UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

S.J-D., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. No. 24-cv-00707 (DLF)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

R.J., S.D., and their child, S.J-D., bring this action against the District of Columbia under

the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),

et seq., challenging the

District of Columbia Public Schools’ (DCPS) failure to provide S.J-D. a free appropriate public

education (FAPE). See Compl., Dkt. 3-2. Before the Court is the plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary

Judgment, Dkt. 9, and the District’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 11. For the

following reasons, the Court will deny the plaintiffs’ motion and grant the District’s motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Framework

Under the IDEA, “every child with a disability in this country is entitled to a ‘free

appropriate public education,’ or FAPE.” Leggett v. District of Columbia,

(D.C.

Cir. 2015) (quoting

(d)(1)(A)). For students with disabilities, public school

officials must “develop a comprehensive strategy, known as an ‘individualized education

program,’ or IEP, tailored to the student’s unique needs.”

at 63 (quoting

(d)(1)(A)). “To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s

circumstances.” Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist.,

, 399 (2017).

Among other requirements, an IEP must include “a statement of the special education and

related services and supplementary aids and services . . . to be provided to the child” along with

“an explanation of the extent, if any, to which the child will not participate with nondisabled

children in the regular class.”

(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV)–(V). Special education services

“in general education” are provided in the regular classroom and among non-disabled peers,

whereas special education services “outside general education” are provided apart from the general

student population in a specialized classroom. See Z.B. v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2018).

Under the IDEA, “[t]o the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities . . . are

educated with children who are not disabled.”

(a)(5)(A). “[S]pecial classes,

separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational

environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that

education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved

satisfactorily.”

In other words, students must “be educated in the least restrictive environment

possible,” Leggett,

, such that “they receive education in the regular classroom

whenever possible,” Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 400 (citation modified). Under DCPS policy, a

student’s IEP will provide for “full-time” specialized instruction only when she requires “20 or

more hours of specialized instruction per week outside the general education classroom.” D.C.

Pub. Sch. Off. of Specialized Instruction, Programs & Resources Guide for Staff 4 (2014),

https://dcps.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/dcps/publication/attachments/GAGA-2015-R0046-

AttachmentJ9OSI14-15ProgramsandResourcesGuideforStaff.pdf.

2 The IDEA also requires local education agencies to “establish and maintain procedures in

accordance with [the IDEA] to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are

guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a [FAPE].”

(a).

For example, the IDEA provides parents an opportunity “to participate in meetings with respect to

the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the child, and the provision of a

[FAPE] to such child.”

§ 1415(b)(1). As relevant here, schools must give “timely access” to

parents or their designee “for observing a child’s current or proposed special educational program”

upon request.

(5)(A); see

(9) (“The term [FAPE] means

special education and related services that . . . meet the standards of the State educational

agency.”). School districts must also review and revise a student’s IEP “not less frequently than

annually.”

(d)(4)(A)(i)–(ii).

Parents with either substantive or procedural complaints about a school’s “‘identification,

evaluation, or educational placement’ of their child or to its ‘provision of a [FAPE]’ may request

a due-process hearing.” Davis v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2017)

(quoting

(b)(6)). At this hearing, parents are entitled to have counsel accompany

and advise them, to present evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, and to receive a written decision

from the hearing officer.

(h). Parents may then bring a civil action in state or

federal court for judicial review of the hearing officer’s decision.

§ 1415(i)(2)(A).

B. Factual Background

S.J-D. is a thirteen-year-old student. See Compl. ¶ 4. She attended Francis Stevens

Elementary School (Francis Stevens), a D.C. public school, from 2015 to 2021—from pre-

kindergarten through the fourth grade. See id. ¶ 10. In September 2018, when S.J-D. was in the

second grade, Francis Stevens developed a plan under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to

3 address her ADHD. Administrative Record (AR) 42, Dkt. 7. In February 2020, when S.J-D. was

in the third grade, DCPS found her eligible for special education and related services as a student

with an Other Health Impairment for ADHD, and it developed an initial IEP for S.J-D. AR 91–

92, 102. One month later, in March 2020, Francis Stevens transitioned to virtual learning because

of the COVID-19 pandemic. See AR 116, 122.

S.J-D.’s initial IEP included goals in math, reading, and written expression. AR 104–08.

To achieve those goals, DCPS prescribed specialized instruction of (1) two hours per week in

reading and one hour per week in math, in general education, and (2) one hour per week in written

expression and two hours per week in math, outside general education in a “small setting.” AR

109–10. By the end of the 2019–20 school year, S.J-D.’s progress reports reflected that, out of

five math goals, she mastered one, progressed on two, and was “not introduced” or “just

introduced” to two due to the pandemic. AR 118–20. Out of her four reading and writing goals,

she progressed on two and was not introduced to two. AR 120–22.

S.J-D. advanced to the fourth grade and continued to attend Francis Stevens during the

2020–21 school year. Compl. ¶ 14. The school continued to instruct its students in a virtual

learning environment that year due to the pandemic, and a portion of S.J-D.’s IEP suggested that

she was “working predominantly in groups one on one with a teacher or with one other student.”

AR 137. Her final IEP progress report reflected that she progressed on all reading and writing

goals and that, out of four math goals, she progressed on two and made no progress on two that

had been introduced in the prior quarter. AR 150–54.

