UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

AKEEM T.,1

Plaintiff,

v. No. 24-cv-530-MAU

FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security2

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Akeem T. seeks Disability Insurance (“DI”) and Supplemental Security Insurance

(“SSI”) benefits under the Social Security Act (“the Act”). He claims to have depression, anxiety,

a learning disability, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), and insomnia. ECF Nos. 7 (“AR”)

at 82, 287; 12 at 1. The Social Security Administration (“SSA” or “Commissioner”) entered a

final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim on January 3, 2024. AR at 3.3 On appeal, Plaintiff seeks

reversal under

(g). ECF No. 11.

Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of benefits was not

based on substantial evidence. Specifically, the Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in his

assessment of Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) by not resolving alleged

1 The Court has partially redacted Plaintiff’s name in accordance with the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States. See Memorandum from Hon. Wm. Terrell Hodges, Chair, Comm. on Ct. Admin. & Case Mgmt. to Chief Judges of the U.S. Cts. of Appeals, Chief Judges of the U.S. Cts., Clerks of the U.S. Cts. of Appeals, and Clerks of the U.S. Dist. Cts. (May 1, 2018), available at https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-ap-c-suggestion_cacm_0.pdf (last visited Sep. 19, 2025). 2 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the current Defendant has been substituted for his predecessor. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 3 Citations are to the page numbers provided at the bottom of each page. 1 inconsistencies between his conclusions and findings in a persuasive medical opinion. ECF No.

12. Plaintiff seeks reversal of the final decision while the Commissioner seeks affirmance. ECF

Nos. 11; 12; 15; 16. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for

Judgment of Reversal (ECF No. 11) and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of

Affirmance (ECF No. 15).

BACKGROUND

I. The Social Security Act

In response to the Great Depression, Congress enacted the Act to support individuals

unable to work, including those unable to work due to disability. See Helvering v. Davis,

, 640–45 (1937) (outlining the Act’s general purposes); Flemming v. Nestor,

(1960). Under the Act, a claimant must establish they are “under a disability” to qualify for DI or

SSI benefits. See

(a)(1)(E), 1382c(a)(3)(B); see also Gordon v. Schweiker,

(4th Cir. 1984) (noting that benefits exist to assist those with disabilities who are

“without the ability to sustain themselves”). The Act defines disability as the “inability to engage

in substantial gainful activity” because of a physical or mental impairment which will foreseeably

end in death or last for at least twelve consecutive months. See

(d)(1)(A),

1382c(a)(3)(A). Accordingly, a person is disabled under the Act when their impairment is so

severe that they cannot do their previous work or other jobs in the national economy.

§§

423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).

The Commissioner uses a five-step test to evaluate whether a person is disabled. See

(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is

currently engaged in “substantial gainful activity.”

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i).

Second, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has at least one severe “medically determinable”

impairment. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 404.1520(c), 416.920(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(c); see also id. 2 §§ 404.1509, 416.909. A severe impairment “significantly limits” a claimant’s physical or mental

abilities to perform basic work functions. Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). Third, the ALJ

determines whether the claimant’s impairment(s) is among those disabilities in a regulatory listing

that conclusively establishes disability. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). These

“Listings” are various physical and mental conditions that are presumptively severe enough to

preclude gainful employment. See id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1520(d), 416.920(a)(4)(iii),

416.920(d); see also 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If a claimant satisfies step three, they

are disabled under the Act and eligible for benefits. Butler v. Barnhart,

(D.C.

Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

Fourth, if a claimant has not yet established a disability, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s

RFC and whether the claimant can perform their past work. See

(a)(4)(iv),

404.1520(f), 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(f). At step five, the ALJ considers whether the claimant

can perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy considering the

claimant’s age, education, work experience, and RFC. See §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g),

416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g). The claimant carries the burden of proof for the first four steps.

Butler,

. At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate the

claimant can perform other work.

The RFC is the most the claimant can still do at work on a regular and continuing basis

despite their limitations. See Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96–8p,

, at *2 (July

2, 1996) (noting the RFC is based on a work schedule of eight hours a day, five days a week, or

the equivalent thereof). In formulating the RFC, the ALJ considers all the claimant’s mental or

physical impairments, including any related symptoms.

The ALJ may ask a vocational expert

3 to testify about whether the claimant can perform other work due to their RFC. See

(e), 416.966(e).

II. Plaintiff’s Disability Claims and Procedural History

Plaintiff was born on July 28, 1995. AR at 251. At the time of the administrative hearing,

Plaintiff was twenty-seven years old, had graduated high school, and had attended one and a half

years of college.

at 41–42, 251. Plaintiff has held various jobs over the years, with his last job

being a sales associate at Lowe’s until March 2022.

at 43–45, 60.

Plaintiff applied for DI benefits on January 4, 2022, and SSI benefits on February 1, 2022,

due to depression, anxiety, a learning disability, PTSD, and insomnia.

.

Plaintiff alleged his disability began on December 17, 2021.

