UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. No. 20-cr-213

DONNELLE D. BRAND,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant Donnelle D. Brand’s Motion for Relief. See Def.’s

Mot. Relief, ECF No. 37. Mr. Brand asks the Court to order the District of Columbia Department

of Motor Vehicles (“D.C. DMV”) to allow him to contest the erroneous administrative finding

that led to the revocation of his driver’s license. See Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Relief (“Def.’s

Mem.”) 6, ECF No. 38. Obtaining a license is essential in the pursuit of Mr. Brand’s livelihood

and required for his compliance with court-ordered terms of supervised release. For the reasons

set forth herein, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Relief and hereby ORDERS the

D.C. DMV to provide Mr. Brand with a hearing to contest the deprivation of his driver’s

license.1

I. BACKGROUND

A. Mr. Brand’s Supervision and Terms of Release

This matter stems from Mr. Brand’s alleged violations of the terms of his supervised

release. See Probation Pet. (“Pet.”), ECF No. 29. On June 14, 2024, Judge Kollar-Kotelly

referred the matter to the undersigned. See Min. Order (June 14, 2024). Between July 29, 2024

1 The Court directs counsel for Mr. Brand to send a copy of this order to the D.C. DMV.

1 and January 13, 2025, the undersigned held six separate status hearings to monitor Mr. Brand’s

reentry progress.

One of Mr. Brand’s conditions of supervision required that he “work full time (at least 30

hours per week) at a lawful type of employment.” Pl.’s Judgment 5, ECF No. 19. The condition

further required that he “try to find full-time employment” if he is unemployed. Id. The Court

inquired about Mr. Brand’s compliance with this condition. Mr. Brand indicated that it was

virtually impossible to seek or obtain a job without a driver’s license, let alone get to/from work.

His counsel echoed this, explaining that reinstatement of Mr. Brand’s driver’s license would

open a “world of employment opportunities.” In turn, the Court ordered Mr. Brand to obtain a

driver’s license to facilitate compliance with its prior order mandating he seek and obtain

employment.

However, resolution of the pending probation petition has been stalled by the D.C.

DMV’s refusal to issue Mr. Brand his driver’s license. Since August 8, 2024, Mr. Brand, pro

bono counsel Ms. Amber Hammond, and Assistant Federal Public Defender Ms. Sandra Roland

have taken on the Sisyphean task of trying to reobtain Mr. Brand’s D.C. driver’s license. Despite

the law and equity being on their side, they have come up empty-handed time after time. This is

through no fault of their own. At each hearing, Mr. Brand’s team has detailed the numerous

roadblocks and moving goal posts they have encountered.

Now—one year later—the D.C. DMV continues to thwart this Court’s order for no

apparent reason.

B. Mr. Brand’s Driver’s License Revocation

On April 15, 2023, Mr. Brand was in a single-car accident in Maryland. He suffered

severe injuries to his lungs and chest, including “[c]losed displaced fracture of sixth cervical

2 vertebra, unspecified fracture morphology, . . . [c]ontusion of both lungs, . . . and [s]ternal

fracture with retrosternal contusion.” See Def.’s Mem., Ex. C, April 15, 2023 Hospital

Admission (“Hospital Admission”) at 1–2, ECF No. 38-3.

Maryland law enforcement arrived at the scene of the accident. They suspected Mr.

Brand of having committed a crime—likely after discovering he was on supervision which

typically leads authorities to a presumption of guilt—here, driving under the influence. See

Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness 99

(10th anniversary ed. 2020) (“Once a person is a labeled a felon, [they are] ushered into a

parallel universe in which discrimination, stigma, and exclusion are perfectly legal. It does not

matter whether [they] have actually spent time in prison; [their] second-class citizenship begins

the moment [they] are branded a felon.”). Mr. Brand passed all field sobriety tests “including

standing on one leg, tracking the officer’s finger with his eyes, and walking in a line.” See Def.’s

Mem. at 3 n.2. However, due to his injuries, he physically could not blow into the breathalyzer

(i.e., chemical testing). This is unsurprising. “Any form of crushed chest [injuries] is likely to

result in respiratory failure.” G.M. Copland, R.E. Donevan, & B.F. Ford, Respiratory Failure:

What Is It and How Do I Treat It?, 22 Can. Fam. Physician 265, 266 (1976); Sarah G.