In February 2021, DCPS convened an IEP team meeting. AR 133. The IEP team

maintained S.J-D.’s disability classification for ADHD, updated her IEP’s goals, and maintained

the same number of specialized instruction hours. AR 133, 135–40.

4 At the end of S.J-D.’s fourth-grade year, her parents removed her from Francis Stevens and

placed her in the Lab School of Washington, a private special-education school. Compl. ¶ 15; AR

29. The record contains “no correspondence from [the parents] explaining their decision,” but the

parents later expressed their concern about staffing shortages at Francis Stevens. AR 29. S.J-D.

enrolled in the fifth grade at the Lab School for the 2021–22 school year. AR 192.

In January 2022, S.J-D.’s parents consulted a private psychologist, Dr. Susan Hammond,

who confirmed S.J-D.’s ADHD diagnosis. AR 155, 157. Under the Diagnostic and Statistical

Manual of Mental-Disorders-Fifth Edition (DSM-V) criteria, Dr. Hammond also diagnosed S.J-D.

with a language disorder, a generalized anxiety disorder, and specific learning disorders with

impairment in reading and math. AR 157–58. In her report, Dr. Hammond “fully support[ed]

[S.J-D.’s] parents’ decision to place her at the Lab School,” and asserted that S.J-D. required “small

groupings in all academic subjects, as well as individualized instruction in reading and math,” and

“speech/language therapy.” AR 167. That report was shared with the IEP team on May 10, 2022.

AR 1073. Two months later, S.J-D.’s parents informed DCPS that S.J-D. would continue to attend

the Lab School for the 2022–23 school year and requested funding. AR 206. DCPS denied their

request to fund S.J-D.’s private-school placement. AR 255.

In August 2022, DCPS convened an IEP meeting and provided a draft IEP. AR 208, 211.

In the August 2022 IEP, DCPS updated S.J-D.’s goals and provided specialized instruction of (1)

two hours per week in reading, one hour per week in math, and one hour per week in written

expression, all in general education, and (2) two hours per week in math outside general education.

AR 213–25. The IEP also added other classroom aids and services like time for breaks, repetition

of directions, and frequent check-ins. AR 224–25.

5 In addition, DCPS independently reviewed Dr. Hammond’s evaluation and administered

its own educational assessments of S.J-D. AR 228–45. DCPS determined that S.J-D. did not meet

the criteria for a specific learning disability classification, as advocated by Dr. Hammond, and

maintained her Other Health Impairment classification for ADHD. AR 241–42. DCPS also

concluded that the Lab School records did not show that S.J-D. had a disabling oral communication

disorder that would make her eligible for speech-language pathology services. AR 249. The

parents were unsatisfied with the proposed August 2022 IEP because, in their view, it provided

too few specialized instruction hours outside general education. See AR 252.

In September 2022, DCPS further assessed S.J-D. under a comprehensive speech and

language evaluation. AR 268–95. The evaluator analyzed S.J-D.’s scores on a variety of tests,

interviewed S.J-D.’s Lab School teachers, observed her in a classroom setting, and concluded that

S.J-D.’s language profile was “not consistent with a student with a disabling oral communication

disorder that would prevent her from accessing or gaining benefit from the general education

curriculum.” AR 290, 1262.

In October 2022, DCPS convened an IEP meeting to discuss those evaluations. AR 304.

In attendance were S.J-D.’s father, his attorney, and Amy Mounce, an educational consultant hired

by the parents to assist with developing S.J-D.’s IEP. AR 304, 838. DCPS explained its decision

not to place S.J-D. under any additional disability classifications. AR 309–10. S.J-D.’s parents

objected to DCPS’s refusal to add a specific learning disability classification, which would entitle

S.J-D. to Speech and Language Services. AR 306. After discussing S.J-D.’s social and emotional

struggles, DCPS proposed amending the August 2022 IEP to add behavioral support services

(BSS). AR 313. DCPS later added BSS goals to the August 2022 IEP and provided three hours

per month of BSS outside general education. AR 344–51.

6 In May 2023, DCPS held its next annual IEP review with the plaintiffs. AR 446. The May

2023 IEP maintained S.J-D.’s disability classification as Other Health Impairment, updated the

IEP goals, and provided specialized instruction of (1) five hours per week in written expression

and five hours per week in reading, all in general education, and (2) five hours per week in math

outside general education. AR 454–77. The IEP also included 90 minutes per month of

consultation BSS, which provides support to S.J-D.’s teachers, AR 1338, and three hours per

month of BSS outside general education, which provides direct support to S.J-D., AR 1342. AR

476–77. Finally, the IEP added several new classroom aids and services, including “check-in[s]

with trusted adult/social worker when needed,” “trusted teacher check-in,” and “small groups.”

AR 476. DCPS proposed the plaintiffs’ local school, Francis Stevens, as the implementing school.

AR 452. Unsatisfied with the proposed IEP, S.J-D.’s parents communicated that they wanted their

daughter to remain at the Lab School. AR 452.

Three days later, on May 19, 2023, S.J-D.’s mother asked to observe the proposed program

at Francis Stevens with the family’s educational consultant, Amy Mounce. AR 482. DCPS offered

an observation nearly seven months later. AR 1093–1094.