.4 The Commissioner

initially denied Plaintiff’s claims on May 11, 2022, and again on reconsideration on September 8,

2022.

, 92–93, 163, 166. Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, which the ALJ

held on May 11, 2023.

.

III. The Administrative Hearing

The ALJ heard testimony from Plaintiff and a vocational expert.

.

A. Plaintiff’s Testimony

Plaintiff testified about several matters in his personal life.

Education. Plaintiff testified that he had individualized education plans (“IEPs”) from the

third grade until he graduated from high school.

. He explained that he had IEPs

because he had trouble concentrating in class and experienced slow learning development.

. After completing high school, Plaintiff attended college but left after his third semester.

at 41–42, 48. Plaintiff explained that he left college because the university transferred him after

4 Plaintiff later noted in his disability reports that he had chronic high blood pressure. See

. 4 his second semester from a small campus meant to assist with his learning difficulties to main

campus.

at 46–47. Plaintiff noted that his 3.0 grade point average dropped his third semester

because main campus overwhelmed him.

, 47–48.

Travel. In discussing his education, Plaintiff also noted that he took a four-week acting

class in New York City in 2020.

, 57–58, 433, 439. To attend class, Plaintiff would take

the Megabus to New York City once a week and return to Washington, D.C. on the same day.

, 57–58. Plaintiff also took multiple months-long trips to Los Angeles, California.

at 58–

59. In 2017, Plaintiff stayed in Los Angeles for about six months with a family member before

moving back to Washington D.C.

. In 2018, Plaintiff moved to Los Angeles and lived on

his own for about nine months.

. Plaintiff ultimately ran out of money and moved into a

homeless shelter before moving back to Washington, D.C.

Work History. With respect to Plaintiff’s work history, Plaintiff testified that he worked

full time as an electrician in training for about a month or two in 2015.

. In that role,

he helped electricians install or strip wiring from residential housing.

. Plaintiff’s

employer fired Plaintiff after Plaintiff got into a confrontation with his manager.

. Next,

Plaintiff worked part time at a theater as an usher and ticket taker for approximately a year between

2017 and 2018.

at 44–45. Finally, from September 2021 to March 2022, Plaintiff worked part

time at Lowe’s as a sales associate.

. At Lowe’s, he would talk to and assist guests,

stock items, cut trees, and push carts.

.

Plaintiff’s impairments. Plaintiff also testified about his mental impairments and

symptoms.

. First, Plaintiff testified that he developed PTSD from a December

2018 car accident and, as a result, had “shivers, shakes, nightmares, [and was] scared to get behind

the wheel.”

. Plaintiff explained that the last time he got in the driver’s seat, he froze and

5 started shivering and shaking.

Second, Plaintiff testified about his anxiety and described how

when someone rushed him or he was in a fast-paced work environment, he felt overwhelmed and

would zone out.

. For example, when Plaintiff’s counsel asked Plaintiff if he would be

able to sit and make sure someone did not steal from a store, Plaintiff answered that he would have

concentration issues and lose focus.

. Third, Plaintiff added that he experienced periods

of insomnia due to his anxiety, which occasionally disturbed his sleeping patterns and kept him up

late at night.

. Fourth, Plaintiff testified that he dealt with depression almost every day

and that he could get “low,” which made him not want to do anything or leave the house for a

couple of days or weeks.

Plaintiff also testified that he had anger issues and that when things

do not go his way or someone spoke to him in a certain way, he could become very angry and had

to “take control of himself.”

. Plaintiff later noted that working full time intensified his

anger issues, depression, and anxiety.

.

Treatment. For treatment, Plaintiff stated that he took medication and had been seeing Dr.

Alvaro Guzman since 2019.

. Plaintiff’s last session occurred in the winter before the

administrative hearing, and Plaintiff had not seen Dr. Guzman after his practice closed.

at 49–

50. Plaintiff testified that he had an intake appointment scheduled with a new doctor for the week

following the administrative hearing.

Plaintiff added that that he and Dr. Guzman had been

testing new medications and dosages.

.

Living Arrangements. Plaintiff also testified about his living arrangements and daily tasks.

Plaintiff stated that he lived with his mother and three siblings.

. Plaintiff took out the

trash, did the dishes, and grocery shopped for the home.

Plaintiff usually ordered groceries

online and had them delivered.

Plaintiff took public transportation but felt scared from news

stories “of people pulling out guns and knives.”

at 55–56. Specifically, Plaintiff noted that he

6 did not take public transportation to the hearing because he witnessed an individual “getting very

verbal” with a police officer on the metro the day before.

at 56–57. Plaintiff had a driver’s

license but failed the written test twice.

. Plaintiff also managed his own finances and

received food stamps.

at 62–63.

Finally, Plaintiff described his typical day.

. Plaintiff stated that he usually woke

up, checked his phone and calendar, brushed his teeth, showered, had breakfast, and attempted

physical activity.

He stated that he spent most time around his family and did not see his

friends often.

