UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

WATCH TOWER BIBLE AND TRACT : SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 24-2523 (RC) : v. : Re Document Nos.: 23, 31 : RUSSIAN FEDERATION, et al., : : Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANTS RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND MINISTRY OF HEALTH OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING DEFENDANT V.A. ALMAZOV NATIONAL MEDICAL RESEARCH CENTRE’S MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

In 2017, the Russian Federation (“Russia”) seized the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Russian

headquarters in St. Petersburg, then known as the Bethel Facility. According to the complaint,

Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Pennsylvania (“Watch Tower”), a U.S. nonprofit,

owned the multi-million-dollar Bethel Facility at the time. Russia later converted the property

into a state-owned medical research facility known as the V.A. Almazov National Medical

Research Centre, or Almazov.

Watch Tower initiated this action under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”),

, 1602–11, against Russia, the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation

(“Ministry of Health”), and Almazov (collectively, “Defendants”). It claims that Defendants’

expropriation of the Bethel Facility violated international law. Russia and the Ministry of Health

jointly filed a motion to dismiss; Almazov filed a separate motion to dismiss. For the reasons

discussed below, the Court grants both motions. II. BACKGROUND

Because this case is at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court recounts the facts as alleged

in the complaint. See N. Am. Butterfly Ass’n v. Wolf,

(D.C. Cir. 2020).

Though Jehovah’s Witnesses have been present in Russia since 1891, they faced nearly a century

of persecution until the Soviet Union enacted legislation in 1990 that allowed them to worship

openly. Compl. ¶¶ 2–4, 20, ECF No. 1. Soviet authorities registered the Administrative Centre

of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia (“Administrative Centre”) as the national religious entity for

Russian Jehovah’s Witnesses.

¶ 21–22. In the early 1990s, the Administrative Centre bought

and renovated a complex of buildings in St. Petersburg that it named the Bethel Facility. Id.

¶ 25. The Bethel Facility ultimately served as the national headquarters for over 175,000

Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia. Id. ¶ 26.

Eventually the Administrative Centre transferred the Bethel Center to Watch Tower, a

U.S.-based nonprofit that “support[s] the worship of Jehovah’s Witnesses worldwide.” Id. ¶ 27.

It did so by executing gift contracts in 2000 and 2010, both of which it registered with Russian

authorities. Id. ¶¶ 29–30, 36; see also Ex. C to Compl., ECF No. 1-4 (2000 gift contract); Ex. G

to Compl., ECF No. 1-8 (2010 gift contract). The contracts allowed the Administrative Centre to

continue using and operating the Bethel Facility for free in exchange for maintaining the

property. Compl. ¶¶ 31, 32, 36; see also Ex. E to Compl., ECF No. 1-6; Ex. F to Compl., ECF

No. 1-7; Ex. H to Compl., ECF No. 1-9. After Watch Tower took ownership of the Bethel

Center, it paid 172 million rubles, or approximately $3 million USD, in land and property taxes.

Compl. ¶¶ 28, 38; see also Ex. B to Compl., ECF No. 1-3.

But then Russia began what Watch Tower describes as “a targeted campaign of

persecution against the entire community of Jehovah’s Witnesses.” Compl. ¶¶ 40–41. In March

2 2017, after Russia’s Office of the Prosecutor General submitted a claim to the Russian Supreme

Court asking it to declare the Administrative Centre an extremist organization under Russia’s

Suppression of Extremism Act (“the Extremism Act”), Russia liquidated the Administrative

Centre; banned its activity; and confiscated its assets. Id. ¶¶ 48, 51(a); see also Ex. I to Compl.,

ECF No. 1-10. Watch Tower was prohibited from participating in that proceeding. Compl.

¶ 51(b).

In April 2017, the Supreme Court of Russia ordered the liquidation of the Administrative

Centre. Id. ¶¶ 49(c), 51(c). That “Liquidation Decision” effectively banned the activities of

Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia.1 Id. ¶ 49(c). Watch Tower tried to appeal the Liquidation

Decision but was unsuccessful. Id. ¶ 51(d), (e).