C. Procedural History

On July 14, 2023, S.J-D.’s parents filed a due process complaint against DCPS in the proper

administrative tribunal. AR 573. They alleged that S.J-D. had been denied a FAPE due to DCPS’s

failure to (1) propose an appropriate program or placement for the 2022–23 and 2023–24 school

years and (2) timely respond to S.J-D.’s mother’s request for an observation of Francis Stevens.

AR 40. The plaintiffs sought (1) reimbursement for S.J-D.’s tuition at the Lab School for the

2022–23 school year and (2) placement at Lab School for the 2023–24 school year. AR 34.

7 A four-day due process hearing was held in December 2023 before a hearing officer. AR 4.

The plaintiffs presented five witnesses: educational consultant Amy Mounce, AR 836–916;

speech-language pathology expert Gretchen Kunz, AR 921–44; the Lab School director of

jurisdictional services Audrey Dolginoff, AR 946–1011; psychologist Susan Hammond, AR

1013–59; and S.J-D.’s father, AR 1062–1132. DCPS presented six witnesses: psychology expert

Shirley Hodges, AR 1146–212; speech-language pathology expert Delisa Green, AR 1214–83;

school social worker Regina Nadir, AR 1315–59; special education expert Nicole Manuel, AR

1362–437; assistant principal Olamide Gbenro, AR 1439–53; and special education programming

and placement expert Sean Bradley, AR 1286–309. The hearing officer issued a decision in favor

of DCPS on January 16, 2024. AR 69. He found that DCPS had not denied S.J-D. a FAPE in

either year and therefore rejected the parents’ claims for reimbursement and placement at the Lab

School. AR 69.

Following these proceedings, plaintiffs filed this action against the District on March 13,

2024, seeking review of the hearing officer’s decision. See Dkt. 3. The parties filed cross-motions

for summary judgment, which are now ripe for resolution. See Dkts. 9, 11.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[t]he court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “material” fact is one

that could affect the outcome of the lawsuit. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc.,

(1986); Holcomb v. Powell,

(D.C. Cir. 2006). A dispute is “genuine” if a

reasonable jury could determine that the evidence warrants a verdict for the nonmoving party. See

Liberty Lobby,

; Holcomb,

. “If there are no genuine issues of

8 material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the nonmoving party

‘fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” Holcomb,

(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

(1986)).

In an IDEA suit, “judicial review of an administrative agency’s decision by way of

summary judgment motion . . . is not a true summary judgment procedure.” Lopez-Young v.

District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2016) (citation modified). “Instead, the

district court essentially conducts a bench trial based on a stipulated record.” L.R.L. ex rel. Lomax

v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2012) (citation modified); see also Smith

v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2012) (explaining that court review in

the IDEA context is like “review of an administrative decision”). When “no additional evidence

is introduced in a civil suit seeking review” of a hearing officer’s determination, “a motion for

summary judgment operates as a motion for judgment based on the evidence comprising the

record.” Brown v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2008). “The party

challenging the administrative determination takes on the burden of persuading the court that the

hearing officer was wrong.” Middleton v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C.

2018) (citation modified) (quoting Kerkam v. McKenzie,

(D.C. Cir. 1988)). The

court bases “its decision on the preponderance of the evidence.”

(i)(2)(C)(iii).

The court must give “due weight” to the hearing officer’s determination and “may not

substitute its own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities.” Turner

v. District of Columbia,

, 35–36 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation modified). But

“[j]udicial review under [the] IDEA is more rigorous than in typical agency cases.” N.G. v. District

of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2008) (citing Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia,

9

(D.C. Cir. 2005)). “[A] hearing decision without reasoned and specific findings

deserves little deference,” Reid,

(citation modified), and in such a case, a “district

court may determine that the appropriate relief is a remand to the hearing officer for further

proceedings,”

(citation modified).

III. ANALYSIS

The plaintiffs contend that S.J-D. was denied a FAPE and ask the Court to reverse the

hearing officer’s decision and order reimbursement for the 2022–23 and 2023–24 school years at

the Lab School. S.J-D.’s parents argue that the hearing officer erred by (1) disregarding key

evidence and relying on flawed evidence when assessing the adequacy of the August 2022 and

May 2023 IEPs; (2) improperly assessing the credibility of witnesses; (3) finding that DCPS’s

failure to offer an observation did not constitute a denial of FAPE; and (4) ignoring DCPS’s delay

in developing S.J-D.’s August 2022 IEP. The Court will address each argument in turn.

A. Adequacy of the IEPs

Under the IDEA, an IEP must be “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress

appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 399. “Accordingly, for

a child fully integrated in the regular classroom, an IEP typically should . . . be ‘reasonably

calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.’” Id. at

401 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley,

, 203–04

(1982)); see Uhlenkamp v. District of Columbia,

, 240 (D.D.C. 2023). An IEP

is reviewed as of the time that the IEP “was created rather than with the benefit of hindsight.” Z.B.,

(citation modified).

The hearing officer found that the August 2022 and May 2023 IEPs were reasonably

calculated to enable S.J-D. to make progress and advance from grade to grade. He based this

10 conclusion on S.J-D.’s current performance levels, the IEPs’ level of specialized education hours,

and the IDEA’s least restrictive environment requirement. AR 27–32. To prevail on review, the

plaintiffs must show by a preponderance of the evidence that “the hearing officer was wrong in

concluding that [S.J-D.’s] IEPs were appropriate.” Edward M.R. v. District of Columbia,

, 294 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (citation modified). The plaintiffs fail to meet that burden.