B. Vocational Expert’s Testimony

Vocational expert Donna Nealon testified at the hearing.

at 64–68. The ALJ asked

Nealon a series of questions based on a hypothetical individual with Plaintiff’s age, education

level, and no past relevant work.

The ALJ asked Nealon several questions based on the

hypothetical individual’s profile:

[A]ssume this individual is limited to simple, routine tasks . . . limited to lift/carry, push/pull 50 pounds occasionally, 25 pounds frequently. Can sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday. Can frequently climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl. Can only occasionally climb ropes, ladders and scaffolds. This individual is limited to simple, routine tasks. Can only occasionally interact with supervisors, coworkers, and the public, and can only occasionally adjust to changes in workplace settings. No other limitations.

.

Nealon stated that the hypothetical individual could work several jobs in the national

economy, such as kitchen helper, hand launderer, and hospital cleaner.

. Nealon clarified

that these jobs required a person to only occasionally interact with the public, supervisors, and

coworkers.

. These jobs also generally allowed for half hour to one-hour lunch breaks

and one or two ten-to-fifteen-minute breaks.

7 Following a question from Plaintiff’s counsel, Nealon stated that employers typically

would tolerate an employee being off task 10–15% of the time but rarely would tolerate an

employee being off task 20% of the time.

. Nealon added that one or two absences per

month for an employee without accommodations was acceptable.

Three or more absences,

however, was not acceptable.

IV. The ALJ’s Decision

On June 29, 2023, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled based

on the five-step analysis.

; See

(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).

First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since

December 17, 2021, the alleged onset date of his disability.

. Second, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 1) neurocognitive disorder; 2) affective anxiety;

3) trauma-related disorder; and 4) obesity.

.

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s mental impairments did not meet or medically

equal any impairment in the Listings.

at 22–23. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s mental

impairments did not satisfy the “paragraph B” criteria of the relevant Listings because Plaintiff

only had moderate mental limitations.5

. Moreover, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s mental

impairments did not satisfy the criteria for “paragraph C” because Plaintiff could sustain himself,

did not require hospitalizations, and had not demonstrated any major clinical abnormalities.

The ALJ formulated Plaintiff’s RFC at step four and concluded that Plaintiff’s “medically

determinable” impairments could reasonably be expected to cause his alleged symptoms.

at

5 The Listings employ four functional criteria under “paragraph B” to assess severe mental impairments: 1) “understand, remember, or apply information”; 2) “interact with others”; 3) “concentrate, persist, or maintain pace”; and 4) “adapt or manage oneself.” See Tiana O. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-2051,

, at *7 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2023) (citations omitted). To satisfy “paragraph B,” a claimant’s severe mental impairments must either extremely limit one of these areas of mental functioning or markedly limit two of them.

8 22–24; See, e.g.,

. The ALJ found that other evidence in the record

contradicted Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his

symptoms. AR at 25. The ALJ considered the medical opinions of state agency psychological

consultants Drs. Patricia Cott and Nancy Heiser, consultative examiner Dr. Allison Drewno, and

Plaintiff’s treating physician Dr. Guzman.

at 29–30.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s stated symptoms were more severe than the medical

evidence in the record and that his mental impairments imposed, at most, moderate limitations.

at 27–28. For example, the ALJ noted that there was no evidence in the record reflecting that

Plaintiff had gone to the emergency room or hospital because of his mental health.

.

Moreover, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had not reported experiencing any hallucinations, delusions,

paranoia, obsessive behavior, impulse control issues, or suicidal or homicidal thoughts.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medical records supported the ALJ’s conclusion.

. The ALJ highlighted Dr. Drewno’s June 2019 consultative examination report, in which Dr.

Drewno stated that, although Plaintiff had mildly impaired concentration, memory, and attention

skills, Plaintiff’s intellectual functioning was otherwise within normal bounds.

. The ALJ

added that, despite Plaintiff receiving an extremely low intelligence quotient (“IQ”) score at the

examination, Dr. Drewno cautioned that Plaintiff’s IQ score may underestimate Plaintiff’s true

abilities “due to possible suboptimal effort.”

. Dr. Drewno observed that Plaintiff

responded inconsistently, answered questions with little deliberation, gave up easily, and took long

periods of time to respond to tests.

. The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff’s July 2022

initial psychiatric evaluation documented largely normal mental health conditions, including in

terms of concentration, memory, socialization, sleep, workplace functioning, as well as average

and above intelligence.

. The ALJ chronicled how this evaluation was generally

9 consistent with Plaintiff’s treatment records between January and August 2022, as well as his

records that predated his disability onset date.

, 384–441, 442–521, 532–573.

The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s past activities and behavior showed that Plaintiff had

no more than moderate mental limitations. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff had obtained a high school

diploma, attended a year and a half of college in person, and passed a driver’s test.

. The

ALJ also pointed to Plaintiff’s testimony about his daily activities, his various part-time jobs,

moving to Los Angeles by himself, taking a public bus alone to New York for his acting class, and

shopping online.

