UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TARREN EVANS, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 23-3925 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 7 : INDIVIDUAL ADVOCACY GROUP, INC., : : Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

In March 2023, Plaintiff Tarren Evans was fired from her job as a Clinical Nursing

Director for Defendant Individual Advocacy Group, Inc. (“IAG”). IAG is a nonprofit

organization that contracts with the D.C. Department of Disability Services (“DDS”) to support

adults with disabilities. Evans alleges that she was fired for raising concerns over IAG’s practice

of inaccurately backdating documents submitted to DDS. In December 2023, Evans sued IAG

for damages, alleging (1) retaliation under the False Claims Act’s whistleblower provision,

(h); (2) a similar violation of the D.C. False Claims Act,

;

and (3) wrongful discharge. IAG has moved to dismiss these claims under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, IAG’s motion to dismiss is granted. II. BACKGROUND

DDS, a D.C. government agency, contracts with IAG to serve the needs of individuals

with disabilities. Amended Compl. (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 5, 7, ECF No. 2. 1 IAG hired Evans as a

Clinical Nursing Director in April 2022.

. Her job duties included managing the nursing

staff and department,

as well as “ensur[ing] that necessary documentation is provided to

ensure that service authorizations for nursing services . . . are current,” “[a]ssisting in the training

and promotion of nursing . . . and other staff members,” “[e]nsuring that the nursing staff and

IAG comply with the federal rules, regulations, and codes,” and working “with the Human

Resources Coordinator and the IAG corporate office to ensure that licenses are up to date,”

Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A (“Ex. A”) at 3, ECF No. 7-1. 2 In addition to her duties as a

Clinical Nursing Director, Evans also had a “full caseload of 10 individuals,” which she had to

manage along with her compliance and oversight duties. Compl. ¶ 12. Her workload was

unusual for employees in her position; it was so heavy that she had to work several days unpaid.

In May 2022, Evans was directed to conduct an Individual Service Plan (“ISP”) meeting

with a supported person before she had received full training on DDS requirements.

.

Evans’s predecessor was supposed to train her, but failed to do so before resigning in June 2022.

1 To decide this Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] all the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true and draw[s] all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s favor.” See Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham,

, 1125 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 2 IAG attached Evans’s signed “Role Description” to its motion to dismiss. See Ex. A. Because Evans describes her job duties in her Complaint, they are integral to her claim, and she does not contest the authenticity of the Role Description document, the Court will consider it in ruling on IAG’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Langeman v. Garland,

, 292 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

2

. Around the time Evans’s predecessor resigned, Evans “raised her concerns about lack

of training to Dr. Nelson,” the regional director to whom she reported.

.

Beginning on June 10, 2022, two IAG management officials—Gideon Olatuyi and

Martha Nyan—instructed Evans on multiple occasions to “backdate certain training documents”

so that “it appeared the training had been completed on an earlier date.”

. Olatuyi and

Nyan told Evans that backdating would avoid “residential, medical, or environmental

deficiencies with annual contract renewals, individual support plan (ISP) meetings, and trainings

being posted on the DDS dashboard.”

Evans raised concerns about this process to Olatuyi,

but he told her that if “the real date was not [in] the correct time frame, IAG would get

reprimanded for being out of compliance with DDS.”

.

In August 2022, Evans learned that DDS requires new nurses to complete a mandatory

training within 14 days of employment.

. Evans again raised her concerns about her

“lack of appropriate training” to Dr. Nelson.

Presumably, the 14-day deadline would not be

an issue for IAG were Evans to backdate her training certification, but that was something Evans

apparently refused to do. See

. In September 2022, Evans “adamantly pushed” for IAG

to use electronic health records that could be managed in real time, but she was taken aside by

Olatuyi and told that “‘going live’ with online records will never happen in IAG due to the

backdating of documents and . . . the risk of getting audited by DDS.”

. From about June

2022 until her termination, Evans felt pressured “to make misrepresentations of facts to obtain

Federal health care payments,” such as by backdating patient forms that were provided to DDS.

. “When she refused, she was retaliated against,” including by being “ostracized,

ignored, deprived of meeting agendas, and excluded from crucial annual . . . meetings,”

particularly from December 2022 until her firing.

¶¶ 18–19. At the end of December, for

3 example, IAG discontinued her medical insurance coverage without informing her.

