UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STEPHANIE McDADE,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 23-03801 (AHA) v.

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORP., doing business as AMTRAK,

Defendant.

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Stephanie McDade alleges that the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, commonly

known as Amtrak, violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by failing to reasonably

accommodate her disability. Amtrak moves for summary judgment, arguing that McDade’s ADA

claim is precluded by the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) and that no reasonable jury could find an

ADA violation. The Court concludes that McDade’s claim does not fall within the narrow category

of precluded disputes and that there are genuine disputes of material fact that make summary

judgment inappropriate. The Court accordingly denies Amtrak’s motion for summary judgment.

I. Background

McDade works as a crew management representative at Amtrak. ECF No. 18-1 ¶ 70. She

is responsible for ensuring trains are adequately staffed within a specific territory and generally

performs her tasks by phone or computer. Id. ¶ 71; see ECF No. 16-3 at 58–60. McDade has

chronic inflammatory response syndrome, which means certain environmental toxins cause her to

experience brain fog, muscle aches, and joint pain. ECF No. 18-1 ¶¶ 73–75. According to her doctor, McDade will become ill if exposed to environmental antigens such as perfume and

fragrances, so she needs a fragrance-free workplace. ECF No. 17-7 at 2.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, McDade’s union and Amtrak agreed that union members

would work remotely for the duration of the national state of emergency. ECF No. 17-1 ¶ 19. In

October 2021, McDade took medical leave due to her genetic condition, and when she returned to

work in January 2022, Amtrak approved remote work because McDade’s condition prevented her

from getting vaccinated. Id. ¶¶ 21, 23. A few months later, McDade requested full-time remote

work on an ongoing basis to accommodate her condition. Id. ¶¶ 24, 27, 32. Amtrak approved the

request following a review by its ADA panel. Id. ¶ 32.

In June 2022, the union asked Amtrak to return certain employees to in-person work. Id.

¶ 33. Amtrak and the union then had negotiations about new hybrid/remote work schedules. Id.

¶ 34. In April 2023, an Amtrak official announced that employees in McDade’s department would

resume in-person work in around a month. Id. ¶ 35. McDade sought to continue her remote work

accommodation, and Amtrak granted a three-month extension. Id. ¶¶ 36–37.

In June 2023, McDade provided Amtrak an updated note from her doctor reiterating that

she needed to work remotely. Id. ¶ 41. Amtrak notified McDade that remote work for her position

was no longer available under its collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with the union. Id.

¶ 43. McDade provided another note from her doctor stating that if remote work was not possible,

she would require several in-person work accommodations, including a private office. Id. ¶ 44.

The ADA panel determined that Amtrak could not provide those accommodations, and Amtrak

asked McDade if other measures, such as plexiglass around her desk, would be effective. Id. ¶¶ 49–

50. McDade responded that the only effective accommodation for her condition was remote work,

and Amtrak again said her position did not qualify for remote work under the CBA. Id. ¶¶ 50, 58;

2 see ECF No. 16-28 at 2. McDade then took several months of approved medical leave. ECF No.

17-1 ¶¶ 62–64. When her leave ended, McDade returned to in-person work without any

accommodations. Id. ¶¶ 65–66; see ECF No. 16-3 at 33–34. McDade suffers the symptoms of her

condition, including brain fog, muscle aches, and joint pain, when working in the office. ECF No.

17-1 ¶ 67; see ECF No. 16-3 at 32–33.

McDade filed this action claiming Amtrak violated the ADA by refusing to accommodate

her and failing to engage in the interactive process. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 22–34. Amtrak answered the

complaint, and the parties proceeded to discovery. Amtrak now moves for summary judgment.

ECF No. 16.

II. Discussion

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). “A fact is ‘material’ if a dispute over it might affect the outcome of a suit under governing

law; factual disputes that are ‘irrelevant or unnecessary’ do not affect the summary judgment

determination.” Holcomb v. Powell,

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

(1986)). A dispute “is ‘genuine’ if ‘the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’”

(quoting Anderson,

). The reviewing court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party . . . , draw all reasonable inferences in her favor, and eschew making credibility

determinations or weighing the evidence.” Czekalski v. Peters,

(D.C. Cir. 2007).

Amtrak argues McDade’s ADA claim is precluded by the RLA and no reasonable jury

could find in her favor. The Court concludes that neither argument is persuasive and that McDade

is entitled to present her ADA claim to a jury.

3 A. The RLA Does Not Preclude McDade’s ADA Claim

Congress enacted the RLA “to promote stability in labor-management relations by

providing a comprehensive framework for resolving labor disputes.” Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v.

