UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TRACY S. SARGENT,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-620 (CJN)

SOC LLC,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After extensive motions practice, plaintiff Tracy Sargent tried before a jury four claims

against defendant SOC: (1) Title VII sex discrimination, (2) Title VII retaliation, (3) Title VII

hostile work environment, and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress. See ECF No. 181 at

1–2. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Sargent on Count 3, but in favor of SOC on the

remaining claims. See id. As to the hostile work environment claim, the jury awarded $225,000

in compensatory damages and $1,600,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 2–3. The parties have

stipulated, however, that Sargent’s damages must be “reduced to $300,000 in the aggregate,”

pursuant to Title VII’s statutory damages cap. ECF No. 184 ¶ 1 (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981a(b)(3)(D)).

Now before the Court are three post-trial motions filed by the parties. The motions are

interrelated, but the Court will analyze each in turn before summarizing its overall conclusions.

I. Equitable Relief

When a defendant is found to have engaged in an unlawful employment practice under

Title VII, the Court has authority to provide the plaintiff with equitable relief, including back pay.

1 See Brown v. D.C.,

(D.D.C. 2011) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(1)),

aff’d,

(D.C. Cir. 2012). A “trial court has wide discretion to award equitable

relief,” and “should fashion [its] relief so as to provide a victim of [an unlawful employment

practice] the most complete make-whole relief possible.”

(quotation marks omitted). Here,

although Sargent initially requested a far-ranging award of both back pay and front pay, she now

seeks only “limited” equitable relief. Compare ECF No. 185 with ECF No. 187 at 3. Specifically,

she seeks (1) back pay for the period between leaving Baghdad and being terminated, and (2) “any

other injunctive or equitable relief that . . . does not flow from her termination.” 1 ECF No. 187 at

2–3.

Ordinarily, “a successful hostile work environment claim alone, without a successful

constructive discharge claim, is insufficient to support a back pay award.” Klotzbach-Piper v.

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (“Klotzbach-Piper I”),

, 83 (D.D.C. 2022) (quoting

Spencer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

(3d Cir. 2006)); see also Brown, 768 F. Supp

2d at 101. That is because “if a hostile work environment does not rise to the level where one is

forced to abandon the job, loss of pay” typically “is not an issue.” Klotzbach-Piper I, 636 F. Supp.

3d at 83. Here, of course, Sargent never alleged that she was constructively discharged from her

1 SOC argues that Sargent forfeited her right to seek this relief because she did not squarely request it until her reply brief, where she also conceded that she was not entitled to the non-time- limited front and back pay she initially sought. See ECF No. 191 at 3–4 (citing ECF No. 187 at 4). To be sure, “courts generally will not entertain new arguments first raised in a reply brief.” Lewis v. District of Columbia,

, 139 n.4 (D.D.C. 2011). But Sargent’s request for a limited award of backpay was at least partially encompassed by the arguments in her motion. See ECF No. 185 at 8 (“Moreover, Sargent can establish constructive discharge because she requested to leave Baghdad, Iraq as a result of the sexually harassing hostile work environment, and as soon as she was home she was without a paying job.”). And in any event, SOC was not substantively prejudiced by Sargent’s somewhat shifting theory of harm because the Court granted its request for leave to file a surrreply. See ECF No. 188; Min. Order of Mar. 20, 2025; see also ECF No. 191. 2 employment at SOC; to the contrary, a central aspect of the case was her allegation that she was

unlawfully terminated. See ECF No. 185 at 7 n.2; ECF No. 183 at 11–12, ¶¶ 44–45. But Sargent

did argue, and the evidence at trial demonstrated, that what the jury found was a hostile work

environment at SOC forced her to leave her post in Baghdad. In particular, on September 14,

2017, Sargent sent a letter to SOC’s vice president of human resources, Susan Major, alleging

sexually harassing behavior at the Baghdad Embassy complex, expressing fear for her safety, and

requesting help leaving Iraq.

at 129–48; see also ECF No. 183 at 11, ¶¶ 31–36. Bonnae Vega,

the human resources director who reviewed Sargent’s report the same day, testified that, after

speaking with Sargent about its contents, she “made sure that [Sargent] left [Baghdad]

immediately.” ECF No. 195 at 157–59; see also ECF No. 183 at 11 ¶¶ 37–38. And it is undisputed

that, once Sargent returned home, SOC did not pay her wages. See ECF No. 195 at 165.

Sargent thus “made an adequate showing of a causal connection between” what the jury

ultimately found to be a hostile work environment and her departure from Baghdad, “such that the

latter,” which plainly led to lost compensation, can “provide the basis for . . . back pay . . . under

Title VII.” Klotzbach-Piper v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (“Klotzbach-Piper II”),

, 71 (D.D.C. 2023); see also Brown, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 104–05 (evidence at trial can support

equitable relief for sexual harassment “absent a pleading or jury finding of constructive

discharge”). Indeed, SOC does not challenge that causal connection—it simply argues that “SOC

did not owe wages to [Sargent] for the time she spent stateside, because it is undisputed that she

performed no work for SOC during that time.” ECF No. 191 at 5. But that ignores why Sargent

was stateside. The record and jury verdict together reflect that the reason was a Title VII violation

by SOC.

3 The question then is how much back pay Sargent should receive. The parties agree on the

appropriate rate of compensation (although SOC of course objects that any compensation is

appropriate), but they disagree on the time period over which the rate should be applied. See ECF

No. 212. Here, the Court sides with SOC that the proper time frame is the period between

Sargent’s departure from Baghdad and the effective date of her termination, which the parties

concur was October 15, 2017. See ECF No. 183 at 11 ¶¶ 43–44; see also ECF No. 187 at 2 n.1;

ECF No. 191 at 5 n.1. That Sargent may not have learned of her termination until October 23,

2017, is irrelevant given that her employment indisputably ended before that and the jury found

her termination lawful. The Court therefore finds based on the parties’ jointly stipulated

calculation that Sargent is entitled to an award of $14,533 in back pay, before any prejudgment

interest. ECF No. 212.

As noted, Sargent suggests that, in addition to back pay, the Court could also provide her

with other forms of “make-whole relief,” such as an order requiring SOC to train its employees

and customers on Title VII topics, post Title VII’s requirements at its worksites, or “fix[]”

Sargent’s employment records. ECF No. 187 at 3–4. Even assuming Sargent did not forfeit

entitlement to that additional relief by requesting it for the first time only in her reply brief, see

ECF No. 191 at 4, the Court finds it is not warranted. SOC “no longer has the Worldwide

Protective Services Task Order 3 contract with the Department of State . . . in Baghdad,” ECF No.

185 at 7, and most of the employees involved in Sargent’s case are no longer employed at SOC.

The training and posting remedies Sargent proposes thus could not reach the particular work

environment and individuals the jury found problematic, and would therefore have very limited

“make-whole” effect. And although Sargent does not specify the way in which the Court might

4 “fix” her employment records, it is difficult to imagine any remedy the Court could offer that

would not be inconsistent with the jury’s verdict, which, again, found her termination lawful.

II. Fees and Costs

Title VII authorizes the award of costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, to the

prevailing party. See Castle v. Bentsen,

(D.D.C. 1995) (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(k)). Here, though, the extent of Sargent’s entitlement to fees and costs depends more

on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 than on Title VII. Rule 68 provides that, “[a]t least 14 days

before the date set for trial, a [defendant] may serve on [a plaintiff] an offer to allow judgment on

specified terms, with the costs then accrued.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a). “If the judgment that the

[plaintiff] finally obtains is not more favorable than the unaccepted offer, the [plaintiff] must pay

the costs incurred after the offer was made.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(d). For purposes of a Title VII

case, Rule 68 “costs” include the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees. 2 See Marek v. Chesny,

(1985) (explaining that the scope of Rule 68 costs is set by the underlying statute in the case); 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (defining “a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the

costs”).

On June 26, 2024, seven months before trial, SOC served Sargent with an $800,000 offer

of judgment, “inclusive of all damages and penalties sought, pre-judgment interest, and reasonable

attorneys’ fees and costs incurred to date.” ECF No. 203-3 at 1. Sargent rejected the offer by

2 The Court of Appeals has held that, where the plaintiff’s total recovery does not exceed the offer of judgment, Rule 68 can also require a plaintiff to pay the defendant’s post-offer-of- judgment costs. See Tunison v. Cont’l Airlines Corp.,

(D.C. Cir. 1998). But it is not clear that principle extends to an award of a defendant’s attorneys’ fees in the Title VII context. See, e.g., Le v. Univ. of Pennsylvania,

, 410–11 (3d Cir. 2003). Regardless, the Court need not address the question here, because SOC has neither detailed its post-offer-of- judgment fees and costs nor specifically requested that Sargent reimburse them. See generally ECF No. 203.

5 failing to respond, and her counsel went on to bill 2,289.6 additional hours. 3 ECF No. 203 at 4–

5. The central question for fee and cost purposes is thus whether Sargent’s ultimate monetary

award in this case, combined with her recoverable fees and costs before June 26, 2024, exceed

$800,000. If they do not, then, pursuant to Rule 68, Sargent may recover only her pre-offer-of-

judgment fees and costs—no more.

1. Attorneys’ Fees

The Court will begin by assessing Sargent’s reasonable attorneys’ fees prior to June 26,

2024. See Alavi v. Bennett,

, at *12 (D.D.C. 2024). Sargent argues, relying on

the Fitzpatrick matrix 4 for calculating a reasonable rate under the lodestar approach, that her fees

by that date were $537,782.30. ECF No. 206 at 2; ECF No. 206-4. But there is no need to estimate

what Sargent’s reasonable attorneys’ fees would have been if she were not a paying client, as the

Fitzpatrick approach is designed to do, because Sargent’s counsel “agreed to accept [her] claims

on an hourly basis, and Sargent [] paid fees and expenses billed to her in this matter.” ECF No.

190 at 9; cf. J.T. v. D.C.,

, 19 (D.D.C. 2023) (explaining that the lodestar method

“roughly approximates the fee that the prevailing attorney would have received if he or she had

been representing a paying client who was billed by the hour in a comparable case”). In other

words, everyone knows here what counsel “actually charged” Sargent, and that is “presumptively

3 SOC also made a settlement offer of $1.25 million the week before trial, which Sargent again rejected. See ECF No. 203 at 5; ECF No. 203-2 ¶ 5. 4 “The Fitzpatrick Matrix is a fee matrix based on rates that lawyers charged clients for litigating complex cases in the D.C. District Court as determined from publicly filed fee petitions and resulting court orders.” Segar v. Garland,

, at *7 (D.D.C. 2024) (quotation marks and alteration omitted).

6 the reasonable rate.” 5 Baylor v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Assocs., P.C.,

, 735 (D.C.

Cir. 2018) (affirming district court’s decision to reduce counsel’s requested hourly rate to the rate

that was actually charged); see also Segar v. Garland,

, at *7 (D.D.C. 2024)

(relying on plaintiff’s actual rates as opposed to Fitzpatrick rates where Fitzpatrick rates were

lower).

That presumption is further bolstered here by the fact that Sargent’s pre-offer-of-judgment

fees as calculated using her counsel’s actual rates—$316,946.50—is in the ballpark of the estimate

her counsel provided to SCO of their fees at that time—$400,000. See ECF No. 203 at 10; ECF

No. 203-7; ECF No. 203-1 ¶ 3c. That unsurprising symmetry indicates the appropriateness of

relying on Sargent’s true rates: the alternative would substantially prejudice SOC insofar as it

calculated its offer of judgment based on Sargent’s counsel’s January 2024 representations to

Magistrate Judge Harvey about the amount that Sargent had actually spent on the case. 6 See ECF

No. 203-1 ¶ 3c; ECF No. 203-2 ¶ 4; ECF No. 203-4 at 7–8.

To be sure, Sargent argues that relying on the rates she actually paid would prejudice her,

since she lost the time value of that money and the higher Fitzpatrick rates would help her recoup

it. See ECF No. 206 at 5–6. But caselaw “condon[ing] the use of current [as opposed to historic]

[Fitzpatrick] rates . . . in order to account for a delay in payment,” Alavi,

, at

*15, does not stand for the principle that Fitzpatrick rates are generally appropriate when a client

5 Counsel’s hourly rate was $490 for partners; $290 for associates; and $165 for law clerks. ECF No. 203-6 at 2, 5. Counsel reserved the right to increase rates by 5% annually, but never did so.

6 Sargent’s counsel later asserted to defense counsel during fee litigation that “the $400,000 estimate of our fees at the time of mediation turns out to have been incorrect”—i.e., to have been an underestimate of the total—“because we were not using the 2024 Fitzpatrick rates.” ECF No. 203-4 at 6. 7 has “paid her attorneys’ fees . . . on an hourly basis.” ECF No. 206 at 3. The Court will explain

below how the Consumer Price Index addresses the inflation issue. But applying Fitzpatrick rates

in addition to an inflation adjustment here would confer a windfall in violation of standard fee

shifting policy. See Murray v. Weinberger,

(D.C. Cir. 1984). As the Supreme

Court has explained, “[t]here is nothing unfair about compensating [] attorneys at the very rate

that they requested.” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn,

(2010). The same goes

for compensating the plaintiffs who opt to pay those requested rates.

Having settled this qualitative rate issue, the Court also finds that several quantitative

deductions are warranted from the $316,946.50 in fees that Sargent actually paid prior to receiving

SOC’s offer of judgment. First, the parties agree that a $9,822.50 deduction is appropriate to

account for Sargent’s unsuccessful litigation against the State Department. 7 See ECF No. 203 at

12; ECF No 206 at 6; see also ECF No. 37. Next, SOC argues that various groups of Sargent’s

billing entries are categorically unrecoverable: entries allegedly pertaining to administrative tasks,

internal meetings, and duplicative tasks, as well as allegedly vague entries. See ECF No. 203 at

15–17. Beginning with the purported administrative entries, the Court has reviewed them and

agrees to some extent with SOC’s characterization: they pertain, among related actions, to the

downloading of documents, the scheduling of conference calls, and the calendaring of deadlines.

See ECF No. 203-10. “As a general matter, [those] clerical and administrative services amount to

non-billable overhead.” Barton v. U.S. Geological Surv.,

, at *8 (D.D.C. 2019).

But the Court also acknowledges that Sargent “should not be penalized for hiring” a relatively

“small law firm[] that do[es] not have the staff or support team of a major law firm,” and thus must

7 Sargent proposes a deduction of $15,238, based on 2024 Fitzpatrick rates, but does not dispute that $9,822.50 is the appropriate actual-rate equivalent. See ECF No. 206 at 6 & n.4. 8 rely on its law clerks and associates for a wider range of tasks.

The Court will therefore permit

these services to be compensated at a 25% discount, amounting to a $1,775.25 reduction in

Sargent’s fees.

The Court also partially agrees with SOC’s characterization of various entries as vague or

excessive. As to the former, the Court notes that a number of counsel’s entries are too generic or

coded to be meaningful, such as a $725 charge for “Completed revisions to the Litigation

Worksheet” and a $145 charge for reviewing and revising an “opinion letter.” ECF No. 203-11 at

2, 6. In total, the Court will deduct $1,539 from Sargent’s fees for these sorts of entries—less than

a third of the deduction that SOC proposed. 8 See, e.g., In re Donovan,

(D.C.

Cir. 1989) (affirming exclusion of billing entries where the descriptions “fail[ed] to provide the

court with any basis to determine with a high degree of certainty that the hours billed were

reasonable”) (quotation marks omitted).

As to entries for time that SOC alleges was “spent in duplicative, unorganized or otherwise

unproductive effort,” Env’t Def. Fund, Inc. v. Reilly,

, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1993), the Court

finds that counsel’s $70,759 expenditure on internal meetings, many of which included three or

four attorneys, was at that early stage in the litigation somewhat excessive. See generally ECF

No. 203-12. It will thus deduct 25% of those fees, for an additional deduction of $17,689.75. See,

e.g., Los Padres ForestWatch v. U.S. Forest Serv.,

, 372 (D.D.C. 2025)

(reducing fee for internal conferences by two-thirds where plaintiff “failed to justify” the “large

fee” of $12,225). And the Court will also deduct 25% of counsel’s $18,682 bill for focus group

8 SOC also proposed that the Court exclude the cost of numerous entries that were “cut off mid-sentence.” ECF No. 203 at 16. Because it appears that any omissions were merely the product of a technological error, see ECF No. 203-11, and plaintiff’s counsel offered at oral argument to submit a revised spreadsheet at the Court’s request, the Court will not exclude those additional entries. 9 sessions, see ECF No. 203-13, which was somewhat excessive in light of the dual attendance by

both principal attorneys assigned to the case. See, e.g., Am. Oversight v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

, 70–71 (D.D.C. 2019) (reducing by 33% counsel’s $20,000 bill for attending three

status conferences and conferring with opposing counsel, in light of “overstaffing and unnecessary

efforts”). That creates another $4,670.50 reduction.

Taking all of the above deductions together, Sargent’s attorneys’ fees before the offer of

judgment total $281,449.50. But the Court must consider whether one final deduction is warranted

given that Sargent ultimately prevailed on only one of her four claims. See ECF No. 203 at 12–

15. The Supreme Court has instructed courts considering results-based reductions to do so in view

of “two questions”: (1) whether the plaintiff “fail[ed] to prevail on claims that were unrelated to

the claims on which [s]he succeeded” and (2) whether the plaintiff “achieve[d] a level of success

that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award.” Hensley

v. Eckerhart,

(1983). Here, there was substantial daylight between the hostile

work environment claim on which Sargent prevailed and her two unsuccessful wrongful

termination claims. While the former centered on specific episodes of sexual harassment in

Baghdad, the latter turned on the actions of SOC and the State Department with respect to the loss

of confidence letter that Sargent received, which largely occurred after Sargent had left Baghdad. 9

Cf. Park v. Howard Univ.,

, 661 & n.9 (D.D.C. 1995) (hostile work environment

and discrimination claims were interrelated where they both rested on allegations that plaintiff had

been “systematically stripped . . . of every leadership position at Howard College of Pharmacy”).

It thus blinks reality to suggest that the claims grew out of the same “work,” or that evidence

9 Sargent’s retaliation claim theorized a link between the sexual harassment and her termination, but the verdict supports, at a minimum, that the jury rejected that theory. See ECF No. 181 at 1; contra ECF No. 206 at 8. 10 gathered for the termination claims “was instrumental to Sargent’s ability to prevail at trial.” ECF

No. 190 at 4.

Moreover, even if Sargent’s claims had been more “interrelated,” Sargent’s “limited”

“degree of success”—the “most critical factor”—would still warrant a fee reduction. Hensley, 461

at 436; see also

(“Congress has not authorized an award of fees whenever it was reasonable for

a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit or whenever conscientious counsel tried the case with devotion and

skill.”). The Court in its discretion will reduce Sargent’s fees by 25% to account for that principle,

which Sargent largely fails to grapple with. See, e.g., Baylor, 735 Fed. App’x at 736 (affirming

district court’s 60% fee reduction “to account for the fact that [the plaintiff] prevailed on only one

of her three claims”).

In sum, then, Sargent’s recoverable attorneys’ fees prior to receiving the offer of judgment

total $211,087.13.

2. Costs

The Court must next consider Sargent’s recoverable costs prior to SOC’s offer of judgment.

Although Sargent estimates their total at $75,210.63, see ECF No. 206-5 at 8, not every cost she

lists is compensable. See Noble v. Herrington,

, 118–19 (D.D.C. 1989) (citing

). To start, Sargent may not recover the cost of experts who did not “play[] a

vital role in the resolution of the case”—namely, the vocational experts who did not testify at trial

and whose reports were ultimately irrelevant given that Sargent did not (and could not) request

front pay or back pay beyond the limited period during which she remained employed at SOC but

was not paid. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton,

(D.D.C.

1973), rev’d on other grounds,

(D.C. Cir. 1974); see also ECF No. 203-15; ECF

No. 190 at 17. And it is well-established that expenses associated with mock trials, focus groups,

11 jury consultants, and private investigators generally are not compensable absent specific

circumstances not present here. See, e.g., Harvey v. Mohammed,

(D.D.C.

2013) (excluding mock trial expenses); Jackson v. Estelle Place, LLC,

, at *3

n.1 (E.D. Va. 2009) (excluding private investigator costs in a case brought by Sargent’s counsel),

aff’d,

(4th Cir. 2010). The Court will deduct a total of $29,552.70 for all of the

above expenses, meaning that Sargent’s recoverable costs before June 26, 2024, come to

$45,657.93. 10 See ECF Nos. 203-15, 203-16, and 203-17 (summaries of deducted expenses).

3. Inflation Adjustment

Based on the above analysis, Sargent’s compensable fees and costs before June 26, 2024

total $256,775.06. As noted, though, because Sargent paid her own fees and expenses in this

matter, she lost the time value of that money, and thus would not be fully compensated without

some form of inflation adjustment. See ECF No. 190 at 9; ECF No. 206 at 6; cf. Brackett v.

Mayorkas,

, at *6 (D.D.C. 2023) (awarding current matrix rates to adjust for

inflation).

SOC appears to concede Sargent’s entitlement to an inflation adjustment on her fee and

cost award—just not one effectuated via the application of current Fitzpatrick rates. See ECF No.

203 at 19. And SOC also concedes that the way to apply the adjustment is by entering Sargent’s

total fees and costs into the United States Bureau of Labor’s Consumer Price Index Inflation

Calculator using a start date of May 2018—the month counsel started billing Sargent. See

at

19 n. 15. The Court will accordingly follow that approach, notwithstanding that, as SOC flags, it

10 The Court in its discretion will permit Sargent to recover the cost of her trial consultant. See, e.g., Cefalu v. Village of Elk Grove,

(7th Cir. 2000). As Sargent notes, “SOC employed a paraprofessional to do the same sorts of tasks [that] Mr. Phaneuf” performed at trial. ECF 206 at 14.

12 slightly overestimates the impact of inflation since Sargent did not incur all her expenses at that

time. See

With this last adjustment, then, Sargent’s fees and costs before the offer of judgment

come to $330,655.50.

4. Prejudgment Interest

To finally determine whether the offer of judgment exceeds Sargent’s total recovery such

that it cuts off expenses incurred after June 26, 2024, the Court must assess the extent to which

Sargent is entitled to prejudgment interest on her damages award. 11 “Prejudgment interest serves

to compensate for the loss of use of money due as damages from the time the claim accrues until

judgment is entered, thereby achieving full compensation for the injury those damages are intended

to redress.” W. Virginia v. United States,

, 310 n.2 (1987). But precisely “[b]ecause

prejudgment interest is an element of complete compensation, it should be denied when an award

without prejudgment interest fully compensates a plaintiff.” Barry v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

, 60 (D.D.C. 2020) (citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). “The

determination as to whether a claimant is entitled to prejudgment interest is committed to the sound

discretion of the district court . . . .” Neal v. Dir., D.C. Dep’t of Corr.,

, at *1

(D.D.C. 1995).

Sargent’s sexual harassment damages award consists of three components. The jury

awarded $225,000 in compensatory damages, to remunerate Sargent “for any pain, suffering or

mental anguish that [she] experienced as a consequence of SOC’s [] unlawful actions.” ECF No.

11 SOC argues that Sargent has forfeited her entitlement to prejudgment interest on her damages award because she did not request it in her fee petition or reply brief. See ECF No. 209 at 1. Sargent did in fact fail to seek such interest even as late as her reply brief, but both parties addressed the issue during the June 9, 2025 motion hearing, and later submitted supplemental briefing on it at the Court’s direction. See Min. Entry of June 9, 2025. Moreover, SOC’s offer of judgment was expressly “inclusive of . . . pre-judgment interest.” ECF No. 203-3 at 1. For all these reasons, the Court will address the issue of prejudgment interest on the merits. 13 181 at 2; ECF No. 183 at 24. The jury also awarded $1.6 million in punitive damages, “to punish

[SOC] for its conduct and to serve as an example to prevent others from acting in a similar way.”

ECF No. 181 at 3; ECF No. 183 at 26. And for the reasons stated above, the Court has determined

that Sargent is entitled to $14,533.00 in back pay. The Court therefore must determine whether an

award of prejudgment interest is appropriate as to each of those distinct categories of damages.

The question is straightforward with respect to punitive damages. Courts have repeatedly

held that “prejudgment interest does not apply to punitive damages because prejudgment interest

is an element of complete compensation and punitive damages are non-compensatory.” Akins v.

Islamic Republic of Iran,

, 122 (D.D.C. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). The

Court agrees.

As to compensatory damages, the Court also finds that prejudgment interest is not

applicable here, where the jury’s award compensated for emotional distress alone. “[C]ourts

generally reserve prejudgement interest for backpay awards and similar relief.” Neal,

, at *2. That is because, “unlike a backpay award,” a jury’s award of emotional distress

damages likely already encompasses the plaintiff’s whole psychic injury from the time of the harm

until the conclusion of the trial. Percy v. Townsend,

, at *1–*2 (S.D.N.Y. 2024)

(explaining that pain and suffering damages “are not easily calculated, and the jury’s award already

represents their best quantification of losses that are difficult to quantify”). Indeed, the jury in this

case heard evidence about all “the time periods involved” in Sargent’s pain and suffering, id. at

*2, including Sargent’s testimony that to this day she “questions everything in her life” and that

she will never “get over” “[w]hat happened to her and what SOC has done to her,” and the Court

instructed the jury to “determine an amount that [was] fair compensation for Ms. Sargent’s

damages.” ECF No. 185 at 6; ECF No. 183 at 24. The Court thus finds prejudgment interest is

14 not warranted because the jury’s award itself “account[s] for [Sargent’s] ongoing . . . suffering.” 12

E.E.O.C. v. Everdry Mktg. & Mgmt., Inc.,

(W.D.N.Y. 2008) (jury

instruction to “award damages in an amount that would ‘fairly and justly’ compensate the

claimant” meant the jury was “directed to consider . . . any continuing injury”), aff’d,

(2d Cir. 2009).

Sargent is, however, entitled to prejudgment interest on her backpay award—the

prototypical case for prejudgment interest in a Title VII suit. See Loeffler v. Frank,

(1998) (“Title VII authorizes prejudgment interest as part of the backpay remedy in suits

against private employers.”); see also Neal,

, at *2. The Court will thus adjust

Sargent’s total award of backpay to $20,570.05, based on Sargent’s unchallenged calculation. See

ECF No. 213 at 2 & n.3.

***

When Sargent’s money damages—$300,000 in compensatory and punitive damages plus

$20,570.05 in back pay—are added to her compensable fees and costs prior to the offer of

judgment, the total is $651,225.55. Because that amount is less than the offer of judgment, Sargent

may not recover fees and costs postdating June 26, 2024. Her fees and costs are thus capped at

$330,655.50.

III. Sanctions

After Sargent filed her initial motion for equitable relief, which sought expansive back and

front pay essentially on the theory that she was wrongfully terminated, SOC moved for Rule 11

sanctions on the grounds that the motion was inconsistent with the jury verdict. See ECF No. 189

12 Even if the Court had concluded prejudgment interest was appropriate, it is not clear whether Sargent would have been able to recover that interest given Title VII’s statutory damages cap. See, e.g., Lensing v. Potter,

, at *6 (W.D. Mich. 2013) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D)). 15 at 5. As discussed, though, Sargent later abandoned that broad request to seek only back pay for

the time between her departure from Baghdad and her termination, on a quasi-constructive-

discharge theory. And for the reasons above, the Court awarded that limited back pay after

concluding that Sargent’s narrower request was sufficiently encompassed by her broader request

such that it was not forfeited. In short, the Court concluded that Sargent’s motion for equitable

relief was partially meritorious, meaning the standard for sanctions is not met. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

11(b). And in any event, the Court agrees that Sargent’s choice to narrow her request for equitable

relief after receiving SOC’s sanctions threat satisfied Rule 11’s safe harbor provision, further

shielding counsel. See Fed R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (requiring “challenged . . . contention” to be

“appropriately corrected”).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant in part Sargent’s motion for equitable relief,

ECF No. 185, by awarding her $20,570.05 in back pay, inclusive of prejudgment interest. The

Court will also grant in part Sargent’s motion for fees and costs, ECF No. 190, by awarding her a

total of $330,655.50 for her attorneys’ fees and costs prior to SOC’s offer of judgment. Finally,

the Court will deny SOC’s motion for sanctions, ECF No. 189. An Order will accompany this

Opinion.

DATE: September 12, 2025 CARL J. NICHOLS United States District Judge

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