UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LEWIS BROWN,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 23-02923 (AHA) v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,

Defendant.

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Lewis Brown brings this Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) suit against the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), challenging the adequacy of its search and response to his FOIA

request. Both parties have moved for summary judgment. As explained below, the FBI’s motion

is granted in part and denied in part, and Brown’s motion is denied.

I. Background

In January 2023, Brown submitted a FOIA request to the FBI seeking “[a]ll records

pertaining to the arrest of the undersigned Lewis Brown . . . on or about March 6, 1995 in

Cleveland, Ohio.” ECF No. 1-1 at 3. Brown also requested “[a]ll interview notes and statements

made by Levester Johnson, initially upon his arrest on or about March 6, 1995 in Cleveland, Ohio.”

Id. In February 2023, Brown submitted a modified version of his original request, eliminating

entirely the request for documents regarding Johnson and adding a request for “[a]ll investigation

notes and documents regarding Lewis Brown, on or about March 6, 1995 in Cleveland, Ohio.” Id.

at 10; see also ECF No. 1 at 2. The FBI issued a letter to Brown, acknowledging receipt of his original FOIA request. ECF

No. 25-3 ¶ 6. The FBI eventually received Brown’s modified request, and it issued another letter

to Brown explaining that “unusual circumstances” applied that would delay the agency’s ability to

make a determination. Id. ¶ 7; see ECF No. 1-1 at 12. Brown appealed that response to the Office

of Information Policy (“OIP”) of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”). ECF No. 1 at 3; see ECF No.

1-1 at 17. OIP affirmed the FBI’s determination. ECF No. 1 at 3; see ECF No. 1-1 at 20.

In May 2023, the FBI advised Brown that it had reviewed four pages of records and was

releasing, in full or in part, two of those pages. ECF No. 25-3 ¶ 11; see ECF No. 1-1 at 23. Brown

appealed to OIP, noting that the document produced was an incident report stating that, on the day

in question, “a black male known as ‘Black’ came to the residence of [] for a pre-scheduled

delivery of cocaine.” ECF No. 1-1 at 29 (alteration in original) (capitalization omitted); see id. at

26. The report also indicated that when “Black” was arrested, his license identified him as Lewis

Brown. Id. at 26. In his appeal to OIP, Brown asserted that “[i]f the subject was, as the form states,

a ‘known’ individual, there must be a document related to this incident that explains how this

individual was ‘known.’” Id. at 29. Brown therefore demanded any document in the FBI’s

possession “that contains a description of the individual known as ‘Black’ that was given to them

before the undersigned was arrested.” Id. OIP denied the appeal as moot in light of the FBI’s

response. Id. at 31.

Brown filed this suit in September 2023. In May 2024, the FBI released additional records

to Brown: it reviewed fifty-three pages of records and released forty-eight pages in full or in part,

with certain information redacted. ECF No. 25-3 ¶ 16. The FBI also advised Brown that certain

information was referred to other agencies for review. Id. In July 2024, the FBI made its final

release to Brown, advising that five pages of records were reviewed, and three pages were being

2 released in full or in part, with appropriate redactions made by the Drug Enforcement

Administration (“DEA”) and the Executive Office for United States Attorneys (“EOUSA”). Id.

¶ 17. Brown moved for summary judgment, challenging the agency’s withholdings and requesting

in camera inspection. ECF No. 22. The FBI cross moved for summary judgment. ECF No. 25. 1

II. Legal Standard

FOIA “mandates that an agency disclose records on request, unless they fall within one of

nine exemptions.” Milner v. Dep’t of Navy,

, 565 (2011). Those exemptions “must be

narrowly construed.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The burden is on the

agency to justify withholding the requested documents,” and a district court must “determine de

novo whether non-disclosure was permissible.” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland

Sec.,

(D.C. Cir. 2015). In the FOIA context, “[s]ummary judgment may be

granted on the basis of agency affidavits if they contain reasonable specificity of detail rather than

merely conclusory statements, and if they are not called into question by contradictory evidence

in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.” Jud. Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv.,

(D.C. Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Consumer Fed’n of Am. v. Dep’t of

Agric.,

(D.C. Cir. 2006)).