Norris,

(1994). The Act establishes a mandatory arbitral process for two types

of disputes: “major” disputes, which relate to “the formation of collective [bargaining] agreements

or efforts to secure them,” and “minor” disputes, which “gro[w] out of grievances or out of the

interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.”

at 252–53 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). That is, whereas “major disputes seek to

create contractual rights, minor disputes [seek] to enforce them” through “the interpretation or

application of existing labor agreements.”

(citation omitted); see also Consol. Rail

Corp. v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n,

(1989) (“The distinguishing feature of [a minor

dispute] is that the dispute may be conclusively resolved by interpreting the existing agreement.”).

Amtrak argues that McDade’s ADA claim is a minor dispute that must go through the RLA’s

grievance resolution process. The Court disagrees.

As the Supreme Court has recognized, “the RLA’s mechanism for resolving minor disputes

does not pre-empt causes of action to enforce rights that are independent of the CBA.” Hawaiian

Airlines,

. 1 The “general rule” is that “the RLA does not require arbitration of

1 In Hawaiian Airlines, the Supreme Court considered RLA preemption of a state law cause of action; however, courts have recognized that its analysis applies equally to preclusion of a federal law cause of action because “questions of preemption and preclusion involve the same inquiry: whether the claim is based on a minor dispute.” Sturge v. Nw. Airlines, Inc.,

, 836 n.4 (8th Cir. 2011); see also, e.g., Odell v. Kalitta Air, LLC,

, 529 n.6 (6th Cir. 2024) (“In Hawaiian Airlines, the Supreme Court applied a case dealing with preclusion to a preemption issue, stating that the distinction did not ‘rob’ the preclusion case ‘of its force in this context,’ reasoning that the ‘[p]rinciples of federalism demand no less caution in finding that a federal statute pre-empts state law.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Hawaiian Airlines,

n.6)).

4 claims asserting rights established by state or federal law independent of a collective bargaining

agreement.” Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc.,

(7th Cir. 2014). Here, McDade’s

asserted rights stem from the ADA, not from a right she is entitled to under the CBA. Such claims

are generally not precluded by the RLA. See, e.g., Stouffer v. Union R.R. Co.,

, 145

(3d Cir. 2023) (no RLA preclusion where plaintiff’s claims “stem from a federal statute, not the

CBA itself”); Giles v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,

(4th Cir. 2023) (no RLA

preclusion where plaintiff “asserts a right under an independent federal statute, not the CBA, and

we need not interpret the CBA to resolve this case”).

Other courts in this District have reached the same conclusion in cases against Amtrak

involving the assertion of rights under federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Klotzbach-Piper v.

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 18-cv-1702,

, at *6 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2021)

(finding that plaintiff’s claims were not precluded by RLA where suit was based on “federal

antidiscrimination laws that confer on her rights ‘independent of’ any collective bargaining

agreement” (citation omitted)); Hamilton v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 19-cv-01986,

, at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 18, 2020) (“The [Family and Medical Leave Act] claims that

[the plaintiff] asserts here arise independent of the CBA.”); Said v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,

(D.D.C. 2019) (holding that plaintiff’s claims sought to enforce “the right

not to be discriminated against by an employer as prescribed by federal and state laws” and

therefore were “not preempted or precluded by virtue of the nature of the right asserted”). Amtrak

makes little effort to distinguish these cases.

Amtrak argues that McDade’s claim must go through the RLA’s arbitral process for minor

disputes because, according to Amtrak, it implicates the question whether allowing remote work

as an accommodation would violate the CBA. ECF No. 16-1 at 8–10. Because Amtrak has raised

5 this potential defense, it argues, McDade’s claim is now “inextricably intertwined” with the CBA

and becomes a minor dispute.

This is not persuasive. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion

that the RLA precludes a claim whenever a defendant simply argues its actions were “arguably

justified” by the terms of a CBA. Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 265–66. Amtrak cannot trigger

preclusion “merely by asserting certain CBA-based defenses to what is essentially a non-CBA-

based claim . . . or by arguing that the action challenged by the plaintiff is ‘arguably justified’ by

the terms of a CBA.” Hoffstead v. Ne. Ill. Reg’l Commuter R.R. Corp.,

(7th

Cir. 2025) (quoting Brown v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co.,

(7th Cir. 2001)). Courts have

accordingly concluded it “is not enough to point to sections of the CBA that may be relevant.”

