UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JULIA I. RIX,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 23-03062 (AHA) v.

POLSINELLI PC, et al.,

Defendants.

Memorandum Opinion

Julia Rix sues the law firm Polsinelli PC and two of its partners, Dov Scherzer and Gabriel

Dabiri, asserting sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and related claims from when she

was a partner at the firm. The defendants have filed motions to dismiss and compel arbitration for

certain claims. For the reasons below, the Court denies the motions.

I. Background 1

Rix is an attorney whose practice focuses on cross-border counseling. ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 26.

The complaint alleges Polsinelli recruited her to become an equity shareholder in the firm’s D.C.

office in 2021, promising she could benefit from its international connections and resources. Id.

¶ 28. When Rix joined the firm, she was instead subject to repeated personal and sexual advances

by two partners with influence over the success of her practice, Dov Scherzer and Gabriel Dabiri.

Id. ¶¶ 31–75.

1 As required at the pleading stage, the Court accepts the complaint’s well-pled allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences in Rix’s favor. See Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham,

(D.C. Cir. 2015). The complaint describes numerous specific incidents at work and professional events in

D.C., where Rix worked, New York, where Scherzer and Dabiri worked, and elsewhere in which

Scherzer or Dabiri made comments about Rix’s appearance and other suggestive remarks; repeat

requests to go for drinks, dinner, or dancing despite Rix’s rejections; efforts to join her in her hotel

room; and unwanted physical contact.

All told, the complaint describes at least nine instances

in which Scherzer asked Rix to dinner and drinks over the course of several months, overtly tied

to his “growing affection” and “strong, unprofessional liking to Rix.” Id. ¶¶ 34, 41. The complaint

describes multiple instances in which Scherzer made efforts to join Rix in her hotel room, including

one in which he was successful and kissed her without consent. Id. ¶¶ 63, 66. Scherzer’s conduct

continued after the unwanted kiss; he asked Rix to meet again and expressed his expectation for

another kiss. Id. ¶¶ 67–68. The complaint also describes at least three instances in which Dabiri

invited Rix dancing or to have drinks or dinner, including to “boldly express a sexual interest” in

her and make physical contact with her. Id. ¶¶ 47, 58. At one professional event, Dabiri insisted

on dancing with Rix, repeatedly touched her, and then made sexually charged passes at her after

insisting they share a car home. Id. ¶ 58.

According to the complaint, Scherzer and Dabiri responded to Rix’s rejection by denying

her business opportunities, as they “time and again attempted to condition ‘working deals together’

upon her willingness to succumb to their demands for a personal (sexual) relationship.” Id. ¶ 55.

This impeded Rix’s ability to generate business and succeed at the firm. Id. ¶ 56. Rix subsequently

received her first negative performance review, which was conducted by partners who “regularly

work with Scherzer and Dabiri and are frequently involved in high-level Firm administrative and

personnel issues with a direct impact on Rix’s performance review.” Id. ¶ 59. As a result of the

2 review, the firm de-equitized Rix, decreased her compensation, and withheld money owed to her.

Id. ¶ 61.

In May 2023, Rix reported the misconduct and, two days later, Polsinelli fired her. Id.

¶¶ 69, 71. The firm then withheld her remaining compensation for the year and her equity in the

firm. Id. ¶¶ 72–73.

Rix sued Polsinelli, Dabiri, and Scherzer in D.C. Superior Court and they removed the case

to this Court. See ECF No. 1. Rix’s complaint alleges eight counts: (i) sexual harassment in

violation of the D.C. Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”) against all defendants; (ii) retaliation in

violation of the DCHRA against Polsinelli; (iii) aiding and abetting violations of the DCHRA

against Scherzer and Dabiri; (iv) hostile work environment in violation of Title VII against

Polsinelli; (v) retaliation in violation of Title VII against Polsinelli; (vi) breach of contract against

Polsinelli; (vii) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress against all defendants; and

(viii) negligent infliction of emotional distress against Polsinelli. See ECF No. 1-2 at ¶¶ 76–130.

Rix later voluntarily dismissed the sixth count, for breach of contract. See ECF No. 23. The

defendants filed motions to dismiss and compel arbitration, which implicate all counts except

count four. ECF No. 8; ECF No. 13.

II. Discussion

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)). This standard is satisfied “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

(citing Twombly,

). The Court “must take all the factual allegations in the complaint

3 as true,” though it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Papasan v. Allain,

(1986).