Russia then began to seize Jehovah’s Witnesses’ property. Id. ¶¶ 52–53. Because the

Bethel Facility was still in Watch Tower’s name, Russia initiated legal proceedings to void the

2000 and 2010 gift contracts. Id. ¶ 52; see also Ex. J to Compl., ECF No. 1-11. In December

2017, a Russian district court annulled the gift contracts as fictitious. Compl. ¶ 54; see also Ex.

K to Compl., ECF No. 1-12. The court explained that under Russian law, a “fictitious

transaction” is a “transaction concluded only for appearances, without the intention to create

corresponding legal consequences.” Ex. K at 5. Because the Administrative Centre had

continued to possess and use the Bethel Facility on the same terms at no cost and continued to be

responsible for its maintenance, the Russia court concluded that it had “essentially continu[ed] to

1 Since the Liquidation Decision, hundreds of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia have been criminally prosecuted and imprisoned. Compl. ¶ 49(e). Russia has also banned the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ website and bible. Id. ¶ 49(b), (d). These acts, Watch Tower claims, show that Russia is engaged in a “clear, systematic plan to suppress the peaceful worship of Jehovah’s Witnesses.” Id. ¶ 50.

3 exercise authority as an owner.” Id. at 6. Watch Tower’s appeals were unsuccessful. Compl.

¶¶ 56–57, 59; see also Ex. M to Compl., ECF No. 1-14.

On February 19, 2019, Russia permanently transferred the former Bethel Facility to

Almazov. Compl. ¶¶ 61–62; see also Ex. N to Compl., ECF No. 1-15. According to Watch

Tower, Defendants now use the facility for biomedical research, scientific endeavors, and

medical education and training. Compl. ¶ 63; see also Ex. O to Compl., ECF No. 1-16; Ex. P to

Compl., ECF No. 1-17. They continue to deny Watch Tower access to the property, which is

valued at over $30 million USD. Compl. ¶¶ 64–65; see also Ex. Q to Compl., ECF No. 1-18

(valuing the property at $30,972,000); Ex. R to Compl., ECF No. 1-19 (valuing the property at

$32,011,027).

Having failed to obtain relief in Russia, Watch Tower and the Administrative Centre each

filed applications against Russia in the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”). Compl.

¶ 66; see also Admin. Centre of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Russia, App. No. 10188/17 (Dec. 1,

2017); Watch Tower v. Russia, App. No. 31683/19 (Mar. 27, 2023). Watch Tower’s application

was held in abeyance while the ECHR resolved the Administrative Centre’s. Compl. ¶ 67. On

June 7, 2022, the ECHR rendered a judgment in favor of the Administrative Centre in Taganrog

LRO and Others v. Russia. Id. ¶ 68; see also Taganrog LRO and Others v. Russia, App. Nos.

32401/10 and 19 others, Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 7, 2022) (“Taganrog”). The ECHR held that the

Liquidation Decision was a violation of international law. Compl. ¶ 68; Taganrog ¶¶ 254–255.

Relying on the Russian court’s holding that the gift contracts were null and void, the ECHR

treated the Bethel Center as the property of the Administrative Centre. Taganrog ¶¶ 276, 278,

279. It ordered Russia to either return the Bethel Center to the Administrative Centre or pay

€38,243,874, or around $42 million USD. Compl. ¶ 69.

4 On the same day the ECHR issued its decision in Taganrog, Russia passed legislation to

remove itself from that court’s jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 70; see also Russian MPs vote to quit European

Court of Human Rights, Al Jazeera (June 7, 2022), https://perma.cc/WCV6-RMAY. Russia has

refused to implement the ECHR’s judgment. Compl. ¶ 70. Neither Watch Tower nor the

Administrative Centre has been compensated for Russia’s seizure of the Bethel Facility. Compl.

¶ 94.