Moreover, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s history of limited and routine

treatment and the lack of significant findings in his mental health examinations further supported

the ALJ’s conclusion.

, 29–30.

In weighing Plaintiff’s medical records with the rest of the Administrative Record, the ALJ

found the opinions of Drs. Cott and Heiser persuasive. The ALJ summarized Dr. Cott’s opinion:

On initial review, the State agency psychological consultant opined that the claimant is able to recall [short] and simple instructions, but would have difficulty with recalling and understanding complex or detailed information; that the claimant is capable of performing familiar and/or routine procedures, as well as maintain concentration and attention for two-hour periods in order to complete an eight-hour day; he could interact appropriately with supervisors and coworkers, but would be less comfortable in situations requiring frequent social contact with the public and therefore, is able to interact with the public only for brief periods or infrequently; is able to complete a normal workweek and perform at a generally consistent pace with others with only minimal need for accommodations on an infrequent basis; and that the claimant may need assistance in adapting to change, unless infrequent or implemented gradually.

(citations to exhibits omitted); 71–92. Similarly, Dr. Heiser opined that Plaintiff could

understand, remember, and sustain attention to carry out short and simple instructions, interact

with others to perform routine tasks with occasional interaction with the public, and be aware of

hazards and travel.

; 93–114. The ALJ found both opinions persuasive because they were

10 consistent with Plaintiff’s other medical records, his limited course of treatment, and his ability to

engage in daily activities.

at 29–30.

The ALJ also found Dr. Drewno’s opinion somewhat persuasive.

. Dr. Drewno

opined that Plaintiff has moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying complex

instructions.

She concluded that Plaintiff had no limitations with following an ordinary

routine, managing his personal hygiene, and maintaining awareness of normal hazards.

The

ALJ observed that these findings were generally consistent with Plaintiff’s low IQ score and

treatment records.

The ALJ highlighted that, although Plaintiff’s score and records showed

that Plaintiff had somewhat limited cognitive abilities, the record otherwise demonstrated that

Plaintiff had mildly impaired attention, concentration, and memory skills, and otherwise normal

limitations.

The ALJ determined that Dr. Guzman’s opinion, on the other hand, was not persuasive.

Dr. Guzman opined that Plaintiff had “marked” limitations in 1) all functional areas and

“extreme” limitations in maintaining attention and concentration for extended periods; 2)

completing a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychological symptoms;

and 3) performing at a consistent pace without taking an unreasonable number and length of rest

periods.

The ALJ concluded that Dr. Guzman’s own treatment records did not support this

opinion.

The ALJ observed that Dr. Guzman documented normal mental status examination

findings in terms of speech, eye contact, thought process and content, insight and judgment.

Dr. Guzman also described in his notes how Plaintiff had held many part-time jobs, traveled to

New York by himself, drove, and engaged in other activities, all of which were inconsistent with

a finding of marked or extreme limitation.

Moreover, the ALJ found that Dr. Guzman’s

11 opinion was not consistent with other medical records and examinations, which documented that

Plaintiff had low IQ scores but did not otherwise possess any mental health abnormalities.

Based on these assessments, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform

medium work with the following limitations:

[Plaintiff] can lift, carry, push, and pull fifty pounds occasionally and twenty-five pounds frequently; sit for six hours in and eight-hour workday and stand and walk for six hours in an eight-hour workday; frequent balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, and climbing ramps and stairs and occasional climbing of ropes, ladders, or scaffolds. The [Plaintiff] is limited to simple, routine tasks and can only occasionally adjust to changes in workplace settings. The [Plaintiff] can only occasionally interact with supervisors, co-workers, and the public.

at 24–25.

At step five, the ALJ determined that, given Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience,

and RFC, Plaintiff could still perform a variety of jobs.

. As outlined above, the ALJ and

vocational expert had a series of exchanges concerning whether there were jobs in the national

economy for a hypothetical individual with the same age, education, professional history, and RFC

as Plaintiff. Id.; see supra Background Section III.B. In line with the vocational expert’s hearing

testimony, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could undertake unskilled jobs such as a kitchen

helper, hospital cleaner, and hand launderer. AR at 31. Thus, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff

was not “under a disability” for purposes of the Act during the relevant period and, accordingly,

denied his request for DI and SSI benefits. Id. at 32. The ALJ’s decision became final when the

Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on January 3, 2024. Id. at 3–6.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal district courts have jurisdiction to review final decisions of the Commissioner.

(g); 1383(c)(3). The reviewing court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it

is based on substantial evidence in the record as a whole and the correct application of the relevant

12 legal standards. Butler,

(citation omitted). Substantial evidence is more than a

mere scintilla but less than a preponderance of the evidence.

(citation omitted). This standard

requires “only such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill,

(2019) (citation modified). This is a low bar.

See Katrina M. v. O’Malley,

, 9 (D.D.C. 2024) (citing La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v.

Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n,

(D.C. Cir. 2021)). Moreover, the Court must give

deference to the ALJ as the fact-finder. Rossello ex rel. Rossello v. Astrue,

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

Despite the deference a reviewing court must give to the ALJ, this standard of review “calls

for careful scrutiny of the entire record” to determine whether the ALJ “has analyzed all evidence

and has sufficiently explained the weight he has given to obviously probative exhibits.” Simms v.

Sullivan,

(D.C. Cir. 1989) (citation modified). The ALJ’s decision must

include findings and conclusions on all material issues of fact, law, or discretion as well as the

ALJ’s reasons for those findings and conclusions.

(c)(3)(A). In reaching a decision,

an ALJ cannot simply disregard evidence that does not support the ALJ’s conclusions. Hartline

v. Astrue,

(D.D.C. 2009) (citation omitted).

It is the plaintiff’s burden to show that the ALJ’s decision was not based on substantial

evidence or that the ALJ applied an incorrect legal standard. Settles v. Colvin,

(D.D.C. 2015) (citation omitted); Lane-Rauth v. Barnhart,

(D.D.C.

2006). Only a prejudicial error “that impacted the outcome of the proceeding” warrants reversal.

Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 24-5073,

, at *3 (D.C. Cir. July 22, 2025)

(per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Saunders v. Kijakazi,

(D.C. Cir. 2021)).

13 DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision was not based on substantial evidence because the

ALJ failed to resolve two inconsistencies in formulating his RFC. ECF Nos. 12 at 9–15; 17 1–6.

Although Plaintiff’s arguments are difficult to decipher, Plaintiff apparently claims that the ALJ’s

RFC contradicts Dr. Cott’s persuasive medical findings6 that: 1) Plaintiff required short and simple

instructions; and 2) Plaintiff required accommodations.

The Commissioner responds that the

ALJ’s RFC is consistent with Dr. Cott’s opinion. ECF No. 16 at 8–15. The Commissioner is

correct.

I. Functional Analysis

At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC, which bears on whether Plaintiff can

perform previous work (step four) or other jobs (step five). See

(a)(4)(iv),

404.1520(f), 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(f). The RFC determination requires a “function-by-

function” inquiry based on all the relevant evidence of a claimant’s ability to work. SSR 96–8p,

, at *3. This inquiry includes an assessment of a plaintiff’s exertional and

nonexertional capacities, including their mental abilities. See

at *5–6 (providing examples of

work-related mental functions, such as carrying out instructions and responding appropriately to

supervisors). In formulating the RFC and assessing the claimant’s capacities, the ALJ must

consider all of claimant’s severe and non-severe impairments. SSR 96–8p,

, at

*5. If the claimant has at least one severe impairment or combination of impairments, the ALJ

must consider how the impairments impact a claimant’s physical and mental capacities in the

workplace. See Cheryl S. v. Kijakazi, No. 18-cv-1379,

, at *10–11 (D.D.C.

6 Plaintiff also contends that, in formulating the RFC, the ALJ contradicted Dr. Heiser’s persuasive medical opinion because Dr. Heiser affirmed Dr. Cott’s findings. ECF No. 12 at 11. Plaintiff, however, relies exclusively on Dr. Cott’s specific findings and opinion as the basis for his argument. 14 May 4, 2022); report and recommendation adopted,

(D.D.C. May 20, 2022);

see also

(a)(1)–(2), 416.945(a)(1)–(2).

The function-by-function analysis requires the ALJ to provide a narrative discussion that

identifies the evidence that supports each of the ALJ’s conclusions. Butler,

(citation omitted); SSR 96–8p,

, at *7. Courts in this District have used various

approaches to evaluate this requirement. See Contreras v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

(D.D.C. 2017) (comparing cases); Charles v. Astrue,

, 29–30 (D.D.C.

2012) (same). Specifically, courts are split on whether an ALJ must evaluate and articulate their

conclusions on each of the plaintiff’s work-related functions in writing. Compare Lane-Rauth,

(requiring this analysis for a plaintiff’s exertional capacity), with Kim M. v.

Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-2072,

, at *7 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2021) (collecting cases and

finding such an analysis is unnecessary). Even if a court does not require a written function-by-

function articulation, the ALJ must still provide a “thorough narrative discussion of Plaintiff’s

limitations” and build a “logical bridge” between relevant evidence and the ALJ’s conclusions.

Contreras,

; see also Butler,

; Lane-Rauth,

. Relevant evidence includes medical records, source opinions, and individual’s subjective

complaints about their condition. See

(c)(1)–(3), 416.929(c)(1)–(3).

Although an ALJ need not discuss every piece of record evidence, they must provide a

sufficient basis for this Court to understand their reasoning when viewing the decision as a whole.

Colter v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-0632,

, at *11 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2022); Said S. v.

