UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MEHDI MEHRPOOYA,

Plaintiff

v. Civil Action No. 24-2340 (LLA)

DAVID ALLEN, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Mehdi Mehrpooya, a citizen of Iran, seeks to compel Defendants—David Allen,

in his official capacity as Deputy Chief of Mission to the U.S. Embassy in Armenia, and Marco

Rubio, in his official capacity as Secretary of State—to adjudicate his nonimmigrant visa

application. ECF No. 1.1 Mr. Mehrpooya contends that his H-1B visa application has been

unreasonably delayed in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),

et seq., and the Mandamus Act,

. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 32-53. Defendants have moved

to dismiss Mr. Mehrpooya’s complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6). ECF No. 5. The motion is fully briefed, ECF Nos. 5, 6, 8, and Mr. Mehrpooya has

moved for leave to file a surreply, ECF No. 9. For the reasons explained below, the court will

grant Mr. Mehrpooya leave to file a surreply and deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

1 Mr. Mehrpooya named former Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken as a Defendant, but the current Secretary of State is “automatically substituted” as a party pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The court draws the following facts, accepted as true, from Mr. Mehrpooya’s complaint.

Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found.,

(D.C. Cir. 2023). It further takes

judicial notice of “information posted on official public websites of government agencies.” Arab

v. Blinken,

, 63 n.1 (D.D.C. 2022).

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),

et seq., allows employers

to sponsor temporary, nonimmigrant workers “in a specialty occupation” for a H-1B visa.

(a)(15)(H)(i)(b), 1184(a). An employer begins this process by requesting a “certified labor

condition application from the Department of Labor” for the employee’s occupational specialty.

(h)(4)(i)(B)(1)(i). After receiving the certification, the employer must file a

Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker (Form I-129) with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

(“USCIS”).

§ 214.2(h)(2)(i)(A); see U.S. Dep’t of State, I-129, Petition for a Nonimmigrant

Worker.2 This visa petition process must be completed before the employee “may apply for a

visa.”

(h)(1)(i).

Next, the foreign national must complete the nonimmigrant visa application through the

Department of State at the consular office corresponding to the jurisdiction in which they reside.

(a)(1). Typically, the applicant must then appear for an in-person interview

with a consular officer.

§ 41.102. At the conclusion of the interview, “the consular officer

must [either] issue [or] refuse the visa.” Id. § 41.121(a). If the consular officer determines that he

does not have sufficient information to establish visa eligibility, he may “refuse” the visa pending

further administrative processing under Section 221(g) of the INA, which typically consists of

2 Available at https://perma.cc/4WPZ-BKR6.

2 additional information gathering. U.S. Dep’t of State, Administrative Processing Information;3

see

(g); Giliana v. Blinken,

, 18 (D.D.C. 2022).

Consular officers are forbidden from issuing visas to any individual from “a country that

is a state sponsor of international terrorism” unless the federal government determines that the

applicant “does not pose a threat to the safety or national security of the United States.”

(a). Since 1984, the Secretary of State has designated Iran a “state sponsor of international

terrorism.” U.S. Dep’t of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism.4

In March 2023, Texas Tech University initiated Mr. Mehrpooya’s H-1B visa application

process. ECF No. 1 ¶ 15. Later that month, USCIS approved the H-1B petition and

Mr. Mehrpooya submitted his DS-160 Nonimmigrant Visa Application.

. He was

interviewed at the U.S. Embassy in Armenia in May 2023.

. After the interview, his

application was placed in “administrative processing” under Section 221(g), and he was informed

that he would need “to submit additional documents and information.”

.

Mr. Mehrpooya provided those documents on May 4, 2023.

. Since then, he “has inquired

as to the status of his visa application on numerous occasions and received no meaningful

responses.”

.

Defendants contend that Mr. Mehrpooya’s visa application was “refused because

Section 1735 mandated as much.” ECF No. 5, at 1. Mr. Mehrpooya maintains that “the rationale

given to [him] was pursuant to INA § 221(g).” ECF No. 6, at 6.5

3 Available at https://perma.cc/P9SW-QX99. 4 Available at https://perma.cc/KB3Z-PVY2. 5 The citations for ECF No. 6 refer to the PDF page numbers because the document does not contain internal page numbers.