Watch Tower initiated this action in September 2024. Its five-count complaint alleges

that (1) Defendants expropriated the Bethel Facility in violation of international law;

(2) Defendants’ actions in confiscating and using the Bethel Facility constitute trespass;

(3) Defendants unjustly enriched themselves by taking real property from Watch Tower without

compensation; (4) Defendants are involved in a civil conspiracy; and (5) in the alternative, to the

extent Defendants are deemed separate legal entities, they aided and abetted one another in the

aforementioned expropriation, trespass, unjust enrichment, and conspiracy. Id. ¶¶ 105–133. For

relief, Watch Tower requests that the Court award damages pursuant to

.

.

Almazov moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter and personal

jurisdiction; for insufficient process and service of process; and for failure to state a claim. Mot.

Dismiss Compl., ECF No. 23; Memo. P. & A. Supp. Almazov Centre’s Mot. Dismiss (“Almazov

Mot. Dismiss”), ECF No. 23-1; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (2), (4), (5), (6). Watch Tower

filed an opposition, and Almazov filed a reply. Pl.’s Memo. P. & A. Opp’n Def. Almazov’s

Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s Almazov Opp’n”), ECF No. 28; Reply Memo P. & A. Supp. Almazov

Centre’s Mot. Dismiss (“Almazov’s Reply”), ECF No. 33. Russia and the Ministry of Health

jointly filed a motion to dismiss generally making the same arguments. Mot. Dismiss Compl.,

5 ECF No. 31; Memo. P. & A. Supp. Russian Federation’s Mot. Dismiss (“Russia Mot. Dismiss”),

ECF No. 31-1; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (2), (4), (5), (6). Watch Tower filed an

opposition, and Russia filed a reply. Pl.’s Memo. P. & A. Opp’n Def. Russian Federation’s Mot.

Dismiss (“Pl.’s Russia Opp’n”), ECF No. 34; Reply Memo. P. & A. Supp. Russia Federation’s

Mot. Dismiss (“Russia Reply”), ECF No. 35. Watch Tower also filed a notice of supplemental

authority, to which defendants jointly responded. Pl.’s Notice Suppl. Authority Concerning

Opp’n Defs.’ Mots. Dismiss, ECF No. 36; Defs.’ Resp. Pl.’s Notice Suppl. Authority, ECF

No. 37. Both motions to dismiss are now ripe for decision.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

To withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack

of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of specific and pertinent

jurisdictional facts. See Reuber v. United States,

(D.C. Cir. 1984);

Naegele v. Albers,

(D.D.C. 2005). Under the FSIA, “[p]ersonal

jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district

courts have [subject-matter] jurisdiction . . . where service has been made under section 1608 of

this title.”

(b). An FSIA plaintiff must properly serve the foreign defendant in

accordance with

for the court to have personal jurisdiction. See I.T.

Consultants, Inc. v. Republic of Pakistan,

(D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[P]ersonal

jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which subject matter

jurisdiction exists under the FSIA, so long as the defendant was properly served.” (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)).

6 B. Insufficient Process & Insufficient Service of Process

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5), a complaint may be

dismissed for “insufficient process” or “insufficient service of process,” respectively. Rule

12(b)(4) allows a party to “‘challenge noncompliance with the provisions of Rule 4(b) . . . that

deal[] specifically with the content of the summons.’” Smith v. Overseas Korean Cultural

Heritage Found.,

, 295–96 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting 5B Wright & Miller’s

Federal Practice & Procedure § 1353 (3d ed. 2004)). A motion under Rule 12(b)(5) is the

“proper vehicle for challenging the mode of delivery or the lack of delivery of the summons and

complaint.” Id. (quoting Wright & Miller § 1353). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing

proper service of process. See Light v. Wolf,

(D.C. Cir. 1987). In FSIA

actions, service of process is governed by

.

IV. ANALYSIS

Foreign states are generally immune from suit in United States courts. E.g., CC/Devas

(Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp.,

,

, 1576 (2025); Verlinden B.V. v.