O’Malley, No. 22-cv-362,

, at *10 (D.D.C. May 14, 2024). Nevertheless, the

ALJ cannot “cherry-pick facts” to support their finding of non-disability while ignoring evidence

that reflects otherwise. Said S.,

, at *10 (citation omitted). An ALJ must at

15 least discuss the evidence that contradicts the Commissioner’s position. See Lane-Rauth,

(citing Godbey v. Apfel,

(7th Cir. 2000)). If the ALJ meets this

standard, the Court must sustain the ALJ’s findings even if the Court’s independent analysis of the

evidence may differ. Ali v. Colvin,

(D.D.C. 2017) (citation modified). That

said, courts will only consider the grounds upon which the ALJ relies and will not consider any

post hoc rationale the Commissioner offers on appeal. See, e.g., Ward v. Berryhill,

(D.D.C. 2017).

Here, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform medium work as defined

in

(c) and 416.967(c), except that Plaintiff could sit, stand, or walk for six

hours in an eight-hour workday; occasionally lift, carry, push, and pull fifty pounds and twenty-

five pounds frequently; frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps and stairs;

and occasionally climb ropes, ladders, or scaffolds. AR at 24–25. The ALJ limited Plaintiff to

simple, routine tasks and noted that Plaintiff could only adjust to changes in the workplace setting

or interact with supervisors, co-workers, and the public occasionally.

. As explained

below, substantial evidence supports the RFC assessment because the RFC and Dr. Cott’s medical

opinion do not contradict each other.

II. The RFC is Consistent with Dr. Cott’s Opinion Concerning Plaintiff’s Limitations with Instructions.

Plaintiff’s argument hinges on an alleged inconsistency between the RFC and Dr. Cott’s

opinion as to Plaintiff’s abilities with instructions. ECF No. 12 at 11–12. Specifically, Plaintiff

contends that the ALJ failed to explain why the ALJ limited Plaintiff to simple, routine tasks when

Dr. Cott opined that Plaintiff could only work with “short and simple instructions” due to

Plaintiff’s difficulty understanding and recalling “complex or detailed instructions.”

According to Plaintiff, the alleged unresolved conflict between the ALJ’s RFC determination and

16 Dr. Cott’s persuasive medical opinion means “the ALJ’s decision is void of the requisite

explanation as to how the evidence supports his conclusion about Plaintiff’s RFC.”

. In

response, the Commissioner argues that Plaintiff is making a semantic, rather than substantive,

distinction. ECF No. 16 at 13. The Commissioner contends that an RFC “need not parrot any

opinion word-for-word.”

By limiting Plaintiff to simple, routine tasks, the Commissioner

argues that the ALJ captured the essence of Dr. Cott’s opinion.

The Commissioner is correct.

In formulating the RFC, an ALJ must consider medical opinions in the record. Saunders,

(citation omitted). As noted above, an ALJ must build a logical bridge between the

evidence and the ALJ’s conclusions. Contreras,

. An ALJ need not

expressly incorporate a persuasive medical opinion’s restrictions into the RFC to satisfy this

requirement. Patricia T. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-1028,

, at *10 (D.D.C. Aug. 22,

2022) (citation omitted). Instead, an ALJ may implicitly account for the opinion by restricting a

claimant to a particular type of work.

(collecting cases). As the Commissioner correctly points

out, an ALJ need only “sufficiently capture the essence” of a persuasive opinion, not parrot its

findings verbatim. Mitchell v. Berryhill,

(D.D.C. 2017) (citation

modified); ECF No. 16 at 13. Even if he finds an opinion persuasive, the ALJ need not accept

every word so long as the ALJ provides a sufficient basis for the Court to understand the ALJ’s

implicit or explicit variation from the opinion. See Patricia T.,

, at *11 (citations

omitted); Tiana O.,

, at *6 n.10 (citations omitted).

There is no contradiction between Dr. Cott and the ALJ’s conclusions as to Plaintiff’s

abilities with instructions. Contrary to Plaintiff’s characterization, Dr. Cott did not restrict Plaintiff

to only work with short and simple instructions. Dr. Cott opined that Plaintiff was “able to recall

short and simple instructions but would have difficulty with recalling and understanding complex

17 or detailed information.” AR at 75–76, 86–87. Dr. Cott concluded that Plaintiff was “not

significantly limited” in his ability to carry out short and simple instructions and was only

“moderately limited” in his ability to carry out detailed instructions.

at 75–76, 86–87.

Moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying out detailed instructions do not

limit a plaintiff to only performing tasks with simple instructions. See, e.g., Blackmon v. Astrue,

(D.D.C. 2010) (concluding that the plaintiff had failed to show he was

limited to only simple instructions when the findings of a medical opinion only noted moderate

limitations with detailed instructions). Accordingly, there is no unexplained inconsistency

between the RFC and Dr. Cott’s findings.