3 The delay in the adjudication of his visa since March 2023 has caused Mr. Mehrpooya

“significant personal, emotional, and financial hardship.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 3. He alleges that the delay

has damaged his professional relationships at his current employer and imperiled the grant funding

that sustains his work. Id. ¶¶ 4, 6. Mr. Mehrpooya also alleges that his new position at Texas Tech

may be terminated because of the uncertainty about his visa status. Id. ¶ 4.

In August 2024, Mr. Mehrpooya filed a complaint seeking to compel Defendants to

adjudicate his visa application. ECF No. 1. Defendants have moved to dismiss under Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). See ECF No. 5. The matter is fully briefed, ECF

Nos. 5, 6, 8, and Mr. Mehrpooya has moved for leave to file a surreply, ECF No. 9.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and it is generally presumed that “a cause

lies outside [of] this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

(1994). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the court must dismiss an action

unless the plaintiff can establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the court possesses

subject-matter jurisdiction. Green v. Stuyvesant,

(D.D.C. 2007). In

reviewing such a motion, the court “is not limited to the allegations set forth in the complaint” and

“‘may consider materials outside the pleadings.’” Morrow v. United States,

(D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin.,

(D.C. Cir. 2005)). Additionally, when reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(1), the court is required to “assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the

complaint and ‘construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that

4 can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,

, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi,

(D.C. Cir. 2005)).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court will dismiss a complaint that does not “contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

In

evaluating a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations in

the complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007); see also Atherton v. D.C.

Off. of the Mayor,

(D.C. Cir. 2009). Although the plausibility standard does

not require “detailed factual allegations,” it “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly,

.

Nor will “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” suffice. Iqbal,

(alteration in original) (quoting Twombly,

).

In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, a court may consider only the

facts alleged in the complaint and “any documents either attached to or incorporated in the

complaint and matters of which [the court] may take judicial notice.” N. Am. Butterfly Ass’n v.

Wolf,

(D.C. Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Hurd v. District of

Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2017)).

III. DISCUSSION

The court can easily dispense with Mr. Mehrpooya’s motion for leave to file a surreply,

ECF No. 9, because Defendants do not oppose it. Under Local Civil Rule 7(b), if an opposing

5 party does not timely oppose a motion, “the Court may treat the motion as conceded.” That is the

case here, and the court will direct the Clerk of Court to docket ECF No. 9-1 as Mr. Mehrpooya’s

surreply.

On the merits, Defendants raise two primary challenges to Mr. Mehrpooya’s claims:

(1) that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability bars consideration of his claims, ECF No. 5,

at 9-13; and (2) that Mr. Mehrpooya fails to identify a discrete agency action that Defendants were

obligated to, but did not, take, id. at 5-9.6 The court considers each argument in turn.

A. Consular Nonreviewability

Defendants argue that the court must dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) based on the doctrine of

consular nonreviewability. ECF No. 5, at 9.7 In the context of visa adjudications, “[c]onsular

nonreviewability shields a consular official’s decision to issue or withhold a visa from judicial

review, at least unless Congress says otherwise.” Baan Rao Thai Rest. v. Pompeo,

(D.C. Cir. 2021); see Dep’t of State v. Muñoz,

, 908 (2024). However, “a long

line of decisions from this Court have held that the consular nonreviewability doctrine applies only

to final decisions and thus does not bar judicial review of a consular officer’s delay when a visa

application has been provisionally refused pending a final decision.” Al-Gharawy v. U.S. Dep’t of

Homeland Sec.,

, 11 (D.D.C. 2022) (collecting cases).