1 In June 2025, Brown filed a “Notice of Power of Attorney” that “delegate[s] Power of Attorney to Dr. David Z. Simpson to act on [Brown’s] behalf in this matter and any related legal proceedings,” and purports to authorize Simpson “to receive correspondence, make filings, and coordinate communications regarding this . . . case and beyond.” ECF No. 33 at 1 (emphasis omitted). But litigants can either be represented by an attorney or represent themselves in federal court, and there is no indication Simpson is an attorney.

(“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel . . . .”); see, e.g., Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona,

(D.C. Cir. 1984). The Court accordingly continues to consider Brown a pro se litigant who is representing himself personally.

3 III. Discussion

The Court first considers whether the FBI is entitled to summary judgment as to the

adequacy of the search, and then considers whether its withholdings are justified and Brown’s

request for in camera review.

A. The FBI Is Entitled To Summary Judgment As To The Adequacy Of The Search

To “satisfy FOIA’s aims of providing more transparency into the workings of the

government,” an agency must demonstrate that an adequate search for records responsive to a

FOIA request was made. Montgomery v. IRS,

(D.C. Cir. 2022). This

demonstration “entails a ‘show[ing] that [the agency] made a good faith effort to conduct

a search for the requested records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce

the information requested.’”

(alterations in original) (quoting Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army,

(D.C. Cir. 1990)).

The Court concludes that the FBI complied with its search obligations. The FBI’s

declaration identifies and details the record systems and locations used for the FBI’s search––

including why the relevant information, if available, would be in those systems and locations––

the search terms used, and the scope of the searches. ECF No. 25-3 ¶¶ 18–27. More specifically,

the declaration explains that the FBI’s Central Records System (“CRS”) is “an extensive system

of records consisting of applicant, investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and

general files compiled and maintained by the FBI.” Id. ¶ 19. The CRS is organized into automated

indices, which FBI personnel can access through Sentinel, the FBI’s case management system. Id.

¶ 22. These indices “consist of millions of searchable records that are updated daily with newly

indexed information.” Id. ¶ 25. In addition, because the information requested by Brown “predates

and/or overlaps the implementation of . . . Sentinel,” a manual indices search was also conducted.

Id. The FBI searched the Sentinel indices (as well as Sentinel’s legacy system) using the term,

4 “Brown, Lewis,” and processed sixty-two total pages of records, fifty-three pages of which the

FBI released, in full or in part, to Brown. Id. ¶¶ 25–26; see ECF No. 25-1 ¶ 2.

Brown offers no evidence to contradict the declaration’s assertions that the FBI searched

all areas likely to contain the information sought, nor does the Court independently find any reason

to doubt that the agency fulfilled its search obligations. To the contrary, Brown insists that the

FBI’s efforts were too comprehensive, and that it need not have referred documents to the DEA or

EOUSA, which he characterizes as “evasive techniques and tactics.” ECF No. 30 at 3–4. But if “a

DOJ component receives a request for records in its possession and determines that ‘another

component, or another agency of the Federal Government, is better able to determine whether the

record is exempt from disclosure under the FOIA,’ it may ‘[r]efer the responsibility for responding

to the request . . . to the component best able to determine whether to disclose it, or to another

agency that originated the record.’” Truesdale v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.D.C.

2010) (alteration and omission in original) (citation omitted); see also Friedman v. U.S. Secret

Serv.,

, 307–08 (D.D.C. 2017) (“Nor does the Court find fault with the

[agency’s] decisions to refer records to the agencies where they originated, notwithstanding

plaintiff’s assertion that ‘these other agencies are only acting upon referrals from an agency acting

in bad faith.’” (citation omitted)). And Brown’s personal search preferences are irrelevant to the

reasonableness of the scope and technique of the FBI’s search. See Mobley v. CIA,

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[U]nder [the plaintiff’s] approach, which would allow a requester to dictate,

through search instructions, the scope of an agency’s search, the reasonableness test for search

adequacy long adhered to in this circuit would be undermined.”).

Brown appears to suggest the search was inadequate because the FBI failed to produce a

specific document “containing information, i.e. identification given by informant of the individual

5 known as ‘Black.’” ECF No. 30 at 1; see also ECF No. 37 at 1 (stating that Brown “has sought a

very specific record: the document identifying ‘Black,’ which was provided by the informant

Levester Johnson at the point of his arrest on March 6, 1995”). But Brown’s request did not

mention any pre-arrest investigation into the alias “Black,” and agencies “need not expand their

searches beyond the four corners of the request, nor are they required to divine a requester’s

intent.” Am. Chem. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,

(D.D.C. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The FBI’s search was tailored in

accordance with the parameters of the FOIA request as drafted, and as noted, Brown modified his

request to eliminate the portion pertaining to Levester Johnson. See ECF No. 1 at 2; ECF No. 1-1

at 10. Brown cannot now “expand the scope of his FOIA request” through this litigation. Houser

v. Church,

(D.D.C. 2017).