As a threshold matter, the defendants argue Rix’s state claims are asserted under the wrong

state’s law—that is, Rix’s five claims under the DCHRA and D.C. common law had to be asserted

under Missouri law. See ECF No. 8-1 at 19–27. As explained below, the Court disagrees and

concludes Rix has stated D.C. claims. Moreover, although the defendants do not contest Rix’s

Title VII hostile work environment claim may proceed in this Court, they argue that her Title VII

retaliation claim and state law claims must proceed through arbitration. The Court disagrees there,

too, because the application of the parties’ arbitration clause to those claims is foreclosed by the

Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act.

A. Rix Has Properly Asserted And Plausibly Pled DCHRA And D.C. Common Law Claims

The defendants argue that Missouri law governs Rix’s state law claims based on Rix’s

employment agreement and, in the alternative, under choice-of-law analysis.

In a case premised on diversity or supplemental jurisdiction, this Court applies D.C. choice-

of-law rules. Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (“When

deciding state-law claims under diversity or supplemental jurisdiction, federal courts apply the

choice-of-law rules of the jurisdiction in which they sit.” (quoting Ideal Elec. Sec. Co. v. Int’l

Fidelity Ins. Co.,

(D.C. Cir. 1997))). Under D.C. law, courts generally enforce

contractual choice-of-law provisions “as long as there is some reasonable relationship with the

state specified.” Ekstrom v. Value Health, Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting

Norris v. Norris,

(D.C. 1980)). In the absence of an applicable choice-of-law

agreement, the Court conducts a choice-of-law analysis, which involves considering the

“governmental interests” and which forum has the “most significant relationship.” Oveissi v.

4 Islamic Republic of Iran,

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Hercules & Co., Ltd. v.

Shama Rest. Corp.,

, 40–41 & n. 18 (D.C. 1989)). Here, neither a choice-of-law

provision nor choice-of-law analysis support application of Missouri law over D.C. law.

The defendants say Missouri law applies, citing a provision of Rix’s employment contract

that says: “This Agreement shall be construed and interpreted under the laws of the State of

Missouri.” ECF No. 8-1 at 20. This language would presumably require the application of Missouri

law to a claim that requires construction or interpretation of the employment agreement—such as

the breach of contract claim Rix no longer pursues. But Rix’s remaining claims do not arise under

her contract and therefore do not require construction or interpretation of it; she asserts claims

under state anti-discrimination and tort laws. Nothing in the contractual provision cited requires

the application of Missouri law to those claims. See, e.g., Minebea Co. v. Papst,

(D.D.C. 2005) (holding that provision stating agreement was “governed by and interpreted

in accordance with” the law of a jurisdiction did not apply to tort claims); Sandza v. Barclays Bank

PLC,

(D.D.C. 2015) (same).

The defendants do not meaningfully contest that the terms of the choice-of-law clause do

not encompass Rix’s employment discrimination and tort claims. They instead point to broader

language that appears in the agreement’s forum-selection clause, which requires that “any actions

related to this Agreement” be filed in Missouri. ECF No. 8-1 at 20. But, even assuming that broader

language encompasses employment discrimination and tort claims, the use of that broader

language as to forum selection but not choice of law cuts the other way. 2

2 The defendants have explicitly disclaimed reliance on the forum-selection clause to challenge D.C. as a proper venue, arguing only that this Court should apply Missouri law. See ECF Nos. 26, 27.

5 Absent an applicable choice-of-law provision, choice-of-law analysis favors application of

D.C. law, not Missouri law. Under the governmental interests analysis, courts “evaluate the

governmental policies underlying the applicable laws and determine which jurisdiction’s policy

would be most advanced by having its law applied to the facts of the case under review.” Oveissi,

(quoting Hercules,

)). The complaint alleges Rix is a citizen of, and

was recruited and hired to work in, D.C. ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 17. D.C. unquestionably has an interest in

protecting its citizens and workers from sexual harassment, retaliation, and related tortious conduct

by their employers. Cf. Shaw v. Marriott Int’l, Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2010) (“The

District of Columbia has an interest in protecting its own citizens from being victimized by unfair

trade practices and an interest in regulating the conduct of its business entities.”). Indeed, the

articulated purpose of the DCHRA is “to secure an end in the District of Columbia to

discrimination for any reason other than that of individual merit, including, but not limited to,

discrimination by reason of . . . sex.”