Further, an RFC limiting a plaintiff to simple, routine tasks, paired with vocational expert

testimony identifying only unskilled work as suitable, is consistent with a plaintiff’s limitations to

understanding, remembering, and carrying out only short and simple instructions. See Devylle C.

v. Kijakazi, No. 22-cv-1061,

, at *13 (D.D.C. July 31, 2023) (collecting cases

and finding these restrictions account for a plaintiff’s moderate limitations); Kayra G. v. Kijakazi,

No. 20-cv-10897,

, at *10 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2023) (holding that limiting a

plaintiff to only simple, routine tasks appropriately accounted for the state agency expert’s

restrictions of short, simple instructions); see also

(a), 416.968(a)

(“[U]nskilled work is work which needs little or no judgment to do simple duties that can be

learned on the job in a short period of time.”). The ALJ restricted Plaintiff to simple, routine tasks

in the RFC, and Ms. Nealon’s testimony only concerned unskilled work. AR at 25, 31.

Accordingly, even accepting Plaintiff’s characterization of Dr. Cott’s opinion as restricting him

solely to jobs requiring short and simple instructions, the ALJ did not err in formulating the RFC.

18 Plaintiff also claims that the RFC and Dr. Cott’s opinion conflict because Dr. Cott’s

findings “resemble” the definition of reasoning level one work despite the ALJ concluding that

Plaintiff could perform jobs which require a reasoning level of two.

at 12–13. The Dictionary

of Occupational Titles Appendix C defines reasoning level one work as requiring a person to

“[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry out simple one- or two-step instructions,” whereas

reasoning level two work requires a person to “[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry out

detailed but uninvolved written or oral

instructions.” See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles App. C, pt. III

(4th ed. 1991), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/oalj/PUBLIC/DOT/REFERENCES/DOTAPPC

(last visited Sep. 19, 2025).

In making this argument, Plaintiff relies heavily on Ebony B. v. O’Malley,

(D.D.C. 2024). In Ebony B., this Court found that the ALJ erred when the ALJ failed to address

a conflict between his conclusion that a plaintiff could perform reasoning level two work and the

findings of a persuasive medical opinion that plaintiff had moderate difficulties in understanding,

remembering, and carrying out detailed instructions. 749 F. Supp. 3d at 118. The ALJ in that

case, however, explicitly noted the plaintiff’s ability to perform reasoning level two work and

formulated an RFC that included reasoning level two language, such as that the plaintiff could

carry “out uninvolved written or oral instructions.” Id. at 100, 119. Here, Plaintiff does not point

to anywhere in this record where the ALJ attributed a specific reasoning level to Plaintiff or

included reasoning level two language in the RFC. Thus, Ebony B. is inapposite. The ALJ need

not explain a finding the ALJ did not make.7

7 Plaintiff states he is not arguing that the ALJ erred in relying on the vocational expert’s testimony as to the work Plaintiff could perform in the national economy given his RFC. ECF No. 17 at 3; see Tiana O.,

, at *13 (rejecting argument that limiting a plaintiff to 19 Moreover, the “key error” in Ebony B. was that the ALJ failed to explain how he reconciled

his conclusion regarding the plaintiff’s reasoning level with the persuasive medical opinion’s

findings on the plaintiff’s moderate difficulties with instructions.

. Here, the ALJ

recognized Plaintiff’s moderate limitations in following instructions and cited Dr. Cott’s opinion.

AR at 22–24. The ALJ explained why the evidence did not support greater limitations on

Plaintiff’s ability to work, citing Plaintiff’s education, ability to pass a driving test, and Plaintiff’s

medical records.

. The ALJ also explicitly stated that he accounted for Plaintiff’s

concentration issues by limiting him to simple tasks and noted that Plaintiff’s treatment records

documented only mild attention and concentration impairments.

. Specifically, the

ALJ highlighted Dr. Heiser’s persuasive medical opinion that Plaintiff could “sustain attention and

pace to carry out simple instructions on a regular basis to complete a normal workday and

workweek.”

.

III. The ALJ’s RFC is Consistent with Dr. Cott’s Opinion Concerning Plaintiff’s Need for Accommodation.

Plaintiff next claims that the ALJ failed to address a contradiction between the RFC and

Dr. Cott’s opinion that Plaintiff would require accommodations to complete a normal work week

and perform at a consistent pace.8 ECF No. 12 at 13. In making this argument, Plaintiff relies

simple, routine, and repetitive tasks precludes a plaintiff from performing unskilled work requiring a reasoning level of two); Carpenter v. Colvin, No. 13-cv-637,

, at *8 n.8 (D.D.C. Feb. 24, 2016) (collecting cases and noting that a conflict does not exist between an RFC and a vocational expert’s testimony when the ALJ does not limit the expert to a particular reasoning level), report and recommendation adopted,

(D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2016). 8 Plaintiff also argues that Dr. Cott’s finding that the Plaintiff “requires accommodations” supports Dr. Guzman’s opinion that “he is extremely limited in his ability to perform at a consistent pace.” ECF No. 12 at 13. Defendant interprets this assertion to mean the Plaintiff argued that the ALJ erred in finding Dr. Guzman’s opinion inconsistent with the record. ECF No. 16 at 14. It does not appear that the Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred in his assessment of Dr. Guzman’s opinion. Nonetheless, by not having responded to the Commissioner’s arguments that Dr. Cott found “no more than moderate limitations” as compared to Dr. Guzman who found “numerous extreme and marked limitations,” Plaintiff waives them. See ECF No. 16 at 14; see also Queen v. 20 heavily on Caitlin O. v. Kijakazi, No. 17-cv-1939,

(D.D.C. July 25, 2023).