Stouffer, 85 F.4th at 146; accord, e.g., Carlson,

(“Claims are not precluded just

‘because certain provisions of the CBA must be examined and weighed as a relevant but non-

dispositive factor in deciding a claim or a defense.’” (quoting Brown,

)). That is

precisely what Amtrak tries to do here. Its suggestion that the CBA might have prevented it from

accommodating McDade “boils down to asserting that its actions were permitted by the CBA,”

which is not sufficient to trigger RLA preclusion. Stouffer, 85 F.4th at 146.

Here, Amtrak attempts to invoke the CBA as a justification without even identifying any

provision of the CBA that precludes remote work. Given that Amtrak does not identify a provision

of the CBA precluding remote work, let alone a provision that precludes remote work as an

accommodation under federal disability law, McDade’s claim does not require the Court to resolve

any disputed interpretation of the CBA. See Hamilton,

, at *4 (explaining that

plaintiff’s claims “do not hinge on competing interpretations of a CBA provision”); cf. Odell v.

Kalitta Air, LLC,

(6th Cir. 2024) (holding that failure-to-accommodate claims

were precluded because they could not be resolved without interpreting the CBA). McDade’s

6 argument is that she was entitled to a reasonable accommodation under rights conferred by the

ADA; she does not rely on rights conferred by the CBA. See Carlson,

(explaining

that “RLA preclusion, properly applied, does nothing more than keep disputes actually arising

under a collective bargaining agreement out of court”). Indeed, McDade claims she had a right to

a reasonable accommodation notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the CBA. See Brown,

(explaining that plaintiff’s claim would not have been precluded if “the parties did

not dispute the interpretation of the relevant CBA provisions (and [the plaintiff] had merely argued

that he was entitled to a certain reasonable accommodation under the ADA notwithstanding

anything to the contrary in the CBA)” (emphasis omitted)). Because that is the case, McDade’s

claim is not precluded by the RLA. 2

B. A Jury Must Resolve The Genuine Disputes Of Material Fact As To Whether Amtrak Failed To Accommodate McDade

To prevail on her failure-to-accommodate claim, McDade must show that (1) she was a

qualified individual with a disability; (2) Amtrak had notice of her disability; and (3) Amtrak

denied her request for a reasonable accommodation. Ward v. McDonald,

(D.C.

Cir. 2014). The requested accommodation “must be related to the limitation that rendered the

person disabled.” Hill v. Assocs. for Renewal in Educ., Inc.,

(D.C. Cir. 2018)

(citation omitted). If McDade shows that the accommodation “seems reasonable on its face, i.e.,

ordinarily or in the run of cases,” then Amtrak “must show special (typically case-specific)

2 Amtrak also suggests that accommodating McDade could have been unlawful “direct dealing” with a union member. ECF No. 16-1 at 10–11. But this is just another way of arguing that Amtrak’s decision not to accommodate McDade was “arguably justified” by the CBA, and that is insufficient to trigger RLA preclusion of a claim based on federal antidiscrimination law. See, e.g., Stouffer, 85 F.4th at 146 (“[A] claim is not barred simply because ‘the action challenged by the plaintiff is “arguably justified” by the terms of the CBA.’” (citation omitted)); Carlson,

(explaining that courts must “tak[e] care not to interpret the RLA as excluding a class of employees from statutory protections against employment discrimination and retaliation”).

7 circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the particular circumstances.”

at 237–38

(quoting US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,

, 401–02 (2002)).

Amtrak does not dispute the first two elements. ECF No. 16-1 at 13. Amtrak does not

dispute McDade is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA because she has a genetic

condition that can be triggered by environmental toxins and that causes her to experience brain

fog, muscle aches, and joint pain. ECF No. 18-1 ¶¶ 73–75. And Amtrak does not dispute it was on

notice of McDade’s disability, which is clear from her accommodation request and supporting

medical documentation, as well as the review by Amtrak’s ADA panel. See, e.g., ECF No. 17-1

¶¶ 24–27.

Amtrak focuses on only the third element, arguing that it did not deny McDade a reasonable

accommodation by refusing remote work. ECF No. 16-1 at 13. But a jury could easily conclude

that McDade’s request to work remotely to accommodate her condition was reasonable on its face.

The record shows McDade had already worked remotely for an extended period, and Amtrak does

not suggest she was unable to perform her duties with that accommodation. See ECF No. 17-1

¶¶ 23, 32, 37; see also Norden v. Samper,

(D.D.C. 2007) (explaining that

“accommodations are reasonable if they allow the employee to perform the essential functions of

the job without imposing undue hardship on the employer”). For similar reasons, a jury could

conclude that any undue hardship defense would fail based on the typical factors: “(1) the nature

and cost of the accommodation; (2) the effect on expenses and resources; (3) the overall size of

the business . . . ; and (4) the type of operation.” Ward v. District of Columbia,

(D.D.C. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

(10)(B)).

