UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JEFFREY THOMAS, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 18-800 (TJK)

CRYSTAL MORELAND,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation filed by Magistrate

Judge Zia M. Faruqui on July 31, 2025. See ECF No. 253 (“R&R”). On November 22, 2024, the

Court held Plaintiff Jeffrey Thomas, Jr., in civil contempt for violating the protective order the

Court had entered to govern discovery by including confidential information in a complaint he

filed in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. See generally ECF No. 247. As a sanction,

the Court permitted Defendant Crystal Moreland and Non-Party Respondent the Humane Society

of the United States (“HSUS”) to move “for reasonable costs (including attorneys’ fees) incurred

in litigating this civil contempt proceeding.” Id. at 11 (cleaned up). They have done so, and the

Court referred the motions to a Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation. ECF Nos. 248,

249; Min. Order of Dec. 26, 2024.

Magistrate Judge Faruqui, in a 24-page opinion, first found that HSUS’s motion should be

denied without prejudice. R&R at 23. He determined that its motion was insufficiently detailed,

meaning he could not “determine ‘with a high degree of certainty’ the reasonableness of its fee

request.” Id. at 5 (quoting Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee,

(D.C. Cir. 2004)).

He wrote that, “[s]hould HSUS move for a fee award again, it must produce detailed summaries of the work performed by” its attorneys “based on contemporaneous time records indicating the

work performed by each attorney for whom fees are sought.” Id. at 7 (cleaned up). Magistrate

Judge Faruqui next determined that Moreland’s motion should be granted in part and that she

should be awarded $8,767.57. Id. at 23. For both of Moreland’s attorneys—Anna J. Hrom and

Katelyn Adams—he considered their experience, then used the Fitzpatrick Matrix to determine

their “prevailing market rates,” and then parsed their submission of hours to determine how much

of their claimed time was reasonable.1 Id. at 11–22. He then “deduct[ed] time spent on post-filing

review and clerical work” and further reduced the fee award by 30% to account for excessive block

billing. Id. at 21–22. This resulted in a sum of $8,767.57. Id. at 23.

Thomas partially objected to the R&R, moved to compel Attorney Hrom to produce a copy

of her resume, and moved to stay consideration of the R&R until HSUS submits “relevant evi-

dence” “of the reasonable hourly rate for Defendant Moreland’s pro bono counsel.” ECF Nos.

254–56. Moreland opposes the motions and argues that the R&R should be adopted in full. ECF

No. 258. HSUS did not object to the R&R or respond to Thomas’s objections. The Court agrees

with Moreland and will adopt Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s R&R in full and deny Thomas’s mo-

tions.

A party may file “specific written objections” to a magistrate judge’s R&R. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b)(2); LCvR 72.3(b). The Court “must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s”

R&R to which a proper objection is made. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); LCvR 72.3(c). The Court

reviews only for clear error any part of the magistrate judge’s R&R that is not objected to, that is

The Fitzpatrick Matrix “is promulgated by the D.C. United States Attorney’s Office” and 1

“establishes hourly rates for attorneys of varying experience levels in complex federal litigation in the District of Columbia.” R&R at 12 n.5; see also U.S. Att’y’s Off. for D.C., The Fitzpatrick Matrix, https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/media/1395096/dl?inline.

2 objected to merely in a “general” and “conclusory” fashion, or that is objected to in a manner that

simply rehashes the party’s “original arguments.” IMAPizza, LLC v. At Pizza Ltd., No. 17-cv-

2327,

, at *2 (D.D.C. July 27, 2021); Wu Xiaofeng v. Pompeo, No. 15-cv-1040,

, at *5 (D.D.C. Apr. 17, 2019). “Clear error exists only when the reviewing

court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Momoh v.

Osayande,

(D.D.C. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Also, when objecting

to an R&R, “the parties may not present new issues or arguments to the district judge.” IMAPizza,

LLC,

, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Aikens v. Shalala,

(D.D.C. 1997). The Court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended dis-

position.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

Thomas launches five objections to the R&R. First, he claims the Fitzpatrick Matrix does

not reflect a reasonable hourly rate. ECF No. 255. Second, he says Magistrate Judge Faruqui

erred in calculating Moreland’s attorneys’ years of experience. ECF No. 254 at 1–3, 7; ECF No.

256. Third, he argues that the Court should deduct half an hour from Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s

calculation of reimbursable time because the work done during that time—a discussion between

Attorney Hrom and others regarding a motion to seal a filing that was later unsealed—was unnec-

essary. ECF No. 254 at 3–5. Fourth, he asserts that the recommended award amount should be

reduced to reflect that, notwithstanding the Court’s prior finding of contempt, he did not violate

the protective order. Id. at 5. And fifth, he says the R&R improperly “recommend[s] that the

Court compel [Thomas] to facilitate, subsidize, reimburse, or otherwise participate in [HSUS]’s

illegal actions.” Id. at 5–7. The Court will overrule all of Thomas’s objections.

First, the Court will overrule Thomas’s objection to using the Fitzpatrick Matrix to estab-

lish the proper hourly rates for Moreland’s counsel. “The most useful starting point for

3 determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the

litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart,

(1983).