.

Evans raised complaints about the hostile work environment to Dr. Nelson and Nyan, but to no

avail.

.

In December 2022, Evans also complained that IAG’s “compliance deficiencies with

DDS regulations might jeopardize her professional licenses.”

. The next month, her

“suspicions of faulty documentation practices” were confirmed at a meeting involving

Dr. Nelson and all IAG administrative team members, a guardian of a supported person, and a

DDS service coordinator.

. During that meeting, the “guardian brought up a backdated

consent form that was sent to her,” which led the DDS coordinator to “scold[] the IAG team for

not sending . . . documentation to sign in ‘real time,’ which was an illegal action.”

On February 1, 2023, Evans led a CPR training for new hires.

. During the class,

Evans left for about 10 minutes to take an urgent call regarding a DDS supported person, and

Olatuyi stepped in for her.

When she came back, she could tell that Olatuyi had done an

inadequate job leading the CPR training.

On February 3, Evans reported this incident to an

employee in Human Resources, “noting her concerns that proper standards were not being

adhered to.”

.

That same day, after an orientation training, Evans reminded a nurse that she needed to

drop off a supported person’s medication.

. The nurse said she was in a rush to pick up

her son, so Evans agreed to drop off the medication for her.

On February 6, Evans was told

that she had been accused of telling the nurse, “I’m gonna smack you,” as she was leaving.

. The next day, Evans was placed on administrative leave, and she was terminated on

March 8, 2023.

¶¶ 32–33.

4 In December 2023, Evans filed her Complaint in this case, ECF No. 1, which she

amended in March 2024, ECF No. 2. The operative Complaint alleges that she was retaliated

against for complaining about IAG’s “improper and illegal business practices, including

falsification of business records with the purpose of defrauding” DDS. Compl. ¶ 1. The

Complaint seeks damages for three causes of action based on (1) a violation of the False Claims

Act’s whistleblower provision,

(h); (2) a similar violation of the D.C. False

Claims Act,

; and (3) wrongful discharge. Compl. ¶¶ 34–51.

IAG moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD”), ECF No. 7. The motion is now fully briefed and ready for this

Court’s consideration.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly,

(2007)). In addition to the complaint, “[a] court may also consider

documents attached to a motion to dismiss if they are ‘referred to in the complaint,’ integral to

the claim(s), and if their authenticity is undisputed.” Langeman v. Garland,

, 292

(D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting Kaempe v. Myers,

(D.C. Cir. 2004)). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

. “Factual allegations, although assumed to be true, must still ‘be enough to raise a right to

relief above the speculative level.’” Hettinga v. United States,

(D.C. Cir.

2012) (quoting Twombly,

). And courts need not accept as true conclusory

5 allegations or legal conclusions. Iqbal,

. Instead, courts must draw upon

their “judicial experience and common sense” to determine whether the “well-pleaded facts”

support a plausible claim.

.

IV. ANALYSIS

The Court first analyzes Evans’s retaliation claims under the federal and D.C. False

Claims Acts together, as the parties agree that the same legal standards apply. See MTD at 4–5;

Pl.’s Mem. Law Opp’n (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 12, ECF No. 10; Craig v. Not for Profit Hosp. Corp.,

, 101–02 (D.D.C. 2022) (considering claims brought under the two Acts

together because “[t]here is no material difference between the two Acts’ anti-retaliation

provisions”). The Court then analyzes Evans’s wrongful discharge claim. Because the Court

concludes Evans failed to state a plausible claim to relief, the Court lastly addresses Evans’s

request for leave to amend her Complaint.

A. False Claims Act

The False Claims Act “imposes civil penalties and treble damages upon any person who,

among other things, ‘knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim

for payment or approval’ to the federal government, or ‘knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be

made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim[.]’” Singletary v.

Howard Univ.,

, 293 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting

(a)(1)(A)–(B)). The whistleblower provision of the Act states:

Any employee . . . shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make that employee . . . whole, if that employee . . . is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment because of lawful acts done by the employee . . . or associated others in furtherance of an action under this section or other efforts to stop 1 or more violations of this subchapter.

6

(h)(1). 3 To state a claim under § 3730(h), “a plaintiff must plead facts showing

(i) that she engaged in protected activity, (ii) ‘because of’ which she was retaliated against.”