Cent. Bank of Nigeria,

(1983);

. But the FSIA creates

exceptions to that default immunity. Schubarth v. Fed. Republic of Germany,

(D.C. Cir. 2018); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,

(1989); see also Mauritius, 145 S. Ct. at 1577–79. The FSIA provides that a federal court has

personal jurisdiction over a foreign state, including its agencies or instrumentalities, if there is

subject matter jurisdiction2 and if service is made pursuant to the statute’s service of process

provision,

(b); Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of

2 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605–07 for the FSIA’s substantive immunity exceptions. 3 For some instrumentalities, the plaintiff will also need to show minimum contacts with the United States. See Redes Andinas de Comunicaciones S.R.L. v. Republic of Peru, No. 22-cv-

7 Bolivia,

, 1548 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Section 1608 divides the methods for

serving foreign entities into two sections: § 1608(a) establishes how a plaintiff can serve foreign

states, like Russia, and their political subdivisions, like the Ministry of Health; and § 1608(b)

provides how a plaintiff can serve a foreign agency or instrumentality, like Almazov.4

Defendants argue that they were not served in accordance with § 1608, and that therefore the

Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. Almazov Mot. Dismiss at 9–11; Almazov Reply

at 3–5; Russia Mot. Dismiss at 9–13; Russia Reply at 3–6. The Court agrees.

A. Russia & Ministry of Health

The Court starts with Russia’s motion to dismiss.5 As discussed, § 1608(a) governs

service of process on “a foreign state or political subdivision of a foreign state.”

(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(1). It sets out, in descending order of preference, four methods by

which service “shall be made.”

(a); Republic of Sudan v. Harrison,

(2019). The first is delivery of the summons and complaint “in accordance with any special

arrangement for service between the foreign state or political subdivision.” 28 U.S.C.

3631,

, at *5–6 (D.D.C. July 22, 2025) (describing under what conditions the Due Process Clause applies to a foreign agency or instrumentality). 4 The FSIA defines “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” as any entity that is (1) “a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise”; (2) “an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof”; and (3) not a “citizen of a State of the United States” or “created under the laws of any third country.”

(b). Almazov and Watch Tower agree that Almazov is a Russian agency or instrumentality. Almazov Mot. Dismiss at 8 (“The Almazov Centre is an ‘agency or instrumentality of a foreign state’ under the FSIA.”); Pl.’s Almazov Opp’n at 23 (“[I]t is undisputed that Defendant Almazov is an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state under the FSIA.”). 5 For purposes of this discussion, the Court refers to Russia and the Ministry of Health collectively as “Russia.” See Pl.’s Russia Opp’n at 1 (doing the same); Russia Mot. Dismiss at 1 (referring to the two Defendants as “the Federation”); see also TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukraine,

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that in FSIA actions, “an entity that is an integral part of a foreign state’s political structure is to be treated as the foreign state itself”) (internal quotation omitted).

8 § 1608(a)(1). “[I]f no special arrangement exists,” service may be made by delivery of the

summons and complaint “in accordance with an applicable international convention on service of

judicial documents.” Id. § 1608(a)(2). If service is not possible under the first or second

method, the plaintiff may invoke the third method, which calls for:

sending a copy of the summons and complaint and a notice of suit, together with a translation of each into the official language of the foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned.

Id. § 1608(a)(3). Finally, if service cannot be made within 30 days under § 1608(a)(3), service

may be effected by the clerk of the court dispatching the service packet to the Secretary of State

in Washington, D.C. for transmittal “through diplomatic channels to the foreign state.” Id.

§ 1608(a)(4).

Because service under § 1608(a)(1) and (a)(2) was unavailable here, see Russia Mot.

Dismiss at 10; Pl.’s Russia Opp’n at 31, Watch Tower requested that the clerk of court dispatch

the required materials to Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs pursuant to § 1608(a)(3). Aff.

Requesting Foreign Mailing, ECF No. 8 (requesting service on Russia); Aff. Requesting Foreign

Mailing, ECF No. 9 (requesting service on Ministry of Health). But there were complications.