6 In a departure from similar cases, Defendants do not argue for dismissal based on the factors set forth in Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. Federal Communications Commission,

(D.C. Cir. 1984) (“TRAC”), the very analysis required to evaluate a claim of unreasonable delay. ECF No. 5, at 1-2. Instead, in a footnote, Defendants claim that they will move for judgment on the pleadings based on the TRAC factors if the court denies their motion to dismiss.

at 2 n.1. While allowed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants’ approach strikes the court as an exercise in gamesmanship that increases litigation costs for the parties and taxes limited judicial resources. The court encourages Defendants to litigate more efficiently in the future. 7 It is well established that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability is not jurisdictional. See Dep’t of State v. Muñoz,

, 908 n.4 (2024).

6 In response to this longstanding precedent, Defendants point to the D.C. Circuit’s decision

in Karimova v. Abate, No. 23-5178,

, at *3 (D.C. Cir. July 24, 2024), arguing

that while there may have previously been “some debate . . . as to whether the doctrine applie[s]

in cases seeking to compel action on visa applications in post-refusal administrative processes,

Karimova necessitates an end to that debate,” ECF No. 5, at 11. In Defendants’ view, Karimova

conclusively establishes that where a visa application has been refused under Section 221(g) and

placed in administrative processing, a final decision has been rendered on the application. ECF

No. 8, at 3, 11; see Karimova,

, at *2-3, *6. The court disagrees.

As an initial matter, the court notes—contrary to Defendants’ assertion, ECF No. 5, at 6

n.2; ECF No. 8, at 1-2—that the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Karimova does not bind it. The D.C.

Circuit has twice declined to publish Karimova. See Karimova,

, at *6; Order,

Karimova v. Abate, No. 23-5178 (D.C. Cir. Sep. 10, 2024), Doc. No. 2074062, at 1. Under the

D.C. Circuit’s rules, “[w]hile unpublished dispositions may be cited[,] . . . a panel’s decision to

issue an unpublished disposition means that the panel sees no precedential value in that

disposition.” D.C. Cir. R. 36(e)(2) (emphases added).8 This court takes the D.C. Circuit at its

word and considers, but does not find itself bound by, Karimova.

8 Defendants cite D.C. Circuit Rule 32.1(b)(1)(B) for the proposition that unpublished opinions “may be cited as precedent,” ECF No. 8, at 1-2 (quoting D.C. Cir. R. 32.1(b)(1)(B)), which is true as far as it goes. But as the D.C. Circuit has explained—in a published opinion that is binding on this court—“[w]hile [unpublished] dispositions have some precedential value, they are ‘obviously . . . not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the merits.’” In re Grant,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan,

(1974)). Accordingly, these decisions “may be considered persuasive authority, but they do not constrain a panel of the [C]ourt from reaching a contrary conclusion in a published opinion after full consideration of the issue.”

Other than their say-so, ECF No. 8, at 1-2, Defendants have pointed to no authority suggesting that this court should take a different approach.

7 Having considered Karimova, the court is not inclined to follow it. In Karimova, the

plaintiff was in a position substantially similar to Mr. Mehrpooya’s: she had applied for a visa,

interviewed at an embassy, had her application “officially ‘refused’” under Section 221(g), and

then had her application placed in administrative processing.

, at *2 (quoted

sources omitted). Relying on various regulations and the Department of State’s Foreign Affairs

Manual (“FAM”), the D.C. Circuit reasoned that placing an application in administrative

processing must be a “final” decision because a relevant regulation instructed that a consular

officer “must issue” or “refuse” a visa following an interview,

(emphasis in Karimova)

(quoting

(a)), and because the FAM directed that, after an interview, “[c]onsular

officers ‘cannot temporarily refuse, suspend, or hold the visa for future action,’”

(quoting 9

FAM § 504.1-3(g)). Drawing on these sources, the D.C. Circuit characterized Ms. Karimova as

requesting “yet another ‘final decision’ on her already-refused visa application,” as opposed to a

final decision in the first instance. Id. at *6.