The party seeking fees bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of “the hours worked and

rates claimed.”

at 433–34. For complex federal civil cases like this one, however, the Fitzpat-

rick Matrix “presumptively” establishes the applicable fee rates. Louise Trauma Ctr. LLC v. DHS,

No. 20-cv-01128,

, at *4 (D.D.C. May 16, 2023). So in such cases, “the burden

shifts to the opposing party to ‘provide specific contrary evidence tending to show that a lower

rate would be appropriate.’” J.T. v. District of Columbia,

, 20 (D.D.C. 2023)

(quoting Covington v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 1995)).

The Court has already concluded that this case involves “complex federal litigation,” and

Thomas has given the Court no reason to reconsider that holding now. ECF No. 171 at 8–9. And

in his stay motion—which the Court construes as objecting to the R&R’s application of the Fitz-

patrick Matrix—Thomas provides no “specific contrary evidence” suggesting that Fitzpatrick Ma-

trix rates are inappropriate for Moreland’s counsel. He claims only that he paid his former attorney

at lower rates and that HSUS paid its counsel at below-Matrix rates. ECF No. 255 at 1–2. So

what? A reasonable hourly rate generally reflects the rate “prevailing in the community for similar

work,” Copeland v. Marshall,

(D.C. Cir. 1980), or the requesting attorney’s

“usual billing rate,” at least so long as that rate is “in line with those prevailing in the community,”

Thomas ex rel. Kattan v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 1993), as amended

(June 30, 1993). Thus, whatever he and HSUS paid their attorneys is largely irrelevant.2 Thomas

asks the Court to stay resolution of the R&R until HSUS’s attorneys present “further evidence of

2 Thomas has not alleged, much less shown, that the rates charged by his former attorney or HSUS’s attorneys either reflect those charged by Moreland’s attorneys or are the prevailing rates in the community.

4 their rates.” ECF No. 255 at 2 (emphasis added). But there is no reason to do so. The Court will

overrule Thomas’s first objection and deny his Motion to Stay Hourly Rate Calculation. ECF No.

255.

Second, the Court will overrule Thomas’s objection to Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s calcu-

lation of Attorney Hrom’s and Attorney Adams’s experience under the Fitzpatrick Matrix. As a

default, years of experience under that Matrix are “based on the number of years since an attorney

graduated from law school.” The Fitzpatrick Matrix, supra, at 2 n.4. Attorney Hrom graduated in

2015, and Attorney Adams graduated in 2018. ECF No. 249-1 ¶¶ 4–5. For their work done in

2021 and 2022, therefore, they would have had six and seven and three and four years of experi-

ence, respectively. However, Moreland voluntarily subtracted one year from Attorney Hrom’s

experience to reflect the time she spent completing a PhD dissertation after law school, leaving

her with five and six years of experience over the relevant time frame. Id. at 4–5.

Thomas first objects to the R&R’s calculation since Attorney Hrom spent two years and

Attorney Adams spent one year after graduating as federal judicial law clerks. ECF No. 254 at 1.

Thomas argues that the Court should discount those years because, in his view, time spent as a

judicial law clerk should not count in calculating an attorney’s experience. The Court disagrees.

To begin, the Fitzpatrick Matrix itself does not require the Court to discount time spent as

a judicial law clerk. True, the Matrix notes that downward “[a]djustments” to an attorney’s years

of experience “may be necessary if an attorney did not follow a typical career progression or was

effectively performing law clerk work.” The Fitzpatrick Matrix, supra, at 2 n.4 (emphasis added).

But read in context, the phrase “law clerk” does not encompass judicial law clerks. Instead, it

covers positions such as “legal assistant, paralegal, senior legal assistant, senior paralegal, and

student clerk.” Id. at 3 n.9. As Judge Faruqui explained, the duties of those positions are not

5 comparable to the duties of a judicial law clerk. R&R at 14–15. Indeed, a judicial clerkship is one

of the best ways for a young attorney to gain practical legal experience. It would make no sense

to treat the experience of a first-year associate at a large law firm, sometimes involving “drone-

like document review,” better than the experience of a federal judicial law clerk for reimbursement

purposes. Id. at 15. The Court thus agrees that “[d]iscounting a judicial clerkship is illogical.” Id.

at 14.

Neither the Supreme Court’s nor this Court’s prior decisions compel a different conclusion.

Thomas suggests that “settled Supreme Court case law” requires that courts “not count time spent

as a judicial law clerk for fee reimbursement purposes.” ECF No. 254 at 1, 3. Not so. In fact, in

the very case he cites, the Supreme Court suggested the opposite.3 And despite Thomas’s protes-

tations, this Court has never held to the contrary, either. Instead, in its opinion on a prior fee

dispute, the Court assumed that Thomas was correct that Attorney Hrom’s prior experience should

not be counted under the then-relevant Laffey Matrix. ECF No. 171 at 9–10. But even so, it

concluded that Attorney Hrom should still be compensated at rates reflecting that experience. Id.4

3 In Blum v. Stenson, the Supreme Court considered a fee application by three attorneys, each with 1.5 “years of experience as a practicing attorney.”