Singletary, 939 F.3d at 293 (quoting United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ.,

(D.C. Cir. 1998)). The Court addresses these two requirements in turn.

1. Engaged in Protected Activity

“Protected activity under the False Claims Act’s anti-retaliation provision takes two

forms.” Id. at 295. The first is reactive to a suspected violation, while the second is preventative

of a future violation. Id. at 296. Under the first prong, “an employee’s lawful acts are in

‘furtherance of an action under this section’ if she ‘investigat[es] matters that reasonably could

lead to,’ or have a ‘distinct possibility’ of leading to, a ‘viable False Claims Act case.’” Id.

at 295 (alteration in original) (quoting Hoyte v. American Nat’l Red Cross,

, 68–

69 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). Neither dissatisfaction with treatment at work nor an investigation of

nothing more than an employer’s compliance with regulations is enough.

Rather, “‘the

plaintiff’s investigation must concern “false or fraudulent” claims’ submitted for federal

funding.”

(quoting Yesudian,

). Under the second prong, a plaintiff can

establish that she engaged in protected activity “if she plausibly alleges facts showing that she

took lawful measures to stop or avert what she reasonably believed would be a violation of the

False Claims Act.” Id. at 297.

3 The D.C. False Claims Act whistleblower provision similarly states: Any employee . . . shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make that employee . . . whole, if that employee . . . is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment because of lawful acts done by the employee . . . or associated others in furtherance of an action under this subchapter or other efforts to stop one or more violations of this subchapter.

(a).

7 IAG argues that “Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations she was

investigating false or fraudulent claims for payment by the Federal or D.C. government.” MTD

at 7. The Court agrees. In response, Plaintiff cites to portions of her Complaint in which she

raised concerns about deficient training, was instructed to backdate documents, and complained

about compliance jeopardizing her licensure. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 15–16. But none of these

allegations establish what investigative steps Evans took beyond voicing her concerns. Thus, the

Court proceeds to address whether Evans engaged in protected activity under the second prong.

To constitute protected activity under the second prong, the employee’s conduct must

pertain to her “objectively reasonable belief that the employer is violating, or will violate, the

False Claims Act.” Singletary, 939 F.3d at 296. Though “mere refusal to participate in an

allegedly fraudulent scheme” is not enough, see United States ex rel. Tran v. Computer Scis.

Corp.,

(D.D.C. 2014), refusal to engage in a fraudulent scheme can be

sufficient where the refusal is “intended and reasonably could be expected to prevent the

submission of a false claim to the government,” see United States ex rel. Chorches for Bankr.

Est. of Fabula v. Am. Med. Response, Inc.,

(2d Cir. 2017).

Take, for example, the plaintiff in Singletary. There, the plaintiff alleged retaliation by

Howard University related to violations of National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) standards,

which were tied to some of the University’s grants. Singletary, 939 F.3d at 293–94. The

plaintiff repeatedly warned University officials that laboratory animals were being kept in

impermissibly hot quarters, in violation of NIH standards.

After many mice died from heat

exhaustion, she emailed the NIH to report the violation, copying her supervisors. Id. at 294. The

D.C. Circuit held that she had alleged protected activity to stop or avert a violation of the False

Claims Act, reasoning that she repeatedly informed her supervisor that the laboratory conditions

8 were not in compliance with NIH standards—on which the University’s grant money was

conditioned—and that she had an objectively reasonable belief that the University would submit

a false certification of compliance to the NIH based on the University’s annual certification

requirements. Id. at 297–98.

Here, Evans alleges that she repeatedly raised concerns about backdating to her

supervisors and IAG management officials, and that she herself refused to backdate documents.

Compl. ¶¶ 15, 18, 23. She further alleges that she was instructed to backdate documents—that

is, to misrepresent the date—to maintain compliance with DDS regulations and “to obtain

Federal health care payments.” Id. ¶¶ 14–15, 18. Whereas the fraudulent claim in Singletary

involved the inaccurate annual certification of compliance, here, the alleged fraud was even more

widespread, implicating several categories of documents required by DDS, such as patient

consent forms, ISP documents, and mandatory training forms. See Compl. ¶¶ 14, 18. Accepting

the Complaint’s allegations as true, and drawing reasonable inferences in Evans’s favor, the

Complaint sufficiently alleges the Evans engaged in protected activity by refusing to backdate

forms submitted to DDS and by attempting to get others at IAG to do the same.

