UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CARLOS OTERO, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 24-2331 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 5 : GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT : OF COLUMBIA, : : Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

On May 10, 2023, Carlos Otero (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Otero”) was arrested by an officer of

the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) based on what appeared to be an active bench

warrant issued for his failure to appear at a court hearing on April 5, 2023. Though the warrant

had been quashed by the issuing judge on May 2, Plaintiff claims that the District of Columbia

(“Defendant” or “District”) failed to update its records promptly, leading to his unlawful

detention. Plaintiff has sued the District under

, claiming the District’s

longstanding policies and practices caused Mr. Otero’s arrest, violating his Fourth and Fifth

Amendment rights. In addition, Plaintiff brings common law negligence and false arrest or

imprisonment claims against the District. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

Complaint for failure to allege a plausible claim under

and failure to plead a

viable claim for relief under either common law negligence or false arrest/imprisonment. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss. II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was arrested by an MPD officer on Wednesday, May 10, 2023. Compl. ¶ 10,

ECF No. 1. The arresting officer informed Mr. Otero that he would be held until Monday,

May 15, and then sent to the District of Columbia Superior Court due to what appeared to be an

active bench warrant issued against him for failure to appear at a court hearing in April.

.

Although the bench warrant had been quashed by the issuing judge on May 2, this update was

not reflected in the “District system” at the time of the arrest. Def. D.C.’s Mot. Dismiss Pl.’s

Compl. (“Mot. Dismiss”) at 3–4, ECF No. 5. Mr. Otero informed the arresting officer that the

bench warrant had been quashed. Compl. ¶ 30. In addition, Mr. Otero suggested the arresting

officer call his girlfriend for confirmation that the warrant had been quashed. Compl. ¶ 31. The

girlfriend then provided the officer information supporting Mr. Otero’s claim that the warrant

had been quashed. Compl. ¶ 32. Even so, the officer proceeded with the arrest and detained Mr.

Otero for “days.” Compl. ¶ 14.

Plaintiff subsequently filed a three-count complaint against the District alleging that

(1) the District’s inadequate policies and practices for tracking recalled warrants resulted in Mr.

Otero’s false arrest and violated Mr. Otero’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, providing the

basis for liability under

; (2) the arrest was caused by negligent conduct on

behalf of District employees, constituting common law negligence; and (3) the arrest and

detention of Mr. Otero by the MPD constituted common law false arrest and false imprisonment.

Compl. ¶¶ 33–34, 36, 43–44, 46–47.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing first that Mr. Otero’s

claim failed to establish a predicate constitutional violation and failed to demonstrate that a

custom or policy of the District was the moving force behind any constitutional violation. Mot.

2 Dismiss at 5. Second, Defendant asserts that Mr. Otero’s common law false arrest/imprisonment

claim is time barred because the complaint was filed over a year after his alleged false arrest or,

in the alternative, that the complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that Mr.

Otero’s arrest was unlawful or that the officer lacked probable cause to detain him. Mot.

Dismiss at 11–12. Finally, Defendant argues Mr. Otero’s negligence claim should be dismissed

under the public duty doctrine. Mot. Dismiss at 14. Plaintiff has filed an opposition, Pl.’s Opp’n

to Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Pl.’s Compl. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 7, and Defendant has filed a reply.

Def.’s Reply in Supp. of Def. D.C.’s Mot. Dismiss (“Def.’s Reply”), ECF No. 9. The District’s

motion to dismiss is thus ripe for review.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly,

(2007)). The plaintiff’s factual allegations must be “above the

speculative level,” Twombly,

, such that the facts, taken as true, are “suggestive

of illegal conduct.”

at 563 n.8. “A claim crosses from conceivable to plausible when it

contains factual allegations that, if proved, would ‘allow[] the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Banneker Ventures, LLC v.

Graham,

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Iqbal,

). While a

complaint need not provide “detailed factual allegations,” a plausible claim requires more than

bare “labels and conclusions.” Twombly,

. As such, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are insufficient to

3 withstand a motion to dismiss. Iqbal,

. When considering a motion to dismiss,

the court must presume that the complaint’s factual allegations are true and draw all reasonable

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See N. Am. Butterfly Ass’n v. Wolf,

, 1249 (D.C.