. While Missouri may have an interest

in regulating companies that are incorporated in its state, it has a less direct interest in protecting

workers in D.C. from sexual harassment, retaliation, and related tortious conduct—the relevant

law and policy at issue here. See Bledsoe v. Crowley,

(D.C. Cir. 1988) (“The

state where the defendant’s conduct occurs has the dominant interest in regulating it.” (cleaned up)

(quoting Biscoe v. Arlington Cnty.,

, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1984))).

D.C. also has the “most significant relationship” to the controversy here. Oveissi,

. The first two factors courts look to—“the place where the injury occurred” and “the place

where the conduct causing the injury occurred”—point to D.C., where Rix was a shareholder and

lost her job. Id.; ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 7. Rix alleges she was harassed in D.C. and several other places,

but not Missouri. See ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 31–68. The third factor—the domicile of the parties—is a

6 wash, as Rix is a citizen of D.C., Polsinelli is a citizen of Missouri, and Dabiri and Scherzer are

citizens of New York. Oveissi,

; ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 17–20. And the fourth—“the place

where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered”—at least slightly favors D.C.

Oveissi,

. While Rix became a shareholder of the firm, which is based in Missouri,

the complaint alleges she was recruited and hired to work in the firm’s D.C. office and, while

allegations indicate that Rix traveled to meet with partners influential to her practice with the firm

in other places, there is no indication that the relationship was centered in Missouri beyond the

formality of incorporation. ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 28.

The Court accordingly rejects the defendants’ argument that Missouri law applies to Rix’s

state law claims and turns to whether she has plausibly alleged her claims under D.C. law.

1. The Complaint States A DCHRA Sexual Harassment Claim Against All Defendants (Count One)

Polsinelli and Dabiri do not contest that the complaint’s first count states a claim for sexual

harassment under the DCHRA, but Scherzer contends Rix fails to state a claim against him. ECF

No. 13 at 4–6. The Court disagrees and concludes Rix has stated a claim.

Following amendments in 2022, the DCHRA defines harassment to include any conduct

“that unreasonably alters an individual’s terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or has the

purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.”

(c-2)(2)(A). The Act further defines sexual harassment to include “conduct of a sexual

nature that constitutes harassment,” as well as “[s]exual advances, requests for sexual favors, or

other conduct of a sexual nature where submission to the conduct is made either explicitly or

implicitly a term or condition of employment or where submission to or rejection of the conduct

is used as the basis for an employment decision affecting the individual’s employment.”

(c-2)(2)(B). In determining whether conduct constitutes harassment, courts must

7 consider “the totality of the circumstances,” including “(A) The frequency of the conduct; (B) The

duration of the conduct; (C) The location where the conduct occurred; (D) Whether the conduct

involved threats, slurs, epithets, stereotypes, or humiliating or degrading conduct; and (E) Whether

any party to the conduct held a position of formal authority over or informal power relative to

another party.”

(c-2)(3). “Conduct need not be severe or pervasive to

constitute harassment and no specific number of incidents or specific level of egregiousness is

required.”

The complaint plausibly alleges a sexual harassment claim against Scherzer under these

standards. Rix alleges Scherzer “made at least nine separate requests to Rix for dinner and drinks—

each overtly tied to his ‘growing affection’ for Rix”; “made several blatant sexual overtures

towards Rix” at a dinner; “made suggestive and inappropriate remarks about Rix” during a firm

retreat; “kissed her without her consent” before “incessantly . . . requesting to ‘come back’” to her

hotel room “throughout the night”; and later “made it clear that he expected to receive another kiss

from Rix.” ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 41, 49, 51, 66, 68. Rix also alleges that “the partners upon which her

practice was dependent time and again attempted to condition ‘working deals together’ upon her

willingness to succumb to their demands for a personal (sexual) relationship” and that Scherzer,

who had been at Polsinelli since 2015 and is twenty years senior to Rix, “was a partner who would

be influential in her advancement.”

. Scherzer’s conduct caused Rix to be

“[n]ervous, scared, and under duress”; “[o]ffended and panicked”; “fear[ful] that rejecting [his and

others’] advances would be fatal to her ability to build the practice for which she was hired”; and

“uncomfortable” to the point of cancelling a trip with Scherzer to meet a client.

.