After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the major U.S. mail carriers largely suspended deliveries

to Russia. Pl.’s Russia Opp’n at 31–32. Watch Tower had originally directed the clerk of court

to dispatch copies of the service packages to DHL, but DHL refused to ship to Russia. Id. at 32

(citing Ex. A to Aff. Requesting Foreign Mailing, ECF No. 15-2; Ex. A to Aff. Requesting

Foreign Mailing, ECF No. 16-2).

So Watch Tower tried again. It arranged for the Clerk of Court to dispatch the service

documents via DHL to Turkey, where a German courier service would arrange for delivery into

Russia. Pl.’s Russia Opp’n at 32–33, 40. After the courier took possession of the packages, it

9 made “several attempts to personally deliver the parcel and obtain a signed receipt.” Id. at 34.

But the recipient representing Russia’s foreign minister refused personal delivery. Id. The

courier then sent the documents through Russian Post, the national postal operator in Russia. Id.

Ultimately Russian Post was able to deliver the documents, although it did not obtain a signature

upon delivery. Id. at 40–41. Instead delivery was apparently confirmed through a QR code. Id.

at 34. According to Watch Tower, the combined dispatch to DHL, the foreign courier, and

Russian Post “resulted in the successful service of process on Russia on December 9, 2024.” Id.

Russia argues that its service was invalid for two reasons: one, because service by mail is

categorically unavailable in Russia, Russia Mot. Dismiss at 10–11, and two, because § 1608(a)

requires strict compliance, which Watch Tower did not satisfy. Id. at 11–13. The Court agrees

with both points.

The United States and Russia are both parties to the Hague Convention on the Service

Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (“the

Convention”), Nov. 15, 1965, art. 3, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163; Status Table, 14:

Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial

Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Hague Conf. on Private Int’l L. (Mar. 21, 2024),

https://perma.cc/KFC2-5AT3. The Convention, which was ratified by the United States in 1965,

“regularized and liberalized service of process in international civil suits.” Brockmeyer v. May,

(9th Cir. 2004). “[C]ompliance with the Convention is mandatory in all cases

to which it applies,” Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk,

(1988),

which is “in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a

judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad.” 20 U.S.T., at 362. Watch Tower

acknowledges that this action requires service abroad. See generally Affs. Requesting Foreign

10 Mailing; Harrison,

(holding that to serve a foreign sovereign through the mail, the

plaintiff must send the service packet “directly to the foreign minister’s office in the minister’s

home country”). The Hague Convention therefore applies.

Article 10(a) of the Convention establishes that “[p]rovided the State of destination does

not object,” the Convention does not “interfere with the freedom to send judicial documents, by

postal channels, directly to persons abroad.” 20 U.S.T., at 363. In Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon,

the Supreme Court interpreted Article 10(a) to encompass service of court documents.

(2017). After analyzing the Convention’s text, structure, and drafting history, the Court

concluded that in “cases governed by the Hague Service Convention, service by mail is

permissible if two conditions are met: first, the receiving state has not objected to service by

mail; and second, service by mail is authorized under otherwise-applicable law.” Id.; see also

at 281 (citing then-Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s contemporaneous report to the Senate stating

that “Article 10 permits direct service by mail . . . unless [the receiving] state objects to such

service.”).

When Russia acceded to the Convention, it formally objected to Article 10. See

Declaration/Reservation/Notification, Hague Conf. on Private Int’l L (July 19, 2016),

https://perma.cc/PW3H-TZXX (“Service of documents by methods listed in Article 10 of the

Convention is not permitted in the Russian Federation.”). So under Water Splash, service by

mail is categorically impermissible in Russia. See, e.g., Azadeh v. Gov’t of the Islamic Republic

of Iran,

(D.D.C. 2018) (describing that “the method of service proscribed

in section 1608(a)(3) is categorically unavailable when attempting to serve those countries” that

“specifically objected to service by mail when they acceded to the Hague Convention”);

Tidewater Inv. SRL v. Bolivian Republic of Venezuela, No. 17-cv-1457,

, at *5

11 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2018) (stating that service under § 1608(a)(3) was unavailable because the

defendant state had “expressly objected to service by mail when it acceded to the Hague

Convention); United States ex rel. Walterspiel v. Bayer AG,

(4th Cir.