Cir. 2020); see also Joyner v. Morrison & Foerster LLP,

, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2025). In

addition, the court may consider only the facts alleged in or attached to the complaint and any

matters of which the court may take judicial notice. Hurd v. D.C., Gov’t,

(D.C. Cir. 2017).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Municipal Liability Under

provides a private cause of action against local governments and

municipalities, including the District, for the deprivation of any federally protected rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or by statute. See

;

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

, 700–01 (1978). To hold a municipality liable for

the actions of its employees under § 1983, the plaintiff must pass a two-step inquiry. See

Baker v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2003). First, the plaintiff’s

complaint must state a claim for a predicate constitutional violation.

Second, the plaintiff

must show that a custom or policy of the municipality was the “moving force” behind the

constitutional violation. Id.; Monell, 436 U.S. at 694–95. Under Monell v. Department of Social

Services, a municipality can be held liable under § 1983 only if the municipality’s policy or

custom causes the plaintiff’s injury; liability does not attach on a theory of respondeat superior.

See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691–94.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to meet the requirements for municipal

liability under

. Mot. Dismiss at 5. This is so, according to the District,

4 because Plaintiff neither plausibly alleges an underlying constitutional violation, nor provides the

requisite factual content required to demonstrate that a custom or policy of the municipality was

the “moving force” behind said constitutional violation.

. The Court agrees with both

points.

1. Failure to Allege a Predicate Constitutional Violation

First, the Court addresses Defendant’s argument that Mr. Otero has not articulated any

predicate constitutional violations. Mot. Dismiss at 5–7. Mr. Otero alleges that the District’s

“actions, and failure to act” were the moving force behind violations of his “Fourth and

substantive Fifth Amendment rights.” Compl. ¶ 34. Specifically, Mr. Otero claims that the

District and its employees “have had a longstanding custom and practice of arresting and

detaining people pursuant to bench warrants that have been quashed and should have been re-

called,” and that this practice resulted in Mr. Otero’s improper arrest and detention.

.

Mr. Otero’s claims are virtually identical to the § 1983 claim that the D.C. Circuit rejected in

Vasquez v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2024).

There, the plaintiff Jose Vasquez shared the same name and date of birth as another man

who was subject to an active fugitive warrant.

. An MPD officer stopped Mr. Vasquez

on October 23, 2016 for a traffic violation.

. The officer arrested Mr. Vasquez based

on the other man’s warrant, despite an instruction in the warrant entry stating “DO NOT

DETAIN,” which had been added after prior misidentifications of Mr. Vasquez.

at 285–86.

Mr. Vasquez was detained for eleven days before the error was rectified.

. Following a

traffic stop on March 3, 2017, Mr. Vasquez was once again arrested—this time by the Secret

Service—under the same warrant.

When the Secret Service placed him under MPD’s

custody, Mr. Vasquez “vehemently protested his detention and professed his innocence to the

5 MPD officers who detained him,” yet the officers ignored his warnings.

The D.C. Circuit

held that Mr. Vasquez had not suffered a violation of his constitutional rights:

Mr. Vasquez attempts to make the general point that if MPD had better policies and protocols in place, Mr. Vasquez would not have been misidentified and wrongly detained. Maybe so. But municipalities are not liable under Section 1983 for all harm-causing . . . policies, and Mr. Vasquez does not cite to a single case that explains how MPD’s alleged negligence is unconstitutional.

(internal citation omitted). The D.C. Circuit explained that the argument that the

District violated the Fourth Amendment based on the actions of the arresting MPD officers “is

foreclosed by Monell itself.”

That was so because under Monell, “a municipality cannot be

held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor.”

(quoting Monell,

).