IAG’s arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. IAG faults Evans for not providing

factual allegations regarding any false or fraudulent claims to the government. See MTD at 6.

But reading the Complaint as a whole, Evans did not need to identify specific fraudulent claims

because she alleges that IAG’s standard practice was to postdate documents to maintain DDS

compliance. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 15, 23. IAG also argues that “Plaintiff’s concerns with

backdating documents pertained to IAG’s alleged non-compliance with DDS regulations and

requirements, including the impact it might have on her licensure.” MTD at 9; see Def.’s Reply

Br. (“Def.’s Reply”) at 5, 7, ECF No. 11. True, but the Complaint also alleges that the

9 “falsification of business records” was for “the purpose of defrauding” DDS, Compl. ¶ 1, and

that IAG management officials pressured Evans to backdate documents “to obtain Federal health

care payments,” id. ¶ 18. Though the Court agrees that Evans could have more clearly connected

the dots between DDS regulation compliance and funding, and the Court encourages her to do so

when amending her Complaint, the Court can reasonably infer that connection from the face of

the Complaint. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 15–16. Thus, the Court is satisfied that Evans has plausibly

alleged that she engaged in protected activity under the False Claims Act.

2. Retaliatory Motivation

Having established that she engaged in protected activity, Evans must also establish “(i) a

qualifying retaliatory employment action, (ii) [IAG’s] knowledge that she was engaged in

protected activity, and (iii) facts showing that the employment action was caused,” at least in

part, “by her engagement in that activity.” Singletary, 939 F.3d at 293, 299. “Discharge plainly

qualifies as a retaliatory employment action under Section 3730(h),” id. at 299, and IAG moves

to dismiss based on its lack of notice of the engaged protected activity, without reaching the third

element of causation, 4 MTD at 10–12. Thus, the dispositive issue is IAG’s notice of Evans’s

protected activity.

That means Evans must allege that IAG was aware that she engaged in lawful acts aimed

at preventing IAG’s submission of false or fraudulent claims. See Singletary, 939 F.3d at 300.

Importantly, however, “plaintiffs alleging that performance of their normal job responsibilities

4 IAG argues that “motive” is not at issue in its motion to dismiss. Def.’s Reply at 2 n.1. In doing so, IAG appears to misunderstand the significance of notice to the Court’s analysis. “Common sense teaches that an employer cannot retaliate against conduct of which it was unaware.” Singletary, 939 F.3d at 300. Accordingly, an employer’s lack of notice of protected activity defeats an argument that the employer acted “because of” the plaintiff’s protected activity. See id. Because IAG disputes notice, its motive is at issue.

10 constitutes protected activity must ‘overcome the presumption that they are merely acting in

accordance with their employment obligations’ to put their employers on notice.” United States

ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co.,

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting

Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc.,

(6th Cir. 2003)). But “when an employee acts

outside h[er] normal job responsibilities or alerts a party outside the usual chain of command,

such action may suffice to notify the employer that the employee is engaging in protected

activity,” and thus overcome the Martin-Baker presumption. See

Here, Evans fails to establish IAG’s notice of her protected activity because her

complaints to IAG regarding backdating were within the scope of her job duties. As mentioned,

Evans does not contest that those duties included “ensur[ing] that necessary documentation is

provided to ensure that service authorizations for nursing services . . . are current,” “[a]ssisting in

the training and promotion of nursing, DSP, and other staff members,” “[e]nsuring that the

nursing staff and IAG comply with the federal rules, regulations, and codes,” and working “with

the Human Resources Coordinator and the IAG corporate office to ensure that licenses are up to

date.” Ex. A at 3. Evans challenges the applicability of the Martin-Baker presumption because

her “core duties” were “not exclusively or even principally about ‘ensur[ing] compliance.’” Pl.’s

Opp’n at 19 (quoting Pitts v. Howard Univ.,

(D.D.C. 2015)). But Evans

alleges that her duties included “maintaining compliance of various mandatory training[s] for the

organization.” Compl. ¶ 12. Moreover, to accept Evans’s reasoning would seemingly limit the

presumption to compliance officials. Evans cites no authority for such a limitation; even the

court in Pitts, on which Evans relies, assumed without deciding that the presumption applied.