Hammond, Chest Injuries in the Trauma Patient, 25 Nursing Clinics N. Am. 35, 35 (1990)

(“Chest trauma can disrupt the normal physiologic mechanisms in any of these three areas

[airway, breathing, and circulation].”). Despite the facts pointing otherwise, law enforcement still

issued Mr. Brand a citation.

Cooler heads subsequently prevailed. On June 7, 2023, Maryland prosecutors declined to

prosecute the case. See Def.’s Mem., Ex. A, District Ct. Maryland Prince George’s County Case

Summ. (“Maryland Case Summ.”), ECF No. 38-1. However, Mr. Brand’s Kafkaesque journey

3 was just beginning. The Maryland Department of Transportation Motor Vehicle Administration

(“Maryland MVA”) erroneously sent a notice of “Out-of-State Conviction” to the D.C. DMV.

See Def.’s Mem., Ex. B, Maryland MVA Out-of-State Conviction Report, ECF No. 38-2. This

notice incorrectly reported that Mr. Brand was convicted of the Maryland charge on May 31,

2023. See id.

The D.C. DMV compounded Maryland’s mistake. Specifically,

-

1905(a)(2) provides that a person who refuses chemical testing, regardless of the reason, shall be

punished “upon receipt of a sworn report of the law enforcement officer that he or she had

reasonable grounds to believe the arrested person had been driving . . . [while] intoxicated or

while the person’s ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by the consumption of alcohol

or a drug or a combination thereof.” See

(a)(2). The D.C. Code does not

appear to take physical inability into account.2 And presumably, the D.C. DMV thought there

was reasonable ground to conclude that Mr. Brand was driving under the influence based on the

erroneous report of conviction it received from the Maryland MVA.

The punishments for a violation of

(a)(2) include: revocation of

driving privileges for 12 months; denying the issuance of a license for 12 months, if the person is

without a license to operate a motor vehicle in the District; or require enrollment in the Ignition

Interlock System Program (“IISP”). See

(a)(2). The D.C. DMV both

2 Many states recognize physical inability a valid reason to refuse chemical testing. For example, Pennsylvania courts have held: “[w]ith regard to a driver’s physical inability to take the [chemical] test, each case must be decided on its individual facts. Medical evidence of a driver’s physical incapacity is not a per se requirement. Where a driver’s physical incapacity is obvious, there is no need for the driver to present medical evidence to prove it. In determining the obviousness of a driver’s incapacity, a court does not leave [its] common sense at home.” Carlin v. Commw. of Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing,

(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

4 revoked Mr. Brand’s license and refuse to allow him to reobtain his license until he completes a

12-month enrollment in IISP. See Def.’s Mem. at 1. IISP essentially places a breathalyzer

attached to the steering wheel among other features. See What is an Ignition Interlock Device?,

LifeSafer, https://www.lifesafer.com/ignition-interlock-devices/what-is-an-ignition-interlock/

(last visited Aug 22, 2025). The program requires an upfront installation fee of $70 to $170 and

$50 to $120 per month to lease the device. See Ignition Interlock Cost, LifeSafer,

https://www.lifesafer.com/ignition-interlock-cost/ (last visited Aug 22, 2025). Mr. Brand could

not afford this expense.3 See Def.’s Mem. at 4.

The D.C. DMV mailed Mr. Brand the § 50-1905(a)(2) order revoking his license and

requiring participation in IISP. See id. at 3. The D.C. DMV mailed the notice to the D.C.