In sum, Rix alleges that Scherzer made repeated sexual advances over the course of more

than a year at firm-related and other professional events, that he held informal power at the firm

8 relative to her, and that his conduct created a work environment that was intimidating, hostile, or

offensive. Such allegations are sufficient to state a sexual harassment claim under the DCHRA.

Indeed, such allegations would have been sufficient to state a claim even under the Act’s previous,

more demanding standard. See Howard Univ. v. Best,

(D.C. 1984) (finding

plaintiff had stated a sexual harassment claim under the previous standard when the plaintiff

alleged similar instances of “unwanted physical harassment and verbal propositions”).

2. The Complaint States A Claim Against Dabiri And Scherzer For Aiding And Abetting A DCHRA Violation (Count Three)

Dabiri and Scherzer argue that the complaint’s third count fails to state a claim for aiding

and abetting violations of the DCHRA. They contend they cannot be liable for aiding and abetting

where they are also alleged to have committed the underlying conduct. See ECF No. 8-1 at 31;

ECF No. 13 at 6. The Court disagrees.

The DCHRA makes it “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet,

invite, compel, or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under the provisions of this chapter

or to attempt to do so.”

. The D.C. Court of Appeals has recognized that if

a law firm “unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff as alleged, then the partners who carried

out the allegedly discriminatory acts aided and abetted the employer’s discrimination.” Wallace v.

Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom,

(D.C. 1998). Thus, partners who

“personally engaged in discriminatory conduct” can be held liable under the DCHRA’s aiding and

abetting provision for aiding and abetting the firm’s unlawful activity.

The Court accordingly

concludes Rix has alleged that, as partners of Polsinelli, Scherzer and Dabiri aided and abetted the

firm in violating the DCHRA through their conduct.

9 3. The Complaint States An Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress Claim Against All Defendants (Count Seven)

The defendants argue the complaint’s seventh count fails to state a claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress, but the Court concludes Rix has plausibly alleged the required

elements under D.C. common law.

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege “(1)

extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant which (2) intentionally or recklessly

(3) causes the plaintiff severe emotional distress.” Purcell v. Thomas,

(D.C.

2007) (quoting Best,

). In determining whether conduct is extreme and outrageous,

courts “must consider: (1) applicable contemporary community standards of offensiveness and

decency, and (2) the specific context in which the conduct took place.” King v. Kidd,

(D.C. 1993). While a court must “determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant’s

conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery,” the case

“should be submitted to the jury if reasonable people could differ on whether the conduct is

extreme and outrageous.” Best,

. The D.C. Court of Appeals has further advised

that “[c]reation of a hostile work environment by racial or sexual harassment may, upon sufficient

evidence, constitute a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress.”

.

In addition, repeated harassment “may compound the outrageousness of incidents which, taken

individually, might not be sufficiently extreme to warrant liability.”

(quoting Boyle v. Wenk,

(1979)).

Under these standards, Rix has alleged extreme and outrageous conduct. She alleges that

“two influential shareholders in the Firm’s international practice” who were “necessary resources

of a successful practice” and “gatekeepers to [her] success” repeatedly harassed her over multiple

years. ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 8. As discussed, she alleges Scherzer “made at least nine separate requests

10 to Rix for dinner and drinks—each overtly tied to his ‘growing affection’ for Rix”; “made several

blatant sexual overtures towards Rix” at a dinner; “made suggestive and inappropriate remarks

about Rix” during a firm retreat; “kissed her without her consent” before “incessantly . . .

requesting to ‘come back’” to her hotel room “throughout the night”; and later “made it clear that

he expected to receive another kiss from Rix.” ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 41, 49, 51, 66, 68. She alleges that

Dabiri also repeatedly invited her dancing and to drinks or dinner, including to “boldly express a

sexual interest” and make physical contact with her; at one professional event, he “insisted on a

dance with Rix, during which he repeatedly touched her,” leading Rix to “hid[e] in the bathroom

to calm herself and avoid further advances. Id. ¶¶ 47, 58. Dabiri later insisted on sharing a car with

Rix and, “[o]nce inside the car, Dabiri made sexually charged passes at Rix,” causing Rix to be

“so distraught” and “overwhelmed” that she “could not attend meetings the next day.” Id. ¶ 58. As

stated above, Rix also alleges that “the partners upon which her practice was dependent time and

again attempted to condition ‘working deals together’ upon her willingness to succumb to their

demands for a personal (sexual) relationship.” Id. ¶ 55. The Court has already concluded Rix’s

allegations state a claim for sexual harassment under D.C. law, which Polsinelli and Dabiri do not

contest, and the repeat nature of the harassment further supports the conclusion that Rix has stated

a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Best,

(holding that the

plaintiff “made out a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress insofar as she

demonstrated repeated ‘sexual harassment’ by the man who was her supervisor,” particularly in

light of the public policy animating the DCHRA).