In any event, Brown offers no reason to think the FBI’s search was unreasonable for failing

to turn up the document he seeks. His theory appears to be that the incident report’s use of the

language, “known as ‘Black,’” means there must be a document explaining why the individual

was “known.” ECF No. 1 at 4. But it is not at all clear why that must be so, and Brown does not

provide any basis to conclude the FBI’s search was inadequate for failing to produce such a

document. Cf. Willis v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.D.C. 2008) (explaining that

a plaintiff cannot show that defendants failed to meet their obligations under FOIA “by merely

referring to Plaintiff’s belief that he was—and therefore is—entitled to certain documents, or that

Defendants are simply perpetrating a large-scale fraud against him”). The Court accordingly

concludes the FBI has met its burden in conducting an adequate search.

6 B. The Agencies Properly Applied Various Exemptions To Fifty-Three Pages Released In Full Or In Part

The Court concludes the agencies have justified their application of various FOIA

exemptions to the fifty-three pages released in full or in part, and they have also satisfied their

segregability obligations as to those pages. 2

1. The Agencies Properly Invoked Exemptions 6 And 7(C)

The FBI, DEA, and EOUSA all invoke exemptions 6 and 7(C). See ECF No. 25-3 ¶¶ 34–

45; ECF No. 25-4 at 56–57 ¶¶ 8–14;

at 63–65 ¶¶ 9–13. Exemption 6 covers “personnel and

medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted

invasion of personal privacy.”

(b)(6). Exemption 7(C) encompasses “records or

information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of

such law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”

§ 552(b)(7)(C). “Exemption 7(C) is more protective

of privacy than Exemption 6” and sets a lower bar for withholding information. ACLU v. U.S.

Dep’t of Just.,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth.,

, 496 n.6 (1994)).

The agencies properly redacted certain information under exemption 7(C) within the fifty-

three pages released in whole or in part. At the outset, to “show that the disputed documents were

compiled for law enforcement purposes,” an agency “need only establish a rational nexus between

the investigation and one of the agency’s law enforcement duties and a connection between an

2 The FBI’s declaration also invokes Privacy Act exemption (j)(2) but states that “the FBI has reviewed these records under the access provisions of . . . FOIA to achieve maximum disclosure.” ECF No. 25-3 ¶ 29. The Court therefore need not separately address the applicability of the Privacy Act. See, e.g., Dutton v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.D.C. 2018) (explaining that issue was addressed by FOIA discussion where court determined that FOIA exemptions were properly invoked and plaintiffs did not challenge application of Privacy Act exemption).

7 individual or incident and a possible security risk or violation of federal law.” Blackwell v. FBI,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Courts generally

afford some deference to agencies ‘specializing in law enforcement’ that claim their records are

eligible for Exemption 7(C) protection.” Bartko v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.C. Cir.

2018) (quoting Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.C. Cir. 2003)).

All the agencies satisfy this threshold element. The FBI is a criminal investigatory and

regulatory law enforcement agency within DOJ. See

(“The Federal Bureau of

Investigation is in the Department of Justice.”);

§§ 533–35, 538–540D (listing some of the

FBI’s criminal investigatory and regulatory duties). The DEA and the EOUSA also specialize in

law enforcement. See Cooper v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

, 35 & n.9 (D.D.C. 2016);

Cunningham v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.D.C. 2014). The declarants attest that

the responsive records were compiled for an investigation into organized criminal activity and to

execute associated arrest warrants. See ECF No. 25-3 ¶¶ 34–35; ECF No. 25-4 at 55–56 ¶¶ 5, 8–

9;

at 64 ¶ 11. Indeed, Brown’s own interest in this action is based on his arrest records. See,

e.g., Blackwell,

(finding that, where plaintiff sought records relating to a criminal

investigation and prosecution, it was “quite obvious[]” that the records were compiled for law

enforcement purposes). The records here were compiled for law enforcement purposes.