This interpretation places too much emphasis on the current language in the FAM—which

does not carry the force of law, see Aramnahad v. Rubio, No. 24-CV-1817,

,

at *7 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2025)—and too little emphasis on the allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint

and the realities of the visa-adjudication process, see Al-Gharawy, 617 F. Supp. 3d at 16

(“Although the State Department may ‘choose[] to characterize a section 221(g) notification as a

“refusal,”’ that magic word is not a get-out-of-review-free card . . . . [and] the Court must examine

[a plaintiff’s] allegations to determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleges that the consular

officer’s ‘refusal’ was in fact an ‘interim decision [that] is not sufficiently final to warrant the

application of the [consular nonreviewability] doctrine.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Vulupala v.

Barr,

, 98 (D.D.C. 2020))). It is impossible to square Defendants’ assertion

8 that placement in “administrative processing” was a final disposition of Mr. Mehrpooya’s visa

application with the allegations in his complaint. Mr. Mehrpooya alleges that, after his interview,

he “was informed that [his] visa application was being placed in so-called ‘administrative

processing,’” ECF No. 1 ¶ 19, and he “was requested to submit additional documents and

information to the U.S. Embassy in Armenia,”

. Accepting these allegations as true and

drawing all inferences in Mr. Mehrpooya’s favor—as this court must, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678—

Mr. Mehrpooya has sufficiently alleged that he has not yet received a final decision on his visa

application, see Aramnahad,

, at *8; cf. Ibrahim v. Spera, No. 23-CV-3563,

, at *3 n.2 (D.D.C. Sep. 6, 2024) (noting “that it is extremely difficult to square

[Karimova’s] analysis, which is based largely on agency regulations, with the communications

that visa applicants actually receive from various consulates”).9

Mr. Mehrpooya does not challenge a final decision denying his visa application, nor does

he contend that this court should order the State Department to grant his application. See generally

ECF No. 1. Rather, he argues only that Defendants must “adjudicate [his] visa application within

a reasonable time.”

. Several courts in this district have found, even after Karimova, that

9 The court’s conclusion that placement in administrative processing under Section 221(g) is not a final determination is underscored by language on the Department of State’s website, of which the court takes judicial notice. See Arab, 600 F. Supp. 3d at 63 n.1. The website explains that an application is placed in administrative processing when “[t]he consular officer could not conclude [a person] w[as] elegible [sic] for the visa sought and additional administrative processing of [the] application is required.” U.S. Dep’t of State, INA Section 221(g) – Incomplete Application or Supporting Documentation, https://perma.cc/F733-BHCT. It further elaborates that a person who is placed in administrative processing “will be given a letter stating this” and “the embassy or consulate will contact [him] when the administrative processing is complete.” Id. An inability to “conclude” whether a person is eligible for a visa is plainly different from a conclusive determination that a person is ineligible for a visa. And the language on the website, which instructs applicants to wait for the embassy or consulate to contact them after administrative processing is complete, supports the court’s conclusion that an applicant in this position is still awaiting a final decision on his application.

9 “the doctrine of consular nonreviewability does not bar challenges to timing as opposed to

substance.” de Belinay v. Mayorkas, No. 24-CV-240,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 3,

2025) (quoting Shabestary v. Sanders, No. 24-CV-362,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 16,

2024)); see, e.g., Thein v. Trump, No. 25-CV-2369,

, at 7-10 (D.D.C. Aug. 21,

2025); Shushkov v. Rubio, No. 24-CV-2265,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2025);

Diabin v. Rubio, No. 24-CV-3374,

, at *3 (D.D.C. July 2, 2025); Aramnahad,

, at *10; Mahmoodi v. Altman-Winans, No. 24-CV-2010,

,

at *4-6 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2025); Baygan v. Blinken, No. 23-CV-2840,

, at *4-5

(D.D.C. Aug. 8, 2024). But see Rezvani v. Rubio, No. 24-CV-3381,

, at *2

(D.D.C. May 5, 2025) (noting that “the consular non-reviewability doctrine would likely apply”

but dismissing suit for failure to demonstrate a non-discretionary duty).

This court follows the majority view and determines that Mr. Mehrpooya’s action is

properly understood as an attempt to compel an adjudication that has been unreasonably delayed,

rather than one aimed at changing a final decision that has already been rendered. Accordingly,

the case is not barred by the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.