The complaint also alleges the remaining elements. None of the defendants dispute the

complaint alleges they acted “intentionally or recklessly,” and the complaint therefore satisfies the

second element. Purcell,

. And, while Scherzer makes a conclusory argument that

11 Rix failed to plead that his alleged conduct resulted in severe emotional distress, she has clearly

done so. The complaint is replete with specific allegations that Rix “suffered and continues to

suffer emotional . . . harm” and “humiliation and severe emotional distress” from the alleged

conduct; that she was “[n]ervous, scared, and under duress” when “Scherzer insisted [on]

following [her] to her hotel room”; and that she was “[o]ffended and panicked” when Scherzer

then “kissed her without consent.” ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 16, 66, 123. The complaint accordingly states

a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

4. The Complaint States A Claim For Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Against Polsinelli (Count Eight)

Polsinelli argues the complaint’s eighth count fails to state a claim for negligent infliction

of emotional distress, but the Court concludes Rix plausibly alleges this claim as well.

To state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege “(1)

the plaintiff was in the zone of physical danger, which was (2) created by the defendant’s

negligence, (3) the plaintiff feared for [their] own safety, and (4) the emotional distress so caused

was serious and verifiable.” Harris v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs.,

(D.C. Cir.

2015). Polsinelli offers only a perfunctory assertion that Rix failed to plead this claim: Polsinelli

recites the elements, says that “[g]enerally speaking, courts impose liability for the negligent

infliction of emotional distress only in limited situations,” and says that “[t]his is not one of those

situations.” ECF No. 8-1 at 31. This assertion is made without citation to legal authority or analysis.

Polsinelli otherwise makes factual assertions that do not appear in, or conflict with, Rix’s

complaint, even though the Court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations at this stage.

Iqbal,

. Such an argument is far too undeveloped to be a basis for dismissal. See,

e.g., Robinson v. Farley,

(D.D.C. 2017) (declining to address

“undeveloped arguments for dismissal”); Doe v. Siddig,

, 137–38 (D.D.C.

12 2011) (same) (citing Wash. Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Barry,

(D.C. Cir.

1997)).

The complaint plausibly alleges the elements of negligent infliction of emotional distress.

As stated above, Rix alleges she was repeatedly subject to sexual comments, advances, and

physical touching by two Polsinelli partners at professional events, both of whom were more senior

in their careers and identified as important to her success at the firm. Her allegations include an

instance in which the conduct drove her to hide in a bathroom “to calm herself and avoid further

advances” and repeated efforts to join her in her hotel room, including a successful one in which

a partner “kissed her without her consent” while she was “[n]ervous, scared, and under duress.”

ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 58, 66. Rix further alleges Scherzer and Dabiri were “emboldened by the Firm’s

culture of discrimination” and that when she reported their misconduct to Polsinelli, it “fired her

without cause” and “without conducting an investigation.” Id. ¶¶ 14, 57. And, in addition to the

emotional distress Rix alleges she suffered from the conduct above, she specifically alleges that

Polsinelli’s failure “to adequately consider, investigate, and resolve [her] complaints of harassment

. . . is directly responsible for [her] emotional distress. Id. ¶ 130. These allegations state a claim

for negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Tan v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., No. 23-cv-

00224,

, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2023) (holding that plaintiff’s allegations were

sufficient to state a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim where plaintiff alleged “that

one of her co-workers assaulted her and another sexually harassed her without consequence,

causing her to fear for her physical safety” (citations omitted)).