The Court therefore turns to the balancing test under exemption 7(C). The FBI, DEA, and

EOUSA withheld the names and identifying information of agency special agents and professional

staff, third parties mentioned, persons of investigative interest, and local law enforcement

personnel. See ECF No. 25-3 ¶¶ 33, 40–45; ECF No. 25-4 at 56–57 ¶ 11;

at 64 ¶ 12. Law

enforcement agents and support personnel have a well-recognized and substantial privacy interest

in withholding information about their identities, and redaction of their names has been routinely

8 upheld. See, e.g., Lesar v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.C. Cir. 1980); see also, e.g.,

Ball v. U.S. Marshals Serv., No. 19-cv-1230,

, at *6 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2021)

(“Courts have repeatedly found that it is proper to withhold names and other identifying

information about law-enforcement officers and government officials under Exemption 7(C).”).

The names and personal information of third parties of investigative interest, and even third parties

merely mentioned, are also commonly protected. See Schrecker v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[O]ur decisions have consistently supported nondisclosure of names

or other information identifying individuals appearing in law enforcement records, including

investigators, suspects, witnesses, and informants.”). The agencies have all “described, plausibly

and in considerable detail, the harms one might reasonably expect to flow from the public

disclosure of such information.” Schoenman v. FBI,

(D.D.C. 2011); see

ECF No. 25-3 ¶¶ 40–45; ECF No. 25-4 at 57 ¶ 12;

at 64 ¶ 12. Accordingly, the agencies’

“representations suffice to establish ‘a reasonable likelihood’ that the disclosure of such

information would result in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” and “courts have

repeatedly upheld identical withholdings.” Schoenman,

. These privacy

concerns significantly outweigh what little benefit the public may gain from this information as to

its understanding of agency operations. See, e.g.,

at 199–200.

Brown has not demonstrated any significant public interest with respect to any of these

protected categories of information. He appears to suggest that exemptions 6 and 7(C) are

inapplicable because Levester Johnson testified in open court. See ECF No. 30 at 5–6. But that is

irrelevant because Brown eliminated the portion of his request pertaining to Johnson, and the

agencies did not redact any of the records to conceal the identity of any informant. See ECF No.

31 at 3 (citing ECF No. 25-3 ¶ 33). Indeed, Brown appears to concede that names of staff were

9 properly redacted. See ECF No. 30 at 6 (“Plaintiff’s request could not and did not seek any names

of any staff and they could’ve easily been censored.”). And to the extent Brown seeks disclosure

of information to challenge his conviction, that would not provide the requisite public interest to

overcome the substantial privacy interests at play. See, e.g., Roth v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (explaining that individual’s “personal stake in the release of the

requested information is ‘irrelevant’ to the balancing of public and third-party privacy interests

required by Exemption 7(C)”).

Accordingly, the redactions within the fifty-three pages released in full or in part are

justified under exemption 7(C).

2. The FBI Properly Invoked Exemption 7(E)

The FBI also relies on exemption 7(E), which protects from disclosure law enforcement

records that “would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or

prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if

such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.”

(b)(7)(E). Under this exemption, the D.C. Circuit has set “a relatively low bar for the

agency,” requiring it only to “demonstrate logically how the release of the requested information

might create a risk of circumvention of the law.” Blackwell,

(citation omitted). As

already discussed above, the records at issue were prepared for law enforcement purposes.

The FBI redacted information in the fifty-three pages released in full or in part to protect

(1) nonpublic coordination with other government agencies, and (2) sensitive information

contained within FBI FD-515 forms, which are used by FBI personnel to report “investigative

accomplishments” such as an arrest or conviction. See ECF No. 25-3 ¶¶ 47–51. The FBI’s

declaration explains that public access to this information “would allow criminals to structure their

behavior to avoid investigative triggers that would initiate an investigative referral from the FBI

10 to its partners, and investigative scrutiny by additional government agencies.” Id. ¶ 48. Further,

“release of this information could reveal which agencies cover specific types of investigative or

intelligence matters,” and could “enable criminals to predict and circumvent FBI investigative

coordination with its government partners, and circumvent the law enforcement purpose of these

partnerships and information sharing techniques.” Id. The declaration also states that the FBI

withheld numerical “effectiveness ratings” assigned to various investigative techniques employed

during the investigation. Id. ¶ 49. If those ratings were disclosed, “others involved in similar

criminal activities could change their methods and modus operandi in order to circumvent and

avoid detection.” Id.