See Pitts, 111 F. Supp. 3d at 19–20. Because “training, completion of necessary paperwork,

assurance that necessary documentation for nursing services is current, and compliance with

11 rules, regulations and codes were all within Plaintiff’s regular job responsibilities,” MTD at 11,

the Court agrees that Evans had to do something beyond her duties to put IAG on notice of her

protected activity, see United States ex rel. Schweizer v. Oce N.V.,

, 1239 (D.C.

Cir. 2012) (reasoning that because government contract compliance was part of plaintiff’s job,

her retaliation claim could not succeed unless she acted outside her normal job responsibilities,

notified someone outside her usual chain of command, advised her employer to hire counsel, or

otherwise put her employer on notice that litigation was a reasonable possibility).

Evans has not met this burden. Her Complaint does not allege that she went beyond the

scope of her job duties in voicing her concerns about backdating. For example, to argue she

raised her concerns beyond the usual chain of command, Evans states that she contacted Human

Resources. Pl.’s Opp’n at 20. But she supports that assertion with citations to a declaration

attached to her opposition brief, not allegations included in her Complaint. See id. And to

support that she “clearly complained about IAG conduct being fraudulent or potentially

subjecting IAG to FCA liability,” she cites to paragraphs 15, 18, and 21 of her Complaint. Id.

None of those paragraphs mention FCA liability, and only paragraph 18 includes facts

implicating fraud, but does so in the context of what she felt pressured to do, not what she told

IAG. See Compl. ¶¶ 15, 18, 21. Evans does not even allege that she told IAG why she refused

to backdate documents. See id. ¶ 18.

What is more, Evans’s Complaint alleges that a January 2023 meeting with a DDS

coordinator confirmed her suspicion that backdating was illegal. See id. ¶ 24. But the Complaint

provides no factual allegations regarding what Evans did with this information, which seemingly

would have emboldened her to take action, such as “advising [IAG] to hire counsel,” see

Schweizer,

, submitting whistleblower reports to IAG officials, see United

12 States ex rel. Kini v. Tata Consultancy Servs., Ltd.,

, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2025), or

sending an email to DDS, see Singletary, 939 F.3d at 301. Absent factual allegations that Evans

went beyond her normal job duties in expressing concerns about backdating, the Court is unable

to conclude IAG had notice of her protected activity. Consequently, the Court concludes that

Evans has failed to state a claim under the federal and D.C. False Claims Acts.

B. Wrongful Discharge

“[T]he District of Columbia Court of Appeals [has] recognized a ‘very narrow’ public

policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine: ‘a discharged at-will employee may sue his

or her former employer for wrongful discharge when the sole reason for the discharge is the

employee’s refusal to violate the law, as expressed in a statute or municipal regulation.’”

Kassem v. Washington Hosp. Ctr.,

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Adams v. George

W. Cochran & Co.,

(D.C. 1991)). Such exceptions should be recognized “only

if they reflect a clear mandate of public policy officially declared in a statute or regulation, or in

the Constitution, and demonstrate a close fit between the policy thus declared and the conduct at

issue in the allegedly wrongful termination.” Williams v. Chugach Alaska Corp.,

(D.D.C. 2016) (citation modified) (quoting Leyden v. Am. Accreditation Healthcare

Comm’n,

(D.D.C. 2015)). But in doing so, a plaintiff “must also show

that this policy is not already protected by another statute.” See Brown v. Howard Univ. Hosp.,

No. 19-cv-3340,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 2021).

Evans’s Complaint alleges “a clear mandate of public policy in favor of allowing

employees to report to management health or safety issues, to complain about acts of retaliation

for having done so, and to complain of fraudulent activities of the employer.” Compl. ¶ 47. She

grounds this mandate in the Department on Disability Services Establishment Act, the

13 Rehabilitation Services Program Establishment Act, and the D.C. False Claims Act.

IAG

moved to dismiss this claim on all three bases. MTD at 13. In response, Evans did not address

IAG’s arguments regarding the Rehabilitation Services Program Establishment Act or the D.C.

False Claims Act, so the Court considers those arguments conceded. See Liu v. Georgetown

Univ., No. 22-cv-157,

, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2024) (“Further, if a plaintiff

‘files an opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by the

defendant, a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.’”