2016) (holding that service by mail of defendant in Germany was improper because Germany

had “objected to Article 10(a)”). That includes service effected through international courier

services. E.g., AMTO, LLC v. Bedford Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. 14-cv-9913,

,

at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2015) (“Courts have held . . . that service of documents by

international courier constitutes service through ‘postal channels,’ and accordingly this method

of service in insufficient in light of Russia’s objection to Article 10.”); Advanced Aerofoil Techs.,

AG v. Todaro, No. 11-cv-9505,

, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2012) (characterizing

service by international courier as tantamount to service through postal channels, and therefore

unavailable in countries that have expressly objected to Article 10).

Watch Tower argues that Water Splash is “inapplicable to this case” because it did not

involve the FSIA or Russia. Pl.’s Russia Opp’n at 38. That argument is unavailing. In Water

Splash the Supreme Court held—without qualification—that in “cases governed by the Hague

Service Convention,” service by mail is only permissible if the receiving member state has not

objected to Article 10. Water Splash,

. Granted, in 2003 Russia unilaterally

suspended the application of the Hague Convention to the United States. E.g., Russia Reply at 4;

Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Federation,

(“Agudas

Chasidei I”) (D.D.C. 2011) (describing how Russia “unilaterally suspended all judicial

cooperation with the United States in civil and commercial matters” in 2003). Cf. Pl.’s Russia

Opp’n at 38, 40 (attempting to distinguish Water Splash because Russia “is no longer applying

the Convention to the United States”). But “Russia’s failure to abide by the Convention . . . does

12 not change the fact that Russia does not agree to service by mail.” Kuklachev v. Gelfman, No.

08-cv-2214,

, at *2 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2008); see also Advanced Aerofoil

Techs.,

, at *2 (“[D]istrict courts cannot circumvent the Hague Convention at

whim and authorize alternative service when the foreign state has affirmatively objected to the

type of service requested.”). Since 2003, district courts have uniformly continued to apply the

Hague Convention to defendants in Russia. E.g., Kadmon Corp. v. Ltd. Liab. Co. Oncon, No.

22-cv-5271,

, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2023) (holding that “[b]ecause of

Russia’s objection to Article 10,” service “through DHL courier service” is not permitted within

Russia); AMTO, LLC,

, at *7, *10 (rejecting request to serve defendant in

Russia by mail or international courier because “Russia objected to Article 10 of the Hague

Convention, and Russia’s failure to abide by the Convention does not change the fact that Russia

does not agree to service by mail” (cleaned up)); Bidonthecity.com LLC v. Halverston Holdings

Ltd., No. 12-cv-9258,

, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014) (holding that, despite

Russia’s noncompliance with the Hague Convention, “service by mail still does not suffice as

adequate service” in Russia).

Notably, Watch Tower does not identify a single case where a federal court permitted

service on a defendant in Russia—or Russia itself—by mail. See generally Pl.’s Russia Opp’n.

Instead Watch Tower points to this District’s “Clerk’s Office Procedures for Service of Process

on a Foreign Defendant” as proof that “this district has already approved” service on Russia

under § 1608(a)(3). 6 Pl.’s Russia Opp’n at 32–33 (citing U.S. District Court for the District of

6 Watch Tower claims to rely on the “current Attorney Manual (dated July 2024),” but it instead cites to Attachment B-2 of the Clerk’s Office Procedures for Service of Process on a Foreign Defendant (Pursuant to FRCP 4 and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). Pl.’s Russia Opp’n at 32–33, 39–40; Pl.’s Almazov Opp’n at 24.

13 Columbia, Clerk’s Office Procedures for Service of Process on a Foreign Defendant Attachment

B-2 (July 2024), https://perma.cc/W89D-ZG9W). Attachment B-2 to the Procedures constitutes

a letter from the plaintiff in Yukos Capital Ltd. v. Russian Federation requesting that the clerk of

court dispatch service to Russia via international courier. No. 22-cv-798,

(D.D.C. June 11, 2025). But in Yukos, the parties eventually stipulated that the plaintiff would

serve Russia “pursuant to

(a)(4) (that is, through ‘diplomatic channels’).”