The FBI properly redacted these categories of information under exemption 7(E). The

declaration identifies the specific investigatory function of the redacted information and the

legitimate risk of exposing it. The FBI has sufficiently established that the information about its

coordination with other agencies is private and that its exposure “could alert potential criminals to

the techniques that the FBI finds useful in a certain type or stage of investigation, as well as their

law enforcement partners that might be involved in these investigative methods.” Kowal v. U.S.

Dep’t of Just., No. 18-cv-2798,

, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2021). Indeed, “many

courts” in this District “have upheld the redaction of ‘effectiveness ratings’ columns” in FD-515

forms. Guarascio v. FBI, No. 18-cv-2791,

, at *12 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2023).

Brown again offers no reason to conclude the redactions under exemption 7(E) were

improper. In fact, he states that based on his modified request, “no investigative techniques needed

to be exposed.” ECF No. 30 at 7. The Court accordingly concludes that the FBI properly relied on

exemption 7(E) in redacting the fifty-three pages released in full or in part.

11 3. The Agencies Properly Invoked Exemption 7(F)

The DEA and EOUSA also invoke exemption 7(F). See ECF No. 25-4 at 57–59 ¶¶ 15–20;

at 65 ¶¶ 14–15. Exemption 7(F) protects law enforcement records that “could reasonably be

expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.”

(b)(7)(F).

Exemption 7(F) generally serves to protect “names and identifying information of law enforcement

officers, witnesses, confidential informants and other third persons who may be unknown to the

requester.” Hammouda v. U.S. Dep’t of Just. Off. of Info. Pol’y,

(D.D.C.

2013) (citation omitted). Again, the Court has already found that the records at issue were prepared

for law enforcement purposes.

The DEA relied on exemption 7(F) to protect names and identifying information of DEA

agents, and the EOUSA protected names and identifying information of individuals who were

interviewed by the FBI. See ECF No. 25-4 at 57–59 ¶¶ 15–20;

at 65 ¶¶ 14–15;

. The

declarations describe the risk of harm to these individuals if they were to be identified, including

prejudice to the agents’ ability to execute their duties, a chilling effect on the agencies’ abilities to

confer with third-party individuals, and a risk of targeting and physical danger to all these third

parties. See ECF No. 25-4 at 57–59 ¶¶ 15–20;

at 65 ¶¶ 14–15;

. Law enforcement

personnel and interviewees fall squarely into the category of persons who warrant protection under

exemption 7(F). See, e.g., Williams v. Dep’t of Just., No. 19-cv-0104,

, at *4

(D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2023). And once again, Brown argues only that exemption 7(F) is “inapplicable,”

while asserting that his request allowed for “the censorship of any material, they chose to consider

non-releasable.” ECF No. 30 at 6. While the Court has already held that exemptions 6 and 7(C)

12 are applicable, alternatively, the DEA’s and EOUSA’s reliance on exemption 7(F) is warranted

for redactions within the fifty-three pages released in full or in part. 3

C. The FBI Has Not Established That It Properly Withheld Remaining Pages In Full

The FBI’s submissions indicate that some pages may have been withheld in full. See ECF

No. 25-1 ¶ 2 (“In response to Plaintiff’s FOIA request, the FBI has processed a total of 62 pages

of records and has released 53 pages in full or in part.”). Insofar as that is the case, the FBI has

failed to justify those withholdings. The FBI’s declaration states that its Vaughn index “identifies

the pages that the FBI withheld in full or part and its justification for doing so.” ECF No. 25-3 ¶ 31

(emphasis added). But the FBI’s Vaughn index does not mention any pages withheld in full, and

the agency declarations do not describe the nature of those pages or the FOIA exemptions relied

upon for withholding them.

The FBI’s May 2024 letter to Brown also states that “a deleted page information sheet was

inserted to indicate where pages were withheld entirely pursuant to applicable exemptions.” ECF

No. 25-4 at 38. But “those pages have not been placed in the record,” and the FBI is thus obligated

“to supplement the record with the pages and/or a declaration that describes the contents of the

withheld documents in reasonable detail to permit a proper examination.” Giovanetti v. FBI, No.