The same principle applies here. Like Mr. Vasquez, Mr. Otero alleges that the District’s

warrant tracking system contained errors that resulted in Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations.

at 286–87, 289; Compl. ¶¶ 33–34. Both plaintiffs protested upon being arrested and

explained to the police why they believed the warrant was faulty, and following the lack of

police investigation into the status of the warrants, both were subsequently detained for multiple

days. Vasquez, 110 F.4th at 285–86; Compl. ¶¶ 11–14; 30–32. Like Mr. Vasquez, Mr. Otero

does not point to any case explaining how the District’s alleged negligence in maintaining its

warrant system violates the Fourth Amendment. See Vasquez, 110 F.4th at 289 (citing Collins v.

City of Harker Heights,

(1992)). The D.C. Circuit further held that Mr.

Vasquez’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment was also “unavailing because there is no

cognizable argument that demonstrates the Fifth Amendment’s relevance to the facts [his]

complaint alleges.” See id.; see also Graham v. Connor,

(1989) (holding that

where the Fourth Amendment “provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection”

against the government’s alleged conduct, the plaintiff’s claim must be analyzed under the

6 Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth Amendment’s “more generalized notion of ‘substantive due

process’”).

Just like in Vasquez, where the plaintiff challenged MPD’s protocols for handling the

warrant system, Plaintiff here challenges the delay in removing recalled warrants from the

“District system.” Vasquez, 110 F.4th at 289; Compl. ¶ 23. Mr. Otero fails to plead any fact that

would distinguish his Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims from those of Mr. Vasquez. While he

attempts to differentiate the instant case from Vasquez, arguing that the warrant there was valid

while the warrant in this matter is not, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 15, 17, this is a distinction without a

difference. Vasquez stands for the point that a municipality has not committed a constitutional

violation when an arresting officer relies on a warrant that appears valid—whether or not it

actually is—without first adjudicating a suspect’s protestations about the warrant’s invalidity.

110 F.4th at 289. Controlling D.C. Circuit precedent therefore bars Plaintiff’s constitutional

claims.

2. Failure to Allege a Municipal Policy or Custom

The Court now turns to the District’s argument that Mr. Otero has not alleged a municipal

policy or custom as the cause of his harm. Mot. Dismiss at 8–11. The D.C. Circuit has laid out

four ways where a policy set by a municipality can result in liability under § 1983:

[1] the explicit setting of a policy by the government that violates the Constitution; [2] the action of a policy maker within the government; [3] the adoption through a knowing failure to act by a policy maker of actions by his subordinates that are so consistent that they have become “custom”; or [4] the failure of the government to respond to a need (for example, training of employees) in such a manner as to show “deliberate indifference” to the risk that not addressing the need will result in constitutional violations.

Baker,

(citations omitted). Mr. Otero’s complaint seems to assert the first,

third, and fourth bases for liability under Baker—that the District’s “policies and practices and

their implementation” caused Mr. Otero’s arrest and subsequent detention, and that it “was

7 obvious that this type of situation would commonly occur yet the District had no procedure in

place.”1 Compl. ¶ 3. “Although the [C]ourt could try to surmise which theory of municipal

liability has the strongest support in the complaint, this is not our role.” Blue v. District of

Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2015). As a threshold matter, Plaintiff’s failure to identify

and plead the elements of the relevant type of municipal policy inherently results in the Court

being “unable to determine” whether Plaintiff has provided plausible support for his claim.

(“[I]n order for the district court to assess whether [the plaintiff] stated a facially plausible

complaint, [the plaintiff] needed to assert the elements of the type of municipal policy that

caused her injury.”). This omission alone provides an independently sufficient basis to dismiss

Plaintiff’s federal claim. Yet even if the Court assumes Mr. Otero is pursing the first, third, and

fourth bases for liability under Baker, his complaint fails to provide the requisite factual content

to meet the pleading standards laid out in Twombly and Iqbal for any of the three bases.

Plaintiff must plead “sufficient factual matter” to state a plausible claim. Iqbal,

(citing Twombly,

). Conclusory statements without factual support are not

enough to establish facial plausibility. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79 (holding that “a plaintiff armed

with nothing more than conclusions” will not reach discovery). Moreover, not just any factual

content will suffice: a complaint alleging facts “merely consistent with a defendant’s

liability . . . stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.”