Mayor’s Office of Returning Citizens Affairs (“MORCA”). See id. at 2. Mr. Brand had listed his

home address on his driver’s license as MORCA’s address because he was a returning citizen

with unstable housing. See id. But changes at MORCA led to MORCA refusing to accept

returning citizens’ mail. See id. Thus, Mr. Brand’s order was returned as undeliverable. See id.

As such, Mr. Brand did not learn about the revocation of his license until he tried to obtain a

3 Preserving public safety with sober drivers is an important state interest. But charging for IISP enrollment is a net negative. Poor people cannot afford the program, which prevents them from get their driver’s licenses. Without their licenses, they cannot find quality employment. So, they are stuck in poverty. Setting aside how offensive this is, poverty is an equally concerning public safety problem. See Barry Friedman, What Is Public Safety?, 102 B.U. L. REV. 725, 745 (emphasizing that “[p]eople who cannot afford the very basic necessities of life, such as food and housing, are not safe”).

A simple solution would be to offer IISP for free. Presumably, creating the least amount of friction to ensuring sober drivers on the road is the goal (not to mention higher tax revenue from people climbing out of poverty). Instead, the state traps its poor citizens in a cycle of poverty.

5 Maryland driver’s license.4 See id. at 3–4. At that point, the 10-day window to contest the order

had long since closed. See infra.

II. DISCUSSION

Mr. Brand’s possession of a driver’s license is no mere convenience; it is essential. See

Bell v. Burson,

(1971). Judge Kollar-Kotelly previously found that a driver’s

license holds a significant property interest, the deprivation of which implicates a person’s due

process rights. See Parham v. District of Columbia,

, 107 (D.D.C. 2022),

vacated on other grounds. This is because of the need for a driver’s license to complete everyday

tasks: “[d]ropping children off at childcare, attending doctor’s appointments, caring for elderly

relatives, running errands, and even traveling to and from a place of employment become

challenges.”

(emphasis added). Indeed, “[w]ithout a valid driver’s license, it is

dramatically harder for DC residents to find and sustain employment.” Driving DC to

Opportunity: Report FAQs, Tzedek DC (Apr. 2021), https://www.tzedekdc.org/report-faqs;

“Driving remains the most common way for workers to commute to their jobs in the DC region,”

and having one’s driver’s license revoked “exposes DC residents who need to drive to the risk of

criminal prosecution and jail.” Id.; See also Henry Grabar, States Have Trapped Millions Of

Americans In Crippling Debt By Taking Away Their Driver’s Licenses, Slate (Sept. 27, 2017),

https://slate.com/business/2017/09/state-lawmakers-have-trapped-millions-of-americans-in-debt-

by-taking-their-licenses.html. Thus, without a license, Mr. Brand faces an undue barrier to

securing employment. Unemployment puts him both at risk of poverty, which carries countless

4 Mr. Brand cannot obtain a Maryland driver’s license. The Maryland MVA will not allow Mr. Brand to obtain a Maryland driver’s license because of the D.C. DMV’s revocation of Mr. Brand’s D.C. license—which it bears repeating was predicated on an incorrect charge that was never prosecuted. See Def.’s Mem. at 4.

6 attendant harms, and in violation of his court-ordered conditions of supervised release, which

carries severe consequences, including incarceration. But there is an offramp to Mr. Brand’s

nightmare: a hearing.

A. Due Process

i. Legal standard

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that no State shall “deprive

any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. “The Supreme Court

has recognized a protected property interest in retaining a driver’s license.” Parham, 648 F.

Supp. 3d at 107. This is because “[o]nce licenses are issued . . . their continued possession may

become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state

action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases, the licenses are not to

be taken away without [] procedural due process.” Bell,

. “That the Due Process

Clause applies to a state’s suspension or revocation of a driver’s license is clear.” Mackey v.

Montrym,

, 10 n.7 (1979).

Due process requires (1) notice, (2) an opportunity to be heard, and (3) impartiality

before denying life, liberty, or property. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,

(1950). The D.C. code has due process notice and hearing requirements for

driver’s license revocation orders. Such orders only take effect 10 days “after service of notice

on the person whose license or privilege to drive in the District of Columbia is to be revoked.”