First, the record does not support the plaintiffs’ contention that the hearing officer

arbitrarily rejected Dr. Hammond’s testimony that S.J-D.’s learning profile required full-time

specialized instruction that would entirely remove her from a general education environment.

Contra Pls.’ Mot. at 13–15, Dkt. 9. As the hearing officer explained, he found Dr. Hammond’s

recommendations “unpersuasive for several reasons.” AR 30. In particular, Dr. Hammond failed

to evaluate S.J-D. under the proper IDEA criteria for disability classifications, relying instead on

the DSM-V criteria, AR 24, 30, 1046; she “did not talk to any of [S.J-D.’s] teachers” at the Lab

School or at DCPS, AR 24, 1050–51; she “did not review” records from S.J-D.’s time in a general

education environment and was unfamiliar with any quantitative data about the student’s

performance in that environment, AR 24, 30, 1042; and she did not know what S.J-D.’s class sizes

would be at Francis Stevens, AR 30, 1045.

Further, Dr. Hammond’s recommendations contradicted the evaluations conducted by

DCPS witnesses Hodges and Green, whom the hearing officer found to be “more balanced and

credible.” AR 30. Hodges explained that Dr. Hammond’s evaluation overemphasized a single

subtest result to reach her diagnosis. AR 1167, 30. Green, for her part, applied the IDEA criteria

and concluded that S.J-D. lacked a disabling communication disability that would “prevent her

from accessing or gaining benefit from the general educational curriculum.” AR 292, 19; see AR

1261–63 (“[G]iven her linguistic profile, I don’t see anything that would preclude her from being

11 able to benefit from [a general education environment] . . . . There was nothing that indicated that

[S.J-D.] had a disabling oral communication disorder that would require speech and language

therapy.”). Faced with such conflicting testimony, the Court gives “‘due weight’ to the hearing

officer’s credibility determinations.” J.T. v. District of Columbia (J.T. I), No. 20-cv-7105,

, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 11, 2022) (quoting Rowley,

); see J.T. v. District

of Columbia (J.T. II),

, 207 (D.D.C. 2020) (“[T]he hearing officer is best

positioned to make credibility judgments as to testifying witnesses and resolve factual disputes

that amount to inconsistent testimony.”).

Second, the hearing officer did not ignore Mounce’s determination that “a general

education setting was not appropriate for S.J-D.” Pls.’ Mot. at 16. Instead, he found that Mounce’s

conclusion, which was based on limited information, was “pure conjecture” and “speculative” as

to how S.J-D. would perform in a general education environment. AR 32. Mounce’s testimony

was based on “current year data from the Lab School evaluations, information provided by the

family and [the] Lab School, [her own] observations, and [a] review of all the documents.” AR

870. She pointed to S.J-D.’s “academic levels, but also her anxiety, her academic levels, coupled

with her memory weakness and language weakness, functioning in a larger class.” AR 872. And

Mounce recounted, “[E]ven in the classes I saw [at the Lab School] where it was four, seven

students, excuse me,” S.J-D. “still required [an] adult . . . checking in” and needed “the reassurance

and the prompting and having her rehearse what is the next step.”

According to Mounce, “that

just can’t be programmed for in a larger setting.”

1

1 In addition, the plaintiffs note that they alerted DCPS in May 2023 to their observation that S.J-D. “is really struggling, even in a class size of 4 with really good teachers” at the Lab School. AR 446; Pls.’ Opp’n & Reply at 7, Dkt. 14. Because S.J-D. struggled even in a small-group setting, the plaintiffs argue that DCPS was wrong to ignore their request for full-time specialized instruction and to keep her primarily in a general education environment. But the plaintiffs fail to

12 But the mere fact that S.J-D. required “an adult . . . checking in” with her in a special

education environment does not mean that such check-ins would be ineffective in a general

education environment. See H.R. v. District of Columbia, No. 21-cv-1856,

, at

*7 (D.D.C. July 30, 2024) (finding that testimony “based on the unsupported assumption that

because [a student] had progressed in smaller class sizes, he could not progress in larger ones” was

“based on conjecture” and insufficient). Mounce provided no basis to conclude that DCPS could

not effectively provide the kind of supports that allowed S.J-D. to succeed at the Lab School. In

fact, S.J-D.’s IEPs specifically provided for direct adult supervision through frequent check-ins,

checks for understanding, and repetitions of directions by her teachers. AR 224, 476. Given

credible testimony that “S.J-D. would benefit from interaction with non-disabled peers,” AR 25,

1262, the hearing officer properly determined that Mounce’s testimony failed to establish that

S.J-D. required full-time specialized instruction in light of IDEA’s least restrictive environment

requirement.