1 Plaintiff clarifies in his opposition that he is indeed pursuing the first, third, and fourth of the “Baker theories” to establish his Monell liability claim. Pl.’s Opp’n at 17. Yet as Defendant points out in its reply, Mr. Otero’s opposition cannot make up for deficiencies in his complaint, which failed to expressly assert which Baker theories Mr. Otero sought to pursue. Def.’s Reply at 5–6. “It is axiomatic that a complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Hawkins v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.,

(D.D.C. 2018) (citation omitted). Nor can a plaintiff overcome a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss by adding new information in an opposition brief.

(citing Iqbal,

).

8

(cleaned up). This standard applies to § 1983 claims. See Blue,

(explaining that a plaintiff must plead the necessary elements “with adequate factual support” in

the context of § 1983 claims); see also Trimble v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2011) (“[M]erely speculating that an unidentified policy and uncorroborated practice or

custom exists without providing any factual heft to support the allegation is insufficient to state a

claim under § 1983.”). Conversely, a plaintiff sufficiently pleads a § 1983 claim against a

municipality when his complaint cites specific incidents that plausibly demonstrate a custom or

pattern of behavior on behalf of the municipality. See, e.g., Warren v. District of Columbia,

, 39–40 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding that statements such as “they stuck the same needles in

everybody’s arms to draw blood” (alterations omitted) were sufficient factual allegations to state

a claim of a custom or policy of prisoner mistreatment).

First, Mr. Otero’s complaint fails to assert sufficient facts demonstrating how the MPD’s

conduct during his arrest and detention was the result of a District of Columbia “policy.” Baker,

. It is well established that in a § 1983 claim, a municipality cannot be subject

to liability unless the harm was caused in the implementation of “official municipal policy.”

Lozman v. Riviera Beach,

, 95 (2018) (citation omitted). Mr. Otero asserts that

warrants issued by Superior Court are entered into “the District system” and checked by the

MPD. Compl. ¶¶ 17–18, 20–21. He further elaborates that “the District does have a system for

re-calling quashed warrants from its system,” but that this system “moves so slowly that quashed

warrants remain in the system for days or longer” after recall. Compl. ¶¶ 22–23. As Defendant

points out, Mr. Otero does not identify the name of the “system” allegedly used by the District

and MPD to track warrants. Def.’s Opp’n at 8. By labeling the system MPD uses to track

9 warrants as “the District’s” system, see Compl. ¶¶ 17, Plaintiff concludes that the warrant

tracking system utilized by the arresting officer was an official municipal policy of the District.

But we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Twombly,

(quoting Papasan v. Allain,

(1986)).

Plaintiff provides no factual allegations indicating that the warrant tracking system was

implemented or controlled by the District. In general, “[t]he mere assertion that the police

officer ‘was acting . . . pursuant to the policies of [the] defendant . . .’ is not specific enough to

withstand dismissal.” Miller v. Barry,

(D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam). To

establish that the District was the “moving force” behind the alleged injury, Plaintiff must

demonstrate that the District’s “deliberate conduct” deprived him of his federal rights. Bd. of

Cnty. Comm’rs. of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown,

(1997). Plaintiff fails to provide

facts suggesting that the warrant tracking system was a policy implemented by the District with

the “requisite degree of culpability,” knowledge, or intent that it would lead to unlawful

detentions.