ECF Nos. 12 at 14; 17 at 3–4. In that case, the court held that an ALJ properly considered medical

opinions that stated plaintiff would require accommodations to work and reports that provided

examples of reasonable accommodations. Caitlin O.,

, at *11–12. Given Dr.

Cott’s opinion, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ had an obligation to consider what Plaintiff could do

without accommodations or “independently.” ECF No. 12 at 13–14.

The Commissioner argues that Plaintiff’s reliance on Caitlin O. is misplaced. ECF No. 16

at 15. The Commissioner contends that the ALJ did not err because, in crafting the RFC, he cited

Dr. Cott’s conclusions and considered them, along with the other evidence, to account for

Plaintiff’s limitations. ECF No. 16 at 14. The Commissioner is correct in both respects.

A. Plaintiff Fails to Show What Accommodations the ALJ Did Not Consider.

In Caitlin O., the court reviewed whether the ALJ must expressly consider a medical

opinion that a plaintiff is unable to perform certain types of work without reasonable

accommodations.

, at *11. There, the plaintiff claimed that the ALJ had failed

to consider: 1) medical opinions that stated that the plaintiff required a specific accommodation

for her physical impairment; and 2) a list of example accommodations in state agency medical

reports.

. The court in Caitlin O. concluded that “a medical opinion stating that a

claimant requires reasonable accommodations to work is probative evidence in a disability

proceeding.”

The court still found that the ALJ properly considered the plaintiff’s required

accommodation when the ALJ: 1) explicitly weighed the medical opinions’ findings that plaintiff

Schultz,

(D.D.C. 2015) (“[B]y failing to respond to the defendant’s opposing arguments in his reply, the plaintiff has abandoned these arguments.”), aff’d,

(D.C. Cir. 2016). 21 needed a specific accommodation against other evidence in the record; and 2) addressed the

medical reports containing the list of accommodation examples.

Unlike in Caitlin O. where the medical opinion ordered a specific accommodation, Dr. Cott

did not suggest that Plaintiff required any specific accommodation or even provide any examples

of reasonable accommodations in this case. See AR at 76; Cf. Caitlin O.,

, at

*12. Instead, Dr. Cott opined that Plaintiff was “able to compete a normal work week and perform

at a generally consistent pace with others, with only minimal need for accommodations on an

infrequent basis.” AR at 77. Plaintiff does not state how the ALJ failed to consider Dr. Cott’s

opinion or what accommodations or other limitations the ALJ should have included in the RFC.

Cf. Caitlin O.,

, at *12. Even at this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff does not

offer any specific accommodations or particularized modifications to the RFC that the ALJ should

have made. Nonetheless, Plaintiff has still not shown how the ALJ’s RFC conflicts with Dr. Cott’s

opinion. See Settles,

(noting that it is the plaintiff’s burden to show error).

B. Plaintiff Fails to Show that the ALJ Did Not Consider Plaintiff’s Abilities to Function Independently.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in formulating the RFC by not considering the

Plaintiff’s ability to function independently pursuant to 20 C.F.R. 404.1520a(c)(2) and

416.920a(c)(2). See ECF No. 12 at 13. Specifically, Plaintiff appears to suggest that because Dr.

Cott’s medical opinion stated Plaintiff had a “minimal need for accommodations on an infrequent

basis,” Plaintiff could not function independently, and the ALJ must find him disabled. AR at 77.

It is the plaintiff’s burden to show that the ALJ’s decision was not based on substantial

evidence or that the ALJ applied an incorrect legal standard. Settles,

. First,

Plaintiff cites no case law that instructs an ALJ to find an individual per se disabled if they require

an accommodation. Second, this Court already determined that Dr. Cott never suggested that

22 Plaintiff required any specific accommodation. See supra Analysis Section III.A; AR at 76. Dr.

Cott found that Plaintiff had at most moderate limitations in mental functioning. Id. at 77.

Third, the ALJ accounted for Plaintiff’s moderate mental limitations by including several

restrictions in his RFC so that Plaintiff could still fairly function on an independent basis in the

workplace. AR at 25, 27. Ultimately, the Plaintiff has not met his burden to show the ALJ did not

adequately consider Plaintiff’s abilities to function independently.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of Reversal (ECF No. 11) is

DENIED, and Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Affirmance (ECF No. 15) is GRANTED.

The Court will issue a separate Order.

SO ORDERED.

Date: September 19, 2025 ____________________________________ MOXILA A. UPADHYAYA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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