing [the claimant’s] ankle and lower leg

limitations” as well as “medical evaluations and imaging that justified the limitations.”

Similarly, the ALJ’s RFC assessment here “str[uck] the proper balance between

[Plaintiff’s] hearing testimony” regarding his difficulty walking or performing household chores

like cooking and cleaning independently, and “[Plaintiff’s] documented history” of normal

physical examination findings, lack of treatment, and few complaints about active symptoms. Id.;

see AR 20–24. The ALJ’s RFC assessment reflected Plaintiff’s prior statements about not needing

assistance with his daily activities. See AR 21. Furthermore, the ALJ “cited repeatedly to records

summarizing [Plaintiff’s postural] limitations” as well as “medical evaluations and imaging that

justified the limitations [in the RFC].” Roshelle S. B.,

, at *4; see AR 20–24.

For example, the ALJ’s RFC “partially incorporated” NP Ellison-Ruddock’s and Dr. Haim’s

opinions that Plaintiff had no physical limitations and could perform work at the medium

exertional level. Thomas v. Astrue,

(D.D.C. 2010); see AR 22–23. This

does not mean that the ALJ dismissed Plaintiff’s “subjective pains complained of” or his x-rays

showing moderate to severe degenerative disc disease. Thomas,

; see AR

23. Instead, the ALJ gave Plaintiff “the benefit of the doubt by limiting [him] to light work[,]”

despite the absence of abnormal findings in Plaintiff’s physical examinations. Thomas,

Supp. 2d at 308; see AR 22–23. The sit-stand option in the ALJ’s RFC also provided Plaintiff with

an “accommodation for [his] aggravated [back] pain caused by [prolonged sitting].” Thomas,

; see AR 23. Additionally, the ALJ noted the VE’s testimony that “an individual

with . . . [Plaintiff’s] age, education, work experience, and [RFC]” could work as a final inspector,

electrical accessories assembler, and information clerk. AR 25. These jobs account for the sit-stand

option in the RFC by allowing Plaintiff to perform them “sitting or standing at-will.” AR 25.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “failed to explain his basis for his precise sit/stand option” in

the RFC by not citing any medical opinion that supported his finding. Pl.’s Mot. at 5–6. Plaintiff

is incorrect. “While the ALJ did not cite a medical opinion that laid out the exact RFC at which he

arrived, ‘sufficient information has been provided for the Court to understand [his] reasoning.’”

Callaway,

(quoting Grant v. Astrue,

(D.D.C.

2012)); see AR 23–24. The ALJ here noted the contradictory evidence in the record that tended to

undermine Plaintiff’s testimony about “need[ing] to sit down to take a break” after “five to ten

minutes” of standing. AR 38. Specifically, the ALJ pointed to “the mostly normal medical

evidence in the record, and gave weight to the views of experts whose findings were consistent

with that objective medical evidence—all of which counsels for a more optimistic RFC than those

estimated by” Plaintiff’s testimony. Callaway,

; see AR 23. Thus, in the

absence of objective medical evidence corroborating Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain, the

ALJ’s inclusion of a sit-stand option accommodating Plaintiff’s reported limitations is more than

adequate. See Callaway,

.

Ultimately, the ALJ provided a “thorough discussion and analysis of the objective medical

and other evidence.” SSR 96-8p,

, at *7; see AR 20–24. His opinion provided “a

resolution of any inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole” and “a logical explanation of the

17 effects of the symptoms . . . on [Plaintiff’s] ability to work.” SSR 96-8p,

, at *7;

see AR 20–24. The ALJ also “explained which evidence he found credible and why[,]” rather than

merely listing the record evidence and stating the RFC in a conclusory manner. Pinkney,

; see SSR 96-8p,

, at *7; AR 20–24. In doing so, the ALJ’s RFC

finding “str[uck] the proper balance between” conflicting evidence in the record. Roshelle S. B.,

, at *4; see AR 20–24. The ALJ established a “logical bridge” between his

conclusions and the evidence. Lane-Rauth,

. That is to say, the ALJ’s RFC

“more than adequately accounts for . . . [Plaintiff’s] diabetes and lumbar spine impairment.” AR

23.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of

Reversal and GRANT Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Affirmance. Digitally signed by Zia

Date: August 26, 2025 Zia M.Faruqui M.Faruqui Date: 2025.08.26 15:26:01 -04'00' ___________________________________ ZIA M. FARUQUI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

18 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FITZGERALD DENNISON, SR.,

Plaintiff, v. No. 24-cv-2301-ZMF MARTIN J. O’MALLEY, Commissioner of Social Security

Defendant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of Reversal and Defendant’s

Motion for Judgment of Affirmance, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for

Judgment of Affirmance is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of Reversal is

DENIED.

Zia Digitally signed by Zia M.Faruqui

M.Faruqui Date: 2025.08.26 15:25:42 -04'00' ___________________________________ ZIA M. FARUQUI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

19