Third, even assuming that it was improper for the hearing officer to rely on S.J-D’s progress

reports from the COVID-19 years, as the plaintiffs argue, 2 Pls.’ Opp’n & Reply at 4, the record,

specify that this observation was from S.J-D.’s math class. AR 446, 450. And S.J-D.’s IEPs specifically provided for specialized instruction outside general education in math. AR 476. Indeed, DCPS targeted math as S.J-D.’s “greatest weakness” and increased the hours of specialized instruction where she would have “no more than 12 students in the classroom” with “one certified teacher and one teacher’s aide.” AR 1400. Ultimately, the May 2023 IEP proposed five hours of math outside general education, an increase from two hours in the August 2022 IEP. Considered together, the Court finds that these adjustments were reasonably calculated to allow S.J-D. to progress in the least restrictive environment. 2 The Court agrees with the plaintiffs that the record is, at a minimum, unclear as to the type of learning environment S.J-D. experienced at Francis Stevens from 2020 to 2021, when S.J-D was receiving virtual instruction, rather than in-person instruction. On the one hand, a section of S.J-D.’s February 2021 IEP states that she “had been working predominantly in groups one on one with a teacher or with one other student.” AR 137. On the other hand, her progress reports under the same IEP suggest that S.J-D.’s virtual education was representative of a general education

13 taken as a whole, substantiates the hearing officer’s conclusion that the 2022 and 2023 IEPs were

supported by a “requisite analysis of [S.J-D.’s] circumstances” and “reasonably calculated to

afford her an opportunity to make progress in light of her particular circumstances,” Z.B.,

.

Starting with the August 2022 IEP, both Dr. Hammond’s and DCPS’s assessments

reflected that in 2022, “S.J-D.’s [r]eading scores ranged from [a]verage to high [a]verage, her

[w]riting scores were all in the [a]verage range,” and her math scores “were in the [a]verage range

for all areas except Math Problem Solving.” AR 65. S.J-D.’s academic performance therefore

showed that she was “capable of average range achievement scores and above average grades,”

and her “academic deficits” did “not support a full-time special education placement.” A.D. ex

rel. E.D. v. District of Columbia, 20-cv-2765,

, at *9 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2022).

Thus, where “the data pointed to average functioning,” DCPS appropriately sought to “keep

[S.J-D] in the general education setting and offer her supports in that placement.” AR 1387. To

support S.J-D. in those areas, DCPS prescribed specialized instruction in general education of one

hour per week in written expression and two hours per week in reading. AR 224. And in math,

where S.J-D. was underperforming on at least one metric, DCPS appropriately prescribed

specialized instruction of two hours per week outside general education in addition to one hour per

week in general education. AR 1387.

environment. For example, S.J-D. mastered a goal “introduced in the general education curriculum,” AR 119, worked on goals “in the context of the general education curriculum,” AR 120, 126, and solved problems “embedded in the current general education curriculum that the class [was] working on,” AR 123. Because the record does not make clear that S.J-D. was in a general education environment at the time, the Court will assume for purposes of its ruling that the hearing officer’s reliance on progress reports from the COVID-19 years was erroneous.

14 In S.J-D.’s May 2023 assessments, her math scores dropped to the eighth percentile, and

her reading scores were just below average at the twentieth percentile. AR 456, 460. Accordingly,

DCPS placed the entirety of S.J-D.’s specialized instruction in math outside general education and

increased those services to five hours per week. AR 476. And for both reading and writing, DCPS

likewise increased her specialized instruction in general education to five hours per week. AR

476. DCPS did so “out of an overabundance of caution . . . to make sure that [they] were giving

[S.J-D.] as much support as possible as she made that transition [to seventh grade].” AR 1400. In

other words, where S.J-D. struggled, DCPS responded with additional specialized instruction.

In sum, both of the contested IEPs appropriately balanced S.J-D.’s underachievement in

math against the IDEA’s requirement that S.J-D. remain in the least restrictive environment

possible. The August 2022 IEP noted that S.J-D. “demonstrated difficulties in math that require

small group math support.” AR 225. Likewise, the May 2023 IEP stated that S.J-D. “will benefit

from specialized instruction in math outside the general education setting to meet her academic

needs.” AR 477. Besides those carve-outs for math, DCPS witnesses explained that the data

supported their finding that S.J-D. would progress in a general education environment, AR 1261–

1262, 1334, 1343, 1405–06, and that the IEPs otherwise addressed S.J-D.’s challenges in executive

functioning and attention through “supports and accommodations [under which she] is able to

make progress” instead of “over[-]pathologizing [and] saying that a child has significant and

severe deficits,” AR 1182, 25.

Indeed, each reason articulated by the plaintiffs’ witnesses in favor of full-time specialized

instruction was accounted for by the accommodations that DCPS provided in the IEPs. See H.R.,

, at *7 (“[M]uch of the witnesses’ rationales for full-time special education were

already addressed in the IEPs.” (citation modified)). Dr. Hammond was “concerned about [S.J-D.]

15 falling between the cracks, that she wouldn’t understand what was happening . . . [a]nd [that] with

too many kids in the classroom, the teachers might not notice that she was completely at sea.” AR

1035. Mounce testified that “[S.J-D.] still required that adult . . . checking in, [and] the

reassurance and the prompting and having her rehearse what is the next step . . . that just can’t be

programmed for in a larger setting.” AR 872. Kunz likewise opined that S.J-D. needed to be in a

small classroom, because “[S.J-D.] needed teacher check-ins, . . . less distractions, less people

around, less noise,” and “supports of repetition [and] clarification.” AR 938. Dolginoff reasoned

that a general education environment would be inappropriate because S.J-D. would not “ask[] for

help independently, or even clarification.” AR 981–82. And S.J-D.’s father testified that a “large

classroom . . . just doesn’t work with her anxiety and executive functioning, especially her task

initiation.” AR 1114.