13-cv-1807,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2015). Otherwise, the Court cannot

3 A district court “cannot approve withholding exempt documents without making an express finding on segregability.” Machado Amadis v. U.S. Dep’t of State,

, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An agency is “entitled to a presumption that [it] complied with the obligation to disclose reasonably segregable material.” Hodge v. FBI,

(D.C. Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Here, the agency declarants attest that all segregable information has been produced. See ECF No. 25-3 ¶¶ 30, 55; ECF No. 25-4 at 59 ¶ 21;

at 65–66 ¶¶ 16–19. These representations, which are supported by Vaughn indices describing the documents and the exemptions, satisfy FOIA’s segregability requirement as to the pages released in full or in part. See, e.g., Johnson v. Exec. Off. for U.S. Att’ys,

, 776 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

13 determine whether it was necessary for the FBI to fully withhold these documents, or whether the

information could have been reasonably segregated. See, e.g., Jud. Watch v. Rossotti,

(D.D.C. 2003) (ordering defendant to “supplement the record with a brief and affidavit(s)

addressing the potential segregability of the exempted information in the completely withheld

documents”).

To be clear, the Court is not crediting Brown’s assertions that the agencies have engaged

in bad faith. As it stands, the Court “does not doubt that” the FBI indeed “conducted a segregability

analysis of responsive documents. Nevertheless, the Court believes that the [FBI] can provide a

more comprehensive description as to [any pages] withheld in full.” See Elec. Frontier Found. v.

U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(D.D.C. 2011); see also, e.g., Barouch v. U.S. Dep’t

of Just.,

(D.D.C. 2015) (explaining that because defendants “failed to provide

virtually any description” of records withheld in full, the court could not determine whether any

FOIA exemptions were applicable or whether any of the records were reasonably segregable).

Accordingly, the FBI is not entitled to summary judgment at this stage for any pages

withheld in full.

D. Brown’s Request For In Camera Inspection Is Denied

Finally, Brown asks the Court to conduct an in camera inspection because “he has not

received the requested document or information, but he believes the document(s) sought may yet

be in the custody or control of the Defendant FBI based on items provided from another agency

that was apparently withheld by the Defendant.” ECF No. 22 at 4. In camera review “may be

particularly appropriate when either the agency affidavits are insufficiently detailed to permit

meaningful review of exemption claims or there is evidence of bad faith on the part of the agency.”

Quiñon v. FBI,

(D.C. Cir. 1996). “If the agency’s affidavits provide specific

information sufficient to place the documents within the exemption category, if this information

14 is not contradicted in the record, and if there is no evidence in the record of agency bad faith, then

summary judgment is appropriate without in camera review of the documents.” Larson v. Dep’t

of State,

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, the Court has concluded that, based on the detailed declarations and Vaughn indices,

the FBI has met its burden with respect to the fifty-three pages released in full or in part. As for

any documents withheld in full, “a district court should not undertake in camera review of withheld

documents as a substitute for requiring an agency’s explanation of its claimed exemptions in

accordance with Vaughn,” so “the best approach is to direct the agency to revise their Vaughn

submissions, taking into account the deficiencies identified by the Court.” Elec. Frontier Found.,

(quoting Spirko v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

(D.C. Cir. 1998)).

Brown’s mere assertions of bad faith do not change that conclusion. See Assassination Archives &

Rsch. Ctr. v. CIA,

(D.D.C. 2001) (“[A] mere assertion of bad faith is not

sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.”). And in any event, in camera review is

not warranted because there is no indication the document Brown now seeks is in the FBI’s

possession, nor was it in its production, and FOIA does not require an agency “to create

documents” or “to answer questions.” See Brown v. FBI,

(D.D.C. 2009).

Accordingly, Brown’s request for in camera review is denied.

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, the FBI’s cross motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 25, is granted

in part and denied in part without prejudice. The motion is granted as to the adequacy of the FBI’s

search and the agencies’ redactions of the fifty-three pages released in full or in part. The motion

is denied without prejudice as to any documents withheld in full. Brown’s motion for summary

judgment and for in camera inspection, ECF Nos. 22, 38, is denied.

15 By October 7, 2025, the FBI shall file a notice clarifying whether any documents were

withheld in full. If documents were withheld in full, the FBI shall also supplement the record by

that date with either an updated declaration, an updated Vaughn index, copies of the deleted

withheld pages, or some combination thereof, identifying (1) the pages withheld in full; (2) the

FOIA exemptions applied to each of those pages and the justification for the exemptions; and (3)

the segregability, or lack thereof, of the information contained therein.

The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this memorandum opinion and order and

an updated copy of the docket sheet to Brown.

AMIR H. ALI United States District Judge

Date: September 16, 2025

16