Plaintiff further fails to demonstrate a sustained “custom” or practice of false arrests

stemming from faulty warrant tracking on behalf of the District. Baker,

. A

policy or custom “must be pervasive to support municipal liability.” Tabb v. District of

Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2009) (citing Carter v. District of Columbia,

, 123–24 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). Standing alone, Mr. Otero’s detainment does not support an

inference of pervasiveness. Beyond his own arrest, Mr. Otero does not provide any facts

suggesting that a “pattern of violations” has occurred. See Lovett v. United States, No. 1:23-cv-

02879,

, at *11 (D.D.C. Sep. 25, 2024). In fact, he goes no further than the

bald conclusory assertion that “the District has a custom of arresting and detaining people

10 pursuant to bench warrants that have been quashed and should have been re-called from the

system.” Compl. ¶ 26. “A single incident is only anecdotal,” and without “anything beyond

conclusory assertions, the [§ 1983] claims against the District must be dismissed.” See Lovett,

, at *11; see also City of Okla. City v. Tuttle,

, 823–24 (1985)

(“Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under

Monell.”).

Finally, Plaintiff fails to provide sufficient factual support for a failure to train theory.

See Baker,

. Mr. Otero alleges that “[o]fficers are not taught to check the

Superior Court docket to see whether warrants have been quashed,” and that “the District does

not have a system for officers to follow up when they are told that a warrant has been quashed

and recalled.” Compl. ¶¶ 24–25. The Supreme Court has noted that a failure to train theory is

only a viable basis for liability in “limited circumstances,” and a “municipality’s culpability for

deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick v.

Thompson,

(2011). A municipality’s failure to train its employees “must amount

to ‘deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come

into contact’” to be thought of as an actionable policy or custom under § 1983. Id. (quoting City

of Canton v. Harris,

(1989)). Deliberate indifference is a “stringent standard,”

“requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his

action.”

(quoting Bryan Cnty.,

). Essentially, the District’s “‘policy of

inaction’ in light of notice that its program will cause constitutional violations ‘is the functional

equivalent of a decision by the city itself to violate the Constitution.’”

at 61–62 (quoting

Canton,

(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). “A pattern of

similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate

11 deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.”

at 62 (quoting Bryan Cnty.,

).

As explained above, Plaintiff demonstrates no such pattern. His complaint presents no

evidence of any prior incidents involving District employees mishandling quashed warrants, let

alone evidence of a systemic issue. More importantly, Mr. Otero has pled no facts indicating

that decisionmakers at the District knew or should have known of deficiencies in training of

MPD officers regarding checking for recalled warrants, nor that any such deficiencies would

likely result in constitutional violations. Nor does Mr. Otero allege that District officials ignored

repeated warnings about the warrant tracking system or maintained a “policy of inaction”

regarding constitutional violations. Canton,

(O’Connor, J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part). Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a plausible

claim for relief. See Page v. Mancuso,

, 283–84 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding that

conclusory failure to train allegations without corresponding assertions of fact “clearly miss the

Iqbal and Twombly pleading-standard mark”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the

District must be dismissed.

B. Supplemental Jurisdiction

The Court has original jurisdiction over Mr. Otero’s federal § 1983 claim in Count I.

. In addition, federal district courts have supplemental jurisdiction over state

claims arising from the same case or controversy as federal claims over which they have original

jurisdiction.

(a). As Counts II and III are based on alleged violations of D.C.

law arising from the same operative facts as the federal claim, Compl. ¶¶ 39–45, 46–50, the

Court had supplemental jurisdiction over these claims at the outset of the suit. However, where a

district court “dismiss[es] all claims independently qualifying for the exercise of federal

12 jurisdiction, [the court] ordinarily dismiss[es] as well all related state claims.” Artis v. District of

Columbia,

, 74 (2018).

Here, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Counts II and III.2

(c)(3); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs,

(1966)

(“[P]endent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right.”). Mr. Otero’s claims

present “the usual case” where pretrial dismissal “point[s] toward declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Shekoyan v. Sibley Int’l,

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,

, 350 n.7 (1988)). As

such, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Mr. Otero’s state-law claims so that a D.C. court

may consider them in the first instance. Because federal law tolls the statute of limitations

during the pendency of the federal case and for at least 30 days thereafter, “no unfairness

attaches to [this] decision.” Kyle v. Bedlion,

(D.D.C. 2016);

(d).

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 5) is granted. An

order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.

Dated: September 22, 2025 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

2 Because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, the Court does not reach Defendant’s arguments that these claims fail on the merits.

13