B. Non-Discretionary Duty

Defendants also contend that Mr. Mehrpooya has failed to allege that “the government

agency or official is violating a clear duty to act”—a threshold requirement for a mandamus claim

and a merits question for a claim of unreasonable delay under the APA. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v.

Burwell,

(D.C. Cir. 2016); see ECF No. 5, at 5.10 Defendants argue that

10 Defendants waffle on whether they are seeking dismissal on this basis under Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6) and fail to parse through the individual counts in the complaint. Compare ECF No. 5, at 5 (asking for a dismissal with prejudice concerning non-discretionary duty), with ECF No. 8, at 9 (requesting dismissal “for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction” on the “unreasonable (continued on next page)

10 Mr. Mehrpooya “cannot identify a clear, non-discretionary duty requiring a consular officer to take

any action” on his visa application “now that it has been refused under INA Section 221(g)” and

placed in administrative processing. ECF No. 5, at 5. As support for this proposition, Defendants

again point to Karimova, which they argue is “dispositive” in cases like this one, where

“[p]laintiffs seek to compel State Department officials to act further on visa applications refused

under INA Section 221(g) and undergoing post-refusal administrative processing.” Id. at 6-7.11

In Karimova, the D.C. Circuit held that the plaintiff had “not identified an adequate legal

basis” for her action seeking to “compel[] the consular officer overseeing her visa application to

make yet another ‘final decision’ on her already-refused visa application.”

,

at *6. The Court characterized the plaintiff as “argu[ing] that Section 555(b) [of the APA]—and

only Section 555(b)—‘places a clear, non-discretionary duty’ on her consular officer to

re-adjudicate her already-refused application.”

. The Court easily determined that

delay” claim because Plaintiff did not establish a non-discretionary duty). Under the Mandamus Act, a plaintiff must show (1) “a clear and indisputable right to relief,” (2) that the government “is violating a clear duty to act,” and (3) “that no adequate alternative remedy exists” in order to establish jurisdiction. Burwell,

. The court will thus review Count II under the Rule 12(b)(1) standard. In contrast, under the APA, the question whether a non-discretionary duty exists is not jurisdictional. See Sierra Club v. Jackson,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (explaining that “a complaint seeking review of agency action ‘committed to agency discretion by law,’ has failed to state a claim under the APA, and therefore should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), not under the jurisdictional provision of Rule 12(b)(1)” (citation omitted) (quoting

(a)(2))). The court will thus review Count I under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. 11 Defendants also argue that Mr. Mehrpooya’s visa was refused under Section 1735 because Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism and that such a determination is final. ECF No. 8, at 4. But Mr. Mehrpooya alleges that his application was placed in administrative processing under Section 221(g), ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 19, 21, and that no other rationale was provided, see ECF No. 6, at 6. The court must credit those allegations in considering Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Iqbal,

. But even if Section 1735 were the basis on which Mr. Mehrpooya’s visa application was placed in administrative processing, it does not change the fact that Mr. Mehrpooya is seeking a final adjudication of his visa application in the first instance. See Kahbasi v. Blinken, No. 23-CV-1667,

, at *5 (D.D.C. June 27, 2024) (rejecting a similar argument).

11 “Section 555(b) does no such thing” and instead “simply expresses ‘a congressional view that

agencies should act within reasonable time frames.’”

(quoting Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr.

v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n,

(D.C. Cir. 1984) (“TRAC”)).

The problem for Defendants is that this rationale is wholly inapplicable given this court’s

understanding of the visa process. See supra Part III.A. It may be true that Section 555(b) does

not create a duty to re-adjudicate a final decision where one has already been made, but, as this

court sees it, that is not what plaintiffs like Mr. Mehrpooya (or Ms. Karimova) are seeking.

Instead, they are seeking an initial, final determination on their visa applications. In this way, any

discussion of how Section 555(b) applies to requests to re-adjudicate final visa decisions means

very little for a plaintiff who seeks an initial final decision and wishes for it to be made “within [a]

reasonable time frame[]” as Section 555(b) requires. TRAC,

.