B. Rix Is Not Required To Arbitrate Her Sexual Harassment Dispute

After their arguments for dismissing the complaint, Polsinelli and Dabiri argue that Rix’s

employment agreement requires that some of her claims go to arbitration. See ECF No. 8-1 at 32–

36. They concede that any clause requiring arbitration of Rix’s Title VII hostile work environment

13 claim—premised on sexual harassment—is unenforceable under the Ending Forced Arbitration of

Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (“EFAA”). ECF No. 8-1 at 33; see Pub. L. No. 117-

90,

(2022) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 401–402). However, they contend that Rix’s Title

VII retaliation claim, DCHRA claims, and D.C. tort claims must be arbitrated. See ECF No. 8-1 at

12, 33–36. Rix responds that the EFAA bars any agreement to arbitrate those claims as well. See

ECF No. 19 at 25–27. This question about the scope of the EFAA appears to be one of first

impression in this District. 3

The Federal Arbitration Act mandates that agreements to arbitrate are “valid, irrevocable,

and enforceable.”

. In 2022, Congress enacted the EFAA, which states that when it

comes to a dispute about sexual assault or sexual harassment, “no predispute arbitration agreement

. . . shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State

law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute.”

(a).

Courts in other jurisdictions have generally read the text of this provision to mean what it says—

when a plaintiff alleges conduct that relates to a sexual assault or sexual harassment dispute, any

predispute arbitration clause is rendered unenforceable as to the entire “case.” See, e.g., Johnson

v. Everyrealm, Inc.,

, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2023); Delo v. Paul Taylor Dance Found.,

Inc.,

, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2023); Diaz-Roa v. Hermes L., P.C.,

, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2024); Baldwin v. TMPL Lexington LLC, No. 23-cv-9899,

,

at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2024); Turner v. Tesla, Inc.,

, 925 (N.D. Cal.

2023); Molchanoff v. SOLV Energy, LLC, No. 23-cv-653,

, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar.

1, 2024); Watson v. Blaze Media LLC, No. 3:23-cv-0279-B,

, at *2 (N.D. Tex.

3 Polsinelli and Dabiri also argue that the EFAA does not bar arbitration of Rix’s breach of contract claim and it therefore must be arbitrated. However, Rix voluntarily dismissed that claim and it is no longer before the Court.

14 Aug. 3, 2023). Applying that interpretation, the text clearly resolves this case—the defendants

concede that Rix asserts a Title VII claim that relates to sexual harassment and therefore the

arbitration clause is not enforceable with respect to this case.

Here, any predispute agreement to arbitrate is also unenforceable under the EFAA’s text

for a second, narrower reason: each remaining claim itself “relates to . . . the sexual harassment

dispute.”

(a). There is no question that Rix’s complaint asserts a “sexual harassment

dispute”—as mentioned, the defendants concede Rix’s Title VII hostile work environment claim

is premised on such a dispute. See

§ 401(4) (defining that term as “a dispute relating to conduct

that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law”).

Rix’s retaliation claim that she was fired “when she reported to Polsinelli that she had been the

victim of harassment, discrimination, and a hostile work environment,” ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 109, her

DCHRA claims for committing or aiding and abetting sexual harassment and for retaliation, and

her claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress premised on the very same

allegations of sexual harassment all clearly “relate[] to . . . the sexual harassment dispute.”

(a). Indeed, these claims themselves constitute “a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged

to constitute sexual harassment.”

§ 401(4).

Polsinelli and Dabiri do not attempt to explain how Rix’s DCHRA or D.C. tort claims do

not relate to, or do not themselves constitute, a sexual harassment dispute. They argue that Rix’s

Title VII retaliation claim must be arbitrated despite the EFAA because her retaliation claim “does

not rise or fall on” her hostile work environment claim and therefore is not “inexorably intertwined

with [her] sexual harassment claims.” ECF No. 8-1 at 34; ECF No. 22 at 10. That is true as far as

it goes. Rix’s Title VII retaliation and hostile work environment claims are independent claims

and have their own elements, and Rix may succeed or fail in proving one claim irrespective of the

15 other. But the test for whether the EFAA applies is not whether claims are “inexorably intertwined”

or “rise or fall” together; it is whether the claim is or “relates to” a sexual harassment dispute.

(a). And on that test, the claim of retaliation for reporting sexual harassment is plainly

covered. See Olivieri v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc.,

, 92 (2d Cir. 2024) (concluding

that “retaliation resulting from a report of sexual harassment is ‘relat[ed] to conduct that is alleged

to constitute sexual harassment’” (quoting

(4))); Johnson, 657 F. Supp. 3d at 559

(same); Turner, 686 F. Supp. 3d at 928 (same).

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court denies the motions to dismiss and the motion to compel to

arbitration. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

AMIR H. ALI United States District Judge

Date: September 18, 2025

16