(quoting Xenophon Strategies, Inc. v. Jernigan Copeland & Anderson, PLLC,

(D.D.C. 2017))).

Having narrowed the issue, Evans’s remaining basis does not fare much better. She relies

on the Department of Disability Services Establishment Act, specifically

-

761.03(3) and § 7-761.13(a)(1)(H), and identifies her reporting of “the CPR class incident” as

the protected reporting of “health and safety issues.” See Pl.’s Opp’n at 21. Neither of these

provisions supports Evans’s claim.

First, § 7-761.03(3) provides that “the Department on Disability Services is established as

a separate Cabinet-level agency, subordinate to the Mayor, within the executive branch of the

District of Columbia, for the purpose of . . . [p]romoting the well-being of individuals with

intellectual or developmental disabilities throughout their life spans, through the delivery of

individualized, high-quality, safe services and supports.” This is a general statement of purpose

for the creation of DDS. Thus, Evans’s claims, particularly those related to a deficient CPR

training, are not “solidly” and “close[ly]” based on that general statute. See Williams,

(quoting Leyden,

).

14 Second, § 7-761.13(a)(1)(H) provides that “[t]he Department shall . . . [e]stablish a

process for the resolution of formal complaints, including formal complaints filed with a

provider, which shall include, at a minimum . . . [p]rohibitions on retaliatory actions such as

reprisal, restraint, interference, coercion, or discrimination by DDS or a provider against a person

who files a formal complaint.” A “formal complaint” is defined in the statute as a “statement by

a person of his or her dissatisfaction with DDS or a provider, including the denial of any services

and supports under this chapter or other applicable law.”

(5B)(A). Thus,

the Court agrees with IAG that this section “provides that DDS must establish a process to

resolve ‘formal complaints,’ including ‘formal complaints’ filed with a provider, and sets forth

minimum provisions which must be included in DDS’[s] complaint resolution process.” Def.’s

Reply at 12. To the extent this provision reflects a policy in favor of raising complaints against

providers, because it “create[es] a specific, statutory cause of action to enforce” that policy

through a complaint resolution process, the provision cannot form the basis of a wrongful

termination claim. See Carter v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. 2009);

Brown,

, at *3. Because neither provision supports Evans’s wrongful discharge

claim, the Court will also grant IAG’s motion to dismiss this claim.

C. Leave to Amend

Under Rule 15(a), a “court should freely give leave” to amend a complaint “when justice

so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see Firestone v. Firestone,

(D.C. Cir.

1996). “The key issue in considering a motion to amend is whether the non-movant will suffer

any prejudice from the amendment.” Ellis v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.,

(D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Clark v. Feder Semo & Bard, PC,

(D.D.C. 2008)).

In Evans’s opposition brief, she requested that if the Court grants IAG’s motion to dismiss, she

15 be granted leave to amend. Pl.’s Opp’n at 22. IAG argues that the Court should deny this

request because “Plaintiff has failed to specify the grounds for her purported amendment.”

Def.’s Reply at 13. But, as IAG acknowledged, Plaintiff’s opposition brief and attached

declaration include “allegations [that] are not set forth in Plaintiff’s Complaint.” See

.

Though Evans could not amend her Complaint in her opposition brief, see Valibeigi v. District of

Columbia, No. 22-cv-3149,

, at *5 n.8 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2024), the Court is

not certain that amendment would be futile, see In re Interbank Funding Corp. Sec. Litig.,

(D.C. Cir. 2010) (affirming the district court’s denial of leave to amend the

complaint based on futility of amendment). Further, IAG does not argue that it will be

prejudiced by amendment at this early stage of the litigation. See Driscoll v. George Wash.

Univ.,

(D.D.C. 2012) (finding no prejudice from amendment at the

pleading stage); Ellis,

(finding no undue prejudice from amendment “prior

to the commencement of briefing on summary judgment”). Accordingly, the Court will grant

IAG’s motion without prejudice, and grant Evans leave to amend her Complaint to address the

deficiencies identified in this Memorandum Opinion.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7) is GRANTED

without prejudice. The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend her Complaint on or before

October 16, 2025. An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and

contemporaneously issued.

Dated: September 16, 2025 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

16