In response to these concerns, DCPS programmed for “frequent check[-]ins & checks for

understanding,” “repetition of directions,” and “access to noise-cancelling headphones [and]

privacy boards” in the general education environment. AR 224, 476. The May 2023 IEP further

provided for “small groups,” “trusted teacher check-in[s],” and behavioral support services outside

general education. AR 476. On this record, the plaintiffs “have not shown that the [IEPs] lacked

appropriate types or hours of instruction.” Z.B.,

. Rather, the Court finds that the

IEPs were tailored to provide S.J-D. with services directly responding to her particular needs.

At bottom, the plaintiffs argue that the IEPs “did not provide [S.J-D.] enough small-group

or individual education, especially by contrast to the full-time special education offered at the Lab

School.”

; see Pls.’ Mot. at 13. But “[w]ithout more, that argument runs up against the

IDEA’s imperative that, to the maximum extent appropriate, public schools provide students with

disabilities an education in the least restrictive environment possible.” Z.B.,

.

16 (citation modified). It is undisputed that S.J-D. advanced from grade to grade in the pre-pandemic

general education environment. See Def.’s Opp’n & Mot. at 24, Dkt. 11; see generally Pls.’ Opp’n

& Reply. And the overall record indicates that S.J-D. can satisfactorily progress in the regular

classroom with “the use of supplementary aids and services.” See

(a)(5)(A). In

accordance with the IDEA, DCPS appropriately calibrated S.J-D.’s IEPs to provide (1) support

services that would allow her to “receive education in the regular classroom whenever possible”

and (2) specialized instruction outside general education when it was justifiably required. Endrew

F., 580 U.S. at 400 (citation modified). The plaintiffs therefore fail to show that the hearing officer

erred in concluding that the IEPs were adequate.

B. Hearing Officer’s Credibility Determinations

Next, the plaintiffs make several arguments that the hearing officer made erroneous

credibility determinations, but none of them prevails.

Courts must give “due weight to the administrative proceedings and afford some deference

to the expertise of the hearing officer and school officials responsible for the child’s education.”

Long v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2011) (citation modified). The Court

need not “defer to a [hearing officer’s] decision that lacks reasoned and specific findings,” McNeil

v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2016), and it expects school authorities

to “offer a cogent and responsive explanation . . . that shows the IEP is reasonably calculated,”

Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 404. “[T]he hearing officer,” however, “is best positioned to make

credibility judgments as to testifying witnesses and resolve factual disputes that amount to

inconsistent testimony.” J.T. II, 496 F. Supp. 3d at 207. Therefore, “[a] hearing officer’s findings

based on credibility determinations of live witness testimony are given particular deference where

there is no supplementation of the record.” McAllister v. District of Columbia,

,

17 76 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation modified). And when a “dispute boils down to conflicting testimony,”

the court “must give ‘due weight’ to the hearing officer’s credibility determinations.” J.T. I,

, at 2* (quoting Rowley,

).

First, the plaintiffs complain that the hearing officer credited Hodges and Green over Dr.

Hammond. With respect to Hodges, they contend that her report “had no information about

S.J-D.’s performance at [Francis Stevens] or in the general education setting” and that Hodges

failed to “complete [an] assessment of S.J-D . . . administered by another school psychologist.”

Pls.’ Mot. at 29. The plaintiffs further argue that Hodges’s testimony was not “cogent and

responsive.” Id. at 26.

But this argument “ignores the subject matter on which the witness[] [was] testifying.”

B.B. v. District of Columbia, 20-cv-2467,

, at *12 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2022).

Hodges was credited as an expert in school psychology. AR 1146. She testified about her review

of S.J-D.’s records, AR 1158–59; her participation in the Analysis of Existing Data meeting, AR

1151; her attendance at the October 2022 IEP meeting, AR 1178; and her evaluation of S.J-D.’s

cognitive performance under the IDEA criteria, AR 1169–70. Hodges also analyzed S.J-D.’s

scores in Dr. Hammond’s evaluation and in DCPS’s own assessment. Based on that data, Hodges

concluded that S.J-D.’s cognitive performance was more consistent with an Other Health

Impairment from ADHD and that it did not present evidence of a disabling condition consistent

with the additional specific learning classification advocated by Dr. Hammond. AR 309–10.

The Court defers to the hearing officer’s resolution of this conflict between Dr.

Hammond’s and Hodges’s testimonies. See J.T. I,

, at *2. He chose to credit

Hodges’s analysis, which used the proper IDEA criteria and concluded that S.J-D. was not

“performing significantly below age and grade expectation as it relates to her cognitive

18 performance” such that she required a specific learning disability classification. AR 1175. Hodges

explained that S.J-D.’s low phonological proficiency test score—on which Dr. Hammond based

her clinical diagnosis—was an outlier compared to S.J-D.’s other scores. AR 1167. She also

testified that DCPS sought “not to over pathologize” and to “look[] at the data and what the data

says and mak[e] sure that [DCPS is] following those determinations.” AR 1182. Hodges

acknowledged that S.J-D.’s challenges with ADHD and executive functioning—as identified in

Dr. Hammond’s report—showed “vulnerabilities or areas of support.”