Here, Mr. Mehrpooya alleges that a nondiscretionary duty to adjudicate his visa application

can be located in a range of statutes and agency regulations, including

(b),

(d),

, and other provisions in the APA and INA. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 34-41,

49-50. Several courts in this district have concluded that there is a duty to complete adjudication

of a visa application, explaining “that both the APA and State Department regulations create a

clear duty to adjudicate visa applications within a reasonable time.” Rashidian v. Garland,

No. 23-CV-1187,

, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2024); see e.g., Thein,

, at *11; Shushkov,

, at *5-6; Diabin,

, at *3-4;

Aramnahad,

, at *8-10; Kahbasi v. Blinken, No. 23-CV-1667,

, at *5 (D.D.C. June 27, 2024); Ameer v. Schofer, No. 23-CV-3066,

,

at *4 (D.D.C. June 4, 2024); Vulupala, 438 F. Supp. 3d at 100. But see, e.g., Pour v. Rubio,

No. 25-CV-573,

, at *4-5 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2025); Younus v. Palmer,

12 No. 24-CV-2333,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025); Seifan v. Sweeney,

No. 25-CV-261,

, at *4-5 (D.D.C. July 31, 2025); Rahiminejad v. Rubio,

No. 24-CV-3495,

, at *2-4 (D.D.C. July 29, 2025); Pasiukevich v. Lawton,

No. 24-CV-3349,

, at *3-4 (D.D.C. July 17, 2025).

This court continues to adhere to the view that consular officials have a non-discretionary

duty to fully adjudicate a visa application. Issuing a final decision on a visa application is plainly

a discrete agency action, and it is required by both the APA and federal regulations. See Khazaei

v. Blinken, No. 23-CV-1419,

, at *6 (D.D.C. Sep. 18, 2023); see also Mashpee

Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton,

(D.C. Cir. 2003) (explaining that

the APA “imposes a general but nondiscretionary duty upon an administrative agency to pass upon

a matter presented to it ‘within a reasonable time,’

(b), and authorizes a reviewing

court to ‘compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,’

§ 706(1)”).

Even if the court read Karimova with the D.C. Circuit’s understanding that Section 221(g)

refusals are final, it would still deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss. That is because—even taking

the argument on the D.C. Circuit’s own terms—the Court did not rule that no source of law creates

a nondiscretionary duty to re-adjudicate a visa application, just that “Section 555(b)—and only

Section 555(b) . . . does no such thing.”

, at *3. Setting Section 555(b) aside,

Mr. Mehrpooya has cited additional sources of law that he contends establish a nondiscretionary

duty to adjudicate his visa application. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 34-41, 49-50. At this early stage of litigation,

that is sufficient.

* * *

Because Mr. Mehrpooya’s claims are not barred by the doctrine of consular

nonreviewability, because Mr. Mehrpooya seeks a final determination on his visa application by

13 pointing to several sources of law creating a nondiscretionary duty for Defendants to make such a

decision, and because Defendants fail to otherwise contest Mr. Mehrpooya’s claims of

unreasonable delay, the court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss and allow Mr. Mehrpooya

to proceed with his complaint.12

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File

Surreply, ECF No. 9, is GRANTED, and the Clerk of Court shall docket ECF No. 9-1 as

Plaintiff’s surreply. It is further ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 5, is

DENIED, and Defendants shall respond to the complaint on or before September 18, 2025, Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A). Defendants do not need to comply with Local Civil Rule 7(n) at this time.

LOREN L. ALIKHAN United States District Judge Date: September 4, 2025

12 Defendants are correct that, because this case involves agency inaction, they are relieved of their obligation under Local Civil Rule 7(n) to file a “certified list of the contents of the administrative record.” See Janay v. Blinken,

, 105 (D.D.C. 2024); Dastagir v. Blinken,

, 164 n.5 (D.D.C. 2021); Nat’l L. Ctr. on Homelessness & Poverty v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs.,

(D.D.C. 2012).

14