, 890 n.4 (1984). The first had never clerked, the second had clerked for one year, and the third had clerked for two.

If clerkships had no impact on reimbursement rates, their applicable rates might be expected to be the same.

But instead, the attorney with no clerkships billed at $95 an hour, the attorney with a one-year clerkship billed at $100 an hour, and the attorney with a two-year clerkship billed at $105 an hour.

Though the Supreme Court was not directly asked to review the propriety of those differences, it apparently had no qualms that these attorneys billed at rates directly correlated to their time spent as judicial law clerks. 4 Thomas also points out that the Administrative Office of the United States Courts uses the terms “law clerks,” “judicial law clerks,” and “federal judicial law clerks” interchangeably. ECF No. 254 at 2. That may be true, but it has no bearing on whether an attorney’s time as a judicial law clerk should count towards her years of experience in awarding fees.

6 For similar reasons, the Court will deny Thomas’s motion to compel Attorney Hrom “to

produce a full and complete copy of her professional experience practicing law from” 2016 to

2020 and overrule his related objection. ECF No. 254 at 7; ECF No. 256 at 2. According to

Thomas, in applying the Fitzpatrick Matrix, Magistrate Judge Faruqui should have credited Attor-

ney Hrom with only one and two years of experience in 2021 and 2022, respectively—and thus

lowered the applicable rate—because “[t]he evidence demonstrates” that she began practicing law

in 2020.

The Court has previously addressed and rejected a similar argument, finding that the

details he seeks are not necessary to conclude that the relevant Fitzpatrick Matrix rates are reason-

able. In its prior fee order, the Court noted that, even if Attorney Hrom had fewer years of expe-

rience than asserted, “[a]n attorney’s ‘usual billing rate’ . . . is very persuasive evidence of what is

a reasonable rate.” ECF No. 171 at 10 (quoting Baylor v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Assocs., P.C.,

(D.D.C. 2017)). And because Attorney Hrom’s customary rates “are

higher than those reflected in the Fitzpatrick Matrix” for an attorney with five and six years of

experience, ECF No. 249-1 ¶¶ 10–11, the Court again has no trouble concluding that the R&R’s

recommended Fitzpatrick Matrix rates are reasonable, see ECF No. 171 at 10.

Third, the Court will overrule Thomas’s objection to Magistrate Judge Faruqui’s recom-

mendation that the Court require that he reimburse Moreland for the half hour Attorney Hrom

spent “[c]onfer[ring] with plaintiff and [the] case team on” whether to seal ECF No. 126. ECF

No. 254 at 4. Thomas argues that this half hour should be excluded as “unnecessary” because,

following the Court’s summary-judgment decision, Moreland moved to unseal that document.

ECF No. 254 at 3–5. But Moreland’s change in position on whether to seal ECF No. 126 does not

mean her initial motion to seal was unnecessary. When an attorney makes a good-faith change of

position in light of changed circumstances or strategy, it is not unreasonable to request

7 reimbursement for the time she spent pursuing the initial position. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Ultimo,

LLC, No. 19-cv-3188,

, at *6 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2025) (refusing to exclude time

an attorney spent preparing for a jury trial, even though the attorney ultimately opted for a bench

trial based on “various pretrial rulings”). Here, Moreland explains that she initially moved to seal

ECF No. 126 because, “at the time of filing,” it included “confidential information which required

protection pursuant to the Court’s Protective Order.” ECF No. 258 at 4. And she only moved to

unseal the document after the Court entered summary judgment in her favor and “required the

parties to renew their sealing motions in light of the materials cited in” that opinion. Id.; see also

ECF No. 216. So instead of being an unjustifiable about-face, Moreland’s good-faith change in

position stemmed directly from these changed circumstances, including the Court’s order. “The

Court will not play Monday-morning quarterback” and find that Moreland’s “chosen path”—or

the work Attorney Hrom spent in pursuing that path—“was unreasonable.” K.P. v. District of

Columbia, No. 15-cv-1365,

, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 27, 2018).

Fourth, the Court will not revisit its prior holding that Thomas violated the Court’s protec-

tive order. Thomas appears to argue that the reimbursement award should be reduced by some

unspecified amount because the information he included in paragraphs 88 and 89 of his Superior

Court complaint “ha[s] never been confidential.” ECF No. 254 at 5. But the Court has already

concluded otherwise, ECF No. 247 at 8–10, and Thomas may not relitigate that finding in these

fee proceedings.

Fifth, Thomas’s objection that the R&R would require him to “subsidize” what he alleges

to be HSUS’s illegal conduct is not well taken. ECF No. 254 at 6. Indeed, the R&R—unobjected

to by HSUS—recommends that the Court deny HSUS’s motion for fees. R&R at 4–7. And

8 because the R&R recommends that Thomas not reimburse HSUS at all, the Court will overrule

this objection.

For these reasons, the Court will overrule Thomas’s objections and deny his motions. And

as for the unobjected-to portions of the R&R, upon independent consideration of the entire record

and the applicable law, the Court finds no clear error. Accordingly, it will adopt the R&R in full.

A separate order will issue.

/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge Date: September 17, 2025

9