McDade had done her job remotely in the past, and Amtrak does not point to any evidence to infer,

8 let alone eliminate any dispute of fact as to whether, continuing the accommodation would have

posed an undue hardship on these grounds.

Amtrak argues that it is entitled to judgment on McDade’s ADA claim now for two reasons.

First, it says remote work was an unreasonable accommodation because the union had filed a

grievance when Amtrak permitted some employees, including those in McDade’s position, to work

remotely. ECF No. 16-1 at 14. Amtrak contends that it would not have been reasonable to create

a remote work position for McDade outside the process for negotiating such positions under the

CBA.

But a jury could conclude otherwise. As described above, Amtrak has not pointed to any

CBA provision that prevented remote work, let alone allowing it as an accommodation. McDade

has introduced facts showing that Amtrak’s current understanding is inconsistent with its prior

conduct, as Amtrak allowed McDade to work remotely as an accommodation for an extended

period, including well after the union had raised its concerns about remote work under the CBA.

ECF No. 17-1 ¶¶ 33, 37. And the particular fact Amtrak relies on—the union’s position regarding

remote work as an accommodation—is in genuine dispute. McDade points to evidence that the

union did not have any opposition to remote work as an accommodation. See ECF No. 17-11 at 2

(stating that “based on the rules cited in [McDade’s] denial letter, . . . we did not see a violation of

the CBA”); ECF No. 17-12 at 2 (stating that “[t]he Organization would never stand in the way of

an approved ADA accommodation between a member and the company”). A reasonable jury

therefore could discredit Amtrak’s explanation and find that continuing its remote work

accommodation was not an undue hardship. 3

3 McDade contends that an accommodation poses an undue hardship only if it would impair the seniority rights of other employees, while Amtrak maintains that courts have found accommodations unreasonable even where seniority provisions were not implicated. ECF No. 17 at 14; ECF No. 18 at 10–11. Regardless, a jury could conclude that McDade’s proposed

9 Second, Amtrak argues McDade failed to consider other reasonable accommodations—

including installation of plexiglass or a job transfer—and insisted that remote work was the only

solution. ECF No. 16-1 at 14–16; ECF No. 18 at 15–17. To be sure, “[a]n employer is not required

to provide an employee that accommodation he requests or prefers, the employer need only provide

some reasonable accommodation.” Congress v. Gruenberg,

, 221 (D.D.C.

2022) (quoting Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr.,

(D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)). But that

simply raises the question whether the other proposed accommodations are reasonable. And

“[d]eciding the reasonableness of a given accommodation not uncommonly involves context-

based decisions ill-suited for summary judgment.” Ali v. Regan,

(D.C. Cir.

2024). While there are some cases in which “the undisputed evidence establishes that a proffered

accommodation is so plainly effective as to permit summary judgment,” this “fact-specific

question” often “must be resolved by a factfinder.”

(internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). That is the case here. As to plexiglass as an alternative accommodation,

McDade’s doctor testified this could have been an alternative if it went “all the way to the ceiling,”

essentially “creating a room” for McDade. ECF No. 16-8 at 60–61. But McDade points to evidence

indicating that Amtrak did not actually propose such an accommodation; a human resources

official asked only whether plexiglass around her desk would be effective. ECF No. 16-28 at 2. As

to the possibility of a job transfer as an accommodation, McDade points to evidence that a transfer

would not have come with the same seniority and benefits she enjoyed. ECF No. 17-4 at 53

(McDade testifying that while reassignment was mentioned, “it was not said to me, you will be

able to work from home, you will be able to retain your seniority, you will be able to retain your

accommodation was reasonable and did not present an undue hardship for the reasons already discussed.

10 same pay”). And it is insufficient for Amtrak to argue that McDade should have found a new job,

if she could have continued in her position with an accommodation. See Wirtes v. City of Newport

News,

, 242–43 (4th Cir. 2021) (explaining that “reassignment is strongly disfavored

when an employee can still do their current job with the assistance of a reasonable accommodation,

and that reassignment should therefore be held in reserve for unusual circumstances” (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Aka,

(“Congress saw

reassignment, as the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] does, as an option to be

considered only after other efforts at accommodation have failed.”).

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, Amtrak’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 16, is denied.

AMIR H. ALI United States District Judge

Date: September 22, 2025

11