(a). In turn, that person can “request for a hearing [on the revocation]

within 10 days . . . of service of the notice.”

Here, the D.C. DMV failed both to provide

notice or an opportunity to be heard.

7 ii. Failure to provide notice

When notice is due, “[t]he means employed must be such as one desirous of actually

informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.” Mullane,

. The

D.C. DMV’s single inadequate effort here resulted in its notice being returned as undeliverable.

“We do not think that [an agency] who actually desired to inform a real [driver’s license holder]

of an impending [revocation of his license] would do nothing when a [] letter sent to the [license

holder] is returned.” Jones v. Flowers,

(2006). Indeed, “when a letter is

returned by the post office, the sender will ordinarily attempt to resend it, if it is practicable to do

so. This is especially true when, as here, the subject matter of the letter concerns such an

important and irreversible prospect as the loss of a [driver’s license].” Flowers,

.

The notice failure is particularly egregious here. The D.C. Mayor’s office has oversight

of both license revocation hearings and MORCA. As such, the D.C. Mayor’s delegate, the DMV,

should have known that mailing Mr. Brand’s notice to MORCA would be unsuccessful given

MORCA’s changes in processes in receiving mail for returning citizens. Thus, the D.C. Mayor’s

office chose a method of notice that had zero possibility of success. In doing so, the D.C. DMV

failed to provide Mr. Brand with timely, constitutionally-required notice of his license

revocation. See supra.

iii. Failure to provide opportunity to be heard

“Procedural due process requires that a fair hearing be held prior to permanent

suspension of a driver’s license.” Gilles v. Touchstone,

(D.D.C. 1987).

Here, Mr. Brand never had a hearing. “The risk of erroneous deprivation due to [DMV] errors

would be mitigated with the opportunity for a hearing.” Parham, 648 F. Supp. 3d at 113.

8 iv. Remedy

The remedy for these due process violations is the D.C. DMV granting Mr. Brand a

hearing. Cf. Gilles,

(finding that the plaintiff’s due process right was not

violated since they were given an opportunity to contest the charges). A hearing would allow

him to challenge the chemical testing refusal/DUI adjudication by demonstrating that he could

not blow into the breathalyzer due to his injuries and that he passed all other field sobriety tests.

Cf. Parham, 648 F. Supp. 3d at 113; Wall v. Babers,

, 802–03 (D.C. Ct. App. 2014)

(denying plaintiff’s due process challenge where “there were no contested facts that needed to be

resolved at a past-deprivation hearing”). “[Mr. Brand’s] interest in his driver license . . . may not

[be] take[n] away without satisfying the requirements of the due process guarantee of the

Fourteenth Amendment.” Mackey,

.

B. Supervised Release Requirements

i. Legal standard

The All Writs Act empowers federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in

aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”

(a). Courts can “issue such commands under the All Writs Act as may be necessary or

appropriate to effectuate and prevent the frustration of orders it has previously issued in its

exercise of jurisdiction otherwise obtained.” United States v. New York Tel. Co.,

(1977). Courts may thus issue writs they deem necessary for justice, including compelling

action by government officials and agencies. See In re Nat’l Nurses United,

(D.C. Cir. 2022). When “there is a gap in the law, resort to the All Writs Act is appropriate.” In

re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to

(a) for Order Precluding

Notice of Grand Jury Subpoena, No. 17-mc-1604,

, at *1 (D.D.C. July 7,

9 2017). One such gap is when “an adequate alternative remedy” is unavailable. LeBlanc v. U.S.

Priv. & C.L. Oversight Bd., No. 25-cv-542,

, at *34 (D.D.C. 2025).

ii. All Writs Act mandates a hearing on DUI / chemical testing allegations

The All Writs Act empowers this Court to take action to enforce its orders that Mr. Brand

obtain employment and his driver’s license. To that end, this Court also orders the D.C. DMV to

grant Mr. Brand a hearing pursuant to the All Writs Act.5 Providing Mr. Brand with the

opportunity to be heard is “in aid of [this Court’s] respective jurisdiction[]” and necessary to

“achieve the rational ends of law.”