But she explained that

those challenges did not create “a disabling condition” such that S.J-D. had “significant and severe

deficits” requiring full-time special education. AR 1181–82. With such reasoning, Hodges’s

testimony was cogent and responsive. See Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 404.

As for Green’s testimony, the plaintiffs argue that the hearing officer “fail[ed] to provide

any legal analysis as to why [her] testimony and opinion were given more weight.” Pls.’ Mot. at

30 (emphasis added). “It is undisputed that a hearing officer is entitled to make reasonable

credibility determinations and, in the absence of extrinsic evidence to the contrary, those

determinations are entitled to deference from the [c]ourt.” Wimbish v. District of Columbia,

, 29 n.5 (D.D.C. 2019) (citation modified). Here, the hearing officer found that

Green’s evaluation was more credible than Dr. Hammond’s and that it “refuted [Dr. Hammond’s]

assertion that [S.J-D.] has a disabling communication disability.” AR 30–31. That determination

was reasonable and deserves deference. Green was qualified as an expert in speech and language

pathology. AR 1214. She explained that “the field of psychology is very different from the field

of speech pathology.” AR 1225. Upon reviewing Dr. Hammond’s report, Green determined that

“there were no super red flags for . . . a speech and language disorder” but still agreed to do a

speech and language evaluation out of an “overabundance of caution.” AR 1223. To evaluate

19 S.J-D.’s speech and language capabilities, Green met with S.J-D.’s teachers at the Lab School,

observed S.J-D. in the classroom, and conducted multiple speech and language tests. AR 1262.

Besides S.J-D.’s receptive vocabulary score, which was less than “one standard deviation below

the mean” and therefore borderline “below the average range,” AR 1238, S.J-D.’s language

performance was “commensurate with her age-matched peers,” AR 1241, and her “profile [was]

not consistent with a student with a disabling communication disorder,” AR 1249. Green further

explained that the discrepancy between S.J-D.’s expressive and receptive vocabulary scores was

attributable to her attention deficits. AR 1237–38. She opined that S.J-D. would “benefit from

interaction with her typically developing or nondisabled peers in a general education environment”

because that exposure would “sharpen [her] linguistic skills” and “[nothing] would preclude her

form being able to benefit from that.” AR 1261–62. Like Hodges’s testimony, Green’s testimony

therefore provided a “cogent and responsive explanation.” Endrew F., 580 U.S. at 404.

Second, the plaintiffs argue that the hearing officer improperly discredited Mounce’s

testimony that S.J-D required full-time specialized instruction. They contend that instead of

accepting Mounce’s conclusion, the hearing officer erroneously relied on S.J-D.’s previous

progress reports. Pls.’ Mot. at 30. But, as the Court already found above, see supra at 12–13, any

misplaced reliance on the progress reports does not taint the hearing officer’s conclusion that

Mounce’s testimony was based on “pure conjecture,” AR 32. Nor does it call into question the

hearing officer’s determination that Mounce’s recommendation to place S.J-D. in a full-time

specialized environment conflicted with the IDEA’s least restrictive environment mandate. See

Z.B.,

. And, again, Mounce’s concerns about S.J-D.’s ability to progress in a

general education environment were accounted for by the numerous support services included in

her IEPs. See supra at 15–16.

20 Third, the plaintiffs argue that the hearing officer improperly ignored the testimonies of

Kunz and Dolginoff because he “did not consider their opinion at all in reaching his conclusions

[of law].” See Pls.’ Mot. at 16–17. Citing M.O. v. District of Columbia, the plaintiffs argue that

the hearing officer’s omission amounted to a fatal lack of “sufficiently detailed reasoning.”

(D.D.C. 2013).

The facts of this case are different. In M.O., the court found that the hearing officer’s

decision lacked any “discussion of the adequacy of the District’s consideration of the

recommendations, or why the District’s review of the evaluations was credited over those of the

plaintiffs’ witnesses.”

. But here, the hearing officer thoroughly recounted the testimony

of each witness, including Kunz and Dolginoff, in his findings of fact. AR 23. Kunz opined that

S.J-D. required speech and language services.

Both argued that S.J-D. required full-time

specialized education.

Their testimonies directly contradicted the testimonies of Green and

Hodges, both of whom the hearing officer found to be “balanced and credible.” AR 30. And

Kunz’s and Dolginoff’s asserted reasons for full-time specialized education were addressed by the

support services included in S.J-D.’s IEPs. See supra at 15–16. The Court therefore defers to the

hearing officer’s weighing of the conflicting testimonies. See K.S. v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2013) (“[W]hile Plaintiffs contend that the hearing officer’s failure to

explain why he was discounting the testimony of their experts merits remand, the Court cannot

concur. Because he otherwise provided substantial justification for his determination that [the

student] was receiving sufficient educational benefit . . . no remand for further elaboration is

warranted.”).

Fourth, the plaintiffs argue that the hearing officer improperly credited DCPS witnesses

Manuel and Hodges even though they had never met, observed, or evaluated S.J-D. Pls.’ Mot. at

21 30–31. But as the plaintiffs admit, both were “qualified in their respective fields.” Id. at 30.

Manuel and Hodges were members of the DCPS Central IEP team and participated in various IEP

meetings and reviews of S.J-D.’s records to develop her IEPs. AR 35–36, 211, 228, 308, 365, 450.

As a school psychologist, Hodges reviewed Dr. Hammond’s report and analyzed S.J-D.’s

disabilities under the IDEA criteria. AR 1169–70. As a program specialist and licensed teacher

for general and special education, Manuel drafted the May 2023 IEP. AR 1362, 1386–88, 1396.

In accordance with their respective roles, Hodges and Manuel appropriately testified about their

own analyses and how they developed S.J-D.’s IEPs based on the relevant data—including data

collected from in-person observations conducted by other DCPS witnesses. See AR 1231–32

(Green’s observation and assessments), 1322 (Nadir’s first observation), 1336 (Nadir’s second

observation). Ultimately, the hearing officer weighed the opinions before him and found Hodges

and Manuel to be more credible. AR 30. The plaintiffs offer no concrete reason to disturb that

finding. See B.B.,

, at *10 (“Hearing Officers have the opportunity to hear

testimony in person, examine the demeanor of the witness and reactions of the participants, and

bring immeasurable experience and expertise in this specialized area.” (citation modified)).

In sum, contrary to the plaintiffs’ arguments, “there is no evidence that blind deference was

accorded to the [DCPS] witnesses by the [h]earing [o]fficer.”

. Contra Pls.’ Mot. at 30.

Because the hearing officer’s decision does not lack “reasoned and specific findings” as to the

witnesses before him, McNeil,

(citation modified), and the plaintiffs have

not shown extrinsic evidence to the contrary, the Court will defer to the hearing officer’s credibility

determinations, Wimbish,

n.5 (citation modified).

22 C. Procedural Violations

A procedural violation creates a viable claim under the IDEA “only if [that] procedural

violation[] affected the student’s substantive rights.” Lesesne ex rel. B.F. v. District of Columbia,

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (citation modified). To establish a denial of substantive rights

such that a “child did not receive a [FAPE],” the plaintiffs must show that the procedural

inadequacies (1) impeded the child’s right to a FAPE; (2) significantly impeded the parents’

opportunity to participate in the decision-making process for the provision of a FAPE to the

parents’ child; or (3) caused a deprivation of educational benefits.

(f)(3)(E)(ii).

1. DCPS’s Failure to Offer an Observation

The plaintiffs are correct that DCPS’s failure to provide a timely observation of the

proposed program at Francis Stevens constituted a procedural violation. Pls.’ Mot. at 32. DCPS’s

failure denied the plaintiffs an opportunity to observe how Francis Stevens would implement the

proposed IEP. See

(5)(A). And a violation of “the-right-to-observe

provision” may indeed “impede[] [a parent’s] opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking

process regarding the provision of a FAPE.” Middleton, 312 F. Supp. 3d at 147–48.

The plaintiffs have not, however, shown “a serious deprivation, in light of the many

opportunities [the] plaintiff[s] had for participation.” J.T. II, 496 F. Supp. 3d at 203. S.J-D.’s

parents had “substantial input” at all stages of the IEP development. Cooper v. District of

Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2014). S.J-D.’s father attended the August 2022 and

October 2022 meetings, where he communicated his feedback on the proposed IEP. AR 1077,

1080. Both parents and their educational consultant attended and shared their feedback during the

January 2023 meeting and the May 2023 IEP review. AR 354–56, 446–49. “At each meeting,

[the] plaintiff[s] had substantial input into the IEP baselines, annual goals, special education and

23 related services requirements that the [IEP team] developed on behalf of [S.J-D.].” Cooper,

. And where appropriate, the IEP team responded to the plaintiffs’ concerns by

adjusting S.J-D.’s specialized instruction and classroom supports. See, e.g., AR 355, 448. Such

parental involvement in IEP development indicates meaningful participation such that there was

no denial of a FAPE. Paolella ex rel. Paolella v. District of Columbia,

(D.C.

Cir. 2006).

2. DCPS’s Delay

The plaintiffs also argue that DCPS’s delay in developing S.J-D.’s August 2022 IEP

constituted a substantive denial of a FAPE. Pls.’ Mot. at 23–26.

DCPS’s delay in convening the team meeting amounts to a “failure to meet a procedural

deadline,” and the parents must therefore show that the delay affected S.J-D.’s substantive rights.

D.R. ex rel. Robinson v. Gov’t of D.C.,

(D.D.C. 2009) (citation modified)

(quoting Lesesne,

). But because the plaintiffs failed to raise this procedural

violation before the hearing officer, AR 6–7, 616, they cannot seek judicial review of it here, see

Douglass v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2009) (citing Honig v. Doe,

, 326–27 (1988)) (“Judicial review is generally unavailable under the IDEA unless

all administrative procedures have been exhausted.”).

D. Reimbursement

Because the Court concludes that the District did not deny S.J-D. a FAPE for the 2022–23

and 2023–24 school years, it will not consider the plaintiffs’ request for tuition reimbursement.

24 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment,

Dkt. 9, and grants the District’s cross-motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 11. A separate order

consistent with this decision accompanies this memorandum opinion.

________________________ DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH September 22, 2025 United States District Judge

25