. The Yukos letter therefore does not show that any court in this District has actually

approved a plaintiff serving Russia under § 1608(a)(3).

To be clear, the Court’s holding does not render Russia categorically immune from FSIA

actions. That is because Watch Tower still has access to the FSIA’s fourth method for service of

a foreign state: service through diplomatic channels. See

(a)(4). Plaintiffs in

this District have recently used the method described in § 1608(a)(4) to successfully serve

Russia. E.g., Yukos,

, at *7 (finding Russia had been properly served where

the parties had stipulated to service pursuant to § 1608(a)(4)); JSC DTEK Krymenergo v. Russian

Federation, No. 23-cv-3330,

, at *2, *6 (D.D.C. Apr. 17, 2025) (holding that

plaintiff had “effected proper service” of Russia under § 1608(a)(4)); Stabil LLC v. Russian

Federation, No. 22-cv-983,

, at *2, *2 n.1 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2024) (finding

proper service where Russia “[did] not contest service” under § 1608(a)(4)); Agudas Chasidei I,

(finding Russia had been “properly served” under § 1608(a)(4)). And

Russia has conceded that a “proper method for serving [it] in this case” would be “via diplomatic

channels.” Russia Mot. Dismiss at 11 n.4; Russia Reply at 5.

One last point. Russia argues in the alternative that Watch Tower failed to satisfy the

requirements of § 1608(a)(3), see Russia Mot. Dismiss at 11–13, which requires “strict”

14 compliance. See Harrison,

; Barot v. Embassy of the Republic of Zambia,

(D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that neither substantial compliance nor actual notice

constitutes effective service under section 1608(a)(3)). By its terms, § 1608(a)(3) obligates the

clerk of court to “address[] and dispatch[]” the service packet “to the head of the ministry of

foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned.”

(a)(3); see also Harrison,

(holding that to satisfy § 1608(a)(3), the “service packet must bear the foreign

minister’s name and customary address”). It also requires the plaintiff to use a “form of mail

requiring a signed receipt.”

(a)(3). Watch Tower admits that it was unable to

address the service packet to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs because of shipping

restrictions, Pl.’s Russia Opp’n at 31–32; the packets were actually addressed to “Rustem Ulker,

Attn: Care Courier Group GmbH” in Turkey. See Certificate of Clerk, ECF No. 18-1; Certificate

of Clerk, ECF No. 20-1. Watch Tower also acknowledges that the Russian Post did not obtain a

signed receipt upon delivery. Pl.’s Russia Opp’n at 34. Those formal deficiencies render

Russia’s service invalid under § 1608(a)(3). Russia Reply at 5–6; Harrison,

(“[Section] 1608(a)(3) requires that a mailing be sent directly to the foreign minister’s office in

the minister’s home country.”); see also Harrison,

(requiring the service packet to

“bear the foreign minister’s name and customary address”); Agudas Chasidei I,

(holding that plaintiff’s failure to submit signed receipts of service was “fatal” to effecting

valid service under § 1608(a)(3)). It does not matter that Russia has actual notice of this lawsuit,

because “even ‘actual notice’ is insufficient to bypass the requirement[s]” of § 1608(a)(3).

Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U. S. v. Russian Federation,

, 12 (D.D.C. 2023)

(quoting Barot,

).

15 Absent effective service under § 1608, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Russia

and the Ministry. See

(b). The Court therefore dismisses the claims against

Russia and the Ministry under Rule 12(b)(2) without prejudice. See Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza

Aerea Boliviana,

(D.C. Cir. 1994) (ordering district court to dismiss FSIA

action where defendant had not been properly served under § 1608).

B. Almazov

The Court now turns to Almazov. Section 1608(b) provides that service “shall be made

upon an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” using one of three methods, in descending

order of preference.