(a); New York Telephone Co.,

. Affording Mr. Brand a hearing is both necessary to ensure “the ends of justice” and

“appropriate in aid of [this Court’s] respective jurisdiction[].” New York Telephone Co.,

;

(a). Indeed, the ends of justice would seemingly dictate a quick end to

such hearing in Mr. Brand’s favor considering his success on field sobriety tests and his

“physical incapacity [precluding a chemical test was] obvious.” Carlin,

. And

given that the Maryland MVA has denied Mr. Brand a Maryland driver’s license because of the

D.C. DMV’s revocation, there is no “adequate alternative remedy” available to Mr. Brand.

LeBlanc, No. 25-542,

, at *34. On the flip side, requiring Mr. Brand to pay

thousands of dollars to participate in the 12-month IISP would be a grave miscarriage of justice.

This is especially true given the lack of evidence supporting the allegation that Mr. Brand was

intoxicated.

5 If the D.C. DMV fails to comply, the Court will issue a show cause order requiring the D.C. DMV to demonstrate why it is prohibiting Mr. Brand from receiving a hearing.

10 C. All Writs Act Mandates a Hearing on Other Driving Infraction Allegations

Pro bono counsel for Mr. Brand also flagged that the D.C. DMV had indicated that

Mr. Brand’s outstanding traffic infractions (i.e., speeding and parking tickets) may prevent him

from acquiring a driver’s license. See Maryland Case Summ. However, these tickets should not

be (another) barrier to Mr. Brand receiving his driver’s license. Judge Kollar-Kotelly previously

enjoined enforcement of Washington D.C.’s Clean Hands Law6 under similar circumstances. See

Parham, 648 F. Supp. 3d at 116 (holding that Clean Hands Law likely violated due process

rights of D.C. residents; and finding that this law harmed people who were “unable to afford the

fines and fees imposed by the District”).

Forcing Mr. Brand to “contend with additional burdens imposed by not having [a] license

[because of traffic infractions]” would be a profound injustice. First, D.C. DMV issued many of

these tickets while Mr. Brand was incarcerated. He could not have committed traffic violations

while trapped behind bars. Second, Mr. Brand contests notice of the remaining tickets. For the

reasons described above, the D.C. DMV cannot make traffic infractions a “barrier [to Mr. Brand]

receiving . . . a license renewal” without “afford[ing] [him] any opportunity . . . to be heard.” See

Parham, 648 F. Supp. 3d at 109, 112. Therefore, to “ensur[e] that [Mr. Brand is] not erroneously

stripped of [his] license[],” due process and the All Writs Act require that the D.C. DMV provide

Mr. Brand with a hearing to contest the traffic infractions.7 See id. at 113.

6 This law disqualifies applicants from obtaining or renewing driver’s licenses if they owe more than $100 in parking, traffic, or other fines and fees. See

, et seq. 7 Mr. Brand appears to be an ideal candidate for MORCA's Pathways program for ticket fines forgiveness/reduction.

11 III. CONCLUSION8

If this year-long nightmare is how a person with the benefit of appointed and pro bono

counsels is treated, what hope is there for the thousands of poor people who are not so lucky?

Zia Digitally signed by Zia M.Faruqui

M.Faruqui Date: 2025.09.12 11:31:10 -04'00' Date: September 12, 2025 ___________________________________ ZIA M. FARUQUI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

8 The parties are hereby advised that, under the provisions of Local Criminal Rule 59.1(b) of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, any party may file written objections for consideration by the district judge within fourteen days of the party’s receipt of this Order. The written objections must specifically identify the portion to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The parties are further advised that failure to file timely objections to the findings and recommendations set forth in this report may waive their right of appeal from an order of the District Court that adopts such findings and recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn,

, 144–45 (1985).

12