(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(1); Amaplat Mauritius Ltd. v.

Zimbabwe Mining Dev. Corp.,

, 14 (D.D.C. 2024), reversed in part on other

grounds,

(D.C. Cir. 2025). The first method is “by delivery . . . in accordance

with any special arrangement for service between the plaintiff and the agency or

instrumentality.”

(b)(1). If “no special arrangement exists,” the plaintiff can

effect service by delivering the service packet “either to an officer, a managing or general agent,

or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process in the

United States; or in accordance with an applicable international convention on service of judicial

documents.”

§ 1608(b)(2). Finally, if neither of those methods is available, service

“reasonably calculated to give actual notice” may be made

(A) as directed by an authority of the foreign state or political subdivision in response to a letter rogatory or request or

(B) by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the agency or instrumentality to be served, or

(C) as directed by order of the court consistent with the law of the place where service is to be made.

16 Id. § 1608(b)(3). Unlike § 1608(a), “section 1608(b) may be satisfied by technically faulty

service that gives adequate notice.” Transaero, Inc.,

.

Watch Tower concluded that service under § 1608(b)(1) and (2) was unavailable, so it

attempted to serve Almazov pursuant to § 1608(b)(3)(B). See Pl.’s Almazov Opp’n at 23;

Request for Service of Process on Def. Almazov, ECF No. 5-1. But as with Russia, Watch

Tower was unable to directly send the service packet to Almazov because U.S. mail carriers have

suspended deliveries to Russia. Pl.’s Almazov Opp’n at 24. So Watch Tower requested that the

clerk of court dispatch the service documents to DHL for delivery to an Austrian courier service.

Id.; Return of Service for Def. Almazov, ECF No. 14. The courier was able to hand deliver the

service documents to the Director General of Almazov, though it did not obtain a signed receipt.

Pl.’s Almazov Opp’n at 25; Ex. A to Return of Service for Def. Almazov, ECF No. 14-1.

Like Russia, Almazov argues that service by mail was categorically unavailable because

of Russia’s objection to Article 10 of the Hague Convention. Almazov Mot. Dismiss at 10. It

also argues that service by mail was practically unavailable because of the U.S. carriers’ shipping

restrictions. Id. at 10–11. As discussed above, the Court agrees that plaintiffs cannot serve

defendants in Russia through the mail. See supra pp. 11–16.

This result is compelled by Water Splash. Water Splash dealt with a U.S. corporation’s

attempted service on an individual residing in Canada.

. There the Supreme

Court held that “in cases governed by the Hague Service Convention, service by mail is

permissible if,” among other things, “the receiving state has not objected to service by mail.”

. Because this action is governed by the Convention and Russia has objected to service by

mail, Almazov’s service by courier was legally deficient. See, e.g., Kadmon Corp.,

, at *4 (refusing to allow plaintiff to serve Russian company through courier service);

17 AMTO, LLC,

, at *7 (refusing to allow plaintiff to serve Russian individual

through the mail). As a general principle, “district courts cannot circumvent the Hague

Convention at whim.” Advanced Aerofoil Techs.,

, at *2. Watch Tower has

not given the Court a reason to do so here.7

That said, Watch Tower may invoke the other methods outlined in § 1608(b)(3) to serve

Almazov. E.g., Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, No. 16-mc-00405,

, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 22, 2023) (approving service of process by personal delivery

pursuant to § 1608(b)(3)(C) where alternative methods of service were unavailable, and where

such service was “consistent” with the defendant state’s laws). The Court will therefore dismiss

the complaint against Almazov without prejudice.

***

The Court grants both Russia and Almazov’s motions to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2). The Court does not reach Defendants’ alternative arguments

for dismissal.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, both motions to dismiss are GRANTED without prejudice.

An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.

Dated: September 22, 2025 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

7 Nor could it. Whether the United States should retaliate against Russia’s unilateral suspension of the Hague Treaty is a quintessentially political question. See Baker v. Carr,

, 